二十世纪西方文论选读

Selective Readings in 20th Century Western Critical Theory

张中载 王逢振 赵国新 编

外语教学与研究出版社
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前　言

《二十世纪西方文论选读》是《西方古典文论选读》(外研社 2000)的续篇。

早在《西方古典文论选读》付梓前，我们就已策划《二十世纪西方文论选读》的编写。当时想：如果能让这两本书同时问世，最好。因为，从教学考虑，学了"古典的"，还需要学现、当代的，总不能"厚古薄今"。又何况20世纪是西方文论最活跃、最发达、流派最多的时期。

《西方古典文论选读》在一些高校使用后，许多师生纷纷询问编者和出版社：何时出版《二十世纪西方文论选读》？催之甚急。这促使我们决定把其他的写作任务放下，立即投入这本书的编写。

这两部书若能同时出版，教学时就可以在同一学年的两个学期中将上下约两千五百年的西方文论尽收眼底。可惜当时拟参与编写《二十世纪西方文论选读》的三人中有两人因故暂不能参与。这样，一搁就是两年。

2001年6月下旬，欣悉"教育部办公厅关于2000—2001年度'研究生教学用书'审定结果的通知"已将本书编者之一张中载教授所编的《西方古典文论选读》选入"研究生教学用书"。这一喜讯促使我们加快《二十世纪西方文论选读》的编写工作，以尽早满足全国高校的教学需要。

从20世纪80年代起，我国高校英语系和中文系相继开设了"西方古典文论"和"20世纪西方文论"这两门课程，讲授西方自柏拉图以降各时期的批评理论。这方面的教材、著作和译著也纷纷问世。

但是，不少高校的英语系却苦于缺乏教材。国内书店里能买到的多是中文版，不适合作英语系教学用书。若从国外进口，则价格昂贵，且需外汇。教材的匮乏让不少英语系教师深感"巧妇难为无米之炊"。

现在，我国不少高校的英语系已经把"西方古典文论"和"20世纪西方文论"列为文学专业的必修课。实践证明，这样做是正确的。因为学生从这两门课中学到的不仅是批评理论(文论)，从中学到的是有关西方历史、哲学、美学、人类学、政治学、心理学、社会学、思想史等广泛的知识。

当然,最直接的收益是用学到的文论解读、欣赏、评论西方文学作品。学生反映,学了文论后,视野开阔了,在讨论或书面评论外国文学作品时有得心应手的良好感觉。以 E. M. 福斯特的小说《印度之行》为例:在评论这部小说时,学生能用马克思主义、后殖民主义、新历史主义、文化研究、女性主义等多种批评方法,对其进行剖析。

20 世纪是一个批评理论世纪。在这个世纪,文学批评已经彻底摆脱了"文学作品的寄生虫"的地位,与文学创作平起平坐,并驾齐驱。法国当代著名文学批评家让一伊卡·塔迪埃在《二十世纪的文学批评》一书中说:"在 20 世纪,文学批评首次试图与作为其分析对象的文学作品平分秋色。"

西方文论有名地难懂。而 20 世纪的有些西方文论更是出奇地难懂。

我国文论强调人的情感和个人经历,关注文采、文体和审美精神,即便是外国人读,也不觉其难。而西方文论则重理论和理性,轻感悟。因为强调逻辑、推理、阐述、论证以及论证的依据,就比较抽象晦涩。西方的大学生、研究生读西方文论也常常叫苦不迭,我们东方人读西方文论有语言和文化的差异,加之抽象晦涩,读起来艰苦是可想而知的。

要解决我国学生读西方文论之难,是编写本书的另一目的。

为此,我们从以下几点入手:

一、精选材料,压缩篇幅。从每一家重要理论流派中选名家名篇;过长的名篇只选其精华,略去可读可不读的段落,使学生掌握某一篇文论的主要论点。

二、简要介绍 20 世纪西方文论的主要理论流派,对于一些入选的文章提供导读性的简介,以利学生读懂原文。

三、注释难点。

每一章中所列的参考书目,既是编写过程中参阅的主要文献,也是深入研究西方文论的读者所必读的。

本书的对象是大学本科生和研究生,特别是攻读文学专业且掌握了英语的学生。尚未完全掌握英语的读者,也同样可以以本书的中文部分为起点,学到 20 世纪西方批评理论的概貌和基本知识。

二次大战后的西方文论,正以新的研究方法和观念改变着文学研究和批评的传统范式。但是,并非所有流行的西方文论都能为我所用。它们的价值和存活期也还需要时间来检验。因此,青年学生在学习西方文论时不可没有清醒的借鉴意识和批判意识,切莫以为从西方输入的"洋

货”均能为我所用。

书中选入的20世纪西方文论是否选得好，选得恰当，评价是否正确、合适，还请专家和读者多多指正。

本书编写和注释分工如下：

· 张中载：前言，原型批评，新历史主义，全书总审校。

· 王逢振：导言，新批评，女权主义，后结构主义，后现代主义。

· 赵国新：俄国形式主义、结构主义，精神分析批评、接受美学与读者反应理论，西方马克思主义的文学理论，后殖民主义。

· 王逢振与赵国新：文化研究。

张中载

导　　言

所谓导言,似乎已经变成了一个普遍的现象。几乎每一部作品的开头,都有一篇或作者、或编者、或请别人写的导言。其目的仿佛是为全书提供某种阅读指导。但谁能完成这一任务呢?即使作者本人,也不过是说出自己的想法,至多算是一家之言。因为不同的读者在不同的时间和地点阅读同一部作品时,必然会形成自己不同的见解。导言之类的东西,或许提供指导,或许提供误导,或许只是批评的靶子。因此,当我的合作者把这一任务交给我时,我备感惶恐。然而我又不想违背这一不成文的常规。因此下面所写的只能说是我个人的看法。

一

20世纪是个辉煌的时代,同时也是个苦难的时代。科学技术的迅速发展,拓展了人们对物质世界认识的深度和广度:从微观方面,已经看到了电子排列的方式,揭开了人类遗传基因的密码;从宏观方面,已经进行太空之旅,就不断扩大的、在"大爆炸"中产生的宇宙现象增添了类星体、脉冲星、放射星系和黑洞等概念。这期间,旧观念的修正,新意识的建立,从探测宇宙奥秘到物质生产分配,种种壮丽的想像都增加了实现的可能。但另一方面,20世纪经历了极其残酷的两次世界大战,战后痛苦的余波和不间断的地区战争,重建国家的艰辛和冷战的压抑,这些又是史无前例的苦难经历。人们耳闻目睹或亲身经历的种种现实,撞击着他们的心灵,让人产生惊奇、兴奋、痛苦、彷徨等复杂的心情。尤其在后工业社会和全球化的情况下,未来充满了不确定因素,既有模糊的憧憬,同时又感到一片混乱;既张着吞噬一切的大口,同时也展现着无限的未来。于是,人们感到正在出现某种新的与过去截然不同的东西。这种意识强烈而真诚,但又抽象而朦胧。因此便出现了各种不同的探索和认识新事物的方式,或者说方法和理论。

众所周知,在资本主义发展史上曾经有过三次技术革命。第一次技

术革命出现在18世纪。16世纪末以后发展起来的力学是这次革命的理论准备。这次革命使资本主义的工场手工业生产发展到机器生产。第二次技术革命开始于19世纪后半期。19世纪中期以后物理学的发展，如电磁学和热力学等，为它的产生奠定了理论基础。这次革命的结果使资本主义早期的机器生产发展到电气化生产。自20世纪50年代以来，西方发生了第三次科学技术革命。这次革命的标志是机器生产或电气化生产发展成为自动化的机器生产，而这种转变的关键是电子计算机的发展和应用。三次革命意味着生产力的巨大发展，因而也引起了社会的巨大变革。第一次革命产生了市场资本主义，第二次革命产生了垄断资本主义，第三次革命则产生了跨国资本主义。换句话说，第一次革命开始了现代化，第二次革命实现了现代化，第三次革命开始了后现代社会。因此20世纪的西方文论的主要语境是从现代到后现代的社会。正如恩格斯所说："每一时代的理论思维，从而我们时代的理论思维，都是一定历史的产物，在不同的时代具有非常不同的形式，并因而具有非常不同的内容。"①20世纪西方文论的发展，正是与西方社会的历史条件密切联系在一起的。大体上说，第二次世界大战后出现的西方文论受到三方面的影响：首先是方法论的影响——科学的理论和方法直接影响到人文学科的理论和方法；其次是社会的发展引起社会观念和意识形态的变化，因而引起了理论的发展和变化；第三是社会条件的变化引起人们生活方式和思维方式的变化，从而影响到人们的思想意识和文化实践，引起认知方式和理论方法的发展。这三种情况纵横交错，彼此间也产生进一步的影响。因此，对待西方文论，应该注意它们与社会发展的联系以及它们彼此之间的关系。强调关系和过程研究，可以说是各种西方文论共有的特点。

二

这里，也许我们应该对"文论"这个术语加以界定，因为它已经大大不同于通常所说的文学理论。其实"文论"一词是中国人在翻译中的一大发明。在西方学术界，并没有一个专门与之对应的词。我们所说的"文论"，在西方一般指"批评理论"、"理论"、"话语理论"以及现在广义上所说的文化理论。简单说，就是关于文字（包括各种符号）和文本（包括

① 马克思，恩格斯，《马克思恩格斯全集》，第三卷，人民出版社，1972年，第465页。

社会文本)的理论。这种理论的产生和应用与20世纪的"语言转向"密切相关。

从总体上看,过去的文学理论以语言的"表征模式"为基础,即语言模仿、再现或反映现实。也就是说,文学通过语言对现实的模仿和再现,能够反映现实的真实和本质。换言之,在语言之外,有一种先于人的、独立于人的意识的、先验的存在,文学反映的正是这种存在的真实和本质。然而,这种先于语言的真实和本质并不存在,或者说,在语言的表征和模仿发生之前它并不能自动地、直接地呈现在人的面前。因为,不经过语言,任何真实或本质都不能成立。说到底,所谓的客观真实只能是一种主观假设,因为人们的思维离不开语言,而人一生下来就进入了"语言的牢笼"——一种先于他而存在的语言。这种语言是一种固定意义的关系网,决定着他的存在的地位,决定着他与自然、社会、历史、他人和自我的关系,也决定着他的行为及其与其他人交往的方式。因此,人并不是自由地支配语言,而是被语言支配,语言并不是一种死的、随手拿来可用的工具。

根据这种语言观,20世纪的西方文论,尤其是后结构主义和与之相关的文论,普遍抛弃了语言的表征模式。语言不再是对外在现实的模仿,不再反映真实和本质。所谓的真实只是语言构成的一个幻影。所谓的意义只能产生于语言本身。意义是在语言运用过程中产生的,是语言符号排列组合的结果。于是,阅读和解释不再是"发现"真实和意义,而是"发明和创造"意义。这样,一切文本都不再有绝对的意义,失去了统一的核心,解释变成了一种自由的个人活动。

其实,这种转变也是一个认识论的问题。众所周知,自从柏拉图和亚里士多德以来,强调主观和强调客观的争论一直存在,而且将无休止地继续下去。因为主观主义和客观主义的争论,实质上是由不同视角和不同出发点引起的争论,永远不可能达成一致或此胜彼败。例如一个人手上有根刺,强调客观的人说,因为有刺,所以我觉得疼;而强调主观的则说,因为我感到疼,所以才发现有根刺。如果用于语言转向的问题,可以说:因为有客观存在,所以语言是客观现实的反映或模仿;但是,如果人们意识不到这种存在,则这存在等于虚无,而如果意识到这种存在,就必须通过语言,所以存在是靠语言构成的。这听起来像是诡辩,但却充满了辩证。

那么,20世纪为什么会出现这种语言转向呢?这同样应该从社会发展来考察。随着从现代进入后现代或者说计算机时代,整个社会发生了

巨大变化。计算机化的电子结构，巨大的商业网，无形的大系统，引起了可怕的新极权主义的前景："居统治地位的少数人，将制造一个统一的、包括一切的、超星际的、为自动化而设计的组织结构。人不是作为自治的人而积极地发挥作用，而是将变成一种被动的、无目的的、由机器控制的动物，他们的正当作用……要么被机器吞没，要么因丧失个性的集体组织的利益而受到严格的限制和控制。"①在这种情况下，作为个人，他们不知道向何处去。他们摇摆不定，犹豫不决，在意见方面混乱而踌躇，在行动方面分散而缺少连贯性。他们担心而又怀疑，但却不能集中他们担心和怀疑的目标。正是这样一种可怕的前景，使得以怀疑论哲学为基础的文论开始兴起，特别是后结构主义，在七八十年代达到了颠峰；同时，为了强调个人意识的作用、对抗大系统机构的垄断和控制，以人本主义思想为基础的理论如接受美学或读者反应批评，也在这一时期得到了承认和发展。

20 世纪文论发展的另一个非常重要的方面是"文化转向"。随着全球化的发展和知识商品化的出现，尤其是跨国公司的的发展和运营方式，已经使经济权力开始危及到国家的统治，至少关于投资的部分决定超出了国家控制的范围。正如有些人说过的，比尔·盖茨在决定世界事务方面，有时超过了比尔·克林顿的权力。记得 1996 年中美贸易谈判时，双方各提出过一份商品制裁名单，中方的名单中包括福特牌汽车，但福特汽车公司的老板声言，这种限制对他们并无妨碍，他们可以从加拿大或巴西的工厂向中国出口。这也从另一方面说明了跨国公司的力量。

此外，随着后工业社会（或计算机时代）的发展，知识的性质也发生了变化。知识的提供和应用，变成了生产和消费的关系。知识也商业化了。于是，知识生产力不仅构成一个国家发展的关键，同时也使它成为世界权力竞争的重要因素。国家之间很可能有一天会为争夺知识和控制信息而斗争，就像过去为控制领土、掠夺原材料或廉价劳动力而进行战争一样。这样，知识一方面为商业开辟了新的领域，另一方面也为政治战略带来了新的挑战。于是在西方出现了知识政治化的趋势，政府和各种机构竞相加强对文化的控制，结果在知识界激起了一股反垄断、反权威、反控制的浪潮，并由此激发文化研究，出现了从国家、民族、种族、性别、阶级等方面进行意识形态研究的理论。

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① 刘易斯·芒福德，机器的神话（1967 年），转引自丹尼尔·霍夫曼编《当代美国文学导论》，哈佛大学出版社，1979 年，第 7 页。

简单说，这种理论关心的是人类的社会实践、人类经验的生成和再现以及人类主体的构成。今天，文化研究和它的发展现状一样，是一个各种学科混合的领域，同理论本身一样难以界定。可以说文化研究和理论并行不悖：理论是文化的理论，文化研究是理论的实践；或者说文化研究是文化的实践，理论是关于文化实践的理论。当前我们所说的"文论"，似乎也应该从这种意义上来考虑，而不仅仅局限于关于文字语言或文本理论。

三

就文学研究而言，理论并不是什么新的现象。它过去一直存在，只是不那么集中、系统罢了。自 20 世纪 60 年代中期以来，围绕文学的理论话语引起了一次根本的变革。如果说现在理论看上去是新的东西，并不是因为对文学的理论阐述行为是新的东西，而是因为当代批评作品的数量和质量的变化。当代理论最重要的特点有二：一是它的异质性，即各种理论并不求取一致；二是对传统批评的基础和设想进行空前的批判。美国著名批评家乔纳森·卡勒归纳为四个特点：一、它们是跨学科的——话语的效果在其原学科之外；二、它们是分析和思辨的——力图找出我们称之为性别、语言、意义、著作、主体等诸多事物的内涵；三、它们对常识采取批判的态度——批判那些被自然而然地接受的观念；四、它们是内省性的——对思想进行考察，探索人们使事物产生意义的范畴，既包括文学实践也包括其他话语实践。①

文学研究一向是个多元化的学科。构成传统的各种实践，例如文学史、文学传记、道德—美学批评、新批评等，直到 20 世纪 60 年代，都一直在一种相当稳定的不平衡状态下共生共存，它们对作者、文学作品的性质以及批评的目的有着相同或相似的认识。批评家对某一作品是否纳入经典可以进行争论，但对所谓的"文学"本身的存在并不怀疑，对作者决定作品意义的看法也不怀疑，对批评依附于所研究的文学对象也不怀疑。而所有这一切，都受到当代理论话语的严厉质疑和重新评价。

当代的批评理论认为自己不仅已经成为独立的学科，而且已经成为文学研究不可或缺的日常工作。它拒绝接受依附于文学的边缘地位，也不承认是更接近哲学的一种外部关怀。它把自己置于批评事业的核心，

① 乔纳森·卡勒，《文学理论》，哈佛大学出版社，1997 年，第 15 页。

坚持认为一切批评行为都不能超越理论。正如许多理论家所指出的，研究文学所用的传统形式的批评，对文学名著的反应，不可能没有理论，也不会是纯学术的努力。所有形式的批评都依据某种理论，或某种混合的理论，不论它们是否意识到这一点。理论著作已经表明，在文学研究中，那些常常被视为"自然的"、"常识性的"方式，实际上靠的是一套理论指令。对批评家而言，这些指令已经融化在血液中，落实到行动上，不必在自己的实践中再加证实。

理论转化为文学研究日常工作之后，引起了一系列激烈的争论。有些批评家认为，理论深刻地隐含于文学研究的日常工作之中，隐含于对具体作品的分析之中；另一些批评家认为，理论不应该直接指向研究的对象，应该在抽象深奥的领域运作，脱离细读和对作品的直接研究这些标志传统特点的方式。大部分理论是抽象的，不直接为探讨文学文本提供一种方法，但对文学研究的方式具有重要的意义，这种意义不会因理论缺少直接的实用价值而被取消。文学批评学科基本上以与研究客体的直接联系为基础，但这是历史决定的，而不是必然的或自然的。对正统批评的部分抨击，涉及到研究文学的自然方式的确定。如果文学理论有时嘲讽它所抨击的传统，使它看上去像是单一的而不是多元的，那是因为它的抨击目标不是构成传统的那些批评实践的多样性，而是它的基础，它的一整套基本设想——传统的批评顽固地坚持这种基础或设想只能是"自然的"和"可以感觉的"。

传统批评的基础是一种认识论和本体论的确定性，认为作者、文本和读者之间的关系是确定的。每一个批评形式，都侧重于一个不同的方面。例如传记批评强调作者，历史或社会学的批评强调背景，新批评强调文本自身，道德－审美批评强调文本与现实之间的关系。然而，它们都接受广义的文学模仿论。就是说，对于生活和人类的生存状况，文学总是以这种或那种方式反映并提供所谓的"真实"。文学的任务是描写生活，以潜在的方式描写经验和情感。批评的工作是揭示这种描写的真实价值和意义。这里有一个悖论：这种描写包含在文学之中，但却需要批评活动把它揭示出来。

模仿论把语言作为一种透明的媒体，现实可以通过语言以美学的形式再现，并超越其文字的表述。这种语言观又与一种普遍的世界观相联系：人是世界的中心，认识是经验的产物。经验先于表达它的语言，语言只是表达它的工具。按照这种看法，文学是杰出个人的集体产物，他们能以语言表达人类普遍的、永恒的真理。换句话说，文学是少数精英的

行为。

当代的理论质疑和批判的正是这套基本的设想，并在批判实践中形成了多种不同的理论观点。通过它们的批判，围绕文学研究的传统共识以及支持它的意识形态现在已经分崩离析。例如，女性主义把文化政治引入到文学研究，读者反应理论把研究的中心从作者和文本的关系转向文本和读者的关系，新马克思主义强调文化介入并干预社会，后结构主义颠覆传统的形而上学认识，后殖民理论反对文化霸权，后现代主义推进多样性，等等。当前流行的文化研究，更是从多方面理解文化的作用和功能，尤其在当前世界中文化的作用和功能：在一个由各种不同的社会群体混合的世界中，在一个由国家权力、媒体工业和跨国公司构成的世界中，文化生产如何运作？个人和群体的文化身份如何构成？人们如何受到文化力量的影响和控制？在多大程度上受文化形式的支配？在多大程度上或以什么方式可以把文化形式用于其他目的？在多大程度上人们能够成为对自己的行为负责的主体？又在多大程度上人们的选择会受到他们无法控制的力量的限制？显然，对这些问题的回答远远超出了传统批评的范围，但无疑会大大推动整个文学研究的发展。

如前所说，新的理论的出现并不是空穴来风，而是有着它产生和发展的社会基础。近半个世纪以来，随着高新科技的发展和运用以及伴随而来的经济全球化，整个人类社会结构和国际关系发生了前所未有的变化，人们的思想意识、道德观念乃至思维方式也随之发生了巨大变化。面对新的情况，人们如何认识社会、如何应对不断变化的社会现实便成了思想界和知识界的重要任务。于是，有见识、有责任的知识分子对传统采取反思和批判的态度，从不同方面提出了新的见解和理论阐述，形成了多样理论同时存在、相互影响的繁荣局面。

实际上，正是各种新的理论思想的出现，才使文学研究拓展了自己的范围，出现了前所未有的新局面。三十多年来，新的解读经典作品的著作成倍增加，提高了人们的认识，活跃了人们的思想，大大增强了知识分子的自觉性和使命感。对于这种情况，我以为应该持欢迎的态度，参与的态度，而不是倒退到过去，固守已经被证明过于狭隘的传统批评，更不应采取抵制和反对的态度。当然，传统的批评也有它自身存在的理由。如果你愿意，你可以继续坚持。但不要采取压制别人、压制新型理论的态度。为什么不允许多样批评同时存在呢？为什么要搞“一言堂”呢？你可以坚持你的做法，可以用你的成果去说服别人，而不要指责别人的做法甚至限制别人的做法。记得1988年美国斯坦福大学曾发生一

场争论。那场关于西方文化概念及课程设置的争论，最终以多元文化的胜利而结束。所以我想，对待“西方文论”也应该采取“兼容并包”的态度。

四

20世纪90年代，西方人文学科中出现了一个重要现象。有的教授写关于香烟的书，有的现实主义专家谈系列谋杀，有些诗歌研究者写美术评论，还有一些文学教授从弥尔顿转向麦当娜，从莎士比亚转向肥皂剧，整个放弃了传统的文学研究。这一现象现在统称为文化研究。为什么会出现这种情况呢？应该说，这与理论的发展有着密切的关系。

但是，文学研究和文化研究之间是什么关系呢？如前所说，就其广义的概念而言，文化研究是理解文化的作用和功能，尤其在现代世界中文化的作用和功能。一般来说，文化研究包含文学研究，把文学作为一种特殊的文化实践来考察。但这种包含是什么意思呢？这里有许多有待论证的东西。是否因文化研究具有巨大的包容性和潜力，在文化研究中文学研究可以获得新的力量和洞察力？是否文化研究吞掉文学研究并破坏文学研究？

现代文化研究有两个根源。它首先产生于60年代法国的结构主义。结构主义把文化（包括文学）看做是一系列的实践，其规则或常规可以描述说明。法国文学理论家罗兰·巴特写过一部文化研究著作《神话》(1957)，主张通过从文学到时装和食品来研究文化实践，解读文化形象的含义，分析奇特的文化构成的社会功能。另一个根源是马克思主义文学理论，包括雷蒙·威廉斯的著作（如《文化与社会》），伯明翰当代文化研究中心的创建者理查德·霍加特的著作（如《识字的用途》），这些作品力求恢复和探讨流行的、工人阶级的文化，因为英国一向认为高雅文学才是文化，工人阶级的文化没有受到应有的重视，或者说在很大程度上已经消亡。这种恢复消失了的声音的计划，这种从下层写历史的计划，正好与马克思主义对文化的理论阐述相吻合。后者把大众文化（与流行文化相对）视为一种压迫性的意识形态形式，把读者定位于消费者，说明国家权力的运作。这两重文化分析之间的相互作用和影响——文化作为人的表达方式和文化作为强加于人的东西——对文化研究的发展至关重要。

在这种传统中，文化研究受到一种张力的驱使，一方面是恢复通俗

文化的愿望，把文化作为人民的表达方式、或者让边缘化群体发出应有的声音；另一方面把大众文化作为一种意识形态强加的东西，作为一种压迫性的意识形态的构成来研究。一方面，研究通俗文化的关键是联系普通人民生活中重要的东西，与唯美主义者和教授们所称的文化和生活相对；另一方面，有一种强大的推动力，力图说明人民如何受到文化力量的影响和控制。

由于这种张力，文化研究特别注意有争议的同一性或身份特征，注意构成身份的多重方式，也注意体验身份和传达身份的方式。因此，文化研究特别注意研究一些群体不稳定的文化和文化身份，这些群体包括少数民族、移民、妇女等等。他们难以与更大的、自身身处其中的那种文化认同。所以，文化本身便是一种不断变动的意识形态的构成方式。

文化研究与文学研究之间的关系是个复杂的问题。理论上，文化研究无所不包：莎士比亚和摇滚音乐或打击乐，高雅文化和低俗文化，过去的文化和现在的文化，等等。但实际上，由于意义的基础是差异，所以人们与某种其他事物相对照来进行文化研究。与什么相对照呢？由于文化研究最初从文学研究衍生出来，所以回答常常是"与传统上设想的文学研究相对照"。在文学研究里，主要任务是解释文学作品，把它们作为作者的成就，研究文学的主要理由是伟大的作品有特殊的价值。

但是，不论从传统上还是从其他意义上说，文学研究本身应该做些什么从来没有统一的标准。自从60年代的新理论出现之后，文学研究一直是个有争论的、也常常被争论的学科，在这个学科里，各种各样的项目——有论述文学作品的，也有论述非文学作品的——都取得了引人注目的成就。

总的来说，文学研究和文化研究之间不存在什么冲突。文化研究产生于把文学分析的技巧应用于其他文化物质的实践。它把文化制品作为文本来解读，而不是作为摆在那里的物体。反过来，当文学被视为一种特殊的文化实践并将其作品与其他话语方式联系起来考虑时，文学研究也会从中获得巨大的好处。总的说，由于文化研究坚持把文学作为一种与其他表意实践相同的表意实践来研究，坚持考察文学所具有的文化作用，所以文化研究可以强化文学研究，使它成为一种综合的、互为文本的现象。

关于文学研究和文化研究的关系，还可以从另外两个方面来考虑。一是所谓的"文学经典"——即通常在大学教授和研究的作品，或者说构成"文学遗产"的作品。二是分析文化客体适用的方法。

如果文学研究是文化研究的一部分，那么什么还会成为文学经典呢？如果肥皂剧代替了莎士比亚，是不是应该谴责文化研究？文化研究主张研究电影、电视和其他流行的文化形式，而不是世界文学经典，是不是文化研究会扼杀文学研究呢？其实，迄今为止，文化研究的发展一直伴随着文学经典的某种扩展。今天大学教授的文学包括妇女写的作品，也包括历史上被边缘化的其他群体的成员的作品。这些著作（例如亚裔美国文学、后殖民英语文学等）不论是作为对传统文学课的补充还是作为分开的传统来研究，它们都常常被视为经验的再现来研究，也就是作为对所说的那些人的文化的再现来研究（例如在美国，作为非裔美国人、亚裔美国人、土著美国人、拉美裔美国人和妇女文化的再现来研究）。但这些著作凸现了这样的问题：文学在多大程度上创造了公认为由它表达和再现的文化？是否文化是再现的结果而不是再现的源泉或原因？

广泛研究先前被忽视的著作引起了媒体的热烈争论：是否传统的文学标准已经让步？选择先前被忽视的著作，是因为它们的文学成就还是因为它们对文化的再现性？是否是政治正确性而非特殊的文学标准决定着对所研究作品的选择？事实上，"文学成就"从不决定所研究的内容。教师教学时，决不会选择自己认为最好的世界文学名著，而是选择一些代表某种东西的作品：也许是文学形式，也许是文学史的某个时期，如英国小说，伊丽莎白时期的文学，或现代美国诗歌等等。正是在这种表现某种东西的语境之内来选择最好的作品。如果你要讲华裔美国文学，你一定要选择华裔美国文学中最好的作品。现在已经发生变化的是人们选择作品的兴趣，即选择的作品既要表现一系列的文化经验又要表现一系列的文化形式。甚至可以说，对"文学成就"这个标准的运用，已经历史地被非文学的标准打破了。这些非文学的标准包括民族、国家、种族、性别、阶级等当前人们论述最多的一些问题，也包括"文学成就"这个概念如何在教育制度内发生作用的问题——这些都是文化研究的组成部分。

如果文化研究变成支配性的，它的实践者不再从文学研究出发来进行文化分析，是否对文学分析方法的运用就不再那么重要了呢？《文化研究》一书的编者卡尔·奈尔森在其前言里说：在文化研究中，虽然并不禁止文本的细读，但也不要求这种细读。然而只是不禁止细读，很难被文学评论家确认。由于脱离了长期以来支配文学研究的原则——即主要兴趣是个体作品的独特性和复杂性——所以文化研究可能很容易变成一种非量性研究的社会学，把作品作为其他某个事物的实例和征象，

而不是对作品本身感兴趣，或者说会屈从于其他的诱惑。

在种种诱惑当中，最重要的是“总体性”的诱惑——即认为存在一种社会的总体性，文化形式是这种总体性的表达或征象，因此对它们进行分析就是要把它们与它们从中产生的社会总体性联系起来。最近理论争论的问题是：是否存在一种社会的总体性，一种社会－政治结构？如果存在，文化产品和文化活动如何与它联系？文化研究倾向于直接联系，即把文化产品看成是一种潜在的社会政治结构的征象。

还有一个重要的问题是文学研究和文化研究的目的。进行文化研究的人常常希望关于当前文化的著作会对文化进行干预而不单单是描述。《文化研究》一书编者的结论是：文化研究者相信，文化研究的思想著作应该——也能够——形成某种差异，或改变旧的东西。实际上，关于文学和文化研究之间的争论，就有助于区分不同类型的文化客体的价值问题。例如，研究莎士比亚而不是肥皂剧的价值再不能认为是想当然的事情，而是需要论证的事情：不同类型的研究会获得什么样的成果？例如，是知识的训练还是道德的教育？这种论证并非易事。例如，德国集中营的司令官同时是文学、艺术和音乐鉴赏家的实例，就使企图要求特定类型的研究产生某种特定效果的问题变得非常复杂。而这些问题在研究中又必须直面相对。

其实，提出不同的问题就包含着对各种文化客体的不同的研究方法。不同方式的解释和分析——例如把文化客体解释为一种复杂的结构或把它们读作社会总体性的症状——也各有其长处和短处。虽然鉴赏的解释与文学研究相联系，征象的分析与文化研究相关，但两种方式对两种文化客体都同样适用。对非文学著作的细读并不意味着对客体作文学评价，这与对文学作品提出文化问题意味着它们只不过是某个时期的文献并无不同。

总之，文化研究与文学研究密切相关，二者并不对立。前者将文学研究的方法应用于其他文化客体，而后者作为一种特殊的文化实践，与其他话语方式相联系也会获得新的活力。

“腹有诗书气自华。”个人的气质、知识、涵养，可以表现出他的文化水平。同样，一个社会的文化水平如何，可以通过构成它的个人的知识能力来窥知。经济发展和物质条件的改善，并不意味着文化水平会同步提高。个人文化水平的提高，在很大程度上取决于阅读的质量和认识问题的能力。阅读质量的提高有赖于引进新的阅读方式。固守旧的阅读习惯，恐怕很难提高阅读的质量。因为阅读方式也是内容，是认知能力

的一个方面。那种抵制理论、强调回归传统的看法，实际上就是抵制新的阅读方式。而要引进新的阅读方式，提高认识问题的能力，首先要提高自己的理论修养。这就需要像经济建设那样，采取一种对外开放、吸收先进成果的态度。任何一种文化，若不与其他文化发生联系，就不可能形成自身的存在。正如你、我、他三者，如果没有你和他，我就不成为我。若不将自己置于与他人的关系之中，就不可能产生自我。同样，若不将一国文化置于与世界其他文化的关系之中，也就谈不上该国本身的民族文化。然而，只要与其他文化发生联系，影响才是双向性的。这种关系是一种张力关系，既互相排斥又互相吸引。一切文化的发展，都离不开与其他文化的联系；只有不断吸收外来的新鲜东西，才能不断激发自己的生机。正如近亲结婚一代不如一代，优种杂交产生新的优良品种，世界各国的文化也应该互相引进，互相借鉴。我们不必担心西方理论的种种缺陷和负面影响，因为我们固有的文化传统已经变成无意识的构成，这种内在化了的传统足以形成我们自己的文化身份，并在吸收、借鉴外国文化和理论中形成自己的立场。

关于全书的编选过程，张中载先生已经在前言里作了说明。这里所提供的只是个人对整个文论语境的某些看法。谬误之处在所难免，恳请读者不吝教正。

王逢振

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第一章　俄国形式主义

英国著名马克思主义批评家特里·伊格尔顿曾经指出,20 世纪西方文论发端于俄国形式主义。虽然存在的时间极为短暂,前后不过 15 年左右的光景,俄国形式主义的影响却十分深远,从布拉格学派、英美新批评到法国的结构主义都带有它的痕迹。自诞生之日起,俄国形式主义内部就有两个不同的派别:建立于 1915 年的莫斯科语言小组,以罗曼·雅各布逊为首,成立于 1916 年的彼得堡诗歌语言研究会,以维克多·什克洛夫斯基为首,主要成员还有鲍里斯·艾亨鲍姆和尤里·特尼亚诺夫等人。这两个派别研究文学的视角有所不同:前者认定诗歌是具有审美功能的语言,很注重从韵律入手研究诗歌,后者认为诗歌的主旨不仅仅在于呈现语言材料;前者认为各种艺术形式的发展有社会学基础,后者坚持艺术形式具有完全自主性。即便在每一个流派内部,不同成员之间也是歧见纷出。在形式主义的不同发展阶段,主要观点也经历过变化,因此并不存在一个整齐划一的形式主义流派。俄国形式主义这个名称只是一个很笼统的提法,暗指在这些形式主义者手里,文学批评的对象发生了改变,从作品表现的内容(如社会现实、作家生平和作品的主导思想)转向文学形式(技巧)本身。它批判的对象是当时批评界较为盛行的传统文学批评方法,如:根据作者生平阐释文本的传记式批评,将作品完全归结为社会思潮反映的社会学批评,以及借用文学阐述批评家本人哲学思想的哲学批评。传统文学批评主要探讨文学表现什么内容,为此而去考究作家生平、与作品有关的社会事件和作品孕育的主题思想,把文学的组织形式、文学作品何以成为文学的原因放在次要地位。俄国形式主义把批评的重心转向了文本的形式和结构,试图从科学角度准确描述作品叙述技巧的特征和功能,因为,按照他们的说法,文学研究的对象是文学性。用雅各布逊的话说:"文学科学的主题不是文学,而是文学性,也就是那些使某一作品称其为文学作品的东西。"对文学性的探讨成为俄国形式主义理论的核心。这样一来,传统文学批评中的模仿论和所宣

扬的教化功能遭到摈弃，文学内在规律得以突出强调，什克洛夫斯基有句名言总结得恰到好处."艺术永远是独立于生活的，它从不反映飘扬在城堡上空的旗帜的颜色"。

俄国形式主义者认为，文学性存在于作品对日常生活语言的特殊运用中，文学语言偏离和扭曲了日常生活语言。后者主要用于交流，而前者没有这种实用功能。什克洛夫斯基提出的陌生化手法就是特殊运用日常语言的表现。在他看来，人们对生活中许多熟悉的事物习以为常，浑然不觉其独特的性质，习惯使人们对这些事物(包括言语行为)的感受变成自动的。而艺术的任务就在于恢复人们对事物本来面目的感受，让人们带着一种新眼光去看熟悉的事物，从而产生一种新奇感，这就是陌生化技巧所产生的效果。受到陌生化概念的启发，布莱希特提出了"间离效果"(alien effects)观念。他认为，文学作品往往故作是对社会现实的真实再现，使读者或观众在读书或观剧的时候不自觉地将自己等同于作品中的人物，从而丧失了在清醒状态之下的批判能力，在政治上产生了倒退的后果。他让女演员扮演剧中的男性，就是为了将男性角色陌生化；提请观众注意这个角色的男性属性。

叙事理论是形式主义者主要探讨的领域，他们最大的兴趣就是发现构造故事的技巧，研究把故事中的各个事件连结起来的方法。他们严格区分出"故事"(story)和"情节"(plot)。亚里士多德把情节定义为"对事件的组织编排"。也就是说，情节是对组成故事的各个事件的艺术排列。在俄国形式主义看来，故事是根据发生时间的先后顺序和因果规律所罗列的系列事件，而情节打乱了事件发生的先后顺序和因果规律，严格地说，只有情节才具有文学性质，而故事只是有待于作者加工整理的原材料。什克洛夫斯基对《项狄传》的分析表明，这部奇书的情节不仅仅是对事件的编排，而且还是用来打断和拖延叙事的技巧。在叙述当中，作者时不时东拉西扯，玩弄文字游戏，故意删掉前言和题献，描写过于冗长，利用这些技巧提醒读者小说的独特形式。在这里，情节打破了读者通常对作品事件编排的期待，成为陌生化技巧，它改变了读者的习惯性感受，时刻让读者意识到，艺术作品是怎样构造或编排呈现在我们面前的现实的。"作为技巧的艺术"是俄国形式主义最重要的文献之一，这篇文章极力反对当时颇为盛行、主张艺术本质即形象思维的美学理论。在俄国，这一派理论以波捷勃尼亚和别林斯基为代表，主张由形象入手来研究作品。什克洛夫斯基认为，诗歌的主要特点不是形象，而是"对词语进行加工的技巧"，诗歌形象同其他技巧，如比较、重复、对称和夸张具有同等的

功能，都是用来提高人们对诗歌的直接感受，加深读者的印象。使用这些技巧的目的就在于消除人们业已习惯的自动感受方式，延长并加强新的感受方式，取得陌生化效果。什克洛夫斯基主要以托尔斯泰小说《霍斯托米尔》为例证，具体分析了陌生化技巧在延长和强化审美感受的重要作用。托尔斯泰不直呼事物的名称，而是刻意与描述对象保持一段距离，就好像他第一次看到这种事物。他透过马的眼睛观察世界，揭示出人类社会私有制的种种荒谬，而在日常生活中，人们却对这些荒谬现象见怪不怪，视为理所当然。这种陌生化的处置方法，比起从正面义正词严地批判私有制更能给读者以深刻的印象和警醒的认识，表现出作品的艺术吸引力和作者的匠心独具。

俄国形式主义的研究方法不是一成不变的，而是经历了不同的发展阶段。纵观它的演变历史，有人归纳出三种研究模式来代表它的三个发展阶段。机械论研究模式以什克洛夫斯基为代表人物，因其习惯于以机械为比喻说明艺术现象而得名，例如，"如果你想成为一名作家，你必须像钟表匠检查手表、司机检修汽车那样专心看书"，"在文学理论中，我注重研究文学的内部规律。以工业为例打一个比方，我关心的既不是世界棉花市场的行情，也不是托拉斯的政策，而是棉纱的支数和纺织方法。"什克洛夫斯基把文学批评视为技术工人的检修工作，把文学文本当作各种技巧的总和。机械形式主义致力于研究文学作品的起源，试图去解释文学作品是怎样衍生于非文学现象的，某一文学题材而不是具体作品得以产生的基本技巧和支配规律。什克洛夫斯基和艾亨鲍姆分别以《堂吉诃德》和《外套》为案例，勾画出长篇小说和短篇小说的创作原则。由于机械形式主义解释艺术事实时脱离社会和历史事实，所以它的实践者往往忽略了作品得以产生的社会文化状况。在有机论阶段，文学作品不再被当作技术的总和，而被视为由各种功能要素构成的统一体，作者之所以使用某些技巧，就是因为它们在作品内部发挥了功能，用它的代表人物日尔蒙斯基的话说，"诗学在研究一部文学作品的时候，把它当作一个由一致的艺术目的所决定的美学系统。也就是说，当作一个技巧系统。"这种文学有机论将文学作品当作一个功能系统，系统中的每一个因素根据自身的功能占有特定的位置，例如，日尔蒙斯基把韵脚看成是"在一首韵律诗中履行组织功能的重复的音节"。在日常生活与文学之间关系方面，有机论形式主义不像机械论形式主义那样将二者截然分开，它承认文学作品的内部组织受非文学因素的影响，但是与文学内在规律相比，这些影响是偶然和次要的。以特尼亚诺夫为代表的系统论形式主义深

受索绪尔语言学理论的影响，索绪尔在《普通语言学教程》中指出，言语行为是人们所言说的语言的内在系统的具体化，这个内在系统被称为语言(langue)。与此相似，在特尼亚诺夫看来，各种文学现象的文学性质是由所谓的文学题材、流派和风格等规范决定的。文学作品与文学系统密不可分，一旦离开这个系统，文学作品就会失去它的文学属性。推而广之，特尼亚诺夫将全部文化视为一个复杂的"系统之系统"(system of systems)，文学和科学等为子系统。在这个大系统内部，非文学现象与文学之间相互作用。虽说与前两种研究模式相比，系统形式主义降低了文学自律性的地位，但是，它还是坚持认为，决定文学发展的主要还是文学系统的内部情况，非文学背景只起到次要作用。

俄国形式主义在上个世纪20年代末期达到高峰，从20年代中期开始，它遭受了马克思主义文学批评的有力挑战和批判，托洛茨基的《文学与革命》和米哈伊尔·巴赫金的《文学研究中的形式方法》是当时最具有洞察力的批评著作。随着政治形势的变化，苏联文艺政策发生改变，文艺领域的自由探索时期结束，社会主义现实主义在文艺界逐渐占据统治地位。什克洛夫斯基在1930年发表文章，宣告形式主义理论流派解体。此后，继续留在国内的主要成员转向没有政治风险的其他研究和创作领域，而雅可布森等其他成员则移居国外，帮助建立了布拉格学派。纳粹占领捷克后，雅可布森和布拉格学派的一些成员，如雷内·韦勒克移民美国，他们对新批评的形成和发展起到了重要的推动作用。

维克多·什克洛夫斯基：作为技巧的艺术

Art as Technique

Victor Shklovsky

"Art is thinking in images." This maxim, which even high school students parrot, is nevertheless the starting point for the erudite philologist who is beginning to put together some kind of systematic literary theory. The idea, originated in part by Potebnya[1], has spread. "Without imagery there is no art, and in particular no poetry," Potebnya writes. And elsewhere, "Poetry, as well as prose, is first and foremost a special way of thinking and knowing".

Poetry is a special way of thinking; it is, precisely, a way of thinking in images, a way which permits what is generally called "economy of mental effort", a way which makes for "a sensation of the relative ease of the process". Aesthetic feeling is the reaction to this economy. This is how the academician Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky[2] who undoubtedly read the works of Potebnya attentively, almost certainly understood and faithfully summarized the ideas of his teacher. Potebnya and his numerous disciples consider poetry a special kind of thinking—thinking by means of images; they feel that the purpose of imagery is to help channel various objects and activities into groups and to clarify the unknown by means of the known. Or, as Potebnya wrote:

> The relationship of the image to what is being clarified is that: (1) the image is the fixed predicate of that which undergoes change—the unchanging means of attracting what is perceived as changeable... (2) the image is far clearer and simpler than what it clarifies.

In other words:

> Since the purpose of imagery is to remind us, by approximation, of those meanings for which the image stands, and since, apart from this, imagery is unnecessary for thought, we must be more familiar with the image than with what it clarifies.

It would be instructive to try to apply this principle to Tyutchev's[3] comparison of summer lightning to deaf and dumb demons or to Gogol's comparison of the sky to the garment of God.

"Without imagery there is no art."—"Art is thinking in images." These maxims have led to far-fetched interpretations of individual works of art. Attempts have been made to evaluate even music, architecture, and lyric poetry as imagistic thought. After a quarter of a century of such attempts Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky finally had to assign lyric poetry, architecture, and music to a special category of imageless art

and to define them as lyric arts appealing directly to the emotions. And thus he admitted an enormous area of art which is not a mode of thought. A part of this area, lyric poetry (narrowly considered), is quite like the visual arts; it is also verbal. But, much more important, visual art passes quite imperceptibly into nonvisual art; yet our perceptions of both are similar.

Nevertheless, the definition "Art is thinking in images", which means (I omit the usual middle terms of the argument) that art is the making of symbols, has survived the downfall of the theory which supported it. It survives chiefly in the wake of Symbolism[4], especially among the theorists of the Symbolist movement.

Many still believe, then, that thinking in images—thinking in specific scenes of "roads and landscape" and "furrows and boundaries"[5]—is the chief characteristic of poetry. Consequently, they should have expected the history of "imagistic art", as they call it, to consist of a history of changes in imagery. But we find that images change little; from century to century, from nation to nation, from poet to poet, they flow on without changing. Images belong to no one; they are "the Lord's". The more you understand an age, the more convinced you become that the images a given poet used and which you thought his own were taken almost unchanged from another poet. The works of poets are classified or grouped according to the new techniques that poets discover and share, and according to their arrangement and development of the resources of language; poets are much more concerned with arranging images than with creating them. Images are given to poets; the ability to remember them is far more important than the ability to create them.

Imagistic thought does not, in any case, include all the aspects of art nor even all the aspects of verbal art. A change in imagery is not essential to the development of poetry. We know that frequently an expression is thought to be poetic, to be created for aesthetic pleasure, although actually it was created without such intent—e. g., Annensky's opinion that the Slavic languages are especially poetic and Andrey Bely's[6] ecstasy over the technique of placing adjectives after nouns, a technique used by eighteenth-century Russian poets. Bely joyfully

accepts the technique as something artistic, or more exactly, as intended, if we consider intention as art. Actually, this reversal of the usual adjective-noun order is a peculiarity of the language (which had been influenced by Church Slavonic). Thus a work may be (1) intended as prosaic and accepted as poetic, or (2) intended as poetic and accepted as prosaic. This suggests that the artistry attributed to a given work results from the way we perceive it. By "works of art", in the narrow sense, we mean works created by special techniques designed to make the works as obviously artistic as possible.

Potebnya's conclusion, which can be formulated "poetry equals imagery", gave rise to the whole theory that "imagery equals symbolism", that the image may serve as the invariable predicate of various subjects. (This conclusion, because it expressed ideas similar to the theories of the Symbolists, intrigued some of their leading representatives—Andrey Bely, Merezhkovsky[7] and his "eternal companions"-- and, in fact, formed the basis of the theory of Symbolism.) The conclusion stems partly from the fact that Potebnya did not distinguish between the language of poetry and the language of prose. Consequently, he ignored the fact that there are two aspects of imagery: imagery as a practical means of thinking, as a means of placing objects within categories; and imagery as poetic, as a means of reinforcing an impression. I shall clarify with an example. I want to attract the attention of a young child who is eating bread and butter and getting the butter on her fingers. I call, "Hey, butterfingers!" This is a figure of speech, a clearly prosaic trope. Now a different example. The child is playing with my glasses and drops them. I call, "Hey, butterfingers!" This figure of speech is a poetic trope. (In the first example, "butterfingers" is metonymic; in the second, metaphoric—but this is not what I want to stress.)

Poetic imagery is a means of creating the strongest possible impression. As a method it is, depending upon its purpose, neither more nor less effective than other poetic techniques; it is neither more nor less effective than ordinary or negative parallelism, comparison, repetition, balanced structure, hyperbole, the commonly accepted rhetorical

figures, and all those methods which emphasize the emotional effect of an expression (including words or even articulated sounds). But poetic imagery only externally resembles either the stock imagery of fables and ballads or thinking in images—e. g., the example in Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky's *Language and Art* in which a little girl calls a ball a little watermelon. Poetic imagery is but one of the devices of poetic language. Prose imagery is a means of abstraction: a little watermelon instead of a lampshade, or a little watermelon instead of a head, is only the abstraction of one of the object's characteristics, that of roundness. It is no different from saying that the head and the melon are both round. This is what is meant, but it has nothing to do with poetry.

...

If we start to examine the general laws of perception, we see that as perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic. Thus, for example, all of our habits retreat into the area of the unconsciously automatic; if one remembers the sensations of holding a pen or of speaking in a foreign language for the first time and compares that with his feeling at performing the action for the ten thousandth time, he will agree with us. Such habituation explains the principles by which, in ordinary speech, we leave phrases unfinished and words half expressed. In this process, ideally realized in algebra, things are replaced by symbols. Complete words are not expressed in rapid speech; their initial sounds are barely perceived. Alexander Pogodin[5] offers the example of a boy considering the sentence "The Swiss mountains are beautiful" in the form of a series of letters: *T*, *S*, *m*, *a*, *b*.

This characteristic of thought not only suggests the method of algebra, but even prompts the choice of symbols (letters, especially initial letters). By this "algebraic" method of thought we apprehend objects only as shapes with imprecise extensions; we do not see them in their entirety but rather recognize them by their main characteristics. We see the object as though it were enveloped in a sack. We know what it is by its configuration, but we see only its silhouette. The object, perceived thus in the manner of prose perception, fades and does not leave even a first impression; ultimately even the essence of what it was

is forgotten. Such perception explains why we fail to hear the prose word in its entirety (see Leo Jakubinsky's[9] article) and, hence, why (along with other slips of the tongue) we fail to pronounce it. The process of "algebrization", the overautomatization of an object, permits the greatest economy of perceptive effort. Either objects are assigned only one proper feature—a number, for example--or else they function as though by formula and do not even appear in cognition:

> I was cleaning a room and, meandering about, approached the divan and couldn't remember whether or not I had dusted it. Since these movements are habitual and unconscious, I could not remember and felt that it was impossible to remember—so that if I had dusted it and forgot --that is, had acted unconsciously, then it was the same as if I had not. If some conscious person had been watching, then the fact could be established. If, however, no one was looking, or looking on unconsciously, if the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been.[10]

And so life is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization devours works, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of war. "If the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been." And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known.[11] The technique of art is to make objects "unfamiliar", to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. *Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important.*[12]

The range of poetic (artistic) work extends from the sensory to the cognitive, from poetry to prose, from the concrete to the abstract: from Cervantes' Don Quixote—scholastic and poor nobleman, half consciously bearing his humiliation in the court of the duke—to the broad

but empty Don Quixote of Turgenev[13]; from Charlemagne to the name "king" [in Russian "Charles" and "king" obviously derive from the same root, *korol*]. The meaning of a work broadens to the extent that artfulness and artistry diminish; thus a fable symbolizes more than a poem, and a proverb more than a fable. Consequently, the least self-contradictory part of Potebnya's theory is his treatment of the fable, which, from his point of view, he investigated thoroughly. But since his theory did not provide for "expressive" works of art, he could not finish his book. As we know, *Notes on the Theory of Literature* was published in 1905, thirteen years after Potebnya's death. Potebnya himself completed only the section on the fable.

After we see an object several times, we begin to recognize it. The object is in front of us and we know about it, but we do not see it—hence we cannot say anything significant about it.[14] Art removes objects from the automatism of perception in several ways. Here I want to illustrate a way used repeatedly by Leo Tolstoy, that writer, who, for Merezhkovsky at least, seems to present things as if he himself saw them, saw them in their entirety, and did not alter them.

Tolstoy makes the familiar seem strange by not naming the familiar object. He describes an object as if he were seeing it for the first time, an event as if it were happening for the first time. In describing something he avoids the accepted names of its parts and instead names corresponding parts of other objects. For example, in *Shame* Tolstoy "defamiliarizes" the idea of flogging in this way: "to strip people who have broken the law, to hurl them to the floor, and to rap on their bottoms with switches", and, after a few lines, "to lash about on the naked buttocks". Then he remarks:

> Just why precisely this stupid, savage means of causing pain and not any other why not prick the shoulders or any part of the body with needles, squeeze the hands or the feet in a vise, or anything like that?

I apologize for this harsh example, but it is typical of Tolstoy's way of

pricking the conscience. The familiar act of flogging is made unfamiliar both by the description and by the proposal to change its form without changing its nature. Tolstoy uses this technique of "defamiliarization" constantly. The narrator of "Kholstomer", for example, is a horse, and it is the horse's point of view (rather than a person's) that makes the content of the story seem unfamiliar. Here is how the horse regards the institution of private property:[15]

> I understood well what they said about whipping and Christianity. But then I was absolutely in the dark. What's the meaning of "his own", "his colt"? From these phrases I saw that people thought there was some sort of connection between me and the stable. At that time I simply could not understand the connection. Only much later, when they separated me from the other horses, did I begin to understand. But even then I simply could not see what it meant when they called me "man's property". The words "my horse" referred to me, a living horse, and seemed as strange to me as the words "my land", "my air", "my water".
>
> But the words made a strong impression on me. I thought about them constantly, and only after the most diverse experiences with people did I understand, finally, what they meant. They meant this: In life people are guided by words, not by deeds. It's not so much that they love the possibility of doing or not doing something as it is the possibility of speaking with words, agreed on among themselves, about various topics. Such are the words "my" and "mine", which they apply to different things, creatures, objects, and even to land, people, and horses. They agree that only one may say "mine" about this, that, or the other thing. And the one who says "mine" about the greatest number of things is, according to the game which they've agreed to among themselves, the one they consider the most happy. I don't know the point of all this, but it's true. For a long time I tried to explain it to myself in terms of some kind of real gain, but I had to reject that explanation because it was wrong.

Many of those, for instance, who called me their own never rode on me—although others did. And so with those who fed me. Then again, the coachman, the veterinarians, and the outsiders in general treated me kindly, yet those who called me their own did not. In due time, having widened the scope of my observations, I satisfied myself that the notion "my", not only in relation to us horses, has no other basis than a narrow human instinct which is called a sense of or right to private property. A man says "this house is mine" and never lives in it; he only worries about its construction and upkeep. A merchant says "my shop", "my dry goods shop", for instance, and does not even wear clothes made from the better cloth he keeps in his own shop.

There are people who call a tract of land their own, but they never set eyes on it and never take a stroll on it. There are people who call others their own, yet never see them. And the whole relationship between them is that the so-called "owners" treat the others unjustly.

There are people who call women their own, or their "wives", but their women live with other men. And people strive not for the good in life, but for goods they can call their own.

I am now convinced that this is the essential difference between people and ourselves. And therefore, not even considering the other ways in which we are superior, but considering just this one virtue, we can bravely claim to stand higher than men on the ladder of living creatures. The actions of men, at least those with whom I have had dealings, are guided by *words*—ours, by deeds.

The horse is killed before the end of the story, but the manner of the narrative, its technique, does not change:

> Much later they put Serpukhovsky's body, which had experienced the world, which had eaten and drunk, into the ground. They could profitably send neither his hide, nor his flesh, nor his bones anywhere.

> But since his dead body, which had gone about in the world for twenty years, was a great burden to everyone, its burial was only a superfluous embarrassment for the people. For a long time no one had needed him; for a long time he had been a burden on all. But nevertheless, the dead who buried the dead found it necessary to dress this bloated body, which immediately began to rot, in a good uniform and good boots; to lay it in a good new coffin with new tassels at the four corners, then to place this new coffin in another of lead and ship it to Moscow; there to exhume ancient bones and at just that spot, to hide this putrefying body, swarming with maggots, in its new uniform and clean boots, and to cover it over completely with dirt.

Thus we see that at the end of the story Tolstoy continues to use the technique even though the motivation for it [the reason for its use] is gone.

In *War and Peace* Tolstoy uses the same technique in describing whole battles as if battles were something new. These descriptions are too long to quote; it would be necessary to extract a considerable part of the fourvolume novel. But Tolstoy uses the same method in describing the drawing room and the theater:

> The middle of the stage consisted of flat boards; by the sides stood painted pictures representing trees, and at the back a linen cloth was stretched down to the floor boards. Maidens in red bodices and white skirts sat on the middle of the stage. One, very fat, in a white silk dress, sat apart on a narrow bench to which a green pasteboard box was glued from behind. They were all singing something. When they had finished, the maiden in white approached the prompter's box. A man in silk with tight-fitting pants on his fat legs approached her with a plume and began to sing and spread his arms in dismay. The man in the tight pants finished his song alone; then the girl sang. After that both remained silent

as the music resounded; and the man, obviously waiting to begin singing his part with her again, began to run his fingers over the hand of the girl in the white dress. They finished their song together, and everyone in the theater began to clap and shout. But the men and women on stage, who represented lovers, started to bow, smiling and raising their hands.

In the second act there were pictures representing monuments and openings in the linen cloth representing the moonlight, and they raised lamp shades on a frame. As the musicians started to play the bass horn and counter-bass, a large number of people in black mantles poured onto the stage from right and left. The people, with something like daggers in their hands, started to wave their arms. Then still more people came running out and began to drag away the maiden who had been wearing a white dress but who now wore one of sky blue. They did not drag her off immediately, but sang with her for a long time before dragging her away. Three times they struck on something metallic behind the side scenes, and everyone got down on his knees and began to chant a prayer. Several times all of this activity was interrupted by enthusiastic shouts from the spectators.

The third act is described:

> ... But suddenly a storm blew up. Chromatic scales and chords of diminished sevenths were heard in the orchestra. Everyone ran about and again they dragged one of the bystanders behind the scenes as the curtain fell.

In the fourth act: "There was some sort of devil who sang, waving his hands, until the boards were moved out from under him and he dropped down."[16]

In *Resurrection* Tolstoy describes the city and the court in the same way; he uses a similar technique in "Kreutzer Sonata"[17] when he describes marriage—"Why, if people have an affinity of souls, must they

sleep together?" But he did not defamiliarize only those things he sneered at:

> Pierre stood up from his new comrades and made his way between the campfires to the other side of the road where, it seemed, the captive soldiers were held. He wanted to talk with them. The French sentry stopped him on the road and ordered him to return. Pierre did so, but not to the campfire, not to his comrades, but to an abandoned, unharnessed carriage. On the ground, near the wheel of the carriage, he sat cross-legged in the Turkish fashion, and lowered his head. He sat motionless for a long time, thinking. More than an hour passed. No one disturbed him. Suddenly he burst out laughing with his robust, good natured laugh—so loudly that the men near him looked around, surprised at his conspicuously strange laughter.
>
> "Ha, ha, ha," laughed Pierre. And he began to talk to himself. "The soldier didn't allow me to pass. They caught me, barred me. Me—me--my immortal soul. Ha, ha, ha," he laughed with tears starting in his eyes.
>
> Pierre glanced at the sky, into the depths of the departing, playing stars. "And all this is mine, all this is in me, and all this is I," thought Pierre. "And all this they caught and put in a planked enclosure." He smiled and went off to his comrades to lie down to sleep.

Anyone who knows Tolstoy can find several hundred such passages in his work. His method of seeing things out of their normal context is also apparent in his last works. Tolstoy described the dogmas and rituals he attacked as if they were unfamiliar, substituting everyday meanings for the customarily religious meanings of the words common in church ritual. Many persons were painfully wounded; they considered it blasphemy to present as strange and monstrous what they accepted as sacred. Their reaction was due chiefly to the technique through which Tolstoy perceived and reported his environment. And after turning to

what he had long avoided, Tolstoy found that his perceptions had unsettled his faith.

The technique of defamiliarization is not Tolstoy's alone. I cited Tolstoy because his work is generally known.

Now, having explained the nature of this technique, let us try to determine the approximate limits of its application. I personally feel that defamiliarization is found almost everywhere form is found. In other words, the difference between Potebnya's point of view and ours is this: An image is not a permanent referent for those mutable complexities of life which are revealed through it; its purpose is not to make us perceive meaning, but to create a special perception of the object—*it creates a "vision" of the object instead of serving as a means for knowing it.*

The purpose of imagery in erotic art can be studied even more accurately; an erotic object is usually presented as if it were seen for the first time. Gogol, in "Christmas Eve", provided the following example:

> Here he approached her more closely, coughed, smiled at her, touched her plump, bare arm with his fingers, and expressed himself in a way that showed hoth his cunning and his conceit.
>
> "And what is this you have, magnificent Solokha?" and having said this, he jumped back a little.
>
> "What? An arm, Osip Nikiforovich!" she answered.
>
> "Hmm, an arm! *He, he, he!*" said the secretary cordially, satisfied with his beginning. He wandered about the room.
>
> "And what is this you have, dearest Solokha?" he said in the same way, having approached her again and grasped her lightly by the neck, and in the very same way he jumped back.
>
> "As if you don't see, Osip Nikoforovich!" answered Solokha, "a neck, and on my neck a necklace."
>
> "Hmm! On the neck a necklace! *He, he, he!*" and the secretary again wandered about the room, rubbing his hands.
>
> "And what is this you have, incomparable Solokha?"... It is

not known to what the secretary would stretch his long fingers now.

And Knut Hamsum[18] has the following in *Hunger*: "Two white prodigies appeared from beneath her blouse."

Erotic subjects may also be presented figuratively with the obvious purpose of leading us away from their "recognition". Hence sexual organs are referred to in terms of lock and key or quilting tools or bow and arrow, or rings and marlinspikes, as in the legend of Stavyor, in which a married man does not recognize his wife, who is disguised as a warrior. She proposes a riddle:

"Remember, Stavyor, do you recall
How we little ones walked to and fro in the street?
You and I together sometimes played with a marlinspike[19]—
You had a silver marlinspike,
But I had a gilded ring?
I found myself at it just now and then,
But you fell in with it ever and always."
Says Stavyor, son of Godinovich,
"What! I didn't play with you at marlinspikes!"
Then Vasilisa Mikulichna: "So he says.
Do you remember, Stavyor, do you recall,
Now must you know, you and I together learned to read and write;
Mine was an ink-well of silver,
And yours a pen of gold?
But I just moistened it a little now and then,
And I just moistened it ever and always."

In a different version of the legend we find a key to the riddle:

Here the formidable envoy Vasilyushka
Raised her skirts to the very navel,

And then the young Stavyor, son of Godinovich,
Recognized her gilded ring...

Even erotic images not intended as riddles are defamiliarized ("boobies", "tarts", "piece", etc.). In popular imagery there is generally something equivalent to "trampling the grass" and "breaking the guelder-rose". The technique of defamiliarization is absolutely clear in the widespread image—a motif of erotic affectation—in which a bear and other wild beasts (or a devil, with a different reason for nonrecognition) do not recognize a man.

The lack of recognition in the following tale is quite typical:

> A peasant was plowing a field with a piebald mare. A bear approached him and asked, "Uncle, what's made this mare piebald for you?"
>
> "I did the piebalding myself."
>
> "But how?"
>
> "Let me, and I'll do the same for you."
>
> The bear agreed. The peasant tied his feet together with a rope, took the ploughshare from the two-wheeled plough, heated it on the fire, and applied it to his flanks. He made the bear piebald by scorching his fur down to the hide with the hot ploughshare. The man untied the bear, which went off and lay down under a tree.
>
> A magpie flew at the peasant to pick at the meat on his shirt. He caught her and broke one of her legs. The magpie flew off to perch in the same tree under which the bear was lying. Then, after the magpie, a horsefly landed on the mare, sat down, and began to bite. The peasant caught the fly, took a stick, shoved it up its rear, and let it go. The fly went to the tree where the bear and the magpie were. There all three sat.
>
> The peasant's wife came to bring his dinner to the field. The man and his wife finished their dinner in the fresh air, and he began to wrestle with her on the ground.

The bear saw this and said to the magpie and the fly, "Holy priests! The peasant wants to piebald someone again."

The magpie said, "No, he wants to break someone's legs."

The fly said, "No, he wants to shove a stick up someone's rump."

The similarity of technique here and in Tolstoy's "Kholstomer", is, I think, obvious.

Quite often in literature the sexual act itself is defamiliarized; for example, the Decameron refers to "scraping out a barrel", "catching nightingales", "gay wool-beating work" (the last is not developed in the plot). Defamillarization is often used in describing the sexual organs.

A whole series of plots is based on such a lack of recognition; for example, in Afanasyev's *Intimate Tales* the entire story of "The Shy Mistress" is based on the fact that an object is not called by its proper name—or, in other words, on a game of nonrecognition. So too in Onchukov's "Spotted Petticoats", tale no. 525, and also in "The Bear and the Hare" from *Intimate Tales*, in which the bear and the hare make a "wound".

Such constructions as "The Pestle and the Mortar", or "Old Nick and the Infernal Regions" (*Decameron*), are also examples of the technique of defamiliarization. And in my article on plot construction I write about defamiliarization in psychological parallelism. Here, then, I repeat that the perception of disharmony in a harmonious context is important in parallelism. The purpose of parallelism, like the general purpose of imagery, is to transfer the usual perception of an object into the sphere of a new perception—that is, to make a unique semantic modification.

In studying poetic speech in its phonetic and lexical structure as well as in its characteristic distribution of words and in the characteristic thought structures compounded from the words, we find everywhere the artistic trademark—that is, we find material obviously created to remove the automatism of perception; the author's purpose is to create

the vision which results from that deautomatized perception. A work is created "artistically" so that its perception is impeded and the greatest possible effect is produced through the slowness of the perception. As a result of this lingering, the object is perceived not in its extension in space, but, so to speak, in its continuity. Thus "poetic language" gives satisfaction. According to Aristotle, poetic language must appear strange and wonderful; and, in fact, it is often actually foreign: the Sumerian used by the Assyrians, the Latin of Europe during the Middle Ages, the Arabisms of the Persians, the Old Bulgarian of Russian literature, or the elevated, almost literary language of folk songs.

...

We should remember the consternation of Pushkin's contemporaries over the vulgarity of his expressions. He used the popular language as a special device for prolonging attention, just as his contemporaries generally used Russian words in their usually French speech (see Tolstoy's examples in *War and Peace*).

Just now a still more characteristic phenomenon is under way. Russian literary language, which was originally foreign to Russia, has so permeated the language of the people that it has blended with their conversation. On the other hand, literature has now begun to show a tendency towards the use of dialects (Remizov, Klyuyev, Essenin,[20] and others, so unequal in talent and so alike in language, are intentionally provincial) and of barbarisms (which gave rise to the Severyanin[21] group). And currently Maxim Gorky is changing his diction from the old literary language to the new literary colloquialism of Leskov[22]. Ordinary speech and literary language have thereby changed places (see the work of Vyacheslav Ivanov and many others). And finally, a strong tendency, led by Khlebnikov, to create a new and properly poetic language has emerged. In the light of these developments we can define poetry as *attenuated, tortuous* speech. Poetic speech is formed speech. Prose is ordinary speech—economical, easy, proper, the goddess of prose [*dea prosae*] is a goddess of the accurate, facile type, of the "direct" expression of a child. I shall discuss roughened form and retardation as the general law of art at greater length in an article on plot

construction.

...

注释：

1 波捷勃尼亚(Alexander Potebnya,1835—1891)：俄罗斯著名斯拉夫学、语文学学者。

2 奥夫夏尼科—库利克夫斯基(Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky,1835—1920)：著名俄罗斯学者，俄国马克思主义杂志早期撰稿人，文学趣味比较保守，对未来派持反对态度。

3 丘特切夫(Fryodor Tyutchev,1803—1873)：诗人。根据英译本注释，作者在此之所以提到他和果戈里，是因为他们对形象的大胆使用是无法用波捷勃尼亚的理论来解释的。什克洛夫斯基认为，作家常常将平常事物比作异常事物，而不是相反。

4 俄国象征主义：19 世纪末、20 世纪初俄国文学重要流派，在诗歌、小说、文学理论和戏剧等方面均有建树，大约以 1910 年为分界线。早期以巴尔蒙特、梅列日科夫斯基等为代表，后期以勃洛克和别雷等为代表。在思想渊源上，受尼采和国内宗教文学的影响。他们反对俄国文学发展中的功利主义和实用主义的倾向，力图恢复文学的审美性和宗教精神，有意识地使文学变得含混歧义。

5 根据英译本注释，作者在此引用了伊万诺夫的《犁沟与田界》，这是一部重要的象征主义理论著作。

6 别雷(Andrey Bely,1880 1934)：俄罗斯重要的象征主义作家。

7 梅列日科夫斯基(D. C. Merezhkovsky,1866—1941)：俄国象征主义作家和批评家。

8 波戈金(Alexander Pogodin,1872- 1947)：前苏联历史学家和语文学家。

9 雅库宾斯基(Leo Jakubinsky,1892—1945)：前苏联语言学家和文艺理论家。

10 根据英译本注解，这段话选自托尔斯泰的《日记》。

11 作者在此强调，艺术的目的在于让读者去感受作品所描述的内容，而不是仅仅了解这些内容。

12 这句话的大意是：艺术是体验作品所描述对象制作过程的一种方式，被描述对象本身并不重要。

13 屠格涅夫写过一篇论述《堂吉诃德》的哲学论文。

14 最早出现在《词语的复活》中。大意是：我们对于眼前许多事物已经习以为常，所以不再去看它们，这种局面需要陌生化技巧来打破。

15 以下这几段话选自“霍斯托米尔——一匹马的身世”，中文版见《外国中篇小说选》，湖南人民出版社，1982 年。托尔斯泰的陌生化技巧表现在，他不直呼事物的名称，而是刻意与描述对象保持一段距离，就好像第一次看到这类事物。他透过马的眼睛观察世界，揭示出人类社会私有制的种种荒谬，而在日常生活中人们却对这些荒谬现象见怪不怪，视为理所当然。

16 根据英译本注释，这段话以及下面几段话选自《战争与和平》，由本文英译者从俄

文译成英语。

17 "Kreutzer Sonata":《克莱采奏鸣曲》。

18 汉姆生(Knut Hamsum,1895—1952):挪威作家,著有自传体小说《饥饿》。

19 marlinspike:钉子游戏,俄罗斯民间游戏。

20 根据英译本注释,列米佐夫(Alexy Remizov,1877—1957,小说家和讽刺作家)、克留耶夫(Nicholas Klyuyev,1885—1937)和叶赛宁(Sergey Essenin,1895—1925,农民诗人)都以使用地道的方言俗语著称。

21 谢维里亚林(Igol Severyanin,1887—1941):俄国未来主义诗歌流派的创始人之一。

22 根据英译本注释,列斯克夫(Nicholas Leskov,1831--1895):为俄国一小说家。他对 skaz 这种文学形式的流行贡献颇多;skaz 的语言具有方言特征。

鲍里斯·艾亨鲍姆:"形式方法"理论

The Theory of the "Formal Method"

Boris Eichenbaum

The so-called formal method grew out of a struggle for a science of literature that would be both independent and factual; it is not the outgrowth of a particular methodology. The notion of a method has been so exaggerated that it now suggests too much. In principle the question for the Formalist[1] is not how to study literature, but what the subject matter of literary study actually is. We neither discuss methodology nor quarrel about it. We speak and may speak only about theoretical principles suggested to us not by this or that ready-made methodology, but by the examination of specific material in its specific context. The Formalists' works in literary theory and literary history show this clearly enough, but during the past ten years so many new questions and old misunderstandings have accumulated that I feel it advisahle to try to summarize some of our work—not as a dogmatic system but as a historical summation. I wish to show how the work of the Formalists began, how it evolved, and what it evolved into.

The evolutionary character of the development of the formal method is important to an understanding of its history; our opponents and

many of our followers overlook it. We are surrounded by eclectics and latecomers who would turn the formal method into some kind of inflexible formalistic system in order to provide themselves with a working vocabulary, a program, and a name. A program is a very handy thing for critics, but not at all characteristic of our method. Our scientific approach has had no such prefabricated program or doctrine, and has none. In our studies we value a theory only as a working hypothesis to help us discover and interpret facts; that is, we determine the validity of the facts and use them as the material of our research. We are not concerned with definitions, for which the latecomers thirst; nor do we build general theories, which so delight eclectics. We posit specific principles and adhere to them insofar as the material justifies them. If the material demands their refinements or change, we change or refine them. In this sense we are quite free from our own theories—as science must be free to the extent that theory and conviction are distinct. There is no ready-made science; science lives not by settling on truth, but by overcoming error.

This essay is not intended to argue our position. The initial period of scientific struggle and journalistic polemics is past. Such attacks as that in *The Press and the Revolution*[2] (with which I was honored) can be answered only by new scientific works. My chief purpose here is to show how the formal method, by gradually evolving and broadening its field of research, spread beyond the usual "methodological" limits and became a special science of literature, a specific ordering of facts. Within the limits of this science, the most diverse methods may develop, if only because we focus on the empirical study of the material. Such study was, essentially, the aim of the Formalists from the very beginning, and precisely that was the significance of our quarrel with the old traditions. The name *formal method*, bestowed upon the movement and now firmly attached to it, may be tentatively understood as a historical term; it should not be taken as an accurate description of our work. Neither *Formalism* as an aesthetic theory nor *methodology* as a finished scientific system characterizes us; we are characterized only by the attempt to create an independent science of literature which studies

specifically literary material. We ask only for recognition of the theoretical facts of literary art as such.

Representatives of the formal method were frequently reproached by various groups for their lack of clarity or for the inadequacy of their principles—for indifference to general questions of aesthetics, sociology, psychology, and so on. These reproofs, despite their varying merit, are alike in that they correctly grasp that the chief characteristic of the Formalists is indeed their deliberate isolation both from "aesthetics from above" and from all ready-made or self-styled general theories. This isolation (particularly from aesthetics) is more or less typical of all contemporary studies of art. Dismissing a whole group of general problems (problems of beauty, the aims of art, etc.), the contemporary study of art concentrates on the concrete problems of aesthetics [*Kunstwissenschaft*]. Without reference to socio-aesthetic premises, it raises questions about the idea of artistic form and its evolution. It thereby raises a series of more specific theoretical and historical questions.

...

The formal method has attracted general attention and become controversial not, of course, because of its distinctive methodology, but rather because of its characteristic attitude towards the understanding and the study of technique. The Formalists advocated principles which violated solidly entrenched traditional notions, notions which had appeared to be axiomatic not only in the study of literature, but in the study of art generally. Because they adhered to their principles so strictly, they narrowed the distance between particular problems of literary theory and general problems of aesthetics. The ideas and principles of the Formalists, for all their concreteness, were pointedly directed towards a general theory of aesthetics. Our creation of a radically unconventional poetics, therefore, implied more than a simple reassessment of particular problems; it had an impact on the study of art generally. It had its impact because of a series of historical developments, the most important of which were the crisis in philosophical aesthetics and the startling innovations in art (in Russia most abrupt and most

clearly defined in poetry). Aesthetics seemed barren and art deliberately denuded—in an entirely primitive condition. Hence, Formalism and Futurism seemed bound together by history.

But the general historical significance of the appearance of Formalism comprises a special theme; I must speak of something else here because I intend to show how the principles and problems of the formal method evolved and how the Formalists came to their present position.

Before the appearance of the Formalists, academic research, quite ignorant of theoretical problems, made use of antiquated aesthetic, psychological, and historical axioms and had so lost sight of its proper subject that its very existence as a science had become illusory. There was almost no struggle between the Formalists and the Academicians, not because the Formalists had broken in the door (there were no doors), but because we found an open passageway instead of a fortress. The theoretical heritage which Potebnya and Veselovsky[3] left to their disciples seemed to lie like dead capital—a treasure which they were afraid to touch, the brilliance of which they had allowed to fade. In fact, authority and influence had gradually passed from academic scholarship to the "scholarship" of the journals, to the work of the Symbolist critics and theoreticians. Actually, between 1907 and 1912 the books and essays of Vyacheslav Ivanov, Bryusov, Merezhkovsky,[4] Chukovsky, and others, were much more influential than the scholarly studies and dissertations of the university professors. This journalistic scholarship, with all its subjectivity and tendentiousness, was supported by the theoretical principles and slogans of the new artistic movements and their propagandists. Such books as Bely's *Simvolizm* (1910) naturally meant much more to the younger generation than the monographs on the history of literature which sprang up from no set of principles and which showed that the authors completely lacked both a scientific temperament and a scientific point of view.

The historical battle between the two generations [the Symbolists and the Formalists] · a battle which was fought over principles and was extraordinarily intense—was therefore resolved in the journals, and the battle line was drawn over Symbolist theory and Impressionistic

criticism rather than over any work being done by the Academicians. We entered the fight against the Symbolists in order to wrest poetics from their hands—to free it from its ties with their subjective philosophical and aesthetic theories and to direct it toward the scientific investigation of facts. We were raised on their works, and we saw their errors with the greatest clarity. At this time, the struggle became even more urgent because the Futurists (Khlebnikov, Kruchenykh, and Mayakovsky[5]), who were on the rise, opposed the Symbolist poetics and supported the Formalists.

The original group of Formalists was united by the idea of liberating poetic diction from the fetters of the intellectualism and moralism which more and more obsessed the Symbolists. The dissension among the Symbolist theoreticians (1910—1911) and the appearance of the Acmeists[6] prepared the way for our decisive rebellion. We knew that all compromises would have to be avoided, that history demanded of us a really revolutionary attitude—a categorical thesis, merciless irony, and bold rejections of whatever could not be reconciled with our position. We had to oppose the subjective aesthetic principles espoused by the Symbolists with an objective consideration of the facts. Hence our Formalist movement was characterized by a new passion for scientific positivism—a rejection of philosophical assumptions, of psychological and aesthetic interpretations, etc. Art, considered apart from philosophical aesthetics and ideological theories, dictated its own position on things. We had to turn to facts and, abandoning general systems and problems, to begin "in the middle", with the facts which art forced upon us. Art demanded that we approach it closely; science, that we deal with the specific.

The establishment of a specific and factual literary science was basic to the organization of the formal method. All of our efforts were directed toward disposing of the earlier position which, according to Alexander Veselovsky, made of literature an abandoned thing [a *res nullius*]. This is why the position of the Formalists could not be reconciled with other approaches and was so unacceptable to the eclectics. In rejecting these other approaches, the Formalists actually rejected and still

reject not the methods, but rather the irresponsible mixing of various disciplines and their problems. The basis of our position was and is that the object of literary science, as such, must be the study of those specifics which distinguish it from any other material. (The secondary, incidental features of such material, however, may reasonably and rightly be used in a subordinate way by other scientific disciplines.) Roman Jakobson formulated this view with perfect clarity:

> The object of the science of literature is not literature, but literariness—that is, that which makes a given work a work of literature. Until now literary historians have preferred to act like the policeman who, intending to arrest a certain person, would, at any opportunity, seize any and all persons who chanced into the apartment, as well as those who passed along the street. The literary historians used everything—anthropology, psychology, politics, philosophy. Instead of a science of literature, they created a conglomeration of homespun disciplines. They seemed to have forgotten that their essays strayed into related disciplines—the history of philosophy, the history of culture, of psychology, etc. — and that these could rightly use literary masterpieces only as defective, secondary documents.[7]

To apply and strengthen this principle of specificity and to avoid speculative aesthetics, we had to compare literary facts with other kinds of facts, extracting from a limitless number of important orders of fact that order which would pertain to literature and would distinguish it from the others by its function. This was the method Leo Jakubinsky followed in his essays in the first *Opoyaz*[8] collection, in which he worked out the contrast between poetic and practical language that served as the basic principle of the Formalists' work on key problems of poetics. As a result, the Formalists did not look, as literary students usually had, towards history, culture, sociology, psychology, or aesthetics, etc., but toward linguistics, a science bordering on poetics and sharing material with it, but approaching it from a different perspective

and with different problems. Linguistics, for its part, was also interested in the formal method in that what was discovered by comparing poetic and practical language could be studied as a purely linguistic problem, as part of the general phenomena of language. The relationship between linguistics and the formal method was somewhat analogous to that relation of mutual use and delimitation that exists, for example, between physics and chemistry. Against this background, the problems posed earlier by Potebnya and taken for granted by his followers were reviewed and reinterpreted.

...

The Formalists began their work with the question of the sounds of verse—at that time the most controversial and most basic question. Behind this particular question of poetics stood more general theses which had to be formulated. The distinction between systems of poetic and practical language, which defined the work of the Formalists from the very beginning, was bound to result in the formulation of a whole group of basic questions. The idea of poetry as "thought by means of images" and the resulting formula, poetry = imagery, clearly did not coincide with our observations and contradicted our tentative general principles. Rhythm, sound, syntax—all of these seemed secondary from such a point of view; they seemed uncharacteristic of poetry and necessarily extraneous to it. The Symbolists accepted Potebnya's general theory because it justified the supremacy of the image-symbol; yet they could not rid themselves of the notorious theory of the "harmony of form and content" even though it clearly contradicted their bent for formal experimentation and discredited it by making it seem mere aestheticism. The Formalists, when they abandoned Potebnya's point of view, also freed themselves from the traditional correlation of form and content and from the traditional idea of form as an envelope, a vessel into which one pours a liquid (the content). The facts of art demonstrate that art's uniqueness consists not in the parts which enter into it but in their original *use*. Thus the notion of form was changed; the new notion of form required no companion idea, no correlative.

Even before the formation of the *Opoyaz* in 1914, at the time of

the public performances of the Futurists, Shklovsky had published a monograph, *The Resurrection of the Word*, in which he took exception partly to the concepts set forth by Potebnya and partly to those of Veselovsky (the question of imagery was not then of major significance) to advance the principle of perceptible form as the specific sign of artistic awareness:

> We do not experience the commonplace, we do not see it; rather, We recognize it. We do not see the walls of our room; and it is very difficult for us to see errors in proofreading, especially if the material is written in a language we know well, because we cannot force ourselves to see, to read, and not to "recognize" the familiar word. If we have to define specifically "poetic" perception and artistic perception in general, then we suggest this definition: "Artistic" perception is that perception in which we experience form—perhaps not form alone, but certainly form.

Perception here is clearly not to be understood as a simple psychological concept (the perception peculiar to this or that person), but, since art does not exist outside of perception, as an element in art itself. The notion of *form* here acquires new meaning; it is no longer an envelope, but a complete thing, something concrete, dynamic, self-contained, and without a correlative of any kind. Here we made a decisive break with the Symbolist principle that some sort of content is to shine through the form. And we broke with aestheticism—the preference for certain elements of form consciously isolated from "content".

But these general acknowledgments that there are differences between poetic and practical language and that the specific quality of art is shown in its particular use of the material were not adequate when we tried to deal with specific works. We had to find more specific formulations of the principle of perceptible form so that they could make possible the analysis of form itself—the analysis of form understood as *content*. We had to show that the perception of form results from special artistic techniques which force the reader to experience the form.

Shklovsky's Art as Technique, presenting its own manifesto of the Formalist method, offered a perspective for the concrete analysis of form. Here was a really clear departure from Potebnya and Potebnyaism and, at the same time, from the theoretical principles of Symbolism. The essay began with objections to Potebnya's basic view of imagery and its relation to content. Shklovsky indicates, among other things, that images are almost always static:

> The more you understand an age, the more convinced you become that the images a given poet used and which you thought his own were taken almost unchanged from another poet. The works of poets are classified or grouped according to the new techniques they discover and share, and according to their arrangement and development of the resources of language; poets are much more concerned with arranging images than creating them. Images are given to poets; the ability to remember them is far more important than the ability to create them. Imagistic thought does not, in any case, include all aspects of art or even all aspects of verbal art. A change in imagery is not essential to the development of poetry.

He further pointed out the difference between poetic and nonpoetic images. The poetic image is defined as one of the devices of poetic language—as a device which, depending upon the problem, is as important as such other devices of poetic language as simple and negative parallelism, comparison, repetition, symmetry, hyperbole, etc., but no more important. Thus imagery becomes a part of a system of poetic devices and loses its theoretical dominance.

Shklovsky likewise repudiated the principle of artistic economy, a principle which had been strongly asserted in aesthetic theory, and opposed it with the device of defamiliarization and the notion of roughened form. That is, he saw art as increasing the difficulty and span of perception "because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged"; he saw art as a means of destroying the automatism of perception; the purpose of the image is not to present

the approximate meaning of its object to our understanding, but to create a special perception of the object--the creation of its vision, and not the recognition of its meaning. Hence the image is usually connected with the process of defamiliarization.

The break with Potebnya was formulated definitely in Shklovsky's essay *Potebnya*. He repeats once more that imagery—symbolization—does not constitute the specific difference between poetic and prosaic (practical) language:

> Poetic language is distinguished from practical language by the perception of its structure. The acoustical, articulatory, or semantic aspects of poetic language may be felt. Sometimes one feels the verbal structure, the arrangement of the words, rather than their texture. The poetic image is one of the ways, but only one of the ways, of creating a perceptible structure designed to be experienced within its very own fabric...The creation of a scientific poetics must begin inductively with a hypothesis built on an accumulation of evidence. That hypothesis is that poetic and prosaic languages exist, that the laws which distinguish them exist, and, finally, that these differences are to be analyzed.

These essays are to be read as the summation of the first phase of the Formalists' work. The main achievement of this period consisted in our establishment of a series of theoretical principles which provided working hypotheses for a further investigation of the data for the defeat of the current theories based on Potebnyaism. The chief strength of the Formalists, as these essays show, was neither the direction of their study of so-called forms nor the construction of a special method; their strength was founded securely on the fact that the specific features of the verbal arts had to be studied and that to do so it was first necessary to sort out the differing uses of poetic and practical language. Concerning form, the Formalists thought it important to change the meaning of this muddled term. It was important to destroy these traditional correlatives and so to enrich the idea of form with new significance. *The*

notion of technique, because it has to do directly with the distinguishing features of poetic and practical speech, *is much more significant in the long-range evolution of Formalism than is the notion of form.*

The preliminary stage of our theoretical work had passed. We had proposed general principles bearing directly upon factual material. We now had to move closer to the material and to make the problems themselves specific. At the center stood those questions of theoretical poetics that had previously been outlined only in general form. We had to move from questions about the sound of verse to a general theory of verse. The questions about the sound of verse, when originally posed, were meant only as illustrations of the difference between poetic and practical language. We had to move from questions about technique-in-general to the study of the specific devices of composition, to inquiry about plot, and so on. Our interest in opposing Veselovsky's general view and, specifically, in opposing his theory of plot, developed side by side with our interest in opposing Potebnya's.

At this time, the Formalists quite naturally used literary works only as material for supporting and testing their theoretical hypotheses; we had put aside questions of convention, literary evolution, etc. Now we felt it important to widen the scope of our study, to make a preliminary survey of the data, and to allow it to establish its own kind of laws. In this way we freed ourselves from the necessity of resorting to abstract premises and at the same time mastered the materials without losing ourselves in details.

Shklovsky, with his theory of plot and fiction, was especially important during this period. He demonstrated the presence of special devices of "plot construction" and their relation to general stylistic devices in such diverse materials as the *skaz*[9], Oriental tales, Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, Tolstoy's works, Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, and so on. I do not wish to go into details--those should be treated in specialized works and not in a general essay such as this on the Formalist method—but I do wish to cover those ideas in Shklovsky's treatment of plot which have a theoretical significance beyond any relationship they might have to particular problems of plots as such. Traces of those ideas can be

found in the most advanced pieces of Formalist criticism.

The first of Shklovsky's works on plot, *The Relation of Devices of Plot Construction to General Devices of Style*, raised a whole series of such ideas. In the first place, the proof that special devices of plot arrangement exist, a proof supported by the citation of great numbers of devices, changed the traditional notion of plot as a combination of a group of motifs and made plot a compositional rather than a thematic concept. Thus the very concept of plot was changed; *plot* was no longer synonymous with *story*.[10] Plot construction became the natural subject of Formalist study, since plot constitutes the specific peculiarity of narrative *art*. The idea of form had been enriched, and as it lost its former abstractness, it also lost its controversial meaning. Our idea of form had begun to coincide with our idea of literature as such, with the idea of the literary fact.

Furthermore, the analogies which we established between the devices of plot construction and the devices of style had theoretical significance, for the step-by-step structure usually found in the epic was found to be analogous to sound repetition, tautology, tautological parallelism, and so on. All illustrated a general principle of verbal art based on parceling out and impeding the action.

...

Here we clashed with Veselovsky, who in such cases usually avoided theory and resorted to historical-genetic hypotheses. For instance, he explained epic repetition as a mechanism for the original performance (as embryonic song). But an explanation of the genetics of such a phenomenon, even if true, does not clarify the phenomenon as a fact of literature. Veselovsky and other members of the ethnographic school used to explain the peculiar motifs and plots of the *skaz* by relating literature and custom; Shklovsky did not object to making the relationship but challenged it only as an explanation of the peculiarities of the *skaz*—he challenged it as an explanation of a specifically literary fact. The study of literary genetics can clarify only the origin of a device, nothing more; poetics must explain its literary function. The genetic point of view fails to consider the device as a self-determined use

of material; it does not consider how conventional materials are selected by an author, how conventional devices are transformed, or how they are made to play a structural role. The genetic point of view does not explain how a convention may disappear and its literary function remain. The literary function remains not as a simple [customary or social] experience but as a literary device retaining a significance over and beyond its connection with the convention. Characteristically, Veselovsky had contradicted himself by considering the adventures of the Greek romance as purely stylistic devices.

The Formalists naturally opposed Veselovsky's ethnographism because it ignored the special characteristic of the literary device and because it replaced the theoretical and evolutionary point of view with a genetic point of view.

Veselovsky saw syncretism as a phenomenon of primitive poetry, a result of custom, and he later was censured for this in B. Kazansky's *The Concept of Historical Poetics*. Kazansky repudiated the ethnographic point of view by affirming the presence of syncretic tendencies in the very nature of each art, a presence especially obvious in some periods. The Formalists naturally could not agree with Veselovsky when he touched upon general questions of literary evolution. If the clash with the Potebnyaists clarified basic principles of poetics, the clash with Veselovsky's general view and with that of his followers clarified the Formalist's views on literary evolution and, thereby, on the structure of literary history.

Shklovsky began to deal with the subject of literary evolution in the essay I cited previously, *The Relation of Devices of Plot Construction to General Devices of Style*. He had encountered Veselovsky's formula, a formula broadly based on the ethnographic principle that "the purpose of new form is to express new content", and he decided to advance a completely different point of view:

> The work of art arises from a background of other works and through association with them. The form of a work of art is defined by its relation to other works of art, to forms existing prior

to it... Not only parody, but also any kind of art is created parallel to and opposed to some kind of form. *The purpose of the new form is not to express new content, but to change an old form which has lost its aesthetic quality.*

Shklovsky supported this thesis with B[roder] Christiansen's[11] demonstration of "differentiated perceptions" or "perceptions of difference". He sees that the dynamism characteristic of art is based on this and is manifested in repeated violations of established rules. At the close of his essay, he quotes F[erdinand] Brunetière's[12] statements that "of all the influences active in the history of literature, the chief is the influence of *work on work*", and that "one should not, without good cause, increase the number of influences upon literature, under the assumption that literature is the expression of society, nor should one confuse the history of literature with the history of morals and manners. These are entirely different things".

Shklovsky's essay marked the changeover from our study of theoretical poetics to our study of the history of literature. Our original assumptions about form had been complicated by our observation of new features of evolutionary dynamics and their continuous variability. Our moving into the area of the history of literature was no simple expansion of our study; it resulted from the evolution of our concept of form. We found that we could not see the literary work in isolation, that we had to see its form against a background of other works rather than by itself. Thus the Formalists definitely went beyond "Formalism", if by *Formalism* one means (as some poorly informed critics usually did) some fabricated system which permitted us to be classified, some system which zealously adapted itself to logic-chopping, or some system which joyously welcomed any dogma. Such scholastic Formalism was neither historical nor essentially connected with the work of the *Opoyaz*. We were not responsible for it; on the contrary, we were irreconcilably its enemies on principle.

Later I shall return to the historical-literary work of the Formalists, but now I wish to conclude the survey of those theoretical principles

and problems contained in the early work of the *Opoyaz*. The Shklovsky essay I referred to above contains still another idea which figured prominently in the subsequent study of the novel—the idea of motivation.

...

The concept of motivation permitted the Formalists to approach literary works (in particular, novels and short stories) more closely and to observe the details of their structure, which Shklovsky did in two later works, *Plot Development* and *Sterne's* Tristram Shandy *and the Theory of the Novel*. In these works, he studied the relationship between technique and motivation in Cervantes' *Don Quixote* and Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*. He uses *Tristram Shandy* as material for the study of the structure of the short story and the novel apart from literary history, and he studies *Don Quixote* as an instance of the transition from collections of tales (like the *Decameron*) to the novel with a single hero whose travels justify or motivate its episodic structure. *Don Quixote* was chosen because the devices it contains and their motivation are not fully integrated into the entire context of the novel. Material is often simply inserted, not welded in; devices of plot construction and methods of using material to further the plot structure stand out sharply, whereas later structures tend "more and more to integrate the material tightly into the very body of the novel". While analyzing "how Don Quixote was made", Shklovsky also showed the instability of the hero and concluded that his type appeared "as the result of the business of constructing the novel". Thus the dominance of structure, of plot over material, was emphasized.

Neither a work fully motivated nor an art which deliberately does away with motivation and exposes the structure provides the most suitable material for the illumination of such theoretical problems. But the very existence of a work such as *Don Quixote*, with a deliberately exposed structure, confirms the relevance of these problems, confirms the fact that the problems need to be stated as problems, and confirms the fact that they are *significant* literary problems. Moreover, we were able to explain works of literature entirely in the light of these theoretical

problems and principles, as Shklovsky did with *Tristram Shandy*. Shklovsky not only used the book to illustrate our theoretical position, he gave it new significance and once more attracted attention to it. Studied against the background of an interest in the *structure* of the novel, Sterne became a contemporary; people spoke about him, people who previously had found in his novel only boring chatter or eccentricities, or who had prejudged it from the point of view of its notorious sentimentalism, a characteristic for which Sterne is as little to blame as Gogol for realism.

Shklovsky pointed out Sterne's deliberate laying bare of his methods of constructing *Tristram Shandy* and asserted that Sterne had exaggerated the structure of the novel. He had shown his awareness of form by his manner of violating it and by his manner of assembling the novel's contents. In his conclusion to the essay, Shklovsky formulated the difference between plot and story:

> The idea of plot is too often confused with the description of events—with what I propose provisionally to call the *story*. The story is, in fact, only material for plot formulation. The plot of *Eugeny Onegin* is, therefore, not the romance of the hero with Tatyana, but the fashioning of the subject of this story as produced by the introduction of interrupting digressions...
>
> The forms of art are explainable by the laws of art; they are not justified by their realism. Slowing the action of a novel is not accomplished by introducing rivals, for example, but by simply *transposing* parts. In so doing the artist makes us aware of the aesthetic laws which underlie both the transposition and the slowing down of the action.

My essay *How Gogol's* The Greatcoat *Was Made* also considers the structure of the novel, comparing the problem of plot with the problem of the *skaz*—the problem of structure based upon the narrator's manner of telling what had happened. I tried to show that Gogol's text "was made up of living speech patterns and vocalized

emotions", that words and sentences are selected and joined by Gogol as they are in the oral *skaz*, in which articulation, mimicry, sound gestures, and so on, play a special role. From this point of view I showed how the structure of *The Greatcoat* imparts a grotesque tone to the tale by replacing the usual humor of the *skaz* (with its anecdotes, puns, etc.) with sentimental-melodramatic declamation. I discussed, in this connection, the end of *The Greatcoat* as the apotheosis of the grotesque—not unlike the mute scene in *The Inspector General*[13]. The traditional line of argument about Gogol's romanticism and realism proved unnecessary and unilluminating.

Thus we began to make some progress with the problem of the study of prose. The line between the idea of plot as structure and the idea of the story as material was drawn; this explanation of the typical techniques of plot construction opened the door for work on the history and theory of the novel; and furthermore, the *skaz* was treated as the structural basis of the plotless short story. These works have influenced a whole series of recent studies by persons not directly connected with the *Opoyaz*.

As our theoretical work broadened and deepened it naturally became specialized—the more so because persons who were only beginning their work or who had been working independently joined the *Opoyaz* group. Some of them specialized in the problems of poetry, others in the problems of prose. The Formalists insisted upon keeping clear the demarcation between poetry and prose in order to counterbalance the Symbolists, who were then attempting to erase the boundary line both in theory and in practice by painstakingly attempting to discover meter in prose.

...

Among the general questions of poetics revived and illuminated by this book, that of the idea of the material is most fundamental. The generally accepted view saw an opposition between form and content; when the distinction was made purely verbal, it lost its meaning. In fact, as I have already mentioned, our view gave form the significance of a thing complete in itself and strengthened it by considering the work

of art in relation to its purpose. Our concept of form required no complement—except that other, artistically insignificant, kind of form. Tynyanov showed that the materials of verbal art were neither all alike nor all equally important, that "one feature may be prominent at the expense of the rest, so that the remainder is deformed and sometimes degraded to the level of a neutral prop". Hence the conclusion that "the idea of material does not lie beyond the limits of form; the material itself is a formal element. To confuse it with external structural features is a mistake". After this, Tynyanov could make the notion of form more complex by showing that form is dynamic: "The unity of the work is not a closed, symmetrical whole, but an unfolding, dynamic whole. Its elements are not static indications of equality and complexity, but always dynamic indications of correlation and integration. The form of literary works must be thought of as dynamic."

Rhythm is here presented as the fundamental specific factor which permeates all the elements of poetry. The objective sign of poetic rhythm is the establishment of a *rhythmic group* whose *unity* and *richness* exist side by side with each other. And again, Tynyanov affirms the principal distinction between prose and poetry:

> Poetry, as opposed to prose, tends toward unity and richness ranged around an uncommon object. This very "uncommonness" prevents the main point of the poem from being smoothed over. Indeed, it asserts the object with a new force...Any element of prose brought into the poetic pattern is transformed into verse by that feature of it which asserts its function and which thus has two aspects: the emphasis of the structure—the versification—and the deformation of the uncommon object.

Tynyanov also raises the question of semantics: "In verse are not the ordinary semantic meanings of the words so distorted (a fact which makes complete paraphrase impossible) that the usual principles governing their arrangement no longer apply?" The entire second part of Tynyanov's book answers this question by defining the precise relation

between rhythm and semantics. The facts show clearly that oral presentations are unified in part by rhythm. "This is shown in a more forceful and more compact integration of connectives than occurs in ordinary speech; words are made correlative by their positions"; prose lacks this feature.

Thus the Formalists abandoned Potebnya's theory and accepted the conclusions connected with it on a new basis, and a new perspective opened on to the theory of verse. Tynyanov's work permitted us to grasp even the remotest implications of these new problems. It became clear even to those only casually acquainted with the *Opoyaz* that the essence of our work consisted not in some kind of static "formal method", but in a study of the specific peculiarities of verbal art—we were not advocates of a method, but students of an object. Again, Tynyanov stated this:

> The object of a study claiming to be a study of art ought to be so specific that it is distinguished from other areas of intellectual activity and uses them for its own materials and tools. Each work of art represents a complex interaction of many factors; consequently, the job of the student is the definition of the specific character of this interaction.

Earlier I noted that the problem of the diffusion and change of form— the problem of literary evolution—is raised naturally along with theoretical problems. The problem of literary evolution arises in connection with a reconsideration of Veselovsky's view of *skaz* motifs and devices; the answer ("new form is not to express new content, but to replace old form") led to a new understanding of form. If form is understood as the very content, constantly changing according to its dependence upon previous images, then we naturally had to approach it without abstract, ready-made, unalterable, classical schemes; and we had to consider specifically its historical sense and significance. The approach developed its own kind of dual perspective: the perspective of theoretical study (like Shklovsky's *Development of Plot* and my *Verse*

Melody), which centered on a given theoretical problem and its applicability to the most diverse materials, and the perspective of historical studies--studies of literary evolution as such. The combination of these two perspectives, both organic to the subsequent development of the formal school, raised a series of new and very complex problems, many of which are still unsolved and even undefined.

Actually, the original attempt of the Formalists to take a particular structural device and to establish its identity in diverse materials became an attempt to differentiate, to understand, the *function* of a device in each given case. This notion of functional significance was gradually pushed toward the foreground and the original idea of the device pushed into the background. This kind of sorting out of its own general ideas and principles has been characteristic of our work throughout the evolution of the formal method. We have no dogmatic position to bind us and shut us off from facts. We do not answer for our schematizations; they may require change, refinement, or correction when we try to apply them to previously unknown facts. Work on specific materials compelled us to speak of functions and thus to revise our idea of the device. The theory itself demanded that we turn to history.

Here again we were confronted with the traditional academic sciences and the preferences of critics. In our student days the academic history of literature was limited chiefly to biographical and psychological studies of various writers—only the "greats", of course. Critics no longer made attempts to construct a history of Russian literature as a whole, attempts which evidenced the intention of bringing the great historical materials into a system; nevertheless, the traditions established by earlier histories (like A. N. Pypin's *History of Russian Literature*) retained their scholarly authority, the more so because the following generation had decided not to pursue such broad themes. Meanwhile, the chief role was played by such general and somewhat vague notions as realism and romanticism (realism was said to be better than romanticism); evolution was understood as gradual perfection, as progress (from Romanticism to realism); succession [of literary schools] as the peaceful transfer of the inheritance from father to son. But

generally, there was no notion of literature as such; material taken from the history of social movements, from biography, etc. had replaced it entirely.

This primitive historicism, which led away from literature, naturally provoked the Symbolist theoreticians and critics into a denial of any kind of historicism. Their own discussions of literature, consequently, developed into impressionistic "*études*" and "silhouettes"[14], and they indulged in a widespread "modernization" of old writers, transforming them into "eternal companions"[15]. The history of literature was silently (and sometimes aloud) declared unnecessary.

We had to demolish the academic tradition and to eliminate the bias of the journalists [the Symbolist theoreticians]. We had to advance against the first a new understanding of literary evolution and of literature itself —without the idea of progress and peaceful succession, without the ideas of realism and romanticism, without materials foreign to literature —as a specific order of phenomena, a specific order of material. We had to act against the second by pointing out concrete historical facts, fluctuating and changing forms, by pointing to the necessity of taking into account the specific functions of this or that device—in a word, we had to draw the line between the literary work as a definite historical fact and a free interpretation of it from the standpoint of contemporary literary needs, tastes, or interests. Thus the basic passion for our historical-literary work had to be a passion for destruction and negation, and such was the original tone of our theoretical attacks; our work later assumed a calmer note when we went on to solutions of particular problems.

That is why the first of our historical-literary pronouncements came in the form of theses expressed almost against our will in connection with some specific material. A particular question would unexpectedly lead to the formulation of a general problem, a problem that inextricably mixed theoretical and historical considerations. In this sense Tynyanov's *Dostoevsky and Gogol* and Shklovsky's *Rozanov* were typical.

Tynyanov's basic problem was to show that Dostoevsky's *The*

Village of Stepanchikovo is a parody, that behind its first level is hidden a second—it is a parody of Gogol's *Correspondence with Friends*. But his treatment of this particular question was overshadowed by a whole theory of parody [which he developed to solve the particular problem], a theory of parody as a stylistic device (stylized parody) and as one of the manifestations (having great historical-literary significance) of the dialectical development of literary groups. With this arose the problem of succession and tradition and, hence, the basic problems of literary evolution were posed [as part of the study of style]:

> When one speaks of literary tradition or succession... usually one implies a certain kind of direct line uniting the younger and older representatives of a known literary branch. Yet the matter is much more complicated. There is no continuing direct line; there is rather a departure, a pushing away from the known point—a struggle... Any literary succession is first of all a struggle, a destruction of old values and a reconstruction of old elements.

Literary evolution was complicated by the notion of struggle, of periodic uprisings, and so lost its old suggestion of peaceful and gradual development. Against this background, the literary relationship between Dostoevsky and Gogol was shown to be that of a complicated struggle.

In his *Rozanov*, Shklovsky showed, almost in the absence of basic themes, a whole theory of literary evolution which even then reflected the current discussion of such problems in *Opoyaz*. Shklovsky showed that literature moves forward in a broken line.

> In each literary epoch there is not one literary school, but several. They exist simultaneously, with one of them representing the high point of the current orthodoxy. The others exist uncanonized, mutely; in Pushkin's time, for example, the courtly tradition of [Wilhelm] Kuchelbecker and [Alexander] Greboyedov existed simultaneously with the tradition of Russian vaudeville verse and

> with such other traditions as that of the pure adventure novel of Bulgarin.[16]

The moment the old art is canonized, new forms are created on a lower level. A "young line" is created which

> grows up to replace the old, as the vaudevillist Belopyatkin is transformed into a Nekrasov[17] (see Brik's discussion of the relationship); a direct descendant of the eighteenth century, Tolstoy, creates a new novel (see the work of Boris Eichenbaum); Blok makes the themes and times of the gypsy ballad acceptable, and Chekhov introduces the "*alarm clock*"[18] into Russian literature. Dostoevsky introduced the devices of the dime novel into the mainstream of literature. Each new literary school heralds a revolution, something like the appearance of a new class. But, of course, this is only an analogy. The vanquished line is not obliterated, it does not cease to exist. It is only knocked from the crest: it lies dormant and may again arise as a perennial pretender to the throne. Moreover, in reality the matter is complicated by the fact that the new hegemony is usually not a pure revival of previous forms but is made more complex by the presence of features of the younger schools and with features, now secondary, inherited from its predecessors on the throne.

Shklovsky is discussing the dynamism of genres, and he interprets Rozanov's books as embodiments of a new genre, as a new type of novel in which the parts are unconnected by motivation. "Thematically, Rozanov's books are characterized by the elevation of new themes; compositionally, by the revealed device." As part of this general theory, we introduced the notion of the dialectical self-creation of new forms, that is, hidden in the new form we saw both analogies with other kinds of cultural development and proof of the independence of the phenomena of literary evolution. In a simplified form, this theory quickly changed hands and, as always happens, became a simple and

fixed scheme--very handy for critics. Actually, we have here only a general outline of evolution surrounded by a whole series of complicated conditions. From this general outline the Formalists moved on to a more consistent solution of historical-literary problems and facts, specifying and refining their original theoretical premises.

Given our understanding of literary evolution as the dialectical change of forms, we did not go back to the study of those materials which had held the central position in the old-fashioned historical-literary work. We studied literary evolution insofar as it bore a distinctive character and only to the extent that it stood alone, quite independent of other aspects of culture. In other words, we stuck exclusively to facts in order not to pass into an endless number of indefinite connections and correspondences which would do nothing at all to explain literary evolution. We did not take up questions of the biography and psychology of the artist because we assumed that these questions, in themselves serious and complex, must take their places in other sciences. We felt it important to find indications of historical regularity in evolution—that is why we ignored all that seemed, from this point of view, circumstantial, not concerned with [literary] history. We were interested in the very process of evolution, in the very *dynamics* of literary form, insofar as it was possible to observe them in the facts of the past. For us, the central problem of the history of literature is the problem of evolution without personality--the study of literature as a *self-formed social phenomenon*. As a result, we found extremely significant both the question of the formation and changes of genres and the question of how second rate and popular literature contributed to the formation of genres. Here we had only to distinguish that popular literature which prepared the way for the formation of new genres from that which arose out of their decay and which offered material for the study of historical inertia.

On the other hand, we were not interested in the past, in isolated historical facts, as such; we did not busy ourselves with the restoration of this or that epoch because we happened to like it. History gave us what the present could not—a stable body of material. But, precisely

for this reason, we approached it with a stock of theoretical problems and principles suggested in part by the facts of contemporary literature. The Formalists, then, characteristically had a close interest in contemporary literature and also reconciled criticism and scholarship. The earlier literary historians had, to a great extent, kept themselves aloof from contemporary literature; the Symbolists had subordinated scholarship to criticism. We saw in the history of literature not so much a special theoretical *subject* as a special *approach*, a special cross section of literature. The character of our historical-literary work involved our being drawn not only to historical conclusions, but also to theoretical conclusions—to the posing of new theoretical problems and to the testing of old.

From 1922 to 1924 a whole series of Formalist studies of literary history was written, many of which, because of contemporary market conditions, remain unpublished and are known only as reports... There is, of course, not space enough here to speak of such works in detail. They usually took up secondary writers (those who form the background of literature) and carefully explained the traditions of their work, noting changes in genres, styles, and so on. As a result, many forgotten names and facts came to light, current estimates were shown to be inaccurate, traditional ideas changed, and, chiefly, the very process of literary evolution became clearer. The working out of this material has only begun. A new series of problems is before us: further differentiation of theoretical and historical literary ideas, introduction of new material, posing new questions, and so on.

I shall conclude with a general summary. The evolution of the formal method, which I have tried to present, has the look of a sequential development of theoretical principles—apart from the individual roles each of us played. Actually, the work of the *Opoyaz* group was genuinely collective. It was this way, obviously, because from the very beginning we understood the historical nature of our task; we did not see it as the personal affair of this or that individual. This was our chief connection with the times. Science itself is still evolving, and we are evolving with it. I shall indicate briefly the evolution of the formal

method during these ten years:

1. From the original outline of the conflict of poetic language with practical we proceeded to differentiate the idea of practical language by its various functions (Jakubinsky) and to delimit the methods of poetic and emotional languages (Jakobson). Along with this we became interested in studying oratorical speech because it was close to practical speech but distinguished from it by function, and we spoke about the necessity of a revival of the poetic of rhetoric.

2. From the general idea of form, in its new sense, we proceeded to the idea of technique, and from here, to the idea of function.

3. From the idea of poetic rhythm as opposed to meter we proceeded to the idea of rhythm as a constructive element in the total poem and thus to an understanding of verse as a special form of speech having special linguistic (syntactical, lexical, and semantic) features.

4. From the idea of plot as structure we proceeded to an understanding of material in terms of its motivation, and from here to an understanding of material as an element participating in the construction but subordinate to the character of the dominant formal idea.

5. From the ascertainment of a single device applicable to various materials we proceeded to differentiate techniques according to function and from here to the question of the evolution of form—that is, to the problem of historical-literary study.

A whole new series of problems faces us, as Tynyanov's latest essay, "Literary Fact", shows. Here the question of the relation between life and literature is posed, a question which many persons answer on the basis of a simple-minded dilettantism. Examples of how life becomes literature are shown and, conversely, of how literature passes into life: "During the period of its deterioration a given genre is shoved from the center toward the periphery, but in its place, from the trivia of literature, from literature's backyard, and from life itself, new phenomena flow into the center."

Although I deliberately called this essay "The Theory of the 'Formal Method'", I gave, obviously, a sketch of its evolution. We have no theory that can be laid out as a fixed, ready-made system. For us

theory and history merge not only in words, but in fact. We are too well trained by history itself to think that it can be avoided. When we feel that we have a theory that explains everything, a ready-made theory explaining all past and future events and therefore needing neither evolution nor anything like it—then we must recognize that the formal method has come to an end, that the spirit of scientific investigation has departed from it. As yet, that has not happened.

注释：

1 根据作者原注，本文所说的形式主义者既包括彼得堡诗歌语言研究会的成员，也包括莫斯科语言小组的成员。

2《报刊与革命》，1921 年创刊，前苏联文学和书报评论月刊。根据原注，当时任教育人民委员的著名文艺理论家卢那察尔斯基（1875—1933）曾在上面撰文攻击形式主义。文中所提到的 attacks，就是指卢那察尔斯基的批判文章。

3 维谢洛夫斯基（Alexandre Veselovsky，1838—1906）：著名俄国文学史家，著有《历史诗学》。

4 这里所提到的梅列日科夫斯基等人当时都是象征主义文学流派的成员。

5 马雅可夫斯基（Vladimir Mayakovsky，1893—1930）：俄国未来派的重要领导人，十月革命期间完全拥护布尔什维克，写有《穿裤子的云》、《革命》、《列宁》等。在这句话中同时提到的赫列勃尼克夫和克鲁切内赫都是未来派重要成员。

6 Acmeists：阿克梅派，当时的一家重要文学流派。他们同未来派一道反对象征主义的理论与实践，重要代表人物有艾赫马托娃和曼德尔斯太姆。

7 根据英译者注释，雅可布森在此并没有认为文学与历史、心理学等无关，而是认为如果文学研究成为一门学科的话就必须有自己的研究对象。

8 Opoyaz：俄文"诗歌语言研究会"的简称。

9 skaz：介于日常言语和文学创作之间的民间文学形式，同时包括加工后的民间文学故事。在俄苏文学史上，列斯克夫和左琴科模仿民间故事手法创作了很多短篇小说，这些作品的词汇、句子结构和语调很有民间口语色彩。

10 故事（story）与情节（plot）的区分：在俄国形式主义者看来，故事指的是虚构作品的基本题材，作品中所叙述的所有事件。换句话说，它是叙事结构的材料。而情节指的是实际讲述的故事，或者说是将全部事件编排起来的方式。

11 克里斯蒂安森（Broder Christiansen，1869—1958）：德国美学家。

12 布吕奈尔（Ferdinand Brunetière，1849—1906）：法国文学批评家。

13 *The Inspector General*：果戈里的名作《钦差大臣》。根据英译本注释，这部戏谢幕前的一分半钟没有台词。

14 *études*，silhouettes：法文，分别指"研究"和"专题研究"。

15 eternal companions:《永恒的伴侣》是梅列日科夫斯基的一部批评著作,作者在这里借用这个名称,隐然有戏谑之意。

16 丘赫尔别凯(Wilhelm Kuchelbecker,1797—1846):十二月党人诗人。
格里鲍耶陀夫(Alexander Greboyedov,1794—1824):俄国剧作家。
布尔加林(Bulgarin,1789—1859):俄国记者、作家兼批评家。

17 涅克拉索夫(Nikolay Alekseyevich Nekrasov,1821—1878):俄国著名诗人,作品以对农民苦难的同情为主要题材。

18 alarm clock:源引于《警钟》,19 世纪末俄国的幽默报纸。

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第二章 新批评

新批评20世纪在英美流行，一度在文学研究中占统治地位。大致讲，新批评分三个阶段。第一阶段是20年代，英国的T. S. 艾略特、I. A. 理查兹和威廉·燕卜荪以及美国的约翰·克罗·兰瑟姆和艾伦·泰特等人，开始提出一些新批评的基本观点并付诸实践。30年代和40年代为第二阶段，这一时期认同并支持新批评这种形式主义的人大量增加，新批评的观点迅速扩展，直接影响到文学期刊、大学教学和课程设置。主要代表人物除上述五人外，还有R. P. 布莱克默、科林斯·布鲁克斯、雷内·韦勒克和W. K. 韦姆萨特等。第三个阶段从40年代末延续到50年代后期，这一时期新批评占据了主流地位，形成了制度化的批评模式，失去了"革命的"气息，批评家的著作大多阐述新批评的原则而缺乏创新。到50年代末，新批评失去了它的生命力，虽然在大学教学中仍被应用，但许多人认为它已经过时，开始以新的理论观念对它进行批判和超越。

新批评与俄国形式主义有许多相似之处，主要目的都是探讨独特的文学性所在，都否认后期浪漫主义诗学中"软弱的"精神性，一味主张经验主义阅读方式。但新批评与俄国形式主义又有许多不同，它有自身的特性。布鲁克斯把新批评的特征概括为五点：(1)把文学批评从渊源研究中分离出来，使其脱离社会背景、思想史、政治和社会效果，寻求不考虑"外在"因素的纯文学批评，只集中注意文学客体本身；(2)集中探讨作品的结构，不考虑作者的思想或读者的反应；(3)主张一种"有机统一"的文学理论，不赞成形式和内容划分的二元论观念，强调探讨作品中词语与整个作品语境的关系，认为每个词对独特的语境都有其作用，并由它在语境中的地位产生意义；(4)强调对单个作品的细读，特别注意词的细微差别、修辞方式以及意义的微小差异，力图具体说明语境的统一性和作品的意义；(5)把文学与宗教和道德区分开来——这主要是因为新批评的许多支持者具有确定的宗教观而又不想把它放弃，也不想以它取

代道德或文学。

新批评的基础是艾略特的“艺术的非个人化”和理查兹的“内在的必然性”。因此它主要关注“诗作为诗的结构”。所谓结构，指的是文本中意义的组织安排，它在优秀的文学作品里的特征不同于在普通话语里的。新批评认为，诗的主要特征是一致性，但并非逻辑上的一致性，而是使矛盾的意义和谐的一致性。正如韦姆萨特所指出的，诗具有客观的特性，因为它有一种“通过内部区分的形式和对各不同部分的调和而确立的意义的完整性”。于是一致性便和综合性与复杂性联系起来。就是说，文本的意义是由它的各部分相互作用的产物。所以对新批评来说，综合性、复杂性和一致性共同构成文学作品分析的关键因素。

在新批评里，“意义”的概念至关重要。它处于许多基本看法的交叉点上，对阅读习惯的形成发生重要的作用。新批评认为，作品的价值不在于内容，而在于它的结构。从诗里寻求内容，对文本进行概括或释义，都违背新批评的原则，因为这样做会使“意义”变成观点或陈述，使形式失去内容，使文学与哲学和政治相争。如果把“意义”等同于释义，就会贬低“意义”的价值，因为释义并不是构成诗歌精髓的意义的核心。在新批评看来，“意义”是结构的一个方面。布鲁克斯认为：“所谓的结构是[文本的]意义、批评家和解释的结构；而使结构充满意义的统一性原则，乃是平衡和调谐含义、态度和意义的原则。”因此，阅读的任务就是要考察和评价结构，而结构由文本诸因素综合组成，包括语言学、修辞学、语义学、哲学和心理学等各方面的因素。于是结构变成了最主要的批评概念。对新批评来说，意义既是结构的从属范畴，同时也是结构不可分割的一种因素；统一性的文学结构不仅不涉及生成和接受，而且也不会归之为可释义的成分和可推断的观点，意义的陈述至多起框架作用。

按照新批评的看法，在阅读当中，只有找出结构上的统一、平衡及和谐，阅读才能算完成。或者说，对文本中各种力量的加工整理，如对张力、冲突和分歧的分析，都是为了达到这种结构上的和谐。正如布鲁克斯所指出的：“论述这样一种结构的努力，可以说明前面章节里经常出现的一些术语，如‘含混’、‘悖论’、‘综合态度’以及最经常出现的——也许最令读者烦恼的——‘反讽’。”这些在新批评中具有关键作用的术语，对破坏性的张力和冲突起着调解作用，正是这种调解作用导致“发现”(或创造)统一的结构。布鲁克斯最喜欢“反讽”这个术语，认为它是有效的阐释工具，能够使文本中不一致的因素达成统一。因此新批评最终是一种阅读的理论和实践，它强调由张力和歧义形成的统一结构，认为这种

结构不仅构成文学的本质，而且也构成批评（阅读）分析的目的。

显然，要实现新批评的阅读方式，要找出含混、悖论、隐喻、反讽、象征及其形成的张力和统一的结构，批评家或读者必须仔细阅读作品——也就是人们常说的新批评的“细读”。雷奇对“细读”作了如下的概括：在进行细读时，新批评一般要做的是：(1)挑选短的文本，通常是超验主义的诗或现代诗；(2)排除“生成”的批评方式；(3)避免“接受论”的探索；(4)设想文本是一个独立自治的、非历史的、处于空间的客体；(5)预设文本既是复杂、综合的，又是有效、统一的；(6)进行多重回溯性的阅读；(7)设想每个文本都是由冲突力量构成的戏剧；(8)连续不断地集中于文本及其在语义和修辞上的多重相互关系；(9)坚持基本上是隐喻的因此也是奇妙的文学语言的力量；(10)避免释义和概括，明确这种陈述不等于作品的意义；(11)寻求一种完全平衡或统一的、由和谐的文本因素组成的综合结构；(12)把不一致和矛盾冲突置于次要地位；(13)把悖论、含混和反讽看做是对不一致的抑制和对统一结构的保证；(14)把（内在的）意义只视为结构的一个因素；(15)在阅读过程中注意文本的结构和经验方面；(16)力图成为理想的读者并创造出惟一的、真正的阅读——把多种阅读归类的阅读。按照雷奇的概括，新批评的细读显然不同于其他批评解释和阅读实践。对新批评来说，“阅读”既需要解释也需要评价，而细读过程本身就包含着批评判断的标准。

新批评追求结构的有机统一，使它对意义的理解大受局限；它追求职业化的批评（集中在大学，由学者们建构批评专业，使批评活动脱离常规的书评），使它的范围也受到限制。因此，它既不能提供一种真正科学的批评，也不能提供一种社会学的批评，甚至不能提供一种确切的阐释批评。所以到50年代末，新批评便开始衰落，随着其他种种新理论的出现，而在60年代几乎完全丧失了活力。

W. K. 韦姆萨特和门罗·比尔兹利:意图谬误

The Intentional Fallacy [1]

W. K. Wimsatt, Jr.

Monroe Beardsley

I

The claim of the author's "intention" upon the critic's judgment has been challenged in a number of recent discussions, notably in the debate entitled *The Personal Heresy* [1939], between Professor Lewis and Tillyard. But it seems doubtful if this claim and most of its romantic corollaries are as yet subject to any widespread questioning. The present writers, in a short article entitled "Intention" for a *Dictionary*[2] of literary criticism, raised the issue but were unable to pursue its implications at any length. We argued that the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art, and it seems to us that this is a principle which goes deep into some differences in the history of critical attitudes. It is a principle which accepted or rejected points to the polar opposites of classical "imitation" and romantic expression. It entails many specific truths about inspiration, authenticity, biography, literary history and scholarship, and about some trends of contemporary poetry, especially its allusiveness. There is hardly a problem of literary criticism in which the critic's approach will not be qualified by his view of "intention".

"Intention", as we shall use the term, corresponds to *what he intended* in a formula which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance. "In order to judge the poet's performance, we must know *what he intended*." Intention is design or plan in the author's mind. Intention has obvious affinities for the author's attitude towards his work, the way he felt, what made him write.

We begin our discussion with a series of propositions summarized and abstracted to a degree where they seem to us axiomatic.

1. A poem does not come into existence by accident. The words of a poem, as Professor Stoll has remarked, come out of a head, not out of a hat. Yet to insist on the designing intellect as a *cause* of a poem is not to grant the design or intention as a *standard* by which the critic is to judge the worth of the poet's performance.

2. One must ask how a critic expects to get an answer to the question about intention. How is he to find out what the poet tried to do? If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem for evidence of an intention that did not become effective in the poem. "Only one *caveat* must be borne in mind," says an eminent intentionalist [3] in a moment when his theory repudiates itself; "the poet's aim must be judged at the moment of the creative act, that is to say, by the art of the poem itself".

3. Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention of an artificer. "A poem should not mean but be." A poem can *be* only through its *meaning*—since its medium is words—yet it *is*, simply *is*, in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant. Poetry is a feat of style by which a complex of meaning is handled all at once. Poetry succeeds because all or most of what is said or implied is relevant; what is irrelevant has been excluded, like lumps from pudding and "bugs" from machinery. In this respect poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention. They are more abstract than poetry.

4. The meaning of a poem may certainly be a personal one, in the sense that a poem expresses a personality or state of soul rather than a physical object like an apple. But even a short lyric poem is dramatic, the response of a speaker (no matter how abstractly conceived) to a situation (no matter how universalized). We ought to impute the

thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic *speaker*, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.

5. There is a sense in which an author, by revision, may better achieve his original intention. But it is a very abstract sense. He intended to write a better work, or a better work of a certain kind, and now has done it. But it follows that his former concrete intention was not his intention. "He's the man we were in search of, that's true," says Hardy's rustic constable, "and yet he's not the man we were in search of. For the man we were in search of was not the man we wanted."

"Is not a critic," asks Professor Stoll, "a judge, who does not explore his own consciousness, but determines the author's meaning or intention, as if the poem were a will, a contract, or the constitution? The poem is not the critic's own." He has accurately diagnosed two forms of irresponsibility, one of which he prefers. Our view is yet different. The poem is not the critic's own and not the author's (it is detached from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or control it). The poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the human being, an object of public knowledge. What is said about the poem is subject to the same scrutiny as any statement in linguistics or in the general science of psychology.

A critic of our *Dictionary* article, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, has argued that there are two kinds of inquiry about a work of art: (1) whether the artist achieved his intentions; (2) whether the work of art "ought ever to have been undertaken at all" and so "whether it is worth preserving". Number (2), Coomaraswamy maintains, is not "criticism of any work of art *qua* work of art", but is rather moral criticism; number (1) is artistic criticism. But we maintain that (2) need not be moral criticism: that there is another way of deciding whether works of art are worth preserving and whether, in a sense, they "ought" to have been undertaken, and this is the way of objective criticism of works of art as such, the way which enables us to distinguish between a skilful murder and a skilful poem. A skilful murder is an

example which Coomaraswamy uses, and in his system the difference between murder and the poem is simply a "moral" one, not an "artistic" one, since each if carried out according to plan is "artistically" successful. We maintain that (2) is an inquiry of more worth than (1), and since (2) and not (1) is capable of distinguishing poetry from murder, the name "artistic criticism" is properly given to (2).

II

It is not so much a historical statement as a definition to say that the intentional fallacy is a romantic one. When a rhetorician of the first century A.D. writes: "Sublimity is the echo of a great soul", or when he tells us that "Homer enters into the sublime actions of his heroes" and "shares the full inspiration of the combat", we shall not be surprised to find this rhetorician considered as a distant harbinger of romanticism and greeted in the warmest terms by Saintsbury. One may wish to argue whether Longinus should be called romantic, but there can hardly be a doubt that in one important way he is.

Goethe's three questions for "constructive criticism" are "What did the author set out to do? Was his plan reasonable and sensible, and how far did he succeed in carrying it out?" If one leaves out the middle question, one has in effect the system of Croce [1]—the culmination and crowning philosophic expression of romanticism. The beautiful is the successful intuition expression, and the ugly is the unsuccessful; the intuition or private part of art is *the* aesthetic fact, and the medium or public part is not the subject of aesthetic at all.

> The Madonna of Cimabue is still in the Church of Santa Maria Novella; but does she speak to the visitor of today as to the Florentines of the thirteenth century?
>
> *Historical interpretation* labours... to reintegrate in us the psychological conditions which have changed in the course of history.
>
> It... enables us to see a work of art (a physical object) as its

author saw it in the moment of production.[5]

The first italics are Croce's, the second ours. The upshot of Croce's system is an ambiguous emphasis on history. With such passages as a point of departure a critic may write a nice analysis of the meaning or "spirit" of a play by Shakespeare or Corneille—a process that involves close historical study but remains aesthetic criticism· or he may, with equal plausibility, produce an essay in sociology, biography, or other kinds of non-aesthetic history.

III

> I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts... I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them... Will you believe me?... there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration.

That reiterated mistrust of the poets which we hear from Socrates may have been part of a rigorously ascetic view in which we hardly wish to participate, yet Plato's Socrates saw a truth about the poetic mind which the world no longer commonly sees so much criticism, and that the most inspirational and most affectionately remembered, has proceeded from the poets themselves.

Certainly the poets have had something to say that the critic and professor could not say; their message has been more exciting; that poetry should come as naturally as leaves to a tree, that poetry is the lava of the imagination, or that it is emotion recollected in tranquillity. But it is necessary that we realize the character and authority of such testimony. There is only a fine shade of difference between such expressions and a kind of earnest advice that authors often give. Thus Edward Young, Thomas Carlyle, Walter Pater[6]:

> I know two golden rules from *ethics*, which are no less golden in *Composition*, than in life. 1. *Know thyself*. 2. *Reverence thyself*. This is the grand secret for finding readers and retaining them: let him who would move and convince others, be first moved and convinced himself. Horace's rule, *Si vis me flere*, is applicable in a wider sense than the literal one. To every poet to every writer, we might say: Be true, if you would be believed.
>
> Truth! there can be no merit, no craft at all, without that. And further, all beauty is in the long run only *fineness* of truth, or what we call expression, the finer accommodation of speech to that vision within.

And Housman's little handbook to the poetic mind yields this illustration:

> Having drunk a pint of beer at luncheon—beer is a sedative to the brain, and my afternoons are the least intellectual portion of my life—I would go out for a walk of two or three hours. As I went along, thinking of nothing in particular, only looking at things around me and following the progress of the seasons, there would flow into my mind, with sudden and unaccountable emotion, sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole stanza at once.

This is the logical terminus of the series already quoted. Here is a confession of how poems were written which would do as a definition of poetry just as well as "emotion recollected in tranquillity"— and which the young poet might equally well take to heart as a practical rule. Drink a pint of beer, relax, go walking, think on nothing in particular, look at things, surrender yourself to yourself, search for the truth in your own soul, listen to the sound of your own inside voice, discover and express the *vraie vérité* ["true truth"].

It is probably true that all this is excellent advice for poets. The

young imagination fired by Wordsworth and Carlyle is probably closer to the verge of producing a poem than the mind of the student who has been sobered by Aristotle or Richards. The art of inspiring poets, or at least of inciting something like poetry in young persons, has probably gone further in our day than ever before. Books of creative writing such as those issued from the Lincoln School are interesting evidence of what a child can do.[7] All this, however, would appear to belong to an art separate from criticism—to a psychological discipline, a system of self-development, a yoga, which the young poet perhaps does well to notice, but which is something different from the public art of evaluating poems.

Coleridge and Arnold were better critics than most poets have been, and if the critical tendency dried up the poetry in Arnold and perhaps in Coleridge, it is not inconsistent with our argument, which is that judgment of poems is different from the art of producing them. Coleridge has given us the classic "anodyne" story, and tells what he can about the genesis of a poem which he calls a "psychological curiosity", but his definitions of poetry and of the poetic quality "imagination" are to be found elsewhere and in quite other terms.

It would be convenient if the passwords of the intentional school, "sincerity", "fidelity", "spontaneity", "authenticity", "genuineness", "originality", could be equated with terms such as "integrity", "relevance", "unity", "function", "maturity", "subtlety", "adequacy", and other more precise terms of evaluation -in short, if "expression" always meant aesthetic achievement. But this is not so.

"Aesthetic" art, says Professor Curt Ducasse, an ingenious theorist of expression, is the conscious objectification of feelings, in which an intrinsic part is the critical moment. The artist corrects the objectification when it is not adequate. But this may mean that the earlier attempt was not successful in objectifying the self, or "it may also mean that it was a successful objectification of a self which, when it confronted us clearly, we disowned and repudiated in favour of another". What is the standard by which we disown or accept the self? Professor Ducasse does not say. Whatever it may be, however, this standard is an

element in the definition of art which will not reduce to terms of objectification. The evaluation of the work of art remains public; the work is measured against something outside the author.

IV

There is criticism of poetry and there is author psychology, which when applied to the present or future takes the form of inspirational promotion; but author psychology can be historical too, and then we have literary biography, a legitimate and attractive study in itself, one approach, as Professor Tillyard would argue, to personality, the poem being only a parallel approach. Certainly it need not be with a derogatory purpose that one points out personal studies, as distinct from poetic studies, in the realm of literary scholarship. Yet there is danger of confusing personal and poetic studies; and there is the fault of writing the personal as if it were poetic.

There is a difference between internal and external evidence for the meaning of a poem. And the paradox is only verbal and superficial that what is (1) internal is also public: it is discovered through the semantics and syntax of a poem, through our habitual knowledge of the language, through grammars, dictionaries, and all the literature which is the source of dictionaries, in general through all that makes a language and culture; while what is (2) external is private or idiosyncratic; not a part of the work as a linguistic fact: it consists of revelations (in journals, for example, or letters or reported conversations) about how or why the poet wrote the poem—to what lady, while sitting on what lawn, or at the death of what friend or brother. There is (3) an intermediate kind of evidence about the character of the author or about private or semi-private meanings attached to words or topics by an author or by a coterie of which he is a member. The meaning of words is the history of words, and the biography of an author, his use of a word, and the associations which the word had for *him*, are part of the word's history and meaning. [8] But the three types of evidence, especially (2) and (3), shade into one another so subtly that it is not always easy

to draw a line between examples, and hence arises the difficulty for criticism. The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance. On the other hand, it may not be all this. And a critic who is concerned with evidence of type (1) and moderately with that of type (3) will in the long run produce a different sort of comment from that of the critic who is concerned with (2) and with (3) where it shades into (2).

The whole glittering parade of Professor Lowes' *Road to Xanadu*, for instance, runs along the border between types (2) and (3) or boldly traverses the romantic region of (2). "'Kubla Khan'," says Professor Lowes, "is the fabric of a vision, but every image that rose up in its weaving had passed that way before. And it would seem that there is nothing haphazard or fortuitous in their return." This is not quite clear - not even when Professor Lowes explains that there were clusters of associations, like hooked atoms, which were drawn into complex relation with other clusters in the deep well of Coleridge's memory, and which then coalesced and issued forth as poems. If there was nothing "haphazard or fortuitous" in the way the images returned to the surface, that may mean (1) that Coleridge could not produce what he did not have, that he was limited in his creation by what he had read or otherwise experienced, or (2) that having received certain clusters of associations, he was bound to return them in just the way he did, and that the value of the poem may be described in terms of the experiences on which he had to draw. The latter pair of propositions (a sort of Hartleyan associationism which Coleridge himself repudiated in the *Biographia*) may not be assented to. There were certainly other combinations, other poems, worse or better, that might have been written by men who had read Bartram and Purchas and Bruce and Milton. And this will be true no matter how many times we are able to add to the brilliant complex of Coleridge's reading. In certain flourishes (such as the sentence we have quoted) and in chapter headings like "The Shaping Spirit", "The Magical Synthesis", "Imagination Creatrix", it may

be that Professor Lowes pretends to say more about the actual poems than he does. There is a certain deceptive variation in these fancy chaptertitles; one expects to pass on to a new stage in the argument, and one finds—more and more sources, more and more about "the streamy nature of association".

"Wohin der Weg?" quotes Professor Lowes for the motto of his book. "Kein Weg! Ins Unbetretene." Precisely because the way is *unbetreten*, we should say, it leads away from the poem. Bartram's *Travels* contain a good deal of the history of certain words and of certain romantic Floridian conceptions that appear in "Kubla Khan". And a good deal of that history has passed and was then passing into the very stuff of our language. Perhaps a person who has read Bartram appreciates the poem more than one who has not. Or, by looking up the vocabulary of "Kubla Khan" in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, or by reading some of the other books there quoted, a person may know the poem better. But it would seem to pertain little to the poem to know that *Coleridge* had read Bartram. There is a gross body of life, of sensory and mental experience, which lies behind and in some sense causes every poem, but can never be and need not be known in the verbal and hence intellectual composition which is the poem. For all the objects of our manifold experience, for every unity, there is an action of the mind which cuts off roots, melts away context—or indeed we should never have objects or ideas or anything to talk about.

It is probable that there is nothing in Professor Lowes' vast book which could detract from anyone's appreciation of either "The Ancient Mariner" or "Kubla Khan". We next present a case where preoccupation with evidence of type (3) has gone so far as to distort a critic's view of a poem (yet a case not so obvious as those that abound in our critical journals).

In a well-known poem by John Donne ["A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning"] appears this quatrain:

Moving of th' earth brings harmes and feares,
    Men reckon what it did and meant,

But trepidation of the spheares,
    Though greater farre, is innocent.

A recent critic in an elaborate treatment of Donne's learning has written of this quatrain as follows:

> He touches the emotional pulse of the situation by a skilful allusion to the new and the old astronomy... Of the new astronomy, the "moving of the earth" is the most radical principle; of the old, the "trepidation of the spheres" is the motion of the greatest complexity... The poet must exhort his love to quietness and calm upon his departure; and for this purpose the figure based upon the latter motion (trepidation), long absorbed into the traditional astronomy, fittingly suggests the tension of the moment without arousing the "harmes and feares" implicit in the figure of the moving earth.

The argument is plausible and rests on a well substantiated thesis that Donne was deeply interested in the new astronomy and its repercussions in the theological realm. In various works Donne shows his familiarity with Kepler's *De Stella Nova*, with Galileo's *Siderius Nuncius*, with William Gilbert's *De Magnete*, and with Clavius' commentary on the *De Sphaera* of Sacrobosco. He refers to the new science in his Sermon at Paul's Cross and in a letter to Sir Henry Goodyer. In the *First Anniversary* he says the "new philosophy calls in doubt". In the *Elegy on Prince Henry* he says that the "least moving of the centre" makes "the world to shake".

It is difficult to answer argument like this, and impossible to answer it with evidence of like nature. There is no reason why Donne might not have written a stanza in which the two kinds of celestial motion stood for two sorts of emotion at parting. And if we become full of astronomical ideas and see Donne only against the background of the new science, we may believe that he did. But the text itself remains to be dealt with, the analysable vehicle of a complicated metaphor. And one may observe: (1) that the movement of the earth according to the

Copernican theory is a celestial motion, smooth and regular, and while it might cause religious or philosophic fears, it could not be associated with the crudity and earthiness of the kind of commotion which the speaker in the poem wishes to discourage; (2) that there is another moving of the earth, an earthquake, which has just these qualities and is to be associated with the tear-floods and sigh-tempests of the second stanza of the poem; (3) that "trepidation" is an appropriate opposite of earthquake, because each is a shaking or vibratory motion; and "trepidation of the spheres" is "greater far" than an earthquake, but not much greater (if two such motions can be compared as to greatness) than the annual motion of the earth; (4) that reckoning what it "did and meant" shows that the event has passed, like an earthquake, not like the incessant celestial movement of the earth. Perhaps a knowledge of Donne's interest in the new science may add another shade of meaning, an overtone to the stanza in question, though to say even this runs against the words. To make the geocentric and heliocentric antithesis the core of the metaphor is to disregard the English language, to prefer private evidence to public, external to internal.

V

If the distinction between kinds of evidence has implications for the historical critic, it has them no less for the contemporary poet and his critic. Or, since every rule for a poet is but another side of a judgment by a critic, and since the past is the realm of the scholar and critic, and the future and present that of the poet and the critical leaders of taste, we may say that the problems arising in literary scholarship from the intentional fallacy are matched by others which arise in the world or progressive experiment.

The question of "allusiveness", for example, as acutely posed by the poetry of Eliot, is certainly one where a false judgment is likely to involve the intentional fallacy. The frequency and depth of literary allusion in the poetry of Eliot and others has driven so many in pursuit of full meanings to the *Golden Bough* and the Elizabethan drama that it

has become a kind of commonplace to suppose that we do not know what a poet means unless we have traced him in his reading—a supposition redolent with intentional implications. The stand taken by F. O. Matthiessen is a sound one and partially forestalls the difficulty.

> If one reads these with an attentive ear and is sensitive to their sudden shifts in movement, the contrast between the actual Thames and the idealized vision of it during an age before it flowed through a megalopolis is sharply conveyed by that movement itself, whether or not one recognizes the refrain to be from Spenser.

Eliot's allusions work when we know them and to a great extent even when we do not know them, through their suggestive power.

But sometimes we find allusions supported by notes, and it is a nice question whether the notes function more as guides to send us where we may be educated, or more as indications in themselves about the character of the allusions. "Nearly everything of importance... that is apposite to an appreciation of 'The Waste Land'," writes Matthiessen of Miss Weston's book [*From Ritual to Romance*], "has been incorporated into the structure of the poem itself, or into Eliot's notes." And with such an admission it may begin to appear that it would not much matter if Eliot invented his sources (as Sir Walter Scott invented chapter epigraphs from "old plays" and "anonymous" authors, or as Coleridge wrote marginal glosses for *The Ancient Mariner*). Allusions to Dante, Webster, Marvell, or Baudelaire doubtless gain something because these writers existed, but it is doubtful whether the same can be said for an allusion to an obscure Elizabethan:

> The sound of horns and motors, which shall bring
> Sweeney to Mrs Porter in the spring.
> "Cf. *Parliament of Bees*," says Eliot.
> When of a sudden, listening, you shall hear.
> A noise of horns and hunting, which shall bring
> Actaeon to Diana in the spring,

Where all shall see her naked skin.

The irony is completed by the quotation itself; had Eliot, as is quite conceivable, composed these lines to furnish his own background, there would be no loss of validity. The conviction may grow as one reads Eliot's next note: "I do not know the origin of the ballad from which these lines are taken: it was reported to me from Sydney, Australia." The important word in this note—on Mrs Porter and her daughter who washed their feet in soda water—is "ballad". And if one should feel from the lines themselves their "ballad" quality, there would be little need for the note. Ultimately, the inquiry must focus on the integrity of such notes as parts of the poem, for where they constitute special information about the meaning of phrases in the poem, they ought to be subject to the same scrutiny as any of the other words in which it is written. Matthiessen believes the notes were the price Eliot "had to pay in order to avoid what he would have considered muffling the energy of his poem by extended connecting links in the text itself". But it may be questioned whether the notes and the need for them are not equally muffling. F. W. Bateson has plausibly argued that Tennyson's "The Sailor Boy" would be better if half the stanzas were omitted, and the best versions of ballads like "Sir Patrick Spenser" owe their power to the very audacity with which the minstrel has taken for granted the story upon which he comments. What then if a poet finds he cannot take so much for granted in a more recondite context and rather than write informatively, supplies notes? It can be said in favour of this plan that at least the notes do not pretend to be dramatic, as they would if written in verse. On the other hand, the notes may look like unassimilated material lying loose beside the poem, necessary for the meaning of the verbal context, but not integrated, so that the symbol stands incomplete.

We mean to suggest by the above analysis that whereas notes tend to seem to justify themselves as external indexes to the author's *intention*, yet they ought to be judged like any other parts of a composition (verbal arrangement special to a particular context), and when so

judged their reality as parts of the poem, or their imaginative integration with the rest of the poem, may come into question. Matthiessen, for instance, sees that Eliot's titles for poems and his epigraphs are informative apparatus, like the notes. But while he is worried by some of the notes and thinks that Eliot "appears to be mocking himself for writing the note at the same time that he wants to convey something by it", Matthiessen believes that "the device" of epigraphs "is not at all open to the objection of not being sufficiently structural". "The *intention*," he says, "is to enable the poet to secure a condensed expression in the poem itself." "In each case the epigraph is *designed* to form an integral part of the effect of the poem." And Eliot himself, in his notes, has justified his poetic practice in terms of intention.

> The Hanged Man, a member of the traditional pack, fits my purpose in two ways: because he is associated in my mind with the Hanged God of Frazer, and because I associate him with the hooded figure in the passage of the disciples to Emmaus in Part V... The man with Three Staves (an authentic member of the Tarot pack) I associate, quite arbitrarily, with the Fisher King himself.

And perhaps he is to be taken more seriously here, when off guard in a note, than when in his Norton Lectures he comments on the difficulty of saying what a poem means and adds playfully that he thinks of prefixing to a second edition of *Ash Wednesday* some lines from *Don Juan*:

> I don't pretend that I quite understand
> My own meaning when I would be *very* fine;
> But the fact is that I have nothing planned
> Unless it were to be a moment merry.

If Eliot and other contemporary poets have any characteristic fault, it may be in *planning* too much.

Allusiveness in poetry is one of several critical issues by which we have illustrated the more abstract issue of intentionalism, but it may be

for today the most important illustration. As a poetic practice allusiveness would appear to be in some recent poems an extreme corollary of the romantic intentionalist assumption, and as a critical issue it challenges and brings to light in a special way the basic premise of intentionalism. The following instance from the poetry of Eliot may serve to epitomize the practical implications of what we have been saying. In Eliot's "Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock", towards the end, occurs the line: "I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each", and this bears a certain resemblance to a line in a song by John Donne, "Teach me to heare Mermaides singing", so that for the reader acquainted to a certain degree with Donne's poetry, the critical question arises: Is Eliot's line an allusion to Donne's? Is Prufrock thinking about Donne? Is Eliot thinking about Donne? We suggest that there are two radically different ways of looking for an answer to this question. There is (1) the way of poetic analysis and exegesis, which inquires whether it makes any sense if Eliot-Prufrock *is* thinking about Donne. In an earlier part of the poem, when Prufrock asks "Would it have been worth while, ... To have squeezed the universe into a ball", his words take half their sadness and irony from certain energetic and passionate lines of Marvell "To His Coy Mistress". But the exegetical inquirer may wonder whether mermaids considered as "strange sights" (to hear them is in Donne's poem analogous to getting with child a mandrake root) have much to do with Prufrock's mermaids, which seem to be symbols of romance and dynamism, and which incidentally have literary authentication, if they need it, in a line of a sonnet by Gérard de Nerval. This method of inquiry may lead to the conclusion that the given resemblance between Eliot and Donne is without significance and is better not thought of, or the method may have the disadvantage of providing no certain conclusion. Nevertheless, we submit that this is the true and objective way of criticism, as contrasted to what the very uncertainty of exegesis might tempt a second kind of critic to undertake; (2) the way of biographical or genetic inquiry, in which, taking advantage of the fact that Eliot is still alive, and in the spirit of a man who would settle a bet, the critic writes to Eliot and asks what he meant, or if he had Donne in mind.

We shall not here weigh the probabilities—whether Eliot would answer that he meant nothing at all, had nothing at all in mind—a sufficiently good answer to such a question—or in an unguarded moment might furnish a clear and, within its limit, irrefutable answer. Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem "Prufrock"; it would not be a critical inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle.

注释：

1 在这篇文章里，作者认为，由于诗不再是诗人自己的，而是属于公众的，所以任何把诗人意图作为理解诗的途径的严肃思考都搞错了对象。诗的意义在于它的内在形式，其存在是一种美学现象。诗的外在的"个人的或特质的"方面，提供关于诗创作方面的信息，对另一个语境可能有某种意义，但在文学批评中对"作为语言行为的作品"的意义却毫无价值。这种严格依附于文本细读的做法，实际上脱离了传记和历史信息，构成了新批评的原则。

2 指施波莱(J. T. Shipley) 编的《世界文学词典》(1942)，本文作者为该词典撰写了"意图"(intention)这一条目。

3 指美国著名批评家斯宾加恩(Joel Elias Spingarn，1875—1939)。

4 克罗齐(Benedetto Croce，1866—1952)：意大利哲学家，以其对美学的贡献著称。他最重要的美学观点是：直觉和表现是一致的，不存在任何不表现出来的直觉。

5 克罗齐在他的《阿里奥斯托、莎士比亚和康奈利》(1920)的第七章"实际个性和诗的个性"以及在他的《诗辩》(1933)里，对感情生成论进行了有力的抨击，但其美学动机显然是出于一种认识上的意图论。

6 扬格(Edward Young，1683—1765)：英国作家、评论家，他的著作在浪漫主义时期产生了重大影响，这主要表现在两个方面：从作品与读者的关系转向作者与其作品的关系；从强调对文学陈述的规则和传统的讨论转向对原创性和生就的"天才"的兴趣。

卡莱尔(Thomas Carlyle，1795—1881)：英国作家、评论家，他强调象征的"隐蔽和揭示"作用，区分外在象征和内在象征，提出了象征的社会意义，对象征形式的发展做出了贡献。

佩特(Walter Pater，1839—1894)：英国批评家，常常被称为唯美主义之父，他在《文艺复兴史研究》中提出了印象主义批评的主要原则。

7 激发诗歌的技巧显然是后来者居上。

8 一首诗写出之后，词的历史可以产生某些意义。如果这些意义适合原始模式，它们不应该因顾及意图而被排除。

I. A. 理查兹：实用批评

Practical Criticism

I. A. Richards

Chapter I
The Four Kinds of Meaning

The all-important fact for the study of literature—or any other mode of communication is that there are several kinds of meaning. Whether we know and intend it or not, we are all jugglers when we converse, keeping the billiard balls in the air while we balance the cue on our nose. Whether we are active, as in speech or writing, or passive[1], as readers or listeners, the total meaning we are engaged with is, almost always, a blend, a combination of several contributory meanings of different types. Language—and preeminently language as it is used in poetry has not one but several tasks to perform simultaneously, and we shall misconceive most of the difficulties of criticism unless we understand this point and take note of the differences between these functions. For our purposes here a division into four types of function, four kinds of meaning, will suffice.

It is plain that most human utterances and nearly all articulate speech can be profitably regarded from four points of view. Four aspects can be easily distinguished. Let us call them *sense*, *feeling*, *tone*, and *intention*.

1. Sense

We speak *to say something*, and when we listen we expect something to be said. We use words to direct our hearers' attention upon some state of affairs, to present to them some items for consideration

and to excite in them some thoughts about these items.

2. Feeling[2]

But we also, as a rule, have some feelings *about these items*, about the state of affairs we are referring to. We have an attitude towards it, some special direction, bias, or accentuation of interest towards it, some personal flavor or coloring of feeling; and we use language to *express* these feelings, this nuance of interest. Equally, when we listen we pick it up, rightly or wrongly; it seems inextricably part of what we receive; and this whether the speaker be conscious himself of his feelings towards what he is talking about or not. I am, of course, here describing the normal situation; my reader will be able without difficulty to think of exceptional cases (mathematics for example) where no feeling enters.

3. Tone

Furthermore, the speaker has ordinarily *an attitude to his listener*. He chooses or arranges his words differently as his audience varies, in automatic or deliberate *recognition of his relation to them*. The tone of his utterance reflects his awareness of this relation, his sense of how he stands towards those he is addressing. Again the exceptional case of dissimulation, or instances in which the speaker unwittingly reveals an attitude he is not consciously desirous of expressing, will come to mind.

4. Intention

Finally, apart from what he says (sense), his attitude to what he is talking about (feeling), and his attitude to his listener (tone), there is the speaker's intention, his aim, *conscious or unconscious*, the effect he is endeavoring to promote. Ordinarily he speaks for a purpose, and his purpose modifies his speech. The understanding of it is part of the whole business of apprehending his meaning. Unless we know what he

is trying to do, we can hardly estimate the measure of his success. Yet the number of readers who omit such considerations might make a fainthearted writer despair. Sometimes, of course, he will purpose no more than to state his thoughts (I), or to express his feelings about what he is thinking of, e.g. Hurrah! Damn! (II), or to express his attitude to his listener (III). With this last case we pass into the realm of endearments and abuse.

Frequently his intention operates through and satisfies itself in a combination of the other functions. Yet it has effects not reducible to their effects. It may govern the stress laid upon points in an argument for example, shape the arrangement, and even call attention to itself in such phrases as *for contrast's sake* or *lest it be supposed*. It controls the plot in the largest sense of the word, and is at work whenever the author is "hiding his hand". And it has especial importance in dramatic and semidramatic literature. Thus the influence of his intention upon the language he uses is additional to, and separable from, the other three influences, and its effects can profitably be considered apart.

We shall find in the protocols instances, in plenty, offailure on the part of one or other of these functions. Sometimes all four fail together; a reader garbles the sense, distorts the feeling, mistakes the tone and disregards the intention; and often a partial collapse of one function entails aberrations in the others. The possibilities of human misunderstanding make up indeed a formidable subject for study, but something more can be done to elucidate it than has yet been attempted. Whatever else we may do by the light of nature it would be folly to maintain that we should read by it. But before turning back to scrutinize our protocols some further explanation of these functions will be in place.

If we survey our uses of language as a whole, it is clear that, at times, now one now another of the functions may become predominant. It will make the possible situations clearer if we briefly review certain typical forms of composition. A man writing a scientific treatise, for example, will put the sense of what he has to say first, he will subordinate his feelings about his subject or about other views upon it and be careful not to let them interfere to distort his argument or to suggest

bias. His tone will be settled for him by academic convention; he will, if he is wise, indicate respect for his readers and a moderate anxiety to be understood accurately and to win acceptance for his remarks. It will be well if his intention, as it shows itself in the work, be on the whole confined to the clearest and most adequate statement of what he has to say (function 1, sense). But, if the circumstances warrant it, further relevant aims—an intention to reorientate opinion, to direct attention to new aspects, or to encourage or discourage certain methods of work or ways of approach— are obviously fitting. Irrelevant aims—the acceptance of the work as a thesis for a Ph. D., for example— come in a different category.

Consider now a writer engaged upon popularizing some of the results and hypotheses of science. The principles governing his language are not nearly so simple, for the furtherance of his intention will properly and inevitably interfere with the other functions.

In the first place, precise and adequate statement of the sense may have to be sacrificed, to some degree, in the interests of general intelligibility. Simplifications and distortions may be necessary if the reader is to "follow". Secondly, a much more lively exhibition of feelings on the part of the author towards his subject matter is usually appropriate and desirable, in order to awaken and encourage the reader's interest. Thirdly, more variety of tone will be called for; jokes and humorous illustrations, for example, are admissible, and perhaps a certain amount of cajolery. With this increased liberty, tact, the subjective counterpart of tone, will be urgently required. A human relation between the expert and his lay audience must be created, and the task, as many specialists have discovered, is not easy. These other functions will interfere still more with strict accuracy of statement; and if the subject has a "tendency", if political, ethical or theological implications are at all prominent, the intention of the work will have further opportunities to intervene.

This leads us to the obvious instance of political speeches. What rank and precedence shall we assign to the four language functions if we analyze public utterances made in the midst of a General Election?

Function 4, the furtherance of intentions (of all grades of worthiness) is unmistakably predominant. Its instruments are function 2, the expression of feelings about causes, policies, leaders and opponents, and function 3, the establishment of favorable relations with the audience ("the great heart of the people"). Recognizing this, ought we to be pained or surprised that function 1, the presentation of facts (or of objects of thought to be regarded as facts are regarded), is equally subordinated?[3] But further consideration of this situation would lead us into a topic that must be examined later, that of *sincerity*, a word with several important meanings.

In conversation, perhaps, we get the clearest examples of these shifts of function, the normal verbal apparatus of one function being taken over by another. Intention, we have seen, may completely subjugate the others; so, on occasion, may feeling or tone express themselves through sense, translating themselves into explicit statements about feelings and attitudes towards things and people—statements sometimes belied by their very form and manner. Diplomatic formulae are often good examples, together with much of the social language (Malinowski's "phatic communion"), the *thank you so very muches*, and *pleased to meet yous*, that help us to live amicably with one another.

Under this head, too, may be put the psychological analyses, the introspective expatiations that have recently flourished so much in fiction as well as in sophisticated conversation. Does it indicate a confusion or a tenuousness in our feelings that we should now find ourselves so ready to make statements about them, to translate them into disquisitions, instead of expressing them in more direct and natural ways? Or is this phenomenon simply another result of the increased study of psychology? It would be rash to decide as yet. Certainly some psychologists lay themselves open to a charge of emptiness, of having so dealt with themselves that they have little left within them to talk about. "Putting it into words", if the words are those of a psychological textbook, is a process which may well be damaging to the feelings. I shall be lucky if my reader does not murmur *de te fabula* at this point.

But feeling (and sometimes tone) may take charge of and operate through sense in another fashion, one more constantly relevant in poetry. (If indeed the shift just dealt with above might not be better described as sense interfering with and dominating feeling and tone.)

When this happens, the statements which appear in the poetry are there for the sake of their effects upon feelings, not for their own sake. Hence to challenge their truth or to question whether they deserve serious attention *as statements claiming truth*, is to mistake their function. The point is that many, if not most, of the statements in poetry are there *as a means* to the manipulation [1] and expression of feelings and attitudes, not as contributions to any body of doctrine of any type whatever. With narrative poetry there is little danger of any mistake arising, but with "philosophical" or meditative poetry there is great danger of a confusion which may have two sets of consequences.

On the one hand there are very many people who, if they read any poetry at all, try to take all its statements seriously -and find them silly. "My soul is a ship in full sail", for example, seems to them a very profitless kind of contribution to psychology. This may seem an absurd mistake but, alas! It is nonetheless common. On the other hand there are those who succeed too well, who swallow "Beauty is truth, truth beauty...", as the quintessence of an aesthetic philosophy, not as the expression of a certain blend of feelings, and proceed into a complete stalemate of muddle-mindedness as a result of their linguistic naivety. It is easy to see what those in the first group miss; the losses of the second group, though the accountancy is more complicated, are equally lamentable.

A temptation to discuss here some further intricacies of this shift of function must be resisted. An overflow into Appendix A, which may serve as a kind of technical workshop for those who agree with me that the matter is important enough to be examined *with pains*, will be the best solution. I am anxious to illustrate these distinctions from the protocols before tedium too heavily assails us. It will be enough here to note that this subjugation of statement to emotive purposes has innumerable modes. A poet may distort his statements which have logically

nothing to do with the subject under treatment: he may, by metaphor and otherwise, present objects for thought which are logically quite irrelevant; he may perpetrate logical nonsense, be as trivial or as silly, logically, as it is possible to be; all in the interests of the other functions of his language—to express feeling or adjust tone or further his other intentions. If his success in these other aims justify him, no reader (of the kind at least to take his meaning as it should be taken) can validly say anything against him.

But these indirect devices for expressing feeling through logical irrelevance and nonsense, through statements not to be taken strictly, literally or seriously, though preeminently apparent in poetry, are not peculiar to it. A great part of what passes for criticism comes under this head. It is much harder to obtain statements about poetry, than expressions of feelings towards it and towards the author. Very many apparent statements turn out on examination to be only these disguised forms, indirect expressions, of feeling, tone and intention. Dr. Bradley's remark that *poetry is a spirit*, and Dr. Mackail's that it is *a continuous substance or energy whose progress is immortal* are eminent examples that I have made use of elsewhere, so curious that I need no apology for referring to them again. Remembering them, we may be more ready to apply to the protocols every instrument of interpretation we possess. May we avoid if possible in our own reading of the protocols those errors of misunderstanding which we are about to watch being committed towards the poems.

Chapter VII
Doctrine in Poetry

> Logic is the ethics of thinking, in the sense in which ethics is the bringing to bear of self-control, for the purpose of realizing our desires.
>
> (Charles Sanders Peirce)

With most of our critical difficulties what we have had to explain is

how mistakes come to be so frequent. But here we are in the opposite case. we have to explain how they come to be so rare. For it would seem evident that poetry which has been built upon firm and definite beliefs about the world, *The Divine Comedy* or *Paradise Lost*, or Donne's *Divine Poems*, or Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*, or Hardy's *The Dynasts*, must appear differently to readers who do and readers who do not hold similar beliefs. Yet in fact most readers, and nearly all good readers, are very little disturbed by even a direct opposition between their own beliefs and beliefs of the poet. Lucretius and Virgil, Euripides and Aeschylus, we currently assume, are equally accessible, given the necessary scholarship, to a Roman Catholic, to a Buddhist and to a confirmed skeptic. Equally accessible in the sense that these different readers, after due study, may respond in the same way to the poetry and arrive at similar judgments about it. And when they differ, their divergencies will commonly not be a result of their different positions with regard to the doctrines of the authors, but are more likely to derive from other causes— in their temperaments and personal experience.

I have instanced religious poetry because the beliefs there concerned have the widest implications, and are the most seriously entertained of any. But the same problem arises with nearly all poetry; with mythology very evidently; with such supernatural machinery as appears in *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*: "The horned Moon, with one bright star/Within the nether tip", with Blake's manifestos; but equally, though less obtrusively, with every passage which seems to make a statement, or depend upon an assumption, that a reader may dissent from, without thereby giving proof of mental derangement.

It is essential to recognize that the problem is the same whether the possible stumbling block, the point of dissent, be trivial or important. When the point is trivial, we easily satisfy ourselves with an explanation in terms of "poetic fictions". When it is a matter of no consequence whether we assent or dissent, the theory that these disputable statements, so constantly presented to us in poetry, are merely *assumptions* introduced for poetic purposes, seems an adequate explanation. And

when the statements, for example, Homer's account of "the monkey-shines of the Olympian troupe", are frankly incredible, if paraded solemnly before the bar of reasoned judgment, the same explanation applies. But as the assumptions grow more plausible, and as the consequences for our view of the world grow important, the matter seems less simple. Until, in the end, with Donne's sonnet (poem 3), for example, it becomes very difficult not to think that *actual belief* in the doctrine that appears in the poem is required for its full and perfect imaginative realization. The mere assumption of Donne's theology, as a poetic fiction, may seem insufficient in view of the intensity of the feeling which is supported and conveyed to us by its means. It is at least certain, as the protocols show, that many who try to read religious poetry find themselves strongly invited to the beliefs presented, and that doctrinal dissent is a very serious obstacle to their reading. Conversely, many successful but dissenting readers find themselves in a mental attitude towards the doctrine which, if it is not belief, closely resembles belief.

Yet if we suppose that, beyond this mere "poetic" assumption, a definite state of belief in this particular doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body is required for a full reading of Donne's poem, great difficulties at once arise. We shall have to suppose that readers who hold different beliefs incompatible with this particular doctrine must either not be able to read the poem, or must temporarily while reading it abandon their own beliefs and adopt Donne's. Both suppositions *seem* contrary to the facts, though these are matters upon which certainty is hazardous. We shall do better, however, to examine the "poetic fiction", or assumption, theory more closely and see whether when fully stated it is capable of meeting the complaint of inadequacy noticed above.

In the first place the very word *assumption* is unsuitable here. Ordinarily an assumption is a proposition, an object of thought, entertained intellectually in order to trace its logical consequences as a hypothesis. But here we are concerned very little with *logical* consequences and almost exclusively with emotional consequences. In the effect of the thought upon our feelings and attitudes, all its

importance, for poetry, lies. But there are clearly two ways in which we may entertain an assumption: intellectually, that is, in a context of other thoughts ready to support, contradict, or establish other logical relations with it; and emotionally, in a context of sentiments, feelings, desires and attitudes ready to group themselves around it. Behind the intellectual assumption stands the desire for logical consistency and order in the receptive side of the mind. But behind the emotional assumption stands the desire or need for order of the whole outgoing emotional side of the personality, the side that is turned towards action.

Corresponding to this distinction there are two forms of belief and similarly two forms of disbelief. Intellectual belief more resembles a weighting of an idea than anything else, a loading[5] which makes other, less heavily weighted ideas, adjust themselves to it rather than vice versa. The loading may be legitimate; the quantity of evidence, its immediacy, the extent and complexity of the supporting systems of ideas are obvious forms of legitimate loading: or it may be illegitimate; our liking for the idea, its brilliance, the trouble that changing it may involve, emotional satisfactions from it, are illegitimate—*from the standpoint of intellectual belief*, be it understood. The whole use of intellectual belief is to bring *all* our ideas into as perfect an ordered system as possible. We disbelieve only because we believe something else that is incompatible, as Spinoza long ago pointed out. Similarly, we perhaps only believe because it is necessary to disbelieve whatever is logically contradictory to our belief. *Neither belief nor disbelief arises*, in this intellectual sense, *unless the logical context of our ideas is in question*. Apart from these logical connections the idea is neither believed nor disbelieved, nor doubted nor questioned; it is just present. Most of the ideas of the child, of primitive man, of the peasant, of the nonintellectual world and of most poetry are in this happy condition of real intellectual disconnection.

Emotional belief is a very different matter. In primitive man, as innumerable observers have remarked, any idea which opens a ready outlet to emotion or points to a line of action in conformity with custom is quickly believed. We remain much more primitive in this phase of our

behavior than in intellectual matters. Given a need[5] (whether conscious *as a desire* or not), any idea which can be taken as a step on the way to its fulfillment is accepted, unless some other need equally active at the moment bars it out. This acceptance, this use of the idea—by our interests, desires, feelings, attitudes, tendencies to action and what not—is emotional belief. So far as the idea is useful to them it is believed, and the sense of attachment, of adhesion, of conviction, which we feel, and to which we give the name of belief, is the result of this implication of the idea in our activities.

Most beliefs, of course, that have any strength or persistence are mixtures of intellectual and emotional belief. A purely intellectual belief need have little strength, no quality of conviction about it, for unless the idea is very original and contrary to received ideas, it needs little loading to hold its own. When we find a modern physicist, for example, passionately attached to a particular theory, we may suspect illegitimate loading, his reputation is perhaps involved in its acceptance. Conversely, a very strong emotional belief may have little persistence. Last night's revelation grows dim amid this morning's affairs, for the need which gave it such glamorous reality was only a need of the moment. Of this kind are most of the revelations received from poetry and music. But though the sense of revelation has faded, we should not suppose that the shaping influence of such experiences must be lost. The mind has found through them a pattern of response which may remain, and it is this pattern rather than the revelation which is important.

The great difference between these two kinds of belief, as I have defined them, appears most plainly if we consider what *justification* amounts to for each. Whether an intellectual belief is justified is entirely a matter of its logical place in the largest, most completely ordered, system of ideas we can attain to. Now the central, most stable, mass of our ideas has already an order and arrangement fixed for it by the facts of nature. We must bring our ideas of these facts into correspondence with them or we promptly perish. And this order among the everyday facts of our surroundings determines the arrangement of yet another

system of our ideas: namely, physical theory. These ideas are thereby weighted beyond the power of irreconcilable ideas to disturb them. Anyone who understands them cannot help believing in them, and disbelieving *intellectually* in irreconcilable ideas, provided that he brings them close enough together to perceive their irreconcilability. There are obviously countless ideas in poetry which, if put into this logical context, must be disbelieved at once.

But this intellectual disbelief does not imply that emotional belief in the same idea is either impossible or even difficult —much less that it is undesirable. For an emotional belief is not justified through any logical relations between its idea and other ideas. Its only justification is its success in meeting our needs—due regard being paid to the relative claims of our many needs one against another. It is a matter, to put it simply, of the *prudence* (in view of *all* the needs of our being) of the kind of emotional activities the belief subserves. The desirability or undesirability of an emotional belief has nothing to do with its intellectual status, provided it is kept from interfering with the intellectual system. And poetry is an extraordinarily successful device for preventing these interferences from arising.

Coleridge, when he remarked that "a willing suspension of disbelief" accompanied much poetry, was noting an important fact, but not quite in the happiest terms, for we are neither aware of a disbelief nor voluntarily suspending it in these cases. It is better to say that the question of belief or disbelief, in the intellectual sense, never arises when we are reading well. If unfortunately it does arise, either through the poet's fault or our own, we have for the moment ceased to be reading poetry and have become astronomers, or theologians, or moralists, persons engaged in quite a different type of activity.

But a possible misconception must be noted here. The intellectual exploration of the *internal* coherence of the poem, and the intellectual examination of the relations of its ideas to other ideas of ordinary experience which are *emotionally* relevant to it, are not only permissible but necessary in the reading of much poetry, as we saw in connection with the sea-harp in poem 9, and in connection with the sentimentality and

stock response problems of poems 4, 8 and 13.[7] But this restricted intellectual inquiry is a different thing from the all-embracing attempt to systematize our ideas which alone brings up the problem of intellectual belief.

We can now turn back to poem 3, to the point from which this long analysis started. There are many readers who feel a difficulty in giving to Donne's theology just that kind of acceptance, *and no more*, that they give to Coleridge's "star within the nether tip". They feel an invitation to accord to the poem that helief in its ideas which we can hardly help supposing to have been, in Donne's mind, a powerful influence over its shaping. These readers may, perhaps, be content if we insist that the fullest possible *emotional* belief is fitting and desirable. At the same time there are many who are unable to accord *intellectual* belief to these particular theological tenets. Such readers may feel that a threatened liberty is not thereby denied them. The fact that Donne probably gave both forms of belief to these ideas need not, I think, prevent a good reader from giving the fullest emotional belief while withholding intellectual belief, or rather while not allowing the question of intellectual belief to arise. The evidence is fragmentary upon the point, largely because it has been so strangely little discussed. But the very fact that the need to discuss it has not insistently arisen--seeing how many people from how many different intellectual positions have been able to agree about the value of such doctrinal poems—points strongly in this direction. The absence of intellectual belief need not cripple emotional belief, though evidently enough in some persons it may. But the habit of attaching emotional belief only to intellectually certified ideas is strong in some people; it is encouraged by some forms of education; it is perhaps becoming, through the increased prestige of science, more common.[8] For those whom it conquers it means "Good-bye to poetry".

For the difficulty crops up, as I have insisted, over all poetry that departs, for its own purposes, from the most ordinary universal facts of common experience or from the most necessary deductions of scientific theory. It waylays the strict rationalist with Blake's *Sunflower*,

Wordsworth's *River Duddon*, and Shelley's *Cloud*, no less than with their more transcendental utterances. Shakespeare's Lark is as shocking as his Phoenix. Even so honest a man as Gray attributes very disputable motives to his Owl. As for Dryden's "new-kindled star", the last verse of Keats' *Ode to Melancholy*, or Landor's *Rose Aylmer*—it is very clear where we should be with them if we could not give emotional assent apart from intellectual conviction. The slightest poetry may present the problem as clearly (though not so acutely) as the greatest. And the fact that we solve it, in practice, without the least difficulty in minor cases shows, I think, that even in the major instances of philosophic and religious issues the same solution is applicable. But the temptation to confuse the two forms of belief is there greater.

For in these cases an appearance of incompleteness or insincerity may attach to emotional acceptance divorced from intellectual assent. That this is simply a mistake due to a double meaning of *belief* has been my contention. To "pretend to believe" what we "don't really believe" would certainly be insincerity, if the two kinds of believing were one and the same; but if they are not, the confusion is merely another example of the prodigious power of words over our lives. And this will be the best place to take up the uncomfortable problem of *sincerity*, a word much used in criticism, but not often with any precise definition of its meaning.

The ideas, vague and precise, for which *sincere* stands must have been constantly in the reader's mind during our discussion both of stock responses and of sentimentality. We can set aside at once the ordinary "business" sense in which a man is insincere when he deliberately attempts to deceive, and sincere when his statement and acts are governed by "the best of his knowledge and belief". And we can deal briefly with another sense, already touched upon in connection with poem 7, in which a man is insincere when "he kids *himself*", when he mistakes his own motives and so professes feelings which are different from those that are in fact actuating him. Two subtle points, however, must be noted before we set this sense aside. The feelings need not be stated or even openly expressed; it is enough if they are hinted to us. And they

need not be actual personal "real, live feelings"; they may be imagined feelings. All that is required for this kind of insincerity is a discrepancy between the poem's claim upon our respose and its *shaping* impulses in the poet's mind. But only the shaping impulses are relevant. A good poem can perfectly well be written for money or from pique or ambition, provided these initial external motives do not interfere with its growth. Interferences of all kinds—notably the desire to make the poem "original", "striking", or "poetic" -- are, of course, the usual cause of insincerity in this sense. A sense which ought not, it may be remarked, to impute blame to the author, unless we are willing to agree that all men who are not good poets are therefore blameworthy in a high degree.

These subtleties were necessary to escape the conclusion that irony, for example where the feeling really present is often the exact contrary to that overtly professed—is as insincere as simple readers often suppose it must be.

A more troublesome problem is raised if we ask whether an emotion, by itself and apart from its expression, can be sincere or insincere. We often speak as if this were so, and though sometimes no doubt this is only an effective way of saying that we approve (or disapprove) of the emotion, there are senses in which a fact about the emotion, not about our feelings about it, is meant. Sincere emotions, we say, are genuine or authentic, as opposed to spurious emotions, and the several senses which we may imply thereby are worth examining. We may mean that the emotion is genuine in the sense that every product of a perfect mind would be genuine. It would result only from the prompting situation *plus* all the relevant experience of that mind, and be free from impurities and from all interferences, from impulses that had in any way got out of place and become disordered. Since such minds are nowhere obtainable in this obstructive world, such a sense is useful only as an ideal standard by which to measure degrees of relative insincerity. "There is not a just man on earth that doeth good and sinneth not." Some great poetry, we might say, represents the closest approach to sincerity that can be found. And for extreme degrees of insincerity we

should look in asylums. Possibly, however, the perfect mind, if it ever appeared among us, might be put there too.

But this is plainly not a sense of sincerity which we often use, it is not what people ordinarily mean. For we would agree that stupid people can be very sincere, though their minds may be very much in a muddle, and we might even suggest that they are more likely to be sincere than the clever. Simplicity, we may think, has something to do with sincerity, for there is a sense in which *genuine* is opposed to *sophisticated*. The sincere feeling, it may be suggested, is one which has been left in its natural state, not worked over and complicated by reflection. Thus strong spontaneous feelings would be more likely to be sincere than feelings that have run the gauntlet of self-criticism, and a dog, for example, might be regarded as a more sincere animal than any man.

This is certainly a sense which is frequent, though whether we should praise emotions that are sincere in this sense as much as most people do, is extremely doubtful. It is partly an echo of Rousseau's romantic fiction, the "natural man". Admiration for the "spontaneous" and "natural" tends to select favorable examples and turns a very blind eye to the less attractive phenomena. Moreover, many emotions which look simple and natural are nothing of the kind; they result from cultivated self-control, so consummate as to seem instantaneous. These cases, and an attractive but limited virtue in some children's behavior, explain, I believe, the popularity of *sincerity* in this sense. So used, the word is of little service in criticism, for this kind of sincerity in poetry must necessarily be rare.

It will be worthwhile hunting a little longer for a satisfactory sense of *sincerity*. Whatever it is, it is the quality we most insistently require in poetry. It is also the quality we most need as critics. And, perhaps, in the proportion that we possess it we shall acknowledge that it is not a quality that we can take for granted in ourselves as our inalienable birthright. It fluctuates with our state of health, with the quality of our recent companions, with our responsibility and our nearness to the object, with a score of conditions that are not easy to take account of. We can *feel* very sincere when, in fact, as others can see clearly, there is

no sincerity in us. Bogus forms of the virtue waylay us— confident inner assurances and invasive rootless convictions. And when we doubt our own sincerity and ask ourselves, "Do I *really* think so; do I really feel so?" an honest answer is not easily come by. A direct effort to be sincere, like other effects to will ourselves into action, more often than not frustrates its intention. For all these reasons any light that can be gained upon the nature of sincerity, upon possible tests for it and means for inducing and promoting it, is extremely serviceable to the critic.

The most stimulating discussion of this topic is to be found in the *Chung Yung*[9] (*The Doctrine of the Mean*, or *Equilibrium and Harmony*), the treatise that embodies the most interesting and the most puzzling part of the teachings of Confucius. A more distinct (and distinguished) word than *stimulating* would be in place to describe this treatise, were the invigorating effect of a careful reading easier to define. Sincerity- the object of some idea that seems to lie in the territory that *sincerity* covers—appears there as the beginning and end of personal character, the secret of a good life, the only means to good government, the means to give full development to our own natures, to give full development to the nature of others, and very much more. This virtue is as mysterious as it is powerful; and, where so many great sinologues and Chinese scholars have confessed themselves baffled, it would be absurd for one who knows no Chinese to suggest interpretations. But some speculations generated by a reading of translations may round off this chapter.

The following extracts from the *Chung Yung* seem the most relevant to our discussion.

> Sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the way of men. He who possesses sincerity, is he who, without an effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, without the exercise of thought; he is the sage who naturally and easily embodies the right way. He who attains to sincerity, is he who chooses what is good, and firmly holds it fast. Sincerity is that whereby self-completion is effected, and its way is that by which man must direct himself.

In self-completion the superior man completes other men and things also . . . and this is the way by which a union is effected of the external and the internal. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, "In hewing an axehandle, in hewing an axe-handle, the pattern is not far off." We grasp one axe-handle to hew the other, and yet, if we look askance from the one to the other, we may consider them as apart. There is a way to the attainment of sincerity in oneself; if a man does not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself. When we have intelligence resulting from sincerity, this condition is to be ascribed to nature; when we have sincerity resulting from intelligence, this condition is to be ascribed to instruction. But given the sincerity, there shall be the intelligence, given the intelligence there shall be the sincerity.

How far apart any detailed precise exposition in English, or in any modern Western language, must be from the form of thought of the original, is shown if we compare a more literal version of this last passage: "Being true begets light, we call that nature. Light leads to being true, we call that teaching. What is true grows light; what is light grows true."

Meditating upon this chain of pronouncements we can perhaps construct (or discover) another sense of *sincerity*. One important enough to justify the stress so often laid upon this quality by critics, yet not compelling us to require an impossible perfection or inviting us to sentimental (sense 3) indiscriminate overadmiration of the ebullitions of infants. And it may be possible, by apprehending this sense more clearly, to see what general conditions will encourage sincerity and what steps may be suggested to promote this mysterious but necessary virtue in the critic.

We may take self-completion as our starting point. The completed mind would be that perfect mind we envisaged above, in which no disorder, no mutual frustration of impulses remained. Let us suppose that in the irremediable default of this perfection, default due to man's innate constitution and to the accidents to which he is exposed, there

exists a tendency towards increased order, a tendency which takes effect unless baffled by physical interferences (disease) or by fixations of habit that prevent us from continuing to learn by experience, or by ideas too invested with emotion for other ideas that disturb them to be formed, or by too lax and volatile a bond between our interests (a frivolousness that is perhaps due to the draining off of energy elsewhere) so that no formations firm enough to build upon result.

There is much to be said in favor of such a supposition. This tendency would be a need, in the sense defined above in this chapter—deriv ing in fact from *the* fundamental imbalance to which biological develop ment may be supposed to be due. This development with man (and his animal neighbors) seems to be predominantly in the direction of greater complexity and finer differentiation of responses. And it is easy to conceive the organism as relieving, through this differentiation, the strain put upon it by life in a partly uncongenial environment. It is but a step further to conceive it as also tending to relieve internal strains due to these developments imposed from without. And a reordering of its impulses so as to reduce their interferences with one another to a minimum would be the most successful and the "natural" --direction which this tendency would take.

Such a reordering would be a partial self-completion, temporary and provisional upon the external world remaining for the individual much what it had been in the past. And by such self completion the superior man *would* "effect a union of the external and the internal". Being more at one within itself the mind thereby becomes more appropriately responsive to the outer world. I am not suggesting that this is what Confucius meant. For him "to complete other men and things too", is possibly the prerogative of the force of example, other men merely imitating the conduct of the sage. But he *may* have meant that freedom calls out freedom: that those who are "most themselves" cause others about them to become also "more themselves"; which would, perhaps, be a more sagacious observation. Perhaps, too, "the union of the external and the internal" meant for him something different from the accordance of our thoughts and feelings with reality. But certainly,

for us, this accordance is one of the fruits of sincerity.

This tendency towards a more perfect order, as it takes effect, "enables us, without effort, to hit what is right, and, without the exercise of thought, to apprehend". The "exercise of thought" here must be understood as that process of deliberately setting aside inappropriate ideas and feelings, which, in default of a sufficient inner order—a sufficient sincerity—is still very necessary. Confucius has enough to say elsewhere in the *Chung Yung* of the need for unremitting research and reflection *before* sincerity is attained to clear himself from any charge of recommending "intuition" as an *alternative* to investigation. "Intuition" is the prerogative only of those who have attained to sincerity. It is only the superior man who "naturally and easily embodies the right way". And the superior man will know when his sincerity is insufficient and take ceaseless steps to remedy it. "If another man (more sincere) succeed by one effort, *he* will use a hundred efforts. If another man succeed by ten efforts, he will use a thousand." It is the sincerity to which the superior man has already attained which enables him to know when it is insufficient; if it does not yet enable him to embody the right way, it at least enables him to refrain from embodying the wrong, as those who trust intuition too soon are likely to do. Indeed, looking back over the history of thought, we might say "are certain to do", so heavy are the probabilities against the success of guesswork.

Sincerity, then, in this sense, is obedience to that tendency which "seeks" a more perfect order within the mind. When the tendency is frustrated (e.g., by fatigue or by an idea or feeling that has lost its link with experience, or has become fixed beyond the possibility of change) we have insincerity. When confusion reigns and we are unable to decide what we think or feel (to be distinguished sharply from the case when *decided* thoughts or feelings are present, but we are unable to define or express them) we need be neither sincere nor insincere. We are in a transitional stage which may result in either. Most good critics will confess to themselves that this is the state in which a *first reading* of any poem of an unfamiliar type leaves them. They know that more study is needed if they are to achieve a genuine response, and they

know this in virtue of the sincerity they have already attained. It follows that people with clear definite ideas and feelings, with a high degree of practical efficiency, may be insincere in this sense. Other kinds of sincerity, fidelity to convictions for example, will not save them, and indeed it may well be this fidelity which is thwarting the life of the spirit in them.

Any response (however mistaken from other points of view) which embodies the present activity of this tendency to inner adjustments will be sincere, and any response that conflicts with it or inhibits it will be insincere. Thus to be sincere is to act, feel and think in accordance with "one's true nature", and to be insincere is to act, feel or think in a contrary manner. But the sense to be given to *one's true nature* is, as we have seen, a matter largely conjectural. To define it more exactly would perhaps be tedious and, for our purposes here, needless. In practice we often seem to grasp it very clearly; and all that I have attempted here is to sketch the state of affairs which we then seem to grasp. "What heaven has conferred is man's nature; an accordance with this is the path." Sometimes we can be certain that we have left it.

On the ways in which sincerity may be increased and extended Confucius is very definite. If we seek a standard for a new response whose sincerity may be in doubt, we shall find it, he says, in the very responses which make the new one possible. The pattern for the new axe-handle is already in our hand, though its very nearness, our firm possession of it, may hide it from us. We need, of course, a founded assurance of the sincerity of these instrumental responses themselves, and this we can gain by comparison. What is meant by *making the thoughts sincere* is the allowing no self-deception "*as when we hate a bad smell*, and as when we love what is beautiful". When we hate a bad smell we can have no doubt that our response is sincere. We can all, at least, find *some* responses beyond suspicion. These are our standard. By studying our sincerity in the fields in which we are fully competent we can extend it into the fields in which our ability is still feeling its way. This seems to be the meaning of *choosing what is good and firmly holding fast to it*, where *good* stands not for our Western ethical

notion so much as for the fit and proper, sane and healthy. The man who does not "hate a bad smell" "does not understand what is good"; having no basis or standards, "he will not attain to sincerity".

Together with these, the simplest, most definite responses, there may be suggested also, as standards for sincerity, the responses we make to the most baffling objects that can be presented to our consciousness. Something like a technique or ritual for heightening sincerity might well be worked out. When our response to a poem after our best efforts remains uncertain, when we are unsure whether the feelings it excites come from a deep source in our experience, whether our liking or disliking is genuine, is *ours*, or an accident of fashion, a response to surface detail or to essentials, we may perhaps help ourselves by considering it in a frame of feelings whose sincerity is beyond our questioning. Such are the feelings that may be aroused by contemplation of the following:

1. Man's loneliness (the isolation of the human situation).
2. The facts of birth, and of death, in their inexplicable oddity.
3. The inconceivable immensity of the Universe.
4. Man's place in the perspective of time.
5. The enormity of his ignorance.

Taking these not as targets for doctrine, but as the most incomprehensible and inexhaustible objects for meditation, while their reverberation lasts pass the poem through the mind, silently reciting it as slowly as it allows. Whether what it can stir in us is important or not to us will, perhaps, show itself then. Many religious exercises and some of the practices of divination and magic may be thought to be directed in part towards a similar quest for sanction, to be rituals designed to provide standards of sincerity.

注释:

1 作者在原注中认为:"相对而言或就实际情况来说,只能是被动的。这是我们的习惯会让我们记住的一个事实。对某种意义的接受(或解释)是一种活动,它可能误人歧途。事实上,在传递过程中总要丢掉或歪曲某种东西。"

2 这里"感情"指生活中整个情感方面——情感、情绪、态度、意愿、欲望、不快等等。

3 这里需要注意的是其含义，即说话者相信"事实"—— 不仅作为有力的论点，而且作为事实。这里信念与功能相关，因而也是个多义词。

4 理查兹认为诗人不会意识到自己的方法和目的之间的区分。

5 这里 loading 像是一种信任感。人们一般站在理性信念的一边。虽然传统上信念常常与判断连在一起，但信念与选择的关系更密切。

6 这里 need 指一种精神或物质的不平衡，一种在特定条件下走向最终平衡的倾向。因此摇摆可以说是通过停止摇摆的需要实现的。人们常常处于内在不平衡的状态。

7 poem 9：诺伊斯(Alfred Noyes)的《为乔治·梅瑞狄斯八十寿辰而作》(" For the Eightieth Birthday of George Meredith")。

poem 4：引自肯尼迪(G. A. Studdert Kennedy)的《神父诗草》("More Rough Rhymes of a Padre")。

poem 8：劳伦斯(D. H. Lawrence)的《钢琴》(" Piano")。

poem 13：朗费罗(Henry Wadsworth Longfellow)的《在剑桥的教堂墓地》("In the Churchyard at Cambridge")。

8 理查兹在《科学与诗》里曾详细讨论过这种危险。他认为，有理由相信，诗常常通过融合或混淆两种形式的信念而出现。因此必须以科学的世界观区分事实和虚构。

9 即《中庸》。

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第三章　原型批评

archetype(原型)由希腊文中的 *arche*(原初,original)和 *typos*(形式,form)组成。古希腊著名哲学家柏拉图曾使用此词。原型是文学中经常使用的象征,但与象征有别。它主要指一种"原初的意象",即人类早期的意象。早期的人类通过图腾崇拜、梦、神话、传说表现原初意象,如太阳象征光明、水象征圣洁等。希腊神话中有太阳神阿波罗和为人类盗火的普罗米修斯。

加拿大批评家、理论家诺斯罗普·弗莱(1912-1993)说,原型是一种典型或重复出现的意象。他用原型指一种象征。他说:"我给它取个名字叫原型,它是一种典型或重复出现的意象。"原型把一首诗和别的诗联系起来。每个诗人都采用自己独特的意象。但是,当许多诗人尤其是千年前、相距万里不能交流的诗人不约而同地使用一些相同的意象时,人们就会问:他们何以能使用相同的意象?例如,古往今来,许多民族把太阳和山视为阳性意象,却把月亮和水同阴性意象联系在一起。我们在世界各地的文学作品中发现田园象征系统的普遍性。古罗马诗人维吉尔的牧歌、锡德尼的《阿卡狄亚》和《仙后》以及《圣经》中有关于羊群的宗教暗示,莎士比亚的森林喜剧也充满了田园意象。

象征或意象通过一代又一代人的文学作品扩展为文学整体的一种原型象征。它成为一种可以交流的玄妙的符号。十字架象征基督教和基督之死,它是一个已被普遍接受的意象。

原型可以是意象、细节描述(如四季交替、生老病死等)、情节(如善与恶的争斗、灵与肉的冲突、"灰姑娘"式的幸运等)和人物类型。人物类型可分为善与恶两大类型。善者又可分为两类:一类拯救人的灵魂,如上帝和神职人员。另一类是救人于危难之际的英雄好汉、侠客义士,如英国文学作品中的罗宾汉,我国梁山泊一百零八将和孙悟空等。

原型批评研究文学作品中反复出现的上述四类原型。弗莱在其名著《批评的剖析》(1957)中从荣格的著作中借用了"原型"一词。弗莱常

说，他的原型批评理论是在荣格的集体无意识理论启发下形成的。因此，他把自己的原型批评理论也称为荣格的批评理论。有的批评家把荣格的"分析心理学"称为"原型心理学"。原型批评的流行是同荣格和弗莱分不开的。

荣格说："个人无意识的内容主要由带感情色彩的情绪组成，它构成心理生活中个人的一面。而集体无意识的内容则是所说的原型。"荣格所说的原型就是一个种族代代相传的基本原型意象。他认为，集体无意识的内容是原型或原始意象，个人的心理是通过进化建立的，它与个人的往昔和种族的往昔联结在一起。从一个人出生开始，这种意识就潜移默化地影响着他的心理活动。这种在每一个人头脑中继承下来的祖先经验被称为"种族记忆"、"原始意象"或"原型"。

荣格说："原型即领悟的典型模式。每当我们面对普遍一致、反复发生的领悟模式，我们就是在与原型相通。"他又说："人的一生中有多少典型情境就有多少原型，这些经验由于不断重复而深深地镂刻在我们的心理结构中。"他认为，创作的过程就是从无意识中激活原型意象，并对其进行加工制作，使之成为一部完整的作品。

1934 年，莫德·博德金在《诗中的原型模式》中论述原型时首次把兴趣从神话转移至原型。

20 世纪 80 年代又出现了女性主义原型批评理论。这方面的著作有：安妮斯·普拉特的《妇女小说中的原型模式》(1981)、埃斯特拉·劳特的《神话制作者的妇女：二十世纪妇女的诗和视觉艺术》(1984)、埃斯特拉·劳特和卡罗尔·施顿尔·鲁普雷希特合著的《女性主义原型理论：跨学科的荣格思想》(1985)。

对原型研究有杰出贡献的还有苏格兰人类学家詹姆士·乔治·弗雷泽。他的名著《金枝》(1890—1915)对神话、宗教等问题作了精辟的论述，是弗莱经常引用的著作。

原型与仪式和神话紧密相关。

弗莱认为，文学表征神话和仪式，文学的叙述是象征交流的一种重复进行的行为，也就是说，是一种仪式。原型批评把文学叙述看做是仪式。宗教来源于仪式和神话；各种仪式和神话是史前人类精神生活的主要内容和表现。仪式反映了自然界许多周而复始的自然现象，如春夏秋冬、日出日落、潮起潮落、草木枯荣、生与死等。而象征性的意象则与这些自然现象紧密相连：太阳象征光明、夜晚象征黑暗、四季象征人生周期等。

不少在世界各地仍然流行的仪式均源于史前人类的各种仪式。飞禽在交配前的舞蹈启发了原始人的舞蹈仪式。地震、火山爆发、洪水、干旱、狂风暴雨等自然灾害迫使原始人用各种仪式祈求上天保佑。现今的祭祀、婚礼、葬礼、求神拜佛、庆丰收、狂欢节均源于原始人的仪式;宗教亦源于原始观念和仪式。

仪式反映人类的愿望和嫌恶。耶稣的复活反映人求生的愿望,即便不能永生,也要死而复生。在我国,有人死后重新投胎降生的迷信。驱逐、惩罚、处死等则是表现嫌恶的仪式。

仪式与神话产生宗教,而宗教与文学又互为表里,相辅相成。

弗莱把《圣经》看做文学结构的一个源头来研究。他说,许多文学作品甚至连书名都使用《圣经》中的用词,如托尔斯泰的《复活》、叶芝的《第二次圣临》、《启示录》等。

从古希腊悲剧到莎士比亚戏剧,我们能深切地感受到宗教对文学的影响,看到文学的宗教性,看到文学作品中常常出现的礼仪祈祷、念咒乞灵和种种其他宗教和非宗教仪式。奉献给酒神狄俄尼索斯的悲剧本身就是一种仪式,而表演悲剧或观看悲剧也可以说是一种源于古代的仪式,只是现代人在众多的日常仪式中已经淡化了仪式观,淡忘了现行仪式的渊源。

弗莱给神话下的定义是:"神话是仪式和梦幻在语词交流中的统一。……神话说明仪式和梦幻,并使两者得以交流。"神话是史诗不可缺少的要素。许多现代作家认为,在今日之文学创作中,作家仍然需要借用古代神话并构筑新神话,在新神话中建立新的文学意象。在叶芝的诗、艾略特的《荒原》、乔伊斯的《尤利西斯》中,我们能看到新神话和新意象。英国诗人布莱克在《伐拉·或天神》中创作了一个神话,表现工业社会中人类精神的异化和人格的分裂。叶芝的《幻象》就是一篇充满复杂、深奥的神秘主义和象征主义意象的散文,从中可以看出诗人构筑个人神话体系的意愿。艾略特的《荒原》采用二元对立的神话原型模式(死亡/复活,水/火等)。

神话和仪式是原始人在天、地、神之间寻求自己的地位的努力,是原始人无力对抗天灾时寻求与天、地、神和谐相处的努力,是原始人寻求宇宙和自身意义的一种解释系统。荣格说,这个系统为原始人的生活"提供了大大超出他们有限生存范围的前景,赋予他们展示性格的广阔空间,也为他们提供了作为完整的人的全部生活"。

原始人用许多生动的形象描绘、解释各种自然现象,表现出充满诗

意的想像力。四季的变化与循环诱发了许多有关四季和四季神的神话，至今经久不衰。雪莱的著名诗句“如果冬天已来临，春天还会远吗?”使用了神话中冬、春的意象。我们可以把四季的象征称为“原型想像”。“原型想像”就是把某一物体、事件、现象看做是具有普遍的象征意义。具有这种原型想像的作家在作品中使用原型模式。这种原型模式能在读者的心目中产生一种又陌生又似曾相识的感觉。而这似曾相识的感觉则源于“种族记忆”或集体无意识。

文学作品中的原型研究是一种文学人类学，因为它所关注的是与文学和人类学有关的原初意象、仪式、神话、民间传说等。

原型积淀了一代又一代人的智慧和心理能量。纵向使现代人与我们的祖先原始人一脉相承，横向使一个种族或一个民族与其他种族和民族相连。它是文学艺术的奥秘所在，也是原型批评的价值所在。

诺斯罗普·弗莱：文学中的原型

The Archetypes of Literature

Northrop Frye

I

Every organized body of knowledge can be learned progressively; and experience shows that there is also something progressive about the learning of literature. Our opening sentence has already got us into a semantic difficulty. Physics is an organized body of knowledge about nature, and a student of it says that he is learning physics, not that he is learning nature. Art, like nature, is the subject of a systematic study, and has to be distinguished from the study itself, which is criticism. It is therefore impossible to "learn literature": one learns about it in a certain way, but what one learns, transitively, is the criticism of literature. Similarly, the difficulty often felt in "teaching literature" arises from the fact that it cannot be done: the criticism of literature is all that can be directly taught. So while no one expects literature itself

to behave like a science, there is surely no reason why criticism, as a systematic and organized study, should not be, at least partly, a science. Not a "pure" or "exact" science, perhaps, but these phrases form part of a nineteenth-century cosmology which is no longer with us. Criticism deals with the arts and may well be something of an art itself, but it does not follow that it must be unsystematic. If it is to be related to the sciences too, it does not follow that it must be deprived of the graces of culture.

Certainly criticism as we find it in learned journals and scholarly monographs has every characteristic of a science. Evidence is examined scientifically; previous authorities are used scientifically; fields are investigated scientifically; texts are edited scientifically. Prosody is scientific in structure; so is phonetics; so is philology. And yet in studying this kind of critical science the student becomes aware of a centrifugal movement carrying him away from literature. He finds that literature is the central division of the "humanities", flanked on one side by history and on the other by philosophy. Criticism so far ranks only as a subdivision of literature; and hence, for the systematic mental organization of the subject, the student has to turn to the conceptual framework of the historian for events, and to that of the philosopher for ideas. Even the more centrally placed critical sciences, such as textual editing, seem to be part of a "background" that recedes into history or some other non-literary field. The thought suggests itself that the ancillary critical disciplines may be related to a central expanding pattern of systematic comprehension which has not yet been established, but which, if it were established, would prevent them from being centrifugal. If such a pattern exists, then criticism would be to art what philosophy is to wisdom and history to action.

Most of the central area of criticism is at present, and doubtless always will be, the area of commentary. But the commentators have little sense, unlike the researchers, of being contained within some sort of scientific discipline: they are chiefly engaged, in the words of the gospel hymn, in brightening the corner where they are. If we attempt to get a more comprehensive idea of what criticism is about, we find

ourselves wandering over quaking bogs of generalities, judicious pronouncements of value, reflective comments, perorations to works of research, and other consequences of taking the large view. But this part of the critical field is so full of pseudo-propositions, sonorous nonsense that contains no truth and no falsehood, that it obviously exists only because criticism, like nature, prefers a waste space to an empty one.

The term "pseudo-proposition" may imply some sort of logical positivist attitude on my own part. But I would not confuse the significant proposition with the factual one; nor should I consider it advisable to muddle the study of literature with a schizophrenic dichotomy between subjective-emotional and objective-descriptive aspects of meaning, considering that in order to produce any literary meaning at all one has to ignore this dichotomy. I say only that the principles by which one can distinguish a significant from a meaningless statement in criticism are not clearly defined. Our first step, therefore, is to recognize and get rid of meaningless criticism: that is, talking about literature in a way that cannot help to build up a systematic structure of knowledge. Casual valuejudgments belong not to criticism but to the history of taste, and reflect, at best, only the social and psychological compulsions which prompted their utterance. All judgments in which the values are not based on literary experience but are sentimental or derived from religious or political prejudice may be regarded as casual. Sentimental judgments are usually based either on nonexistent categories or antitheses ("Shakespeare studied life, Milton books") or on a visceral reaction to the writer's personality. The literary chit-chat which makes the reputations of poets boom and crash in an imaginary stock exchange is pseudo-criticism. That wealthy investor Mr Eliot, after dumping Milton on the market, is now buying him again; Donne has probably reached his peak and will begin to taper off; Tennyson may be in for a slight flutter but the Shelley stocks are still bearish. This sort of thing cannot be part of any systematic study, for a systematic study can only progress: whatever dithers or vacillates or reacts is merely leisure-class conversation.

We next meet a more serious group of critics who say: the foreground

of criticism is the impact of literature on the reader. Let us, then, keep the study of literature centripetal, and base the learning process on a structural analysis of the literary work itself. The texture of any great work of art is complex and ambiguous, and in unravelling the complexities we may take in as much history and philosophy as we please, if the subject of our study remains at the centre. If it does not, we may find that in our anxiety to write about literature we have forgotten how to read it.

The only weakness in this approach is that it is conceived primarily as the antithesis of centrifugal or "background" criticism, and so lands us in a somewhat unreal dilemma, like the conflict of internal and external relations in philosophy. Antitheses are usually resolved, not by picking one side and refuting the other, or by making eclectic choices between them, but by trying to get past the antithetical way of stating the problem. It is right that the first effort of critical apprehension should take the form of a rhetorical or structural analysis of a work of art. But a purely structural approach has the same limitation in criticism that it has in biology. In itself it is simply a discrete series of ana lyses based on the mere existence of the literary structure, without developing any explanation of how the structure came to be what it was and what its nearest relatives are. Structural analysis brings rhetoric back to criticism, but we need a new poetics as well, and the attempt to construct a new poetics out of rhetoric alone can hardly avoid a mere complication of rhetorical terms into a sterile jargon. I suggest that what is at present missing from literary criticism is a coordinating principle, a central hypothesis which, like the theory of evolution in biology, will see the phenomena it deals with as part of a whole. Such a principle, though it would retain the centripetal perspective of structural analysis, would try to give the same perspective to other kinds of criticism too.

The first postulate of this hypothesis is the same as that of any science: the assumption of total coherence. The assumption refers to the science, not to what it deals with. A belief in an order of nature is an inference from the intelligibility of the natural sciences; and if the

natural sciences ever completely demonstrated the order of nature they would presumably exhaust their subject. Criticism, as a science, is totally intelligible; literature, as the subject of a science, is, so far as we know, an inexhaustible source of new critical discoveries, and would be even if new works of literature ceased to be written. If so, then the search for a limiting principle in literature in order to discourage the development of criticism is mistaken. The assertion that the critic should not look for more in a poem than the poet may safely be assumed to have been conscious of putting there is a common form of what may be called the fallacy of premature teleology. It corresponds to the assertion that a natural phenomenon is as it is because Providence in its inscrutable wisdom made it so.

Simple as the assumption appears, it takes a long time for a science to discover that it is in fact a totally intelligible body of knowledge. Until it makes this discovery it has not been born as an individual science, but remains an embryo within the body of some other subject. The birth of physics from "natural philosophy" and of sociology from "moral philosophy" will illustrate the process. It is also very approximately true that the modern sciences have developed in the order of their closeness to mathematics. Thus physics and astronomy assumed their modern form in the Renaissance, chemistry in the eighteenth century, biology in the nineteenth and the social sciences in the twentieth. If systematic criticism, then, is developing only in our day, the fact is at least not an anachronism.

We are now looking for classifying principles lying in an area between two points that we have fixed. The first of these is the preliminary effort of criticism, the structural analysis of the work of art. The second is the assumption that there is such a subject as criticism, and that it makes, or could make, complete sense. We may next proceed inductively from structural analysis, associating the data we collect and trying to see larger patterns in them. Or we may proceed deductively, with the consequences that follow from postulating the unity of criticism. It is clear, of course, that neither procedure will work indefinitely without correction from the other. Pure induction will get us lost in haphazard

guessing; pure deduction will lead to inflexible and over-simplified pigeon-holing. Let us now attempt a few tentative steps in each direction, beginning with the inductive one.

II

The unity of a work of art, the basis of structural analysis, has not been produced solely by the unconditioned will of the artist, for the artist is only its efficient cause: it has form, and consequently a formal cause. The fact that revision is possible, that the poet makes changes not because he likes them better but because they are better, means that poems, like poets, are born and not made. The poet's task is to deliver the poem in as uninjured a state as possible, and if the poem is alive, it is equally anxious to be rid of him, and screams to be cut loose from his private memories and associations, his desire for self-expression, and all the other navel-strings and feeding tubes of his ego. The critic takes over where the poet leaves off, and criticism can hardly do without a kind of literary psychology connecting the poet with the poem. Part of this may be a psychological study of the poet, though this is useful chiefly in analysing the failures of his expression, the things in him which are still attached to his work. More important is the fact that every poet has his private mythology, his own spectroscopic band or peculiar formation of symbols, of much of which he is quite unconscious. In works with characters of their own, such as dramas and novels, the same psychological analysis may be extended to the interplay of characters, though of course literary psychology would analyse the behaviour of such characters only in relation to literary convention.

There is still before us the problem of the formal cause of the poem, a problem deeply involved with the question of genres. We cannot say much about genres, for criticism does not know much about them. A good many critical efforts to grapple with such words as "novel" or "epic" are chiefly interesting as examples of the psychology of rumour. Two conceptions of the genre, however, are obviously fallacious, and

as they are opposite extremes, the truth must lie somewhere between them. One is the pseudo-Platonic conception of genres as existing prior to and independently of creation, which confuses them with mere conventions of form like the sonnet. The other is that pseudo-biological conception of them as evolving species which turns up in so many surveys of the "development" of this or that form.

We next inquire for the origin of the genre, and turn first of all to the social conditions and cultural demands which produced it—in other words to the material cause of the work of art. This leads us into literary history, which differs from ordinary history in that its containing categories, "Gothic", "Baroque", "Romantic", and the like are cultural categories, of little use to the ordinary historian. Most literary history does not get as far as these categories, but even so we know more about it than about most kinds of critical scholarship. The historian treats literature and philosophy historically; the philosopher treats history and literature philosophically; and the so-called history of ideas approach marks the beginning of an attempt to treat history and philosophy from the point of view of an autonomous criticism.

But still we feel that there is something missing. We say that every poet has his own peculiar formation of images. But when so many poets use so many of the same images, surely there are much bigger critical problems involved than biographical ones. As Mr Auden's brilliant essay *The Enchafèd Flood* shows, an important symbol like the sea cannot remain within the poetry of Shelley or Keats or Coleridge; it is bound to expand over many poets into an archetypal symbol of literature. And if the genre has a historical origin, why does the genre of drama emerge from medieval religion in a way so strikingly similar to the way it emerged from Greek religion centuries before? This is a problem of structure rather than origin, and suggests that there may be archetypes of genres as well as of images.

It is clear that criticism cannot be systematic unless there is a quality in literature which enables it to be so, an order of words corresponding to the order of nature in the natural sciences. An archetype should be not only a unifying category of criticism, but itself a part of a total

form, and it leads us at once to the question of what sort of total form criticism can see in literature. Our survey of critical techniques has taken us as far as literary history. Total literary history moves from the primitive to the sophisticated, and here we glimpse the possibility of seeing literature as a complication of a relatively restricted and simple group of formulas that can be studied in primitive culture. If so, then the search for archetypes is a kind of literary anthropology, concerned with the way that literature is informed by pre-literary categories such as ritual, myth and folk tale. We next realize that the relation between these categories and literature is by no means purely one of descent, as we find them reappearing in the greatest classics—in fact there seems to be a general tendency on the part of great classics to revert to them. This coincides with a feeling that we have all had: that the study of mediocre works of art, however energetic, obstinately remains a random and peripheral form of critical experience, whereas the profound masterpiece seems to draw us to a point at which we can see an enormous number of converging patterns of significance. Here we begin to wonder if we cannot see literature, not only as complicating itself in time, but as spread out in conceptual space from some unseen centre.

This inductive movement towards the archetype is a process of backing up, as it were, from structural analysis, as we back up from a painting if we want to see composition instead of brushwork. In the foreground of the grave-digger scene in *Hamlet*, for instance, is an intricate verbal texture, ranging from the puns of the first clown to the *danse macabre* [1] of the Yorick [2] soliloquy, which we study in the printed text. One step back, and we are in the Wilson Knight [3] and Spurgeon [4] group of critics, listening to the steady rain of images of corruption and decay. Here, too, as the sense of the place of this scene in the whole play begins to dawn on us, we are in the network of psychological relationships which were the main interest of Bradley. But after all, we say, we are forgetting the genre: *Hamlet* is a play, and an Elizabethan play. So we take another step back into the Stoll and Shaw group and see the scene conventionally as part of its dramatic context. One step more, and we can begin to glimpse the archetype of the scene, as the

hero's *Liebestod*[5] and first unequivocal declaration of his love, his struggle with Laertes and the sealing of his own fate, and the sudden sobering of his mood that marks the transition to the final scene, all take shape around a leap into and return from the grave that has so weirdly yawned open on the stage.

At each stage of understanding this scene we are dependent on a certain kind of scholarly organization. We need first an editor to clean up the text for us, then the rhetorician and philologist, then the literary psychologist. We cannot study the genre without the help of the literary social historian, the literary philosopher and the student of the "history of ideas", and for the archetype we need a literary anthropologist. But now that we have got our central pattern of criticism established, all these interests are seen as converging on literary criticism instead of receding from it into psychology and history and the rest. In particular, the literary anthropologist who chases the source of the Hamlet legend from the pre-Shakespeare play to Saxo[6], and from Saxo to nature-myths, is not running away from Shakespeare; he is drawing closer to the archetypal form which Shakespeare recreated. A minor result of our new perspective is that contradictions among critics, and assertions that this and not that critical approach is the right one, show a remarkable tendency to dissolve into unreality. Let us now see what we can get from the deductive end.

III

Some arts move in time, like music; others are presented in space, like painting. In both cases the organizing principle is recurrence, which is called rhythm when it is temporal and pattern when it is spatial. Thus we speak of the rhythm of music and the pattern of painting; but later, to show off our sophistication, we may begin to speak of the rhythm of painting and the pattern of music. In other words, all arts may be conceived both temporally and spatially. The score of a musical composition may be studied all at once; a picture may be seen as the track of an intricate dance of the eye. Literature seems to be intermediate between

music and painting: its words form rhythms which approach a musical sequence of sounds at one of its boundaries, and form patterns which approach the hieroglyphic or pistorial image at the other. The attempts to get as near to these boundaries as possible form the main body of what is called experimental writing. We may call the rhythm of literature the narrative, and the pattern, the simultaneous mental grasp of the verbal structure, the meaning or significance. We hear or listen to a narrative, but when we grasp a writer's total pattern we "see" what he means.

The criticism of literature is much more hampered by the representational fallacy than even the criticism of painting. That is why we are apt to think of narrative as a sequential representation of events in an outside "life", and of meaning as a reflection of some external "idea". Properly used as critical terms, an author's narrative is his linear movement; his meaning is the integrity of his completed form. Similarly an image is not merely a verbal replica of an external object, but any unit of a verbal structure seen as part of a total pattern or rhythm. Even the letters an author spells his words with form part of his imagery, though only in special cases (such as alliteration) would they call for critical notice. Narrative and meaning thus become respectively, to borrow musical terms, the melodic and harmonic contexts of the imagery.

Rhythm, or recurrent movement, is deeply founded on the natural cycle, and everything in nature that we think of as having some analogy with works of art, like the flower or the bird's song, grows out of a profound synchronization between an organism and the rhythms of its environment, especially that of the solar year. With animals some expressions of synchronization, like the mating dances of birds, could almost be called rituals. But in human life a ritual seems to be something of a voluntary effort (hence the magical element in it) to recapture a lost rapport with the natural cycle. A farmer must harvest his crop at a certain time of year, but because this is involuntary, harvesting itself is not precisely a ritual. It is the deliberate expression of a will to synchronize human and natural energies at that time which produces the harvest songs, harvest sacrifices and harvest folk customs that we call

rituals. In ritual, then, we may find the origin of narrative, a ritual being a temporal sequence of acts in which the conscious meaning or significance is latent: it can be seen by an observer, but is largely concealed from the participators themselves. The pull of ritual is towards pure narrative, which, if there could be such a thing, would be automatic and unconscious repetition. We should notice too the regular tendency of ritual to become encyclopedic. All the important recurrences in nature, the day, the phases of the moon, the seasons and solstices of the year, the crises of existence from birth to death, get rituals attached to them, and most of the higher religions are equipped with a definitive total body of rituals suggestive, if we may put it so, of the entire range of potentially significant actions in human life.

Patterns of imagery, on the other hand, or fragments of significance, are oracular in origin, and derive from the epiphanic moment, the flash of instantaneous comprehension with no direct reference to time, the importance of which is indicated by Cassirer in *Myth and Language*. By the time we get them, in the form of proverbs, riddles, commandments and etiological folk tales, there is already a considerable element of narrative in them. They too are encyclopedic in tendency, building up a total structure of significance, or doctrine, from random and empiric fragments. And just as pure narrative would be unconscious act, so pure significance would be an incommunicable state of consciousness, for communication begins by constructing narrative.

The myth is the central informing power that gives archetypal significance to the ritual and archetypal narrative to the oracle. Hence the myth *is* the archetype, though it might be convenient to say myth only when referring to narrative, and archetype when speaking of significance. In the solar cycle of the day, the seasonal cycle of the year, and the organic cycle of human life, there is a single pattern of significance, out of which myth constructs a central narrative around a figure who is partly the sun, partly vegetative fertility and partly a god or archetypal human being. The crucial importance of this myth has been forced on literary critics by Jung and Frazer[7] in particular, but the several books now available on it are not always systematic in their approach, for

which reason I supply the following table of its phases:

1. The dawn, spring and birth phase. Myths of the birth of the hero, of revival and resurrection, of creation and (because the four phases are a cycle) of the defeat of the powers of darkness, winter and death. Subordinate characters: the father and the mother. The archetype of romance and of most dithyrambic and rhapsodic poetry.

2. The zenith, summer, and marriage or triumph phase. Myths of apotheosis, of the sacred marriage, and of entering into Paradise. Subordinate characters: the companion and the bride. The archetype of comedy, pastoral and idyll.

3. The sunset, autumn and death phase. Myths of fall, of the dying god, of violent death and sacrifice, and of the isolation of the hero. Subordinate characters: the traitor and the siren. The archetype of tragedy and elegy.

4. The darkness, winter and dissolution phase. Myths of the triumph of these powers; myths of floods and the return of chaos, of the defeat of the hero, and Götterdämmerung[8] myths. Subordinate characters: the ogre and the witch. The archetype of satire (see, for instance, the conclusion of *The Dunciad*[9]).

The quest of the hero also tends to assimilate the oracular and random verbal structures, as we can see when we watch the chaos of local legends that results from prophetic epiphanies consolidating into a narrative mythology of departmental gods. In most of the higher religions this in turn has become the same central quest-myth that emerges from ritual, as the Messiah myth became the narrative structure of the oracles of Judaism. A local flood may beget a folk tale by accident, but a comparison of flood stories will show how quickly such tales become examples of the myth of dissolution. Finally, the tendency of both ritual and epiphany to become encyclopedic is realized in the definitive body of myth which constitutes the sacred scriptures of religions. These sacred scriptures are consequently the first documents that the literary critic has to study to gain a comprehensive view of his subject. After he has understood their structure, then he can descend from archetypes to genres, and see how the drama emerges from the ritual side of myth

and lyric from the epiphanic or fragmented side, while the epic carries on the central encyclopedic structure.

Some words of caution and encouragement are necessary before literary criticism has clearly staked out its boundaries in these fields. It is part of the critic's business to show how all literary genres are derived from the quest-myth, but the derivation is a logical one within the science of criticism: the quest-myth will constitute the first chapter of whatever future handbooks of criticism may be written that will be based on enough organized critical knowledge to call themselves "introductions" or "outlines" and still be able to live up to their titles. It is only when we try to expound the derivation chronologically that we find ourselves writing pseudo-prehistorical fictions and theories of mythological contract. Again, because psychology and anthropology are more highly developed sciences, the critic who deals with this kind of material is bound to appear, for some time, a dilettante of those subjects. These two phases of criticism are largely undeveloped in comparison with literary history and rhetoric, the reason being the later development of the sciences they are related to. But the fascination which [Frazer's] *The Golden Bough* and Jung's book on libido symbols [10] have for literary critics is not based on dilettantism, but on the fact that these books are primarily studies in literary criticism, and very important ones.

In any case the critic who is studying the principles of literary form has a quite different interest from the psychologist's concern with states of mind or the anthropologist's with social institutions. For instance: the mental response to narrative is mainly passive; to significance mainly active. From this fact Ruth Benedict's *Pattern of Culture* develops a distinction between "Apollonian" cultures based on obedience to ritual and "Dionysiac" ones based on a tense exposure of the prophetic mind to epiphany. The critic would tend rather to note how popular literature which appeals to the inertia of the untrained mind puts a heavy emphasis on narrative values, whereas a sophisticated attempt to disrupt the connection between the poet and his environment produces the Rimbaud type of *illumination*, Joyce's solitary epiphanies, and

Baudelaire's conception of nature as a source of oracles. Also how literature, as it develops from the primitive to the self-conscious, shows a gradual shift of the poet's attention from narrative to significant values, this shift of attention being the basis of Schiller's distinction between naïve and sentimental poetry[11].

The relation of criticism to religion, when they deal with the same documents, is more complicated. In criticism, as in history, the divine is always treated as a human artifact. God for the critic, whether he finds him in *Paradise Lost*[12] or the Bible, is a character in a human story; and for the critic all epiphanies are explained, not in terms of the riddle of a possessing god or devil, but as mental phenomena closely associated in their origin with dreams. This once established, it is then necessary to say that nothing in criticism or art compels the critic to take the attitude of ordinary waking consciousness towards the dream or the god. Art deals not with the real but with the conceivable; and criticism, though it will eventually have to have some theory of conceivability, can never be justified in trying to develop, much less assume, any theory of actuality. It is necessary to understand this before our next and final point can be made.

We have identified the central myth of literature, in its narrative aspect, with the quest-myth. Now if we wish to see this central myth as a pattern of meaning also, we have to start with the workings of the subconscious where the epiphany originates, in other words in the dream. The human cycle of waking and dreaming corresponds closely to the natural cycle of light and darkness, and it is perhaps in this correspondence that all imaginative life begins. The correspondence is largely an antithesis; it is in daylight that man is really in the power of darkness, a prey to frustration and weakness; it is in the darkness of nature that the "libido" or conquering heroic self awakes. Hence art, which Plato called a dream for awakened minds, seems to have as its final cause the resolution of the antithesis, the mingling of the sun and the hero, the realizing of a world in which the inner desire and the outward circumstance coincide. This is the same goal, of course, that the attempt to combine human and natural power in ritual has. The social

function of the arts, therefore, seems to be closely connected with visualizing the goal of work in human life. So in terms of significance, the central myth of art must be the vision of the end of social effort, the innocent world of fulfilled desires, the free human society. Once this is understood, the integral place of criticism among the other social sciences, in interpreting and systematizing the vision of the artist, will be easier to see. It is at this point that we can see how religious conceptions of the final cause of human effort are as relevant as any others to criticism.

The importance of the god or hero in the myth lies in the fact that such characters, who are conceived in human likeness and yet have more power over nature, gradually build up the vision of an omnipotent personal community beyond an indifferent nature. It is this community which the hero regularly enters in his apotheosis. The world of this apotheosis thus begins to pull away from the rotary cycle of the quest in which all triumph is temporary. Hence if we look at the quest-myth as a pattern of imagery, we see the hero's quest first of all in terms of its fulfilment. This gives us our central pattern of archetypal images, the vision of innocence which sees the world in terms of total human intelligibility. It corresponds to, and is usually found in the form of, the vision of the unfallen world or heaven in religion. We may call it the comic vision of life, in contrast to the tragic vision, which sees the quest only in the form of its ordained cycle.

We conclude with a second table of contents, in which we shall attempt to set forth the central pattern of the comic and tragic visions. One essential principle of archetypal criticism is that the individual and the universal forms of an image are identical, the reasons being too complicated for us just now. We proceed according to the general plan of the game of Twenty Questions, or, if we prefer, of the Great Chain of Being:

1. In the comic vision the *human* world is a community, or a hero who represents the wish-fulfilment of the reader. The archetype of images of symposium, communion, order, friendship and love. In the tragic vision the human world is a tyranny or anarchy, or an individual

or isolated man, the leader with his back to his followers, the bullying giant of romance, the deserted or betrayed hero. Marriage or some equivalent consummation belongs to the comic vision; the harlot, witch and other varieties of Jung's "terrible mother" belongs to the tragic one. All divine, heroic, angelic or other superhuman communities follow the human pattern.

2. In the comic vision the *animal* world is a community of domesticated animlas, usually a flock of sheep, or a lamb, or one of the gentler birds, usually a dove. The archetype of pastoral images. In the tragic vision the animal world is seen in terms of beasts and birds of prey, wolves, vultures, serpents, dragons and the like.

3. In the comic vision the *vegetable* world is a garden, grove or park, or a tree of life, or a rose or lotus. The archetype of Arcadian images, such as that of Marvell's green world or of Shakespeare's forest comedies. In the tragic vision it is a sinister forest like the one in *Comus* or at the opening of the *Inferno*, or a heath or wilderness, or a tree of death.

4. In the comic vision the *mineral* world is a city, or one building or temple, or one stone, normally a glowing precious stone—in fact the whole comic series, especially the tree, can be conceived as luminous or fiery. The archetype of geometrical images, the "starlit dome" belongs here. In the tragic vision the mineral world is seen in terms of deserts, rocks, and ruins, or of sinister geometrical images like the cross.

5. In the comic vision the *unformed* world is a river, traditionally fourfold, which influenced the Renaissance image of the temperate body with its four humours. In the tragic vision this world usually becomes the sea, as the narrative myth of dissolution is so often a flood myth. The combination of the sea and beast images gives us the leviathan and similar water-monsters.

Obvious as this table looks, a great variety of poetic images and forms will be found to fit it. Yeats's "Sailing to Byzantium", to take a famous example of the comic vision at random, has the city, the tree, the bird, the community of sages, the geometrical gyre, and the detachment from the cyclic world. It is, of course, only the general

comic or tragic context that determines the interpretation of any symbol: this is obvious with relatively neutral archetypes like the island, which may be Prospero's island or Circe's[13].

Our tables are, of course, not only elementary but grossly oversimplified, just as our inductive approach to the archetype was a mere hunch. The important point is not the deficiencies of either procedure, taken by itself, but the fact that, somewhere and somehow, the two are clearly going to meet in the middle. And if they do meet, the ground plan of a systematic and comprehensive development of criticism has been established.

注释:

1 *danse macabre*:法语,死亡之舞。

2 Yorik:约瑞克,莎士比亚戏剧《哈姆雷特》一剧中国王的弄臣。

3 奈特(George Wilson Knight):英国利兹大学教授,莎士比亚专家。

4 斯珀吉翁(Caroline Spurgeon):英国大学教授。

5 *Liebestod*:德语,爱情与死亡的结合。

6 格莱芙蒂喀斯(Saxo Grammaticus):13世纪丹麦历史学家,在用拉丁文写的丹麦民族历史中最先讲述了关于哈姆雷特的故事。

7 弗雷泽(James Frazer):名著《金枝》的作者。

8 Gotterdämmerung:德语,英译为 *Twilight of the Gods*,是德国歌剧家理查德·瓦格纳(Richard Wagner,1813—1883)所写的四部系列音乐剧(*Ring des Nibelungen*)中的最后一部。

9《愚人记》(*The Dunciad*):英国诗人蒲柏(Alexander Pope,1688—1744)的诗作。

10 Jung's hook on libido symbols:指荣格所写的 *Wandlungen and Symbole der Libido*(英文纽约版的书名是 *Psychology of the Unconscious*,即《无意识心理学》,1916)。

11 Schiller's distinction between naive and sentimental poetry:德国诗人席勒著《论朴素的诗与感伤的诗》中,"朴素的诗"主要指古典诗,"感伤的诗"主要指现代、浪漫诗。

12 *Paradise Lost*:弥尔顿(John Milton)所著《失乐园》。

13 Prospero's island of Circe's:普罗斯佩罗(Prospero)是莎士比亚戏剧《暴风雨》中的主人公。Circe 即希腊神话中女妖瑟茜,在荷马史诗《奥德赛》中为把人变成猪的妖妇。

诺斯罗普·弗莱:作为原型的象征

Mythical Phase: Symbol As Archetype

Northrop Frye

In the formal phase the poem belongs neither to the class "art", nor to the class "verbal": it represents its own class. There are thus two aspects to its form. In the first place, it is unique, an artifact, with its own peculiar structure of imagery, to be examined by itself without immediate reference to other things like it. The critic here begins with poems, not with a prior conception or definition of poetry. In the second place, the poem is one of a class of similar forms. Aristotle knows that *Oedipus Tyrannus*[1] is in one sense not like any other tragedy, but he also knows that it belongs to the class called tragedy. We, who have experienced Shakespeare and Racine, can add the corollary that tragedy is something bigger than a phase of Greek drama. We may also find tragedy in literary works which are not dramas. To understand what tragedy is, therefore, takes us beyond the merely historical into the question of what an aspect of literature as a whole is. With this idea of the external relations of a poem with other poems, two considerations in criticism for the first time become important: convention and genre.

The study of genres is based on analogies in form. It is characteristic of documentary and historical criticism that it cannot deal with such analogies. It can trace influence with great plausibility, whether it exists or not, but confronted with a tragedy of Shakespeare and a tragedy of Sophocles, to be compared solely because they are both tragedies, the historical critic has to confine himself to general reflections about the seriousness of life. Similarly, nothing is more striking in rhetorical criticism than the absence of any consideration of genre: the rhetorical critic analyzes what is in front of him without much regard to whether it is a play, a lyric, or a novel. He may in fact even assert that there are

no genres in literature. That is because he is concerned with his structure simply as a work of art, not as an artifact with a possible function. But there are many analogies in literature apart altogether from sources and influences (many of which, of course, are not analogous at all) and noticing such analogies forms a large part of our actual experience of literature, whatever its role so far in criticism.

The central principle of the formal phase, that a poem is an imitation of nature, is, though a perfectly sound one, still a principle which isolates the individual poem. And it is clear that any poem may be examined, not only as an imitation of nature, but as an imitation of other poems. Virgil discovered, according to Pope, that following nature was ultimately the same thing as following Homer. Once we think of a poem in relation to other poems, as a unit of poetry, we can see that the study of genres has to be founded on the study of convention. The criticism which can deal with such matters will have to be based on that aspect of symbolism which relates poems to one another, and it will choose, as its main field of operations, the symbols that link poems together. Its ultimate object is to consider, not simply *a* poem as *an* imitation of nature, but the order of nature as a whole as imitated by a corresponding order of words.

All art is equally conventionalized, but we do not ordinarily notice this fact unless we are unaccustomed to the convention. In our day the conventional element in literature is elaborately disguised by a law of copyright pretending that every work of art is an invention distinctive enough to be patented. Hence the conventionalizing forces of modern literature—the way, for instance, that an editor's policy and the expectation of his readers combine to conventionalize what appears in a magazine—often go unrecognized. Demonstrating the debt of A to B is merely scholarship if A is dead, but a proof of moral delinquency if A is alive. This state of things makes it difficult to appraise a literature which includes Chaucer, much of whose poetry is translated or paraphrased from others; Shakespeare, whose plays sometimes follow their sources almost verbatim; and Milton, who asked for nothing better than to steal as much as possible out of the Bible. It is not only the

inexperienced reader who looks for a *residual* originality in such works. Most of us tend to think of a poet's real achievement as distinct from, or even contrasted with, the achievement present in what he stole, and we are thus apt to concentrate on peripheral rather than on central critical facts. For instance, the central greatness of *Paradise Regained*[2], as a poem, is not the greatness of the rhetorical decorations that Milton added to his source, but the greatness of the theme itself, which Milton *passes on* to the reader from his source. This conception of the great poet's being entrusted with the great theme was elementary enough to Milton, but violates most of the low mimetic prejudices about creation that most of us are educated in.

The underestimating of convention appears to be a result of, may even be a part of, the tendency, marked from Romantic times on, to think of the individual as ideally prior to his society. The view opposed to this, that the new baby is conditioned by a hereditary and environmental kinship to a society which already exists, has, whatever doctrines may be inferred from it, the initial advantage of being closer to the facts it deals with. The literary consequence of the second view is that the new poem, like the new baby, is born into an already existing order of words, and is typical of the structure of poetry to which it is attached. The new baby *is* his own society appearing once again as a unit of individuality, and the new poem has a similar relation to its poetic society.

It is hardly possible to accept a critical view which confuses the original with the aboriginal, and imagines that a "creative" poet sits down with a pencil and some blank paper and eventually produces a new poem in a special act of creation *ex nihilo*[3]. Human beings do not create in that way. Just as a new scientific discovery manifests something that was already latent in the order of nature, and at the same time is logically related to the total structure of the existing science, so the new poem manifests something that was already latent in the order of words. Literature may have life, reality, experience, nature imaginative truth, social conditions, or what you will for its *content*; but literature itself is not made out of these things. Poetry can only be made out

of other poems; novels out of other novels. Literature shapes itself, and is not shaped externally: the *forms* of literature can no more exist outside literature than the forms of sonata and fugue and rondo can exist outside music.

All this was much clearer before the assimilation of literature to private enterprise concealed so many of the facts of criticism. When Milton sat down to write a poem about Edward King, he did not ask himself: "What can I find to say about King?" but "How does poetry require that such a subject should be treated?" The notion that convention shows a lack of feeling, and that a poet attains "sincerity" (which usually means articulate emotion) by disregarding it, is opposed to all the facts of literary experience and history. The origin of this notion is, again, the view that poetry is a description of emotion, and that its "literal" meaning is an assertion about the emotions held by the individual poet. But any serious study of literature soon shows that the real difference between the original and the imitative poet is simply that the former is more profoundly imitative. Originality returns to the origins of literature, as radicalism returns to its roots. The remark of Mr. Eliot that a good poet is more likely to steal than to imitate affords a more balanced view of convention, as it indicates that the poem is specifically involved with other poems, not vaguely with such abstractions as tradition or style. The copyright law, and the mores attached to it, make it difficult for a modern novelist to steal anything except his title from the rest of literature: hence it is often only in such titles as *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, *The Grapes of Wrath*, or *The Sound and the Fury*[1], that we can clearly see how much impersonal dignity and richness of association an author can gain by the communism of convention.

As with other products of divine activity, the father of a poem is much more difficult to identify than the mother. That the mother is always nature, the realm of the objective considered as a field of communication, no serious criticism can ever deny. But as long as the father of a poem is assumed to be the poet himself, we have once again failed to distinguish literature from discursive verbal structures. The discursive writer writes as an act of conscious will, and that conscious will, along

with the symbolic system he employs for it, is set over against the body of things he is describing. But the poet, who writes creatively rather than deliberately, is not the father of his poem; he is at best a midwife, or, more accurately still, the womb of Mother Nature herself: her privates he, so to speak. The fact that revision is possible, that a poet can make changes in a poem not because he likes them better but because they are better, shows clearly that the poet has to give birth to the poem as it passes through his mind. He is responsible for delivering it in as uninjured a state as possible, and if the poem is alive, it is equally anxious to be rid of him, and screams to be cut loose from all the navel-strings and feeding-tubes of his ego.

The true father or shaping spirit of the poem is the form of the poem itself, and this form is a manifestation of the universal spirit of poetry, the "onlie begetter"[5] of Shakespeare's sonnets who was not Shakespeare himself, much less that depressing ghost Mr. W. H., but Shakespeare's subject, the master-mistress of his passion. When a poet speaks of the *internal* spirit which shapes the poem, he is apt to drop the traditional appeal to female Muses and think of himself as in a feminine, or at least receptive, relation to some god or lord, whether Apollo, Dionysus, Eros, Christ, or (as in Milton) the Holy Spirit. Est deus in nobis, Ovid says; in modern times we may compare Nietzsche's remarks about his inspiration in *Ecce Homo*.[6]

The problem of convention is the problem of how art can be communicable, for literature is clearly as much a technique of communication as assertive verbal structures are. Poetry, taken as a whole, is no longer simply an aggregate of artifacts imitating nature, but one of the activities of human artifice taken as a whole. If we may use the word "civilization" for this, we may say that our fourth phase looks at poetry as one of the techniques of civilization. It is concerned, therefore, with the social aspect of poetry, with poetry as the focus of a community. The symbol in this phase is the communicable unit, to which I give the name archetype: that is, a typical or recurring image. I mean by an archetype a symbol which connects one poem with another and thereby helps to unify and integrate our literary experience. And as the

archetype is the communicable symbol, archetypal criticism is primarily concerned with literature as a social fact and as a mode of communication. By the study of conventions and genres, it attempts to fit poems into the body of poetry as a whole.

The repetition of certain common images of physical nature like the sea or the forest in a large number of poems cannot in itself be called even "coincidence", which is the name we give to a piece of design when we cannot find a use for it. But it does indicate a certain unity in the nature that poetry imitates, and in the communicating activity of which poetry forms part. Because of the larger communicative context of education, it is possihle for a story about the sea to be archetypal, to make a profound imaginative impact, on a reader who has never been out of Saskatchewan[7]. And when pastoral images are deliberately employed in *Lycidas*[8], for instance, merely because they are conventional, we can see that the convention of the pastoral makes us assimilate these images to other parts of literary experience.

We think first of the pastoral's descent from Theocritus[9], where the pastoral elegy first appears as a literary adaptation of the ritual of the Adonis[10] lament, and through Theocritus to Virgil and the whole pastoral tradition to *The Shepherd's Calender*[11] and beyond to *Lycidas* itself. Then we think of the intricate pastoral symbolism of the Bible and the Christian Church, of Abel and the twenty-third Psalm and Christ the Good Shepherd, of the ecclesiastical overtones of "pastor" and "flock", and of the link between the Classical and Christian traditions in Virgil's "Messianic Eclogue"[12]. Then we think of the extensions of pastoral symbolism into Sidney's *Arcadia*, *The Faerie Queen*, Shakespeare's forest comedies, and the like; then of the post-Miltonic development of pastoral elegy in Shelley, Arnold, Whitman, and Dylan Thomas; perhaps too of pastoral conventions in painting and music. In short, we can get a whole liberal education simply by picking up one conventional poem and following its archetypes as they stretch out into the rest of literature. An avowedly conventional poem like *Lycidas* urgently demands the kind of criticism that will absorb it into the study of literature as a whole, and this activity is expected to begin at once,

with the first cultivated reader. Here we have a situation in literature more like that of mathematics or science, where the work of genius is assimilated to the whole subject so quickly that one hardly notices the difference between creative and critical activity.

If we do not accept the archetypal or conventional element in the imagery that links one poem with another, it is impossible to get any systematic mental training out of the reading of literature alone. But if we add to our desire to know literature a desire to know how we know it, we shall find that expanding images into conventional archetypes of literature is a process that takes place unconsciously in all our reading. A symbol like the sea or the heath cannot remain within Conrad or Hardy: it is bound to expand over many works into an archetypal symbol of literature as a whole. Moby Dick cannot remain in Melville's novel: he is absorbed into our imaginative experience of leviathans and dragons of the deep from the Old Testament onward. And what is true for the reader is *a fortiori* true of the poet, who learns very quickly that there is no singing school for his soul except the study of the monuments of its own magnificence.

In each phase of symbolism there is a point at which the critic is compelled to break away from the range of the poet's own knowledge. Thus the historical or documentary critic has sooner or later to call Dante a "medieval" poet, a notion unknown and unintelligible to Dante. In archetypal criticism, the poet's conscious knowledge is considered only so far as the poet may allude to or imitate other poets ("sources") or make a deliberate use of a convention. Beyond that, the poet's control over his poem stops with the poem. Only the archetypal critic can be concerned with its relationship to the rest of literature. But here again we have to distinguish between explicitly conventionalized literature, such as *Lycidas*, where the poet himself starts us off by referring to Theocritus, Virgil, Renaissance pastoralists, and the Bible, and literature which conceals or ignores its conventional links. The conception of copyright and the revolutionary nature of the low mimetic view of creation also extends to a general unwillingness on the part of authors of the copyright age to have their imagery studied conventionally,

and in dealing with this period, most archetypes have to be established by critical inspection alone.

To give a random example, one very common convention of the nineteenth-century novel is the use of two heroines, one dark and one light. The dark one is as a rule passionate, haughty, plain, foreign or Jewish, and in some way associated with the undesirable or with some kind of forbidden fruit like incest. When the two are involved with the same hero, the plot usually has to get rid of the dark one or make her into a sister if the story is to end happily. Examples include *Ivanhoe*, *The Last of the Mohicans*, *The Woman in White*, *Ligeia*, *Pierre* (a tragedy because the hero chooses the dark girl, who is also his sister), *The Marble Faun*, and countless incidental treatments. A male version forms the symbolic basis of *Wuthering Heights*. This device is as much a convention as Milton's calling Edward King by a name out of Virgil's *Eclogues*, but it shows a confused, or, as we say, "unconscious" approach to conventions. Again, when we meet the images of a man, a woman, and a serpent in the ninth book of *Paradise Lost*, there is no doubt of their conventional links with similar figures in the Book of Genesis. In Hudson's *Green Mansions* the hero and heroine first meet over a serpent in a quasi-Paradisal setting: here the conventional nature of the imagery is a matter on which the author gives us no help. When a critic meets St. George the Redcross Knight in Spenser, bearing a red cross on a white ground,[13] he has some idea what to do with this figure. When he meets a female in Henry James's *The Other House* called Rose Armiger with a white dress and a red parasol, he is, in the current slang, clueless. It is clear that a deficiency in contemporary education often complained of, the disappearance of a common cultural ground which makes a modern poet's allusions to the Bible or to Classical mythology fall with less weight than they should, has much to do with the decline in the explicit use of archetypes.

Whitman[14], as is well known, was a spokesman of an antiarchetypal view of literature, and urged the Muse to forget the matter of Troy and develop new themes. This is a low mimetic prejudice, and is consequently appropriate enough for Whitman, who is both right and

wrong. He is wrong because the matter of Troy will always be, in the foreseeable future, an integral part of the Western cultural heritage, and hence references to Agamemnon in Yeats's *Leda* or Eliot's *Sweeney among the Nightingales* have as much cumulative power as ever for the properly instructed reader. But he is of course perfectly right in feeling that the *content* of poetry is normally an immediate and contemporary environment. He was right, being the kind of poet he was, in making the content of his own *When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloomed* an elegy on Lincoln and not a conventional Adonis lament. Yet his elegy is, in its *form*, as conventional as *Lycidas*, complete with purple flowers thrown on coffins, a great star drooping in the west, imagery of "ever-returning spring" and all the rest of it. Poetry organizes the content of the world as it passes before the poet, but the forms in which that content is organized come out of the structure of poetry itself.

Archetypes are associative clusters, and differ from signs in being complex variables. Within the complex is often a large number of specific learned associations which are communicable because a large number of people in a given culture happen to be familiar with them. When we speak of "symbolism" in ordinary life we usually think of such learned cultural archetypes as the cross or the crown, or of conventional associations, as of white with purity or green with jealousy. As an archetype, green may symbolize hope or vegetable nature or a go sign in traffic or Irish patriotism as easily as jealousy, but the word green as a verbal sign always refers to a certain color. Some archetypes are so deeply rooted in conventional association that they can hardly avoid suggesting that association, as the geometrical figure of the cross inevitably suggests the death of Christ. A *completely* conventionalized art would be an art in which the archetypes, or communicable units, were essentially a set of esoteric signs. This can happen in the arts—for instance in some of the sacred dances of India but it has not happened in Western literature yet, and the resistance of modern writers to having their archetypes "spotted", so to speak, is due to a natural anxiety to keep them as versatile as possible, not pinned down exclusively to one interpretation. A poet may be showing an esoteric tendency if he

specifically points out one association, as Yeats does in his footnotes to some of his early poems. There are no *necessary* associations: there are some exceedingly obvious ones, such as the association of darkness with terror or mystery, but there are no intrinsic or inherent correspondences which must invariably be present. As we shall see later, there is a context in which the phrase "universal symbol" makes sense, but it is not this context. The stream of literature, however, like any other stream, seeks the easiest channels first: the poet who uses the expected associations will communicate more rapidly.

At one extreme of literature we have the pure convention, which a poet uses merely because it has often been used before in the same way. This is most frequent in naive poetry, in the fixed epithets and phrase-tags of medieval romance and ballad, in the invariable plots and character types of naive drama, and, to a lesser degree, in the *topoi*[15] or rhetorical commonplaces which, like other ideas in literature, are so dull when stated as propositions, and so rich and variegated when they are used as structural principles in literature. At the other extreme we have the pure variable, where there is a deliberate attempt at novelty or unfamiliarity, and consequently a disguising or complicating of archetypes. Such techniques come very close to a distrust of communication itself as a function of literature. However, extremes meet, as Coleridge said, and anti-conventional poetry soon becomes a convention in its turn, to be explored by hardy scholars accustomed to the dreariness of literary bad lands. Between these extreme points conventions vary from the most explicit to the most indirect, along a scale parallel to the scale of allegory and paradox already dealt with. The two scales may be often confused or identified, but translating imagery into examples and precepts is a quite distinct process from following images into other poems.

Near the extreme of pure convention is translation, paraphrase, and the kind of use which Chaucer makes of Boccaccio in *Troilus* and *The Knight's Tale*[16]. Next we come to deliberate and explicit convention, such as we have noted in *Lycidas*. Next comes paradoxical or ironic convention, including parody —often a sign that certain vogues in

handling conventions are getting worn out. Then comes the attempt to reach originality through turning one's back on explicit convention, an attempt which results in implicit convention of the kind we detected in Whitman. Then comes a tendency to identify originality with "experimental" writing, based in our day on an analogy with scientific discovery, and which is frequently spoken of as "breaking with convention". And, of course, at every stage of literature, including this last one, there is a great deal of superficial and inorganic convention, producing the kind of writing that most students of literature prefer to keep in the middle distance: run-of-the-mill Elizabethan sonnets and love lyrics, Plautine[17] comedy-formulas, eighteenth-century pastorals, nineteenth-century happy-ending novels, works of followers and disciples and schools and trends generally.

It is clear from all this that archetypes are most easily studied in highly conventionalized literature: that is, for the most part, naive, primitive, and popular literature. In suggesting the possibility of archetypal criticism, then, I am suggesting the possibility of extending the kind of comparative and morphological study now made of folk tales and ballads into the rest of literature. This should be more easily conceivable now that it is no longer fashionable to mark off popular and primitive literature from ordinary literature as sharply as we used to do. Also, we shall find that superficial literature, of the kind just spoken of, is of great value to archetypal criticism simply because it is conventional. If throughout this book I refer to popular fiction as frequently as to the greatest novels and epics, it is for the same reason that a musician attempting to explain the rudimentary facts about counterpoint would be more likely, at least at first, to illustrate from "Three Blind Mice" than from a complex Bach fugue.

Every phase of symbolism has its particular approach to narrative and to meaning. In the literal phase, narrative is a flow of significant sounds, and meaning an ambiguous and complex verbal pattern. In the descriptive phase, narrative is an imitation of real events, and meaning an imitation of actual objects or propositions. In the formal phase, poetry exists between the example and the precept. In the exemplary

event there is an element of *recurrence*; in the precept, or statement about what ought to be, there is a strong element of *desire*, or what is called "wish-thinking". These elements of recurrence and desire come into the foreground in archetypal criticism, which studies poems as units of poetry as a whole and symbols as units of communication.

From such a point of view, the narrative aspect of literature is a recurrent act of symbolic communication: in other words a ritual. Narrative is studied by the archetypal critic as ritual or imitation of human action as a whole, and not simply as a *mimesis praxeos*[16] or imitation of *an* action. Similarly, in archetypal criticism the significant content is the conflict of desire and reality which has for its basis the work of the dream. Ritual and dream, therefore, are the narrative and significant content respectively of literature in its archetypal aspect. The archetypal analysis of the plot of a novel or play would deal with it in terms of the generic, recurring, or conventional actions which show analogies to rituals: the weddings, funerals, intellectual and social initiations, executions or mock executions, the chasing away of the scapegoat villain, and so on. The archetypal analysis of the meaning or significance of such a work would deal with it in terms of the generic, recurring, or conventional shape indicated by its mood and resolution, whether tragic, comic, ironic, or what not, in which the relationship of desire and experience is expressed.

Recurrence and desire interpenetrate, and are equally important in both ritual and dream. In its archetypal phase, the poem imitates nature, not (as in the formal phase) nature as a structure or system, but nature as a cyclical process. The principle of recurrence in the rhythm of art seems to be derived from the repetitions in nature that make time intelligible to us. Rituals cluster around the cyclical movements of the sun, the moon, the seasons, and human life. Every crucial periodicity of experience: dawn, sunset, the phases of the moon, seed-time and harvest, the equinoxes and the solstices, birth, initiation, marriage, and death, get rituals attached to them. The pull of ritual is toward pure cyclical narrative, which, if there could be such a thing, would be automatic and unconscious repetition. In the middle of all this

recurrence, however, is the central recurrent cycle of sleeping and waking life, the daily frustration of the ego, the nightly awakening of a titanic self.

The archetypal critic studies the poem as part of poetry, and poetry as part of the total human imitation of nature that we call civilization. Civilization is not merely an imitation of nature, but the process of making a total human form out of nature, and it is impelled by the force that we have just called desire. The desire for food and shelter is not content with roots and caves; it produces the human forms of nature that we call farming and architecture. Desire is thus not a simple response to need, for an animal may need food without planting a garden to get it, nor is it a simple response to want, or desire *for* something in particular. It is neither limited to nor satisfied by objects, but is the energy that leads human society to develop its own form. Desire in this sense is the social aspect of what we met on the literal level as emotion, an impulse toward expression which would have remained amorphous if the poem had not liberated it by providing the form of its expression. The form of desire, similarly, is liberated and made apparent by civilization. The efficient cause of civilization is work, and poetry in its social aspect has the function of expressing, as a verbal hypothesis, a vision of the goal of work and the forms of desire.

There is however a moral dialectic in desire. The conception of a garden develops the conception "weed", and building a sheepfold makes the wolf a greater enemy. Poetry in its social or archetypal aspect, therefore, not only tries to illustrate the fulfilment of desire, but to define the obstacles to it. Ritual is not only a recurrent act, but an act expressive of a dialectic of desire and repugnance: desire for fertility or victory, repugnance to drought or to enemies. We have rituals of social integration, and we have rituals of expulsion, execution, and punishment. In dream there is a parallel dialectic, as there is both the wish-fulfilment dream and the anxiety or nightmare dream of repugnance. Archetypal criticism, therefore, rests on two organizing rhythms or patterns, one cyclical, the other dialectic.

The union of ritual and dream in a form of verbal communication is

myth. This is a sense of the term myth slightly different from that used in the previous essay. But, first, the sense is equally familiar, and the ambiguity not mine but the dictionary's; and, second, there is a real connection between the two senses which will become more apparent as we go on. The myth accounts for, and makes communicable, the ritual and the dream. Ritual, by itself, cannot account for itself: it is pre-logical, pre-verbal, and in a sense pre human. Its attachment to the calendar seems to link human life to the biological dependence on the natural cycle which plants, and to some extent animals, still have. Everything in nature that we think of as having some analogy with works of art, like the flower or the bird's song, grows out of a synchronization between an organism and the rhythms of its natural environment, especially that of the solar year. With animals some expressions of synchronization, like the mating dances of birds, could almost be called rituals. Myth is more distinctively human, as the most intelligent partridge cannot tell even the most absurd story explaining why it drums in the mating season. Similarly, the dream, by itself, is a system of cryptic allusions to the dreamer's own life, not fully understood by him, or so far as we know of any real use to him. But in all dreams there is a mythical element which has a power of independent communication, as is obvious, not only in the stock example of Oedipus, but in any collection of folk tales. Myth, therefore, not only gives meaning to ritual and narrative to dream: it is the identification of ritual and dream, in which the former is seen to be the latter in movement. This would not be possible unless there were a common factor to ritual and dream which made one the social expression of the other; the investigation of this common factor we must leave for later treatment. All that we need to say here is that ritual is the archetypal aspect of *mythos* and dream the archetypal aspect of *dianoia*[19].

The same distinction in emphasis that we noted in the first essay between fictional and thematic literature recurs here. Some literary forms, such as drama, remind us with particular vividness of analogies to rituals, for the drama in literature, like the ritual in religion, is primarily a social or ensemble performance. Others, such as romance,

suggest analogies to dreams. Ritual analogies are most easily seen, not in the drama of the educated audience and the settled theatre, but in naive or spectacular drama: in the folk play, the puppet show, the pantomime, the farce, the pageant, and their descendants in masque, comic opera, commercial movie, and revue. Dream analogies are best studied in naive romance, which includes the folk tales and fairy tales that are so closely related to dreams of wonderful wishes coming true, and to nightmares of ogres and witches. Naive drama and naive romance, of course, also interpenetrate. What naive drama dramatizes is usually some kind of romance, and the close relation of romance to ritual can be seen in the number of medieval romances that are linked to some part of the calendar, the winter solstice, a May morning, or a saint's eve; or else to some class ritual like the tournament. The fact that the archetype is primarily a *communicable* symbol largely accounts for the ease with which ballads and folk tales and mimes travel through the world, like so many of their heroes, over all barriers of language and culture. We come back here to the fact that literature most deeply influenced by the archetypal phase of symbolism impresses us as primitive and popular.

By these words I mean possessing the ability to communicate in time and space respectively. Otherwise they mean much the same thing. Popular art is normally decried as vulgar by the cultivated people of its time; then it loses favor with its original audience as a new generation grows up; then it begins to merge into the softer lighting of "quaint", and cultivated people become interested in it, and finally it begins to take on the archaic dignity of the primitive. This sense of the archaic recurs whenever we find great art using popular forms, as Shakespeare does in his last period, or as the Bible does when it ends in a fairy tale about a damsel in distress, a hero killing dragons, a wicked witch, and a wonderful city glittering with jewels...

It is at this point that we must notice and avoid the fallacy of a theory of mythological contract. That is, there may be such a thing as a social contract in political theory, if we keep the discussion to observable facts about the present structure of society. But when these facts

are attached to a fable about something that happened in a past too remote for any evidence to disturb the fabler's assertions, and we are told that once upon a time men surrendered or delegated or were tricked into surrendering their power, political theory has merely become one of Plato's indoctrinating lies. And because the only evidence for this remote event is its analogy to the present facts, the present facts are being compared with their own shadows. A precisely similar fabling process has taken place in the literary criticism concerned with myth, which has hardly yet emerged from its historical contract stage.

As the archetypal critic is concerned with ritual and dream, it is likely that he would find much of interest in the work done by contemporary anthropology in ritual, and by contemporary psychology in dreams. Specifically, the work done on the ritual basis of naive drama in Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, and the work done on the dream basis of naive romance by Jung and the Jungians, are of most direct value to him. But the three subjects of anthropology, psychology, and literary criticism are not yet clearly separated, and the danger of determinism has to be carefully watched. To the literary critic, ritual is the *content* of dramatic action, not the source or origin of it. *The Golden Bough* is, from the point of view of literary criticism, an essay on the ritual content of naive drama; that is, it reconstructs an archetypal ritual from which the structural and generic principles of drama may be logically, not chronologically, derived. It does not matter two pins to the literary critic whether such a ritual had any historical existence or not. It is very probable that Frazer's hypothetical ritual would have many and striking analogies to actual rituals, and collecting such analogies is part of his argument. But an analogy is not necessarily a source, an influence, a cause, or an embryonic form, much less an identity. The *literary* relation of ritual to drama, like that of any other aspect of human action to drama, is a relation of content to form only, not one of source to derivation.

The critic, therefore, is concerned only with the ritual or dream patterns which are actually in what he is studying, however they got there. The work of the Classical scholars who have followed Frazer's

lead has produced a general theory of the spectacular or ritual content of Greek drama. *The Golden Bough* purports to be a work of anthropology, but it has had more influence on literary criticism than in its own alleged field, and it may yet prove to be really a work of literary criticism. If the ritual pattern is in the plays --and it is fact, not opinion, that one of the main themes of *Iphigeneia in Tauris*[20], for example, is human sacrifice—the critic need not take sides in the quite separate historical controversy over the ritual *origin* of Greek drama. Hence ritual, as the content of action, and more particularly of dramatic action, is something continuously latent in the order of words, and is quite independent of direct influence. Even in the nineteenth century, we find that the instant drama becomes primitive and popular, as it does in *The Mikado*[21], to repeat an example given before, back comes all Frazer's apparatus, the king's son, the mock sacrifice, the analogy with the festival of the Sacaea[22], and many other things that Gilbert knew and cared nothing about. It comes back because it is still the best way of holding an audience's attention, and the experienced dramatist knows it.

The prestige of documentary criticism, which deals entirely with sources and historical transmission, has misled some archetypal critics into feeling that all such ritual elements ought to be traced directly, like the lineage of royalty, as far back as a willing suspension of disbelief will allow. The vast chronological gaps resulting are usually bridged by some theory of race memory, or by some conspiratorial conception of history involving secrets jealously guarded for centuries by esoteric cults or traditions. It is curious that when archetypal critics hang on to a historical framework they almost invariably produce some hypothesis of continuous degeneration from a golden age lost in antiquity. Thus the prelude to Thomas Mann's Joseph series[23] traces back several of our central myths to Atlantis, Atlantis being clearly more useful as an archetypal idea than as a historical one. When archetypal criticism revived in the nineteenth century with a vogue for sun myths, an attempt was made to ridicule it by proving with equal plausibility that Napoleon was a sun myth. The ridicule is effective only against the historical distortion

of the method. Archetypally, we turn Napoleon into a sun myth whenever we speak of the rise of his career, the zenith of his fame, or the eclipse of his fortunes.

Social and cultural history, which is anthropology in an extended sense, will always be a part of the context of criticism, and the more clearly the anthropological and the critical treatments of ritual are distinguished, the more beneficial their influence on each other will be. The same is true of the relation of psychology to criticism. The first and most striking unit of poetry larger than the individual poem is the total work of the man who wrote the poem. Biography will always be a part of criticism, and the biographer will naturally be interested in his subject's poetry as a personal document, recording his private dreams, associations, ambitions, and expressed or repressed desires. Studies of such matters form an essential part of criticism. I am not of course speaking of the silly ones, which simply project the author's own erotica, in a rationalized clinical disguise, on his victim, but only of the serious studies which are technically competent both in psychology and in criticism, which are aware how much guesswork is involved and how tentative all the conclusions must be.

Such an approach is easiest, and most rewarding, with what we have called thematic writers of the low mimetic that is, chiefly, the Romantic poets, where the poet's own psychological processes are often part of the theme. With other writers, say a dramatist who is aware from the first word he writes that "They who live to please must please to live", there is danger of making an unreal abstraction of the poet from his literary community. Suppose a critic finds that a certain pattern is repeated time and again in the plays of Shakespeare. If Shakespeare is unique or anomalous, or even exceptional, in using this pattern, the reason for his use of it may be at least partly psychological. If there were any evidence that he had persisted in using it when it failed to please an audience, the probability of a personal psychological element would be very high. But if we can find the same pattern in half a dozen of his contemporaries, we clearly have to allow for convention. And if we find it in a dozen dramatists of different ages and cultures,

we have to allow for genre, for the structural requirements of drama itself. Now as a matter of fact we do find in Shakespeare's comedies that the same devices are used over and over, and it is the business of the literary critic to compare these devices with those of other dramatists, in a morphological study of comic form. Otherwise we shall deprive ourselves of the perfectly legitimate appreciation of the *scholarly* qualities of Shakespeare, of seeing in the repeated devices of his comedies a kind of Art of Fugue of comedy[21].

A psychologist examining a poem will tend to see in it what he sees in the dream, a mixture of latent and manifest content. For the literary critic the manifest content of the poem is its form, hence its latent content becomes simply its actual content, its *dianoia* or theme. And this *dianoia* on the archetypal level is a dream, a presentation of the conflict of desire and actuality. We seem to be going around in a circle, but not quite. For the critic, a problem appears which does not exist for a purely psychological analysis, the problem of communicable latent content, of intelligible dream, Plato's conception of art as a dream for awakened minds. For the psychologist all dream symbols are private ones, interpreted by the personal life of the dreamer. For the critic there is no such thing as private symbolism, or, if there is, it is his job to make sure that it does not remain so.

This problem is already present in Freud's treatment of *Oedipus Tyrannus* as a play which owes much of its power to the fact that it dramatizes the Oedipus complex. The dramatic and psychological elements can be linked without any reference to the personal life of Sophocles, of which we know nothing whatever. This emphasis on impersonal content has been developed by Jung and his school, where the communicability of archetypes is accounted for by a theory of a collective unconscious —an unnecessary hypothesis in literary criticism, so far as I can judge.

What we have found to be true of the writer's intention is also true of the audience's attention. Both are centripetally directed, and implications exist in the response to art as they do in the creation of it, implications of which the audience is not explicitly aware. Discrete

conscious awareness can take in only a very few details of the complex of response. This state of things enabled Tennyson, for instance, to be praised for the chastity of his language and read for his powerful erotic sensuousness. It also makes it possible for a contemporary critic to draw on the fullest resources of modern knowledge in explicating a work of art without any real fear of anachronism.

For instance, *Le Malade Imaginaire*[25] is a play about a man who, in seventeenth-century terms, including no doubt Molière's own terms, was not really sick but just thought he was. A modern critic might object that life is not so simple; that it is perfectly possible for a *malade imaginaire* to be a *malade véritable*, and that what is wrong with Argan is clearly an unwillingness to see his children grow up, an infantile regression which his wife—his second wife, incidentally—shows that she understands completely by coddling him and murmuring such phrases as "pauvre petit fils"[26]. Such a critic would find the clue to Argan's whole behavior in his unguarded remark after the scene with the little girl Louison (the erotic nature of which the critic would also notice): "Il n'y a plus d'enfants"[27]. Now whether this reading is right or wrong, it does not swerve from Molière's text, yet it tells us nothing about Molière himself. The play is generically a comedy: it must therefore end happily; Argan must therefore be brought to see some reason; his wife, whose dramatic function it is to keep him within his obsession, must therefore be "exposed" as inimical to him. The plot is a ritual moving toward a scapegoat rejection followed by a marriage, and the theme is a dream-pattern of irrational desire in conflict with reality.

Another essay in this book will be concerned with the details and practice of archetypal criticism; here we are concerned only with its place in the context of criticism as a whole. In its archetypal aspect, art is a part of civilization, and civilization we defined as the process of making a human form out of nature. The shape of this human form is revealed by civilization itself as it develops: its major components are the city, the garden, the farm, the sheepfold, and the like, as well as human society itself. An archetypal symbol is usually a natural object

with a human meaning, and it forms part of the critical view of art as a civilized product, a vision of the goals of human work.

Such a vision is bound to idealize some aspects of civilization and ridicule or ignore others; in other words the social context of art is also the moral context. All artists have to come to terms with their communities: many artists, and many great ones, are content to be the spokesmen of them. But in terms of his moral significance, the poet reflects, and follows at a distance, what his community really achieves through its work. Hence the moral view of the artist is invariably that he ought to assist the work of his society by framing workable hypotheses, imitating human action and thought in such a way as to suggest realizable modes of both. If he does not do this, his hypotheses should at least be clearly labelled as playful or fantastic. Marxism takes more or less this view of art, and thereby repeats the argument reached at the end of the *Republic*[28]. We are told there, if we follow the argument simply as it stands, that according to justice, or social work properly done, the painter's bed is an external imitation of the craftsman's bed. The artist, therefore, is confined either to reflecting or to escaping from the world that the true worker is realizing.

We have adopted the principle in this essay that the events and ideas of poetry are hypothetical imitations of history and discursive writing respectively, which in their turn are verbal imitations of action and thought. This principle brings us close to the view of poetry as a secondary imitation of reality. We are interpreting mimesis, however, not as a Platonic "recollection" but as an emancipation of externality into image, nature into art. From this point of view the work of art must be its own object: it cannot be ultimately descriptive of something, and can never be ultimately related to any other system of phenomena, standards, values, or final causes. All such external relations form part of the "intentional fallacy". Poetry is a vehicle for morality, truth, and beauty, but the poet does not aim at these things, but only at inner verbal strength. The poet *qua* poet intends only to write a poem, and as a rule it is not the artist, but the ego in the artist, who turns away from his proper work to go and chase these other seductive marshlights.

It is an elementary axiom in criticism that morally the lion lies down with the lamb. Bunyan and Rochester, Sade and Jane Austen,[29] *The Miller's Tale* and *The Second Nun's Tale*,[30] are all equally elements of a liberal education, and the only moral criterion to be applied to them is that of decorum. Similarly, the moral attitude taken by the poet in his work derives largely from the structure of that work. Thus the fact that *Le Malade Imaginaire* is a comedy is the only reason for making Argan's wife a hypocrite— she must be got rid of to make the play end happily.

The pursuit of beauty is much more dangerous nonsense than the pursuit of truth or goodness, because it affords a stronger temptation to the ego. Beauty, like truth and goodness, is a quality that may in one sense be predicated of all great art ,but the deliberate attempt to beautify can, in itself, only weaken the creative energy. Beauty in art is like happiness in morals: it may accompany the act, but it cannot be the goal of the act, just as one cannot "pursue happiness", but only something else that may give happiness. Aiming at beauty produces, at best, the attractive: the quality of beauty represented by the word loveliness, a quality which depends on a carefully restricted choice of both subject and technique. A religious painter, for instance, can produce this quality only as long as churches keep commissioning Madonnas: if a church asks for a Crucifixion he must paint cruelty and horror instead.

When we speak of the buman body as "beautiful", we usually mean the body of someone in good physical condition between eighteen and about thirty, and if Degas[31], for example, shows us pictures of thick-bottomed matrons squatting in hip baths, we interpret the shock to our propriety as an aesthetic judgement. Whenever the word beauty means loveliness or attractiveness, as it is bound to do whenever it is made the intention of art, it becomes reactionary: it tries to restrict either what the artist may choose for a subject or the method in which he may choose to treat it, and it marshals all the forces of prudery to keep him from expanding his vision beyond an arid and insipid pseudo-classicism. Ruskin[32] spoiled many of his finest critical insights with this

fallacy: Tennyson[33] often hampered the vigor of his poetry by it, and in some of the lesser beauticians of the same period we can see clearly what the neurotic compulsion to beautify everything leads to. It leads to an exaggerated cult of style, a technique of making everything in a work of art, even a drama, sound all alike, and like the author, and like the author at his most impressive. Here again the vanity of the ego has replaced the honest pride of the craftsman.

The formal or third phase of narrative and meaning, although it includes the external relations of literature to events and ideas, nevertheless brings us back ultimately to the aesthetic view of the work of art as an object of contemplation, a *techne* designed for ornament and pleasure rather than use. This view encourages us to separate aesthetic objects from other kinds of artifacts and to postulate an aesthetic experience different in kind from other experiences. Corresponding to the bibliographical view of literature as the aggregate or pile of all the books and plays and poems that have been written, we find the aesthetic view of criticism as a discrete series of special (sometimes vaguely sacramental) apprehensions. There is no reason for not granting this view of literary experience its own validity; one objects to it only when it excludes other approaches.

The archetypal view of literature shows us literature as a total form and literary experience as a part of the continuum of life, in which one of the poet's functions is to visualize the goals of human work. As soon as we add this approach to the other three, literature becomes an ethical instrument, and we pass beyond Kierkegaard's[34] "Either/Or" dilemma between aesthetic idolatry and ethical freedom, without any temptation to dispose of the arts in the process. Hence the importance, after accepting the validity of this view of literature, of rejecting the external goals of morality, beauty, and truth. The fact that they are external makes them ultimately idolatrous, and so demonic. But if no social, moral, or aesthetic standard is in the long run externally determinative of the value of art, it follows that the archetypal phase, in which art is part of civilization, cannot be the ultimate one. We need still another phase where we can pass from civilization, where poetry is

still useful and functional, to culture, where it is disinterested and liberal, and stands on its own feet.

注释:

1 *Oedipus Tyrannus*:索福克勒斯(Sophocles)的悲剧《俄底浦斯王》。

2 *Paradise Regained*:弥尔顿所著《复乐园》。

3 *ex nihilo*:拉丁文,out of nothing。

4《丧钟为谁而鸣》(*For Whom the Bell Tolls*),美国作家海明威的小说;《愤怒的葡萄》(*The Grapes of Wrath*),美国作家斯坦贝克的名著;《喧哗与骚动》(*The Sound and the Fury*),美国作家福克纳的名著

5 onlie begetter:生身之父。

6 奥维德说"神灵驻于我心":在现代,我们可以比较尼采在《瞧这个人》中关于灵感的议论。

7 Saskatchewan:加拿大西部一省。

8 *Lycidas*:弥尔顿的名诗《黎西达斯》。

9 Theocritus:公元前3世纪希腊田园诗人忒奥克里托斯。他对维吉尔以及后来的田园文学有很大的影响。

10 Adonis:希腊神话中美貌猎人阿多尼斯,深得爱神维纳斯的钟爱。

11 *The Shepherd's Calender*:斯宾塞的早期作品《牧人日记》。

12 Virgil's "Messianic Eclogue":维吉尔的"救世主牧歌"。

13 When a critic meets St. George the Redcross Knight in Spenser, bearing a red cross on a white ground...:当一个批评家在斯宾塞所著的《仙后》中遇到红十字勋章骑士圣乔治时(白底色的上衣上佩着红色的十字勋章)……

14 Whitman:指19世纪美国诗人惠特曼。

15 *topoi*:传统主题;惯用语句。

16 ...and the kind of use which Chaucer makes on Boccaccio in *Troilus* and *The Knight's Tale*:……和乔叟在《特罗勒斯》和《骑士的故事》这两部作品中所采用的薄伽丘式的手法。

17 Plautine:应为普劳图斯(Titus Maccius Plautus,公元前254- 公元前184),古罗马著名喜剧诗人。

18 *mimesis praxeos*:模仿行动。

19 ...ritual is the archetypal aspect of *mythos* and dream the archetypal aspect of *dianoia*:……仪式是神话的原型,而梦则是思想的原型。

20 *Iphigeneia in Tauris*:古希腊悲剧作家欧里庇得斯的剧本《伊菲格尼亚在陶罗人中》。

21 *The Mikado*:吉尔伯特(W. S. Gilbert)和沙利文(A. Sullivan)1885年写的歌剧《天皇》。

22 the festival of the Sacaea：撒卡亚节，古代巴比伦一年一度的节日，为期五天。节日期间，让一死囚坐上王位，尽情吃喝享受，节日结束后即剥下皇袍处死。（见弗雷泽著《金枝》第 24 章）

23 Thomas Mann's Joseph series：德国小说家托马斯·曼（Thomas Mann，1875—1955）1933—1948 年间写的系列小说《约瑟夫和他的弟兄们》，共分四部。

24 Art of Fugue of comedy：喜剧中一种旋律回旋的艺术。

25 *Le Malade Imaginaire*：莫里哀剧作《无病呻吟》（1673），法语中原意是"想像中的疾病"。

26 pauvre petit fils：法文，穷孩子。

27 Il n'y a plus d'enfants：法文，那儿不再有孩子了。

28 *Republic*：柏拉图的著作《理想国》。

29 Bunyan and Rochester, Sade and Jane Austen：班扬（John Bunyan，1628—1688）、罗切斯特（John Wilmot Rochester，1648—1680）与奥斯汀（Jane Austen，1775—1817）均为英国作家；萨德（Alphonse Sade 1740—1814）为法国作家，Sadism 源于此名。

30 *The Miller's Tale*, *The Second Nun's Tale*：均为乔叟《坎特伯雷故事集》（*The Canterbury Tales*）中的故事。

31 德加（Edgar Degas，1834—1917）：法国画家兼雕刻家。

32 罗斯金（John Ruskin，1819—1900）：英国作家兼艺术批评家。

33 丁尼生（Alfred Tennyson，1809—1892）：英国诗人。

34 克尔凯郭尔（Soren Aabye Kierkegaard，1813—1855）：丹麦哲学家兼神学家。

诺斯罗普·弗莱：原型批评：神话理论

Archetypal Criticism: Theory of Myths

Northrop Frye

...

We begin our study of archetypes, then, with a world of myth, an abstract or purely literary world of fictional and thematic design, unaffected by canons of plausible adaptation to familiar experience. In terms of narrative, myth is the imitation of actions near or at the conceivable limits of desire. The gods enjoy beautiful women, fight one another with prodigious strength, comfort and assist man, or else watch his miseries from the height of their immortal freedom. The fact that myth

operates at the top level of human desire does not mean that it necessarily presents its world as attained or attainable by human beings. In terms of meaning or *dianoia*, myth is the same world looked at as an area or field of activity, bearing in mind our principle that the meaning or pattern of poetry is a structure of imagery with conceptual implications. The world of mythical imagery is usually represented by the conception of heaven or Paradise in religion, and it is apocalyptic, in the sense of that word already explained, a world of total metaphor, in which everything is potentially identical with everything else, as though it were all inside a single infinite body.

Realism, or the art of verisimilitude, evokes the response "How like that is to what we know!" When what is written is *like* what is known, we have an art of extended or implied simile. And as realism is an art of implicit simile, myth is an art of implicit metaphorical identity. The word "sun-god", with a hyphen used instead of a predicate, is a pure ideogram, in Pound's[1] terminology, or literal metaphor, in ours. In myth we see the structural principles of literature isolated; in realism we see the *same* structural principles (not similar ones) fitting into a context of plausibility. (Similarly in music, a piece by Purcell and a piece by Benjamin Britten may not be in the least *like* each other, but if they are both in D major their tonality will be the same.) The presence of a mythical structure in realistic fiction, however, poses certain technical problems for making it plausible, and the devices used in solving these problems may be given the general name of *displacement*.

Myth, then, is one extreme of literary design; naturalism is the other, and in between lies the whole area of romance, using that term to mean, not the historical mode of the first essay, but the tendency, noted later in the same essay, to displace myth in a human direction and yet, in contrast to "realism", to conventionalize content in an idealized direction. The central principle of displacement is that what can be metaphorically identified in a myth can only be linked in romance by some form of simile: analogy, significant association, incidental accompanying imagery, and the like. In a myth we can have a sun-god or a tree-god; in a romance we may have a person who is significantly

associated with the sun or tress. In more realistic modes the association becomes less significant and more a matter of incidental, even coincidental or accidental, imagery. In the dragon-killing legend of the St. George and Perseus family, of which more hereafter, a country under an old feeble king is terrorized by a dragon who eventually demands the king's daughter, but is slain by the hero. This seems to be a romantic analogy (perhaps also, in this case, a descendant) of a myth of a waste land restored to life by a fertility god. In the myth, then, the dragon and the old king would be identified. We can in fact concentrate the myth still further into an Oedipus fantasy in which the hero is not the old king's son-in-law but his son, and the rescued damsel the hero's mother. If the story were a private dream such identifications would be made as a matter of course. But to make it a plausible, symmetrical, and morally acceptable story a good deal of displacement is necessary, and it is only after a comparative study of the story type has been made that the metaphorical structure within it begins to emerge.

In Hawthorne's *The Marble Faun* the statue which gives the story that name is so insistently associated with a character named Donatello that a reader would have to be unusually dull or inattentive to miss the point that Donatello "is" the statue. Later on we meet a girl named Hilda, of singular purity and gentleness, who lives in a tower surrounded by doves. The doves are very fond of her; another character calls her his "dove", and remarks indicating some special affinity with doves are made about her by both author and characters. If we were to say that Hilda is a dove-goddess like Venus, identified with her doves, we should not be reading the story quite accurately in its own mode; we should be translating it into straight myth. But to recognize how close Hawthorne is to myth here is not unfair. That is, we recognize that *The Marble Faun* is not a typical low mimetic fiction; it is dominated by an interest that looks back to fictional romance and forward to the ironic mythical writers of the next century--to Kafka, for instance, or Cocteau. This interest is often called allegory, but probably Hawthorne himself was right in calling it romance. We can see how this interest tends toward abstraction in character-drawing, and if we know

no other canons than low mimetic ones, we complain of this.

Or, again, we have, in myth, the story of Proserpine, who disappears into the underworld for six months of every year. The pure myth is clearly one of death and revival; the story as we have it is slightly displaced, but the mythical pattern is easy to see. The same structural element often recurs in Shakespearean comedy, where it has to be adapted to a roughly high mimetic level of credibility. Hero in *Much Ado* is dead enough to have a funeral song, and plausible explanations are postponed until after the end of the play. Imogen in *Cymbeline* has an assumed name and an empty grave, but she too gets some funeral obsequies. But the story of Hermione and Perdita is so close to the Demeter and Proserpine myth that hardly any serious pretence of plausible explanations is made. Hermione, after her disappearance, returns once as a ghost in a dream, and her coming to life from a statue, a displacement of the Pygmalion myth, is said to require an awakening of faith, even though, on one level of plausibility, she has not been a statue at all, and nothing has taken place except a harmless deception. We notice how much more abstractly mythical a thematic writer can be than a fictional one: Spenser's Florimell[2], for instance, disappears under the sea for the winter with no questions asked, leaving a "snowy lady" in her place and returning with a great outburst of spring floods at the end of the fourth book.

In the low mimetic, we recognize the same structural pattern of the death and revival of the heroine when Esther Summerson[3] gets smallpox, or Lorna Doone[4] is shot at her marriage altar. But we are getting closer to the conventions of realism, and although Lorna's eyes are "dim with death", we know that the author does not really mean death if he is planning to revive her. Here again it is interesting to compare *The Marble Faun*, where there is so much about sculptors and the relation of statues to living people that we almost expect some kind of dénouement like that of *The Winter's Tale*[5]. Hilda mysteriously disappears, and during her sbsence her lover, the sculptor Kenyon, digs out of the earth a statue that he associates with Hilda. After that Hilda returns, with a plausible reason eventually assigned for her

absence, but not without some rather pointed and petulant remarks from Hawthorne himself to the effect that he has no interest in concocting plausible explanations, and that he wishes his reading public would give him a bit more freedom. Yet Hawthorne's inhibitions seem to be at least in part self-imposed, as we can see if we turn to Poe's *Ligeia*, where the straight mythical death and revival pattern is given without apology. Poe is clearly a more radical abstractionist than Hawthorne, which is one reason why his influence on our century is more immediate.

This affinity between the mythical and the abstractly literary illuminates many aspects of fiction, especially the more popular fiction which is realistic enough to be plausible in its incidents and yet romantic enough to be a "good story", which means a clearly designed one. The introduction of an omen or portent, or the device of making a whole story the fulfilment of a prophecy given at the beginning, is an example. Such a device suggests, in its existential projection, a conception of ineluctable fate or hidden omnipotent will. Actually, it is a piece of pure literary design, giving the beginning some symmetrical relationship with the end, and the only ineluctable will involved is that of the author. Hence we often find it even in writers not temperamentally much in sympathy with the portentous. In *Anna Karenina*, for instance, the death of the railway porter in the opening book is accepted by Anna as an omen for herself. Similarly, if we find portents and omens in Sophocles, they are there primarily because they fit the structure of his type of dramatic tragedy, and prove nothing about any clear-cut beliefs in fate held by either dramatist or audience.

We have, then, three organizations of myths and archetypal symbols in literature. First, there is undisplaced myth, generally concerned with gods or demons, and which takes the form of two contrasting worlds of total metaphorical identification, one desirable and the other undesirable. These worlds are often identified with the existential heavens and hells of the religions contemporary with such literature. These two forms of metaphorical organization we call the apocalyptic and the demonic respectively. Second, we have the general tendency we have

called romantic, the tendency to suggest implicit mythical patterns in a world more closely associated with human experience. Third, we have the tendency of "realism" (my distaste for this inept term is reflected in the quotation marks) to throw the emphasis on content and representation rather than on the shape of the story. Ironic literature begins with realism and tends toward myth, its mythical patterns being as a rule more suggestive of the demonic than of the apocalyptic, though sometimes it simply continues the romantic tradition of stylization. Hawthorne, Poe, Conrad, Hardy and Virginia Woolf all provide examples.

In looking at a picture, we may stand close to it and analyze the details of brush work and palette knife. This corresponds roughly to the rhetorical analysis of the new critics in literature. At a little distance back, the design comes into clearer view, and we study rather the content represented: this is the hest distance for realistic Dutch pictures, for example, where we are in a sense reading the picture. The further back we go, the more conscious we are of the organizing design. At a great distance from, sya, a Madonna, we can see nothing but the archetype of the Madonna, a large centripetal blue mass with a contrasting point of interest at its center. In the criticism of literature, too, we often have to "stand back" from the poem to see its archetypal organization. If we "stand back" from Spenser's *Mutabilitie Cantoes* we see a background of ordered circular light and a sinister black mass thrusting up into the lower foreground much the same archetypal shape that we see in the opening of the Book of Job[6]. If we "stand back" from the beginning of the fifth act of *Hamlet*, we see a grave opening on the stage, the hero, his enemy, and the heroine descending into it, followed by a fatal struggle in the upper world. If we "stand back" from a realistic novel such as Tolstoy's *Resurrection* or Zola's *Germinal*, we can see the mythopoeic designs indicated by those titles. Other examples will be given in what follows.

We proceed to give an account first of the structure of imagery, or *dianoia*, of the two undisplaced worlds, the apocalyptic and the demonic, drawing heavily on the Bible, the main source for undisplaced

myth in our tradition. Then we go on to the two intermediate structures of imagery, and finally to the generic narratives or *mythoi* which are these structures of imagery in movement.

注释：

1 庞德(Ezra Pound,1885—1972)：美国意象派诗人。
2 Florimell：斯宾塞《仙后》(*The Faerie Queen*)中的人物，是贞节和美德的化身。
3 Esther Summerson：狄更斯名著《荒凉山庄》(*Bleak House*)中的人物。
4 Lorna Doone：布莱克默(R. D. Blackmore) 1869 年出版的同名小说中的女主人公。
5 *The Winter's Tale*：莎士比亚戏剧《冬天的故事》。
6 the Book of Job：《圣经・旧约》中的"约伯记"。

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第四章 结构主义

结构主义文论极盛于20世纪60年代中后期和70年代，是继俄国形式主义和英美新批评之后出现的一种形式主义文论。它把20世纪初瑞士语言学家弗迪南·德·索绪尔所倡导的现代结构语言学研究方法和原则应用于文学批评之中。索绪尔一反传统的探究语言演变的历史语言学研究方法，主张对语言进行共时分析，透过具体的言语行为发掘出语言潜在支配性的规则系统。他提出了言语(parole)和语言(langue)之间的重要区别。言语是人们在日常交往中使用的词句，语言则是支配具体言语的规则系统。词语(符号)由能指(signifier)和所指(signified)两部分组成。前者是词语的音响或书写标记，后者是词语表达的概念。两者就像一张纸的两面那样密不可分。能指与所指的关系是约定俗成和任意性的，它们之间不存在必然的对应关系。意义的产生是符号间相互区分的结果，即词语意义的产生并不依据现实。语言是一种独立自足的系统，意义也就不是由讲话者的主观意图决定的，而是由整个语言系统产生的。正如有的批评家所指出的那样，这些重要的语言学原则对文学批评产生的重要启迪是，它否定了某些传统文学批评(如模仿论、表现说和实用说)中以作者和社会现实为文学作品阐释切入点的做法，转而关注意义产生的方式，而非专注意义本身。语言学家的主要任务并不是研究个别言语而是研究整个语言系统。与这种情况相似，文学结构主义者认为个别作品应看作是类似言语的东西，其中充满了文学语言的规律。

此外，索绪尔本人也认为，语言与任何形式的社会行为在结构和组织上都有相似性。在这个前提下，对于其他人文学科来说，语言研究方法具有范式意义，推而广之，可以应用到包括文学在内的其他人文社会学科之中。列维-斯特劳斯秉承这一思路，把索绪尔的语言理论引入文化人类学。他对美洲土著人的神话、亲属关系和烹饪技术的结构分析表明，这些神话、亲属关系和烹饪技术都是像语言那样有结构的系统。它们的个别构成元素之所以有意义，就在于它们是一个完整系统的一部

分。在他的分析中，神话被分解成一个个基本单位（神话素），如同语言的基本语音单位（音素）一样，正如伊格尔顿所说："只有通过特殊方式把它们结合起来才获得意义。支配这种结合的诸项原则便可以视为一种语法，即存在于叙事表面下的一套关系，它们构成了神话的真正意义。"文学结构主义的成就最突出地体现在以茨维坦·托多洛夫、A.J.格雷玛斯、杰拉德·热耐特等人的叙事学理论以及罗兰·巴特的文学批评之中。同俄国形式主义一样，结构主义深信并努力探求一门文学科学的存在。这门科学建立在形式而不是内容的基础上，文本本身是结构主义文学批评关注的焦点。因此它又和英美新批评有相似之处。但正如有些批评家所指出的，它与俄国形式主义的分歧表现在：后者并不太关注文学文本的深层规律和结构；新批评强调文本意义的有机一致性也与结构主义坚持文本的多义性形成了鲜明对照。按照罗兰·巴特的说法，批评积极地为文本创造意义，而不是被动地译解作品的意义，因为结构主义的一个基本前提便是承认"人文活动及其产物，甚至感知和思想本身是建构性质的而不是天然的"。

结构主义叙事学理论和批评实践极为繁琐，下面仅以托多洛夫对《十日谈》的分析为例，简要说明结构主义叙事学的操作策略。托多洛夫的理论出发点是，语言是一切表意系统的主导模式（master pattern），叙事与语言之间有着类似结构，因此存在着一套叙事语法。他在叙事分析中套用语言学范畴来分析故事。他把叙事分成语义（semantic aspect）、句法（syntactic aspect）和语汇（verbal aspect）三个层面。语义层面是故事的内容，句法层面是事件之间的联系方式，语汇层面指的则是对具体的词和词组的使用，即用以叙述故事的语言。其中句法层面是托多洛夫主要研究的内容。句法由两个基本单位组成，它们是陈述（proposition）和序列（sequence）。陈述要么由人物与"最简约的"（irreducible）动作相结合而产生（如甲爱上了乙，或甲到了乙家），要么是由人物与最基本的特征（attribute）相结合而产生（如甲为人邪恶，或乙是女王）。序列是构成完整故事的各种有关陈述的集合。一个故事可能有多个序列，但至少包含一个序列。各种叙事单位被看成各种词类：人物相当于专有名词，人物动作相当于动词，人物特征相当于形容词；同理，陈述和序列分别发挥句子和段落的功能（如下图所示）。专有名词（人物）和形容词（特征）或者和动词（行动）组合起来就形成了陈述。这样一来，整个文本俨然是一种书写的句子结构。

叙事单位		语言单位
人物	↔	专有名词
人物行动	↔	动词
人物特征	↔	形容词
陈述	↔	句子
序列	↔	段落

其中，所有的特征都可简化为三类形容词：状态（state，不稳定的特征，如幸福和不幸），内在性质（quality，比较稳定的特征，如善和恶），以及条件（condition，最稳定的特征，如人物的性别、宗教信仰及社会地位）。所有动作都可简化为三个动词：改变（modify）、越轨（transgress）和惩罚（punish）。这个重要发现使托多洛夫看到，在他所分析的《十日谈》各个小故事中，一再出现这样一个固定程式：变化在不断地发生，各种罪恶行径一直逍遥法外，不受惩罚。这个程式令托多洛夫看到，《十日谈》所表现出的价值观与作者所处时代奉行的价值观有着重要的关联。在薄伽丘生活的时代，与资本主义自由企业制度相关、颂扬个人胆识和首创精神的新型价值体系正在逐步确立，它开始取代旧有的、约束力较强的商业体系。

罗兰·巴特的符号学批评也是结构主义的一个重要组成部分。他在《符号学要素》、《时尚的系统》和《神话》等论著中广泛分析了当代社会文化的文化现象。他的分析中渗透了这样一种思想：在着装和谈吐的背后都有一个赋予着装或谈吐意义的系统。也就是说，他把这些社会行为解释成各种遵循语言模式运作的符号系统，任何一种社会行为都受到一套规则系统的支配。巴特的结构主义符号学批评对早期英国研究影响甚大，是文化研究批评实践的一个重要理论资源。

总的说来，正如伊格尔顿所指出的那样，结构主义批评呈现出两个基本特征：(1)这种批评是分析性的，而不是评价性的，它排除了审美因素；(2)它不理会文本的表面意义，而是努力发掘故事中潜在的深层结构。结构主义批评的优点在于它打破了传统文论中存在的尤其是浪漫主义文论中盛行的诗人即天才这种神秘观念。与传统批评相比，它最具

革命性的地方在于它赋予语言极为重要的地位：语言本身不仅是结构主义批评主要关注的对象，而且被当作研究非语言学科的模式。结构主义批评的缺陷表现在，它过于关注文本本身，脱离作品赖以产生的历史和社会背景，常常机械地套用语言学模式，并且论证过程显得琐碎和复杂，得出的结论也往往令人感到似是而非，莫衷一是。此外，结构主义批评所自我标榜的科学性和客观性也是值得怀疑的。在后结构主义看来，结构主义在分析作品、神话和言语行为的深层结构时，实际上是带着主观先见暗中构建这些结构，因此它只是一种解读行为，远非以探索所研究领域固有结构为己任的科学。随着后结构主义和解构主义的兴起，巴特等结构主义者开始转向后结构主义，结构主义的时代逐渐成为过去。

弗迪南·德·索绪尔：普通语言学教程

Course in General Linguistics

Ferdinand de Saussure

The Object of Linguistics

1. Definition of Language

What is both the integral and concrete object of linguistics? The question is especially difficult; later we shall see why; here I wish merely to point up the difficulty.

Other sciences work with objects that are given in advance and that can then be considered from different viewpoints; but not linguistics. Someone pronounces the French word *nu* "bare": a superficial observer would be tempted to call the word a concrete linguistic object; but a more careful examination would reveal successively three or four quite different things, depending on whether the word is considered as a sound, as the expression of an idea, as the equivalent of Latin *nudum*, etc. Far from it being the object that antedates the viewpoint, it would seem that it is the viewpoint that creates the object; besides, nothing

tells us in advance that one way of considering the fact in question takes precedence over the others or is in any way superior to them.

Moreover, regardless of the viewpoint that we adopt, the linguistic phenomenon always has two related sides, each deriving its values from the other. For example:

1. Articulated syllables are acoustical impressions perceived by the ear, but the sounds would not exist without the vocal organs; an *n*, for example, exists only by virtue of the relation between the two sides. We simply cannot reduce language to sound or detach sound from oral articulation; reciprocally, we cannot define the movements of the vocal organs without taking into account the acoustical impression.

2. But suppose that sound were a simple thing: would it constitute speech? No, it is only the instrument of thought; by itself, it has no existence. At this point a new and redoubtable relationship arises: a sound, a complex acoustical-vocal unit, combines in turn with an idea to form a complex physiological-psychological unit. But that is still not the complete picture.

3. Speech has both an individual and a social side, and we cannot conceive of one without the other. Besides:

4. Speech always implies both an established system and an evolution: at every moment it is an existing institution and a product of the past. To distinguish between the system and its history, between what it is and what it was, seems very simple at first glance; actually the two things are so closely related that we can scarcely keep them apart. Would we simplify the question by studying the linguistic phenomenon in its earliest stages— if we began, for example, by studying the speech of children? No, for in dealing with speech, it is completely misleading to assume that the problem of early characteristics differs from the problem of permanent characteristics. We are left inside the vicious circle.

From whatever direction we approach the question, nowhere do we find the integral object of linguistics. Everywhere we are confronted with a dilemma: if we fix our attention on only one side of each problem, we run the risk of failing to perceive the dualities pointed out

above; on the other hand, if we study speech from several viewpoints simultaneously, the object of linguistics appears to us as a confused mass of heterogeneous and unrelated things. Either procedure opens the door to several sciences—psychology, anthropology, normative grammar, philology, etc. —which are distinct from linguistics, but which might claim speech, in view of the faulty method of linguistics, as one of their objects.

As I see it there is only one solution to all the foregoing difficulties: *from the very outset we must put both feet on the ground of language and use language as the norm of all other manifestations of speech*. Actually, among so many dualities, language alone seems to lend itself to independent definition and provide a fulcrum that satisfies the mind.

But what is language [*langue*]? It is not to be confused with human speech [*langage*], of which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty. Taken as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously—physical, physiological, and psychological—it belongs both to the individual and to society; we cannot put it into any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity.

Language, on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification. As soon as we give language first place among the facts of speech, we introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself to no other classification.

One might object to that principle of classification on the ground that since the use of speech is based on a natural faculty whereas language is something acquired and conventional, language should not take first place but should be subordinated to the natural instinct.

That objection is easily refuted.

First, no one has proved that speech, as it manifests itself when we speak, is entirely natural, i.e. that our vocal apparatus was designed for speaking just as our legs were designed for walking.

Linguists are far from agreement on this point. For instance Whitney[1], to whom language is one of several social institutions, thinks that we use the vocal apparatus as the instrument of language purely through luck, for the sake of convenience: men might just as well have chosen gestures and used visual symbols instead of acoustical symbols. Doubtless his thesis is too dogmatic; language is not similar in all respects to other social institutions; moreover, Whitney goes too far in saying that our choice happened to fall on the vocal organs; the choice was more or less imposed by nature. But on the essential point the American linguist is right: language is a convention, and the nature of the sign that is agreed upon does not matter. The question of the vocal apparatus obviously takes a secondary place in the problem of speech.

One definition of *articulated speech*[2] might confirm that conclusion. In Latin, *articulus* means a member, part, or subdivision of a sequence; applied to speech, articulation designates either the subdivision of a spoken chain into syllables or the subdivision of the chain of meanings into significant units; *gegliederte Sprache* is used in the second sense in German. Using the second definition, we can say that what is natural to mankind is not oral speech but the faculty of constructing a language, i. e. a system of distinct signs corresponding to distinct ideas.

Broca[3] discovered that the faculty of speech is localized in the third left frontal convolution; his discovery has been used to substantiate the attribution of a natural quality to speech. But we know that the same part of the brain is the center of *everything* that has to do with speech, including writing. The preceding statements, together with observations that have been made in different cases of aphasia resulting from lesion of the centers of localization, seem to indicate: (1) that the various disorders of oral speech are bound up in a hundred ways with those of written speech; and (2) that what is lost in all cases of aphasia or agraphia is less the faculty of producing a given sound or writing a given sign than the ability to evoke by means of an instrument, regardless of what it is, the signs of a regular system of speech. The obvious implication is that beyond the functioning of the various organs there

exists a more general faculty which governs signs and which would be the linguistic faculty proper. And this brings us to the same conclusion as above.

To give language first place in the study of speech, we can advance a final argument: the faculty of articulating words—whether it is natural or not is exercised only with the help of the instrument created by a collectivity and provided for its use; therefore, to say that language gives unity to speech is not fanciful.


2. Place of Language in the Facts of Speech

In order to separate from the whole of speech the part that belongs to language, we must examine the individual act from which the speaking-circuit can be reconstructed. The act requires the presence of at least two persons; that is the minimum number necessary to complete the circuit. Suppose that two people, A and B, are conversing with each other:



Suppose that the opening of the circuit is in A's brain, where mental facts (concepts) are associated with representations of the linguistic sounds (sound-images) that are used for their expression. A given concept unlocks a corresponding sound-image in the brain; this purely *psychological* phenomenon is followed in turn by a *physiological* process: the brain transmits an impulse corresponding to the image to the organs used in producing sounds. Then the sound waves travel from the mouth of A to the ear of B: a purely *physical* process. Next, the circuit continues in B, but the order is reversed: from the ear to the brain, the physiological transmission of the sound-image: in the brain, the psychological association of the image with the corresponding concept.

If B then speaks, the new act will follow—from his brain to A's exactly the same course as the first act and pass through the same successive phases, which I shall diagram as follows:



The preceding analysis does not purport to be complete. We might also single out the pure acoustical sensation, the identification of that sensation with the latent sound-image, the muscular image of phonation, etc. I have included only the elements thought to be essential, but the drawing brings out at a glance the distinction between the physical (sound waves), physiological (phonation and audition), and psychological parts (word-images and concepts). Indeed, we should not fail to note that the word-image stands apart from the sound itself and that it is just as psychological as the concept which is associated with it.

The circuit that I have outlined can be further divided into:

1. an outer part that includes the vibrations of the sounds which travel from the mouth to the ear, and an inner part that includes everything else;

2. a psychological and a nonpsychological part, the second including the physiological productions of the vocal organs as well as the physical facts that are outside the individual;

3. an active and a passive part: everything that goes from the associative center of the speaker to the ear of the listener is active, and everything that goes from the ear of the listener to his associative center is passive;

4. finally, everything that is active in the psychological part of the circuit is executive ($c \rightarrow s$), and everything that is passive is receptive ($s \rightarrow c$).

We should also add the associative and co-ordinating faculty that we find as soon as we leave isolated signs; this faculty plays the dominant role in the organization of language as a system.

But to understand clearly the role of the associative and co-ordinating faculty, we must leave the individual act, which is only the embryo of speech, and approach the social fact.

Among all the individuals that are linked together by speech, some sort of average will be set up: all will reproduce—not exactly of course, but approximately—the same signs united with the same concepts.

How does the social crystallization of language come about? Which parts of the circuit are involved? For all parts probably do not participate equally in it.

The nonpsychological part can be rejected from the outset. When we hear people speaking a language that we do not know, we perceive the sounds but remain outside the social fact because we do not understand them.

Neither is the psychological part of the circuit wholly responsible: the executive side is missing, for execution is never carried out by the collectivity. Execution is always individual, and the individual is always its master. I shall call the executive side *speaking* [*parole*].

Through the functioning of the receptive and co-ordinating faculties, impressions that are perceptibly the same for all are made on the minds of speakers. How can that social product be pictured in such a way that language will stand apart from everything else? If we could embrace the sum of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals, we could identify the social bond that constitutes language. It is a storehouse filled by the members of a given community through their active use of speaking, a grammatical system that has a potential existence in each brain, or, more specifically, in the brains of a group of individuals. For language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity.

In separating language from speaking we are at the same time separating: (1) what is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental.

Language is not a function of the speaker, it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual. It never requires premeditation, and reflection enters in only for the purpose of classification, which we shall take up later.

Speaking, on the contrary, is an individual act. It is wilful and intellectual. Within the act, we should distinguish between: (1) the combinations by which the speaker uses the language code for expressing his own thought; and (2) the psychophysical mechanism that allows him to exteriorize those combinations.

...

To summarize, these are the characteristics of language:

1. Language is a well-defined object in the heterogeneous mass of speech facts. It can be localized in the limited segment of the speaking-circuit where an auditory image becomes associated with a concept. It is the social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create nor modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community. Moreover, the individual must always serve an apprenticeship in order to learn the functioning of language; a child assimilates it only gradually. It is such a distinct thing that a man deprived of the use of speaking retains it provided that he understands the vocal signs that he hears.

2. Language, unlike speaking, is something that we can study separately. Although dead languages are no longer spoken, we can easily assimilate their linguistic organisms. We can dispense with the other elements of speech; indeed, the science of language is possible only if the other elements are excluded.

3. Whereas speech is heterogeneous, language, as defined, is homogeneous. It is a system of signs in which the only essential thing is the union of meanings and soundimages, and in which both parts of the sign are psychological.

4. Language is concrete, no less so than speaking; and this is a help in our study of it. Linguistic signs, though basically psychological, are not abstractions; associations which bear the stamp of collective approval—and which added together constitute language—are

realities that have their seat in the brain. Besides, linguistic signs are tangible; it is possible to reduce them to conventional written symbols, whereas it would be impossible to provide detailed photographs of acts of speaking [*actes de parole*]; the pronunciation of even the smallest word represents an infinite number of muscular movements that could be identified and put into graphic form only with great difficulty. In language, on the contrary, there is only the sound-image, and the latter can be translated into a fixed visual image. For if we disregard the vast number of movements necessary for the realization of sound-images in speaking, we see that each sound-image is nothing more than the sum of a limited number of elements or phonemes that can in turn be called up by a corresponding number of written symbols. The very possibility of putting the things that relate to language into graphic form allows dictionaries and grammars to represent it accurately, for language is a storehouse of sound-images, and writing is the tangible form of those images.

3. Place of Language in Human Facts: Semiology

The foregoing characteristics of language reveal an even more important characteristic. Language, once its boundaries have been marked off within the speech data, can be classified among human phenomena[4], whereas speech cannot.

We have just seen that language is a social institution; but several features set it apart from other political, legal, etc. institutions. We must call in a new type of facts in order to illuminate the special nature of language.

Language is a system of signs that express ideas, and is therefore comparable to a system of writing, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites, polite formulas, military signals, etc. But it is the most important of all these systems.

A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it *semiology*[5] (from Greek *sēmeîon* "sign").

Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology; the laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts.

To determine the exact place of semiology is the task of the psychologist. The task of the linguist is to find out what makes language a special system within the mass of semiological data. This issue will be taken up again later; here I wish merely to call attention to one thing: if I have succeeded in assigning linguistics a place among the sciences, it is because I have related it to semiology.

Why has semiology not yet been recognized as an independent science with its own object like all the other sciences? Linguists have been going around in circles: language, better than anything else, offers a basis for understanding the semiological problem; but language must, to put it correctly, be studied in itself; heretofore language has almost always been studied in connection with something else, from other viewpoints.

There is first of all the superficial notion of the general public: people see nothing more than a name-giving system in language, thereby prohibiting any research into its true nature.

Then there is the viewpoint of the psychologist, who studies the sign-mechanism in the individual; this is the easiest method, but it does not lead beyond individual execution and does not reach the sign, which is social.


Or even when signs are studied from a social viewpoint, only the traits that attach language to the other social institutions—those that are more or less voluntary are emphasized; as a result, the goal is bypassed and the specific characteristics of semiological systems in general and of language in particular are completely ignored. For the distinguishing characteristic of the sign—but the one that is least apparent at first sight—is that in some way it always eludes the individual or social will.

In short, the characteristic that distinguishes *semiological* systems from all other institutions shows up clearly only in language where it manifests itself in the things which are *studied* least, and the necessity or specific value of a semiological science is therefore not clearly recognized. But to me the language problem is mainly *semiological*, and all developments derive their significance from that important fact. If we are to discover the true nature of language we must learn what it has in common with all other semiological systems; linguistic forces that seem very important at first glance (e. g., the role of the vocal apparatus) will receive only secondary consideration if they serve only to set language apart from the other systems. This procedure will do more than to clarify the linguistic problem. By studying rites, customs, etc. as signs, I believe that we shall throw new light on the facts and point up the need for including them in a science of semiology and explaining them by its laws.[6]


Nature of the Linguistic Sign

1. Sign, Signified, Signifier

Some people regard language, when reduced to its elements, as a naming-process only -a list of words, each corresponding to the thing that it names. For example:



ARBOR



EQUOS

etc.　　etc.

This conception is open to criticism at several points. It assumes


that ready-made ideas exist before words (on this point, see below); it does not tell us whether a name is vocal or psychological in nature (*arbor*, for instance, can be considered from either viewpoint); finally, it lets us assume that the linking of a name and a thing is a very simple operation—an assumption that is anything but true. But this rather naive approach can bring us near the truth by showing us that the linguistic unit is a double entity, one formed by the associating of two terms.

We have seen in considering the speaking-circuit that both terms involved in the linguistic sign are psychological and are united in the brain by an associative bond. This point must be emphasized.

The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image.[7] The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it "material", it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract.

The psychological character of our sound-images becomes apparent when we observe our own speech. Without moving our lips or tongue, we can talk to ourselves or recite mentally a selection of verse. Because we regard the words of our language as sound-images, we must avoid speaking of the "phonemes" that make up the words. This term, which suggests vocal activity, is applicable to the spoken word only, to the realization of the inner image in discourse. We can avoid that misunderstanding by speaking of the *sounds* and *syllables* of a word provided we remember that the names refer to the sound-image.


The linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity that can be represented by the drawing:



The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other. Whether we try to find the meaning of the Latin word *arbor* or the word

that Latin uses to designate the concept "tree", it is clear that only the associations sanctioned by that language appear to us to conform to reality, and we disregard whatever others might be imagined.

Our definition of the linguistic sign poses an important question of terminology. I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image a *sign*, but in current usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a word, for example (*arbor*, etc.). One tends to forget that *arbor* is called a sign only because it carries the concept "tree", with the result that the idea of the sensory part implies the idea of the whole.



Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here were designated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the others. I propose to retain the word *sign* [*signe*] to designate the whole and to replace *concept* and *sound-image* respectively by *signified* [*signifié*] and *signifier* [*signifiant*]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. As regards *sign*, if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other.

The linguistic sign, as defined, has two primordial characteristics. In enunciating them I am also positing the basic principles of any study of this type.

2. Principle I: the Arbitrary Nature of the Sign

The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: *the linguistic sign is arbitrary.*

The idea of "sister" is not linked by any inner relationship to the succession of sounds *s-ö-r* which serves as its signifier in French; that it could be represented equally by just any other sequence is proved by

differences among languages and by the very existence of different languages: the signified "ox" has as its signifier *b-ö-f* on one side of the border and *o-k-s* (*Ochs*) on the other.[8]

No one disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign, but it is often easier to discover a truth than to assign to it its proper place. Principle I dominates all the linguistics of language; its consequences are numberless. It is true that not all of them are equally obvious at first glance; only after many detours does one discover them, and with them the primordial importance of the principle.

One remark in passing: when semiology becomes organized as a science, the question will arise whether or not it properly includes modes of expression based on completely natural signs, such as pantomime. Supposing that the new science welcomes them, its main concern will still be the whole group of systems grounded on the arbitrariness of the sign. In fact, every means of expression used in society is based, in principle, on collective behavior or—what amounts to the same thing—on convention. Polite formulas, for instance, though often imbued with a certain natural expressiveness (as in the case of a Chinese who greets his emperor by bowing down to the ground nine times), are nonetheless fixed by rule; it is this rule and not the intrinsic value of the gestures that obliges one to use them. Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process; that is why language, the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is only one particular semiological system.

The word *symbol* has been used to designate the linguistic sign, or more specifically, what is here called the signifier. Principle I in particular weighs against the use of this term. One characteristic of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a chariot.

The word *arbitrary* also calls for comment. The term should not

imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker (we shall see below that the individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community); I mean that it is *unmotivated*, i.e. arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified.

In concluding let us consider two objections that might be raised to the establishment of Principle I:

1. *Onomatopoeia* might be used to prove that the choice of the signifier is not always arbitrary. But onomatopoeic formations are never organic elements of a linguistic system. Besides, their number is much smaller than is generally supposed. Words like French *fouet* "whip" or *glas* "knell" may strike certain ears with suggestive sonority, but to see that they have not always had this property we need only examine their Latin forms (*fouet* is derived from *fagus* "beech-tree", *glas* from *classicum* "sound of a trumpet"). The quality of their present sounds, or rather the quality that is attributed to them, is a fortuitous result of phonetic evolution.

As for authentic onomatopoeic words (e.g. *glug-glug*, *tick-tock*, etc.), not only are they limited in number, but also they are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, for they are only approximate and more or less conventional imitations of certain sounds (cf. English *bow-bow* and French *ouaoua*). In addition, once these words have been introduced into the language, they are to a certain extent subjected to the same evolution—phonetic, morphological, etc.—that other words undergo (cf. *pigeon*, ultimately from Vulgar Latin *pipiō*, derived in turn from an onomatopoeic formation): obvious proof that they lose something of their original character in order to assume that of the linguistic sign in general, which is unmotivated.

2. *Interjections*, closely related to onomatopoeia, can be attacked on the same grounds and come no closer to refuting our thesis. One is tempted to see in them spontaneous expressions of reality dictated, so to speak, by natural forces. But for most interjections we can show that there is no fixed bond between their signified and their signifier. We need only compare two languages on this point to see how much

such expressions differ from one language to the next (e. g. the English equivalent of French *aïe!* is *ouch!*). We know, moreover, that many interjections were once words with specific meanings (cf. French *diable!* "darn!" *mordieu!* "golly!" from *mort Dieu* "God's death", etc.).[9]

Onomatopoeic formations and interjections are of secondary importance, and their symbolic origin is in part open to dispute.

3. Principle II: the Linear Nature of the Signifier

The signifier, being auditory, is unfolded solely in time from which it gets the following characteristics: (1) it represents a span, and (2) the span is measurable in a single dimension; it is a line.

While Principle II is obvious, apparently linguists have always neglected to state it, doubtless because they found it too simple; nevertheless, it is fundamental, and its consequences are incalculable. Its importance equals that of Principle I; the whole mechanism of language depends upon it. In contrast to visual signifiers (nautical signals, etc.) which can offer simultaneous groupings in several dimensions, auditory signifiers have at their command only the dimension of time. Their elements are presented in succession; they form a chain. This feature becomes readily apparent when they are represented in writing and the spatial line of graphic marks is substituted for succession in time.

Sometimes the linear nature of the signifier is not obvious. When I accent a syllable, for instance, it seems that I am concentrating more than one significant element on the same point. But this is an illusion; the syllable and its accent constitute only one phonational act. There is no duality within the act but only different oppositions to what precedes and what follows.[10]

The Concrete Entities of Language

1. Definition: Entity and Unit

The signs that make up language are not abstractions but real objects; signs and their relations are what linguistics studies; they are the *concrete entities* of our science.

Let us first recall two principles that dominate the whole issue:

1. The linguistic entity exists only through the associating of the signifier with the signified. Whenever only one element is retained, the entity vanishes; instead of a concrete object we are faced with a mere abstraction. We constantly risk grasping only a part of the entity and thinking that we are embracing it in its totality; this would happen, for example, if we divided the spoken chain into syllables, for the syllable has no value except in phonology. A succession of sounds is linguistic only if it supports an idea. Considered independently, it is material for a physiological study, and nothing more than that.

The same is true of the signified as soon as it is separated from its signifier. Considered independently, concepts like "house", "white", "see", etc. belong to psychology. They become linguistic entities only when associated with sound-images; in language, a concept is a quality of its phonic substance just as a particular slice of sound is a quality of the concept.

The two-sided linguistic unit has often been compared with the human person, made up of the body and the soul. The comparison is hardly satisfactory. A better choice would be a chemical compound like water, a combination of hydrogen and oxygen; taken separately, neither element has any of the properties of water.

2. The linguistic entity is not accurately defined until it is *delimited*, i. e. separated from everything that surrounds it on the phonic chain. These delimited entities or units stand in opposition to each other in the mechanism of language.

One is at first tempted to liken linguistic signs to visual signs, which can exist in space without becoming confused, and to assume that separation of the significant elements can be accomplished in the same way, without recourse to any mental process. The word "form", which is often used to indicate them (cf. the expression "verbal form", "noun form") gives support to the mistake. But we know that the main characteristic of the sound-chain is that it is linear. Considered by itself, it is only a line, a continuous ribbon along which the ear perceives no self-sufficient and clear-cut division; to divide the chain, we must call in meanings. When we hear an unfamiliar language, we are at a loss to say how the succession of sounds should be analyzed, for analysis is impossible if only the phonic side of the linguistic phenomenon is considered. But when we know the meaning and function that must be attributed to each part of the chain, we see the parts detach themselves from each other and the shapeless ribbon break into segments. Yet there is nothing material in the analysis.


To summarize: language does not offer itself as a set of predelimited signs that need only be studied according to their meaning and arrangement; it is a confused mass, and only attentiveness and familiari zation will reveal its particular elements. The unit has no special phonic character, and the only definition that we can give it is this: it is *a slice of sound which to the exclusion of everything that precedes and follows it in the spoken chain is the signifier of a certain concept*.

2. Method of Delimitation

One who knows a language singles out its units by a very simple method—in theory, at any rate. His method consists of using speaking as the source material of language and picturing it as two parallel chains, one of concepts (*A*) and the other of sound-images (*B*).

In an accurate delimitation, the division along the chain of sound-images (*a*, *b*, *c*) will correspond to the division along the chain of concepts (a', b', c'):

Take French *sižlaprā*. Can we cut the chain after *l* and make *sižl* a



unit? No, we need only consider the concepts to see that the division is wrong. Neither is the syllabic division *siž-la-prā* to be taken for granted as having linguistic value. The only possible divisions are these: (1) *si-ž-la-prā* (*si je la prends* "if I take it") and (2) *si-ž-l-aprā* (*si je l'apprends* "if I learn it"), and they are determined by the meaning that is attached to the words.

To verify the result of the procedure and be assured that we are really dealing with a unit, we must be able in comparing a series of sentences in which the same unit occurs to separate the unit from the rest of the context and find in each instance that meaning justifies the delimitation. Take the two French phrases *laforsdüvā* (la *force* du vent "the *force* of the wind"), and *abudfors* (a bout de *force* "exhausted"; *literally*: "at the end of one's *force*"). In each phrase the same concept coincides with the same phonic slice, *fors*; thus it is certainly a linguistic unit. But in *ilmeforsaparle* (il me *force* a parler "he *forces* me to talk") *fors* has an entirely different meaning: it is therefore another unit.

3. Practical Difficulties of Delimitation

The method outlined above is very simple in theory, but is it easy to apply? We are tempted to think so if we start from the notion that the units to be isolated are words. For what is a sentence except a combination of words? And what can be grasped more readily than words? Going back to the example given above, we may say that the analysis of the spoken chain *sižlaprā* resulted in the delimiting of four units, and that the units are words: *si-je-l-apprends*. But we are immediately put on the defensive on noting that there has been much disagreement about the nature of the word, and a little reflection shows that the usual meaning of the term is incompatible with the notion of concrete unit.

To be convinced, we need only think of French *cheval* "horse" and its plural form *chevaux*. People readily say that they are two forms of the same word; but considered as wholes, they are certainly two distinct things with respect to both meaning and sound. In *mwa* (*mois*, as in le *mois* de Septembre "the *month* of September") and *mwaz* (*mois*, in un *mois* après "a *month* later") there are also two forms of the same word, and there is no question of a concrete unit.[11] The meaning is the same, but the slices of sound are different. As soon as we try to liken concrete units to words, we face a dilemma: we must either ignore the relation—which is nonetheless evident—that binds *cheval* and *chevaux*, the two sounds of *mwa* and *mwaz*, etc. and say that they are different words, or instead of concrete units be satisfied with the abstraction that links the different forms of the same word. The concrete unit must be sought, not in the word, but elsewhere. Besides, many words are complex units, and we can easily single out their suhunits (suffixes, prefixes, radicals). Derivatives like *painful* and *delightful* can be divided into distinct parts, each having an obvious meaning and function. Conversely, some units are larger than words: compounds (French *porte-plume* "penholder"), locutions (*s'il vous plaît* "please"), inflected forms (*il a été* "he has been"), etc. But these units resist delimitation as strongly as do words proper, making it extremely difficult to disentangle the interplay of units that are found in a sound-chain and to specify the concrete elements on which a language functions.

Doubtless speakers are unaware of the practical difficulties of delimiting units. Anything that is of even the slightest significance seems like a concrete element to them and they never fail to single it out in discourse. But it is one thing to feel the quick, delicate interplay of units and quite another to account for them through methodical analysis.

A rather widely held theory makes sentences the concrete units of language: we speak only in sentences and subsequently single out the words. But to what extent does the sentence belong to language? If it belongs to speaking, the sentence cannot pass for the linguistic unit. But let us suppose that this difficulty is set aside. If we picture to

ourselves in their totality the sentences that could be uttered, their most striking characteristic is that in no way do they resemble each other. We are at first tempted to liken the immense diversity of sentences to the equal diversity of the individuals that make up a zoological species. But this is an illusion: the characteristics that animals of the same species have in common are much more significant than the differences that separate them. In sentences, on the contrary, diversity is dominant, and when we look for the link that bridges their diversity, again we find, without having looked for it, the word with its grammatical characteristics and thus fall back into the same difficulties as before.

4. Conclusion

In most sciences the question of units never even arises: the units are delimited from the outset. In zoology, the animal immediately presents itself. Astronomy works with units that are separated in space, the stars. The chemist can study the nature and composition of potassium bichromate without doubting for an instant that this is a well-defined object.

When a science has no concrete units that are immediately recognizable, it is because they are not necessary. In history, for example, is the unit the individual, the era, or the nation? We do not know. But what does it matter? We can study history without knowing the answer.

But just as the game of chess is entirely in the combination of the different chesspieces, language is characterized as a system based entirely on the opposition of its concrete units. We can neither dispense with becoming acquainted with them nor take a single step without coming back to them; and still, delimiting them is such a delicate problem that we may wonder at first whether they really exist.

Language then has the strange, striking characteristic of not having entities that are perceptible at the outset and yet of not permitting us to doubt that they exist and that their functioning constitutes it. Doubtless we have here a trait that distinguishes language from all

other semiological institutions.

Identities, Realities, Values

The statement just made brings us squarely up against a problem that is all the more important because any basic notion in static linguistics depends directly on our conception of the unit and even blends with it. This is what I should like successively to demonstrate with respect to the notions of synchronic identity, reality, and value.

1. What is a synchronic *identity*? Here it is not a question of the identity that links the French negation *pas* "not" to Latin *passum*, a diachronic identity that will be dealt with elsewhere (see p.181), but rather of the equally interesting identity by virtue of which we state that two sentences like je ne sais *pas* "I *don't* know" and ne dites *pas* cela "*don't* say that" contain the same element. An idle question, one might say; there is identity because the same slice of sound carries the same meaning in the two sentences. But that explanation is unsatisfactory, for if the correspondence of slices of sound and concepts is proof of identity (la *force* du vent; a bout de *force*), the reverse is not true. There can be identity without this correspondence. When *Gentlemen!* is repeated several times during a lecture, the listenerhas the feeling that the same expression is being used each time, and yet variations in utterance and intonation make for appreciable phonic differences in diverse contexts · differences just as appreciable as those that elsewhere separate different words (cf. French *pomme* "apple" and *paume* "palm", *goutte* "drop" and *je goute* "I taste", *fuir* "flee", and *fouir* "stuff", etc.); besides, the feeling of identity persists even though there is no absolute identity between one *Gentlemen!* and the next from a semantic viewpoint either. In the same vein, a word can express quite different ideas without compromising its identity (cf. French *adopter* une mode "*adopt* a fashion" and *adopter* un enfant "*adopt* a child", la *fleur* du pommier "the *flower* of the apple tree" and la *fleur* de la noblesse "the *flower* of nobility", etc.).

The linguistic mechanism is geared to differences and identities,

the former being only the counterpart of the latter. Everywhere then, the problem of identities appears; moreover, it blends partially with the problem of entities and units and is only a complication—illuminating at some points—of the larger problem. This characteristic stands out if we draw some comparisons with facts taken from outside speech. For instance, we speak of the identity of two "8:25 p. m. Geneva-to-Paris" trains that leave at twenty-four hour intervals. We feel that it is the same strain each day, yet everything—the locomotive, coaches, personnel—is probably different. Or if a street is demolished, then rebuilt, we say that it is the same street even though in a material sense, perhaps nothing of the old one remains. Why can a street be completely rebuilt and still be the same? Because it does not constitute a purely material entity; it is based on certain conditions that are distinct from the materials that fit the conditions, e.g. its location with respect to other streets. Similarly, what makes the express is its hour of departure, its route, and in general every circumstance that sets it apart from other trains. Whenever the same conditions are fulfilled, the same entities are obtained. Still, the entities are not abstract since we cannot conceive of a street or train outside its material realization.

Let us contrast the preceding examples with the completely different case of a suit which has been stolen from me and which I find in the window of a second-hand store. Here we have a material entity that consists solely of the inert substance—the cloth, its lining, its trimmings, etc. Another suit would not be mine regardless of its similarity to it. But linguistic identity is not that of the garment; it is that of the train and the street. Each time I say the word *Gentlemen*! I renew its substance; each utterance is a new phonic act and a new psychological act. The bond between the two uses of the same word depends neither on material identity nor on sameness in meaning but on elements which must be sought after and which will point up the true nature of linguistic units.

2. What is a synchronic *reality*? To what concrete or abstract elements of language can the name be applied?

Take as an example the distinction between the parts of speech.

What supports the classing of words as substantives, adjectives, etc.? Is it done in the name of a purely logical, extra-linguistic principle that is applied to grammar from without like the degrees of longitude and latitude on the globe? Or does it correspond to something that has its place in the system of language and is conditioned by it? In a word, is it a synchronic reality? The second supposition seems probable, but the first could also be defended. In the French sentence *ces gants sont bon marché* "these gloves are cheap", is *bon marché* an adjective? It is apparently an adjective from a logical viewpoint but not from the viewpoint of grammar, for *bon marché* fails to behave as an adjective (it is invariable, it never precedes its noun, etc.); in addition, it is composed of two words. Now the distinction between parts of speech is exactly what should serve to classify the words of language. How can a group of words be attributed to one of the "parts"? But to say that *bon* "good" is an adjective and *marché* "market" a substantive explains nothing. We are then dealing with a defective or incomplete classification; the division of words into substantives, verbs, adjectives, etc. is not an undeniable linguistic reality.

Linguistics accordingly works continuously with concepts forged by grammarians without knowing whether or not the concepts actually correspond to the constituents of the system of language. But how can we find out? And if they are phantoms, what realities can we place in opposition to them?

To be rid of illusions we must first be convinced that the concrete entities of language are not directly accessible. If we try to grasp them, we come into contact with the true facts. Starting from there, we can set up all the classifications that linguistics needs for arranging all the facts at its disposal. On the other hand, to base the classifications on anything except concrete entities to say, for example, that the parts of speech are the constituents of language simply because they correspond to categories of logic—is to forget that there are no linguistic facts apart from the phonic substance cut into significant elements.

3. Finally, not every idea touched upon in this chapter differs basically from what we have elsewhere called *values*. A new comparison

with the set of chessmen will bring out this point. Take a knight, for instance. By itself is it an element in the game? Certainly not, for by its material make-up -outside its square and the other conditions of the game—it means nothing to the player; it becomes a real, concrete element only when endowed with value and wedded to it. Suppose that the piece happens to be destroyed or lost during a game. Can it be replaced by an equivalent piece? Certainly. Not only another knight but even a figure shorn of any resemblance to a knight can be declared identical provided the same value is attributed to it. We see then that in semiological systems like language, where elements hold each other in equilibrium in accordance with fixed rules, the notion of identity blends with that of value and *vice versa*.

In a word, that is why the notion of value envelops the notions of unit, concrete entity, and reality. But if there is no fundamental difference between these diverse notions, it follows that the problem can be stated successively in several ways. Whether we try to define the unit, reality, concrete entity, or value, we always come back to the central question that dominates all of static linguistics.

It would be interesting from a practical viewpoint to begin with units, to determine what they are and to account for their diversity by classifying them. It would be necessary to search for the reason for dividing language into words-- for in spite of the difficulty of defining it, the word is a unit that strikes the mind, something central in the mechanism of language --but that is a subject which by itself would fill a volume. Next we would have to classify the subunits, then the larger units, etc. By determining in this way the elements that it manipulates, synchronic linguistics would completely fulfill its task, for it would relate all synchronic phenomena to their fundamental principle. It cannot be said that this basic problem has ever been faced squarely or that its scope and difficulty have been understood; in the matter of language, people have always been satisfied with ill-defined units.

Still, in spite of their capital importance, it is better to approach the problem of units through the study of value, for in my opinion value is of prime importance.[12]

Translated by Wade Baskin

注释：

1 惠特尼(William Wright Whitney,1827—1894)：美国语言学家，以经典著作《梵语语法》著名，另外还有著作多种。

2 articulated speech：分节语。

3 卜洛卡(Broca,1824—1880)：法国解剖学家和外科医生。他研究人的大脑结构，发现人的言语发动中枢位于左大脑，跟语言音响中枢和书写中枢有密切关系。这些神经中枢受到损害，就会导致失语症和失书症。

4 human phenomena：人文现象。

5 semiotics，符号学，也可以用 semiology 来表示。

6 作者在这一章中首先区分出词语和音响的各种层次。他指出，对人来说最重要的不是说话的能力，而是建构一种语言符号系统的能力。他通过详细描绘概念与声音的产生以及接受的过程，探讨语言交际行为的本质。他还预言了以研究一切符号系统为己任的学科——符号学，并把语言学视为符号学的一个分支。

7 这里所说的概念(concept)，即是索绪尔所区分出的所指，音响—形象(sound-image)为能指。

8 在法文中，ox 用 bof 来表示，德文中则用 Ochs。

9 以下词语皆为法文：diable 意为"鬼"，mordieu 意为"天哪"。

10 作者在这一章中着重指出了语言符号的任意性，同时揭示了语言符号的二元性：它是能指和所指的结合，相当于一张纸的两面。

11 mois：法语，发音为/mwʌ/。在句子中，当后面出现一个以元音开头的词语时，读音发生了改变，发成/mwʌz/。

12 作者在这两章中主要表明：语言系统完全建立在单元对立的基础上；语言系统的基本单位只有与其他单位发生关系才有意义。索绪尔把这种关系当作研究对象，这一思路给予结构主义文论重要启发。

罗兰·巴特：结构主义活动

The Structuralist Activity

Roland Barthes

What is structuralism? Not a school, nor even a movement (*at least, not yet*)[1], for most of the authors ordinarily labeled with this word are unaware of being united by any solidarity of doctrine or

commitment. Nor is it a vocabulary. *Structure* is already an old word (of anatomical and grammatical provenance)[2], today quite overworked: all the social sciences resort to it abundantly, and the word's use can distinguish no one, except to engage in polemics about the content assigned to it; *functions*, *forms*, *signs* and *significations* are scarcely more pertinent: they are, today, words of common usage, from which one asks (and obtains) whatever one wants, notably the camouflage of the old determinist schema of cause and product; we must doubtless go back to pairings like those of *significans/significatum*[3] and *synchronic/diachronic* in order to approach what distinguishes structuralism from other modes of thought: the first because it refers to the linguistic model as originated by Saussure, and because along with economics, linguistics is, in the present state of affairs, the true science of structure, the second, more decisively, because it seems to imply a certain revision of the notion of history, insofar as the notion of the synchronic (although in Saussure this is a preeminently *operational* concept) accredits a certain immobilization of time, and insofar as that of the diachronic tends to represent the historical process as a pure succession of forms. This second pairing is all the more distinctive in that the chief resistance to structuralism today seems to be of Marxist origin and that it focuses on the notion of history (and not of structure); whatever the case, it is probably the serious recourse to the nomenclature of signification (and not to the word itself, which is, paradoxically, not at all distinctive) which we must ultimately take as structuralism's *spoken sign*: watch who uses *signifier* and *signified*, *synchronic* and *diachronic*, and you will know whether the structuralist vision is constituted.

This is valid for the intellectual metalanguage[4], which explicitly employs methodological concepts. But since structuralism is neither a school nor a movement, there is no reason to reduce it a priori, even in a problematical way, to the activity of philosophers; it would be better to try and find its broadest description (if not its definition) on another level than that of reflexive language. We can in fact presume that there exist certain writers, painters, musicians, in whose eyes a certain

exercise of structure (and not only its thought) represents a distinctive experience, and that both analysts and creators must be placed under the common sign of what we might call *structural man*, defined not by his ideas or his languages, but by his imagination—in other words, by the way in which he mentally experiences structure.

Hence the first thing to be said is that in relation to *all* its users, structuralism is essentially an *activity*, i.e., the controlled succession of a certain number of mental operations: we might speak of structuralist activity as we once spoke of surrealist activity (surrealism[5], moreover, may well have produced the first experience of structural literature, a possibility which must some day be explored). But before seeing what these operations are, we must say a word about their goal.

The goal of all structuralist activity, whether reflexive or poetic, is to reconstruct an "object" in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning (the "functions") of this object. Structure is therefore actually a *simulacrum* of the object, but a directed, *interested* simulacrum, since the imitated object makes something appear which remained invisible, or if one prefers, unintelligible in the natural object.[6] Structural man takes the real, decomposes it, then recomposes it; this appears to be little enough (which makes some say that the structuralist enterprise is "meaningless", "uninteresting", "useless", etc.). Yet, from another point of view, this "little enough" is decisive: for between the two objects, or the two tenses,[7] of structuralist activity, there occurs *something new*, and what is new is nothing less than the generally intelligible: the simulacrum is intellect added to object, and this addition has an anthropological value, in that it is man himself, his history, his situation, his freedom and the very resistance which nature offers to his mind.

We see, then, why we must speak of a structuralist *activity*: creation or reflection are not, here, an original "impression" of the world, but a veritable fabrication of a world which resembles the first one, not in order to copy it but to render it intelligible. Hence one might say that structuralism is essentially *an activity of imitation*, which is also

why there is, strictly speaking, no *technical* difference between structuralism as an intellectual activity on the one hand and literature in particular, art in general on the other: both derive from a *mimesis*, based not on the analogy of substances (as in so-called realist art), but on the analogy of functions (what Lévi-Strauss calls *homology*). When Troubetskoy[8] reconstructs the phonetic object as a system of variations; when Dumézil elaborates a functional mythology; when Propp constructs a folk tale resulting by structuration from all the Slavic tales he has previously decomposed; when Lévi-Strauss discovers the homologic functioning of the totemic imagination, or Granger the formal rules of economic thought, or Gardin the pertinent features of prehistoric bronzes; when Richard decomposes a poem by Mallarmé into its distinctive vibrations— they are all doing nothing different from what Mondrian,[9] Boulez or Butor[10] are doing when they articulate a certain object—what will be called, precisely, a *composition*— by the controlled manifestation of certain units and certain associations of these units. It is of little consequence whether the initial object liable to the simulacrum activity is given by the world in an already assembled fashion (in the case of the structural analysis made of a constituted language or society or work) or is still scattered (in the case of the structural "composition"); whether this initial object is drawn from a social reality or an imaginary reality. It is not the nature of the copied object which defines an art (though this is a tenacious prejudice in all realism), it is the fact that man adds to it in reconstructing it: technique is the very being of all creation. It is therefore to the degree that the goals of structuralist activity are indissolubly linked to a certain technique that structuralism exists in a distinctive fashion in relation to other modes of analysis or creation: we recompose the object *in order* to make certain functions appear, and it is, so to speak, the way that makes the work; this is why we must speak of the structuralist activity rather than the structuralist work.

The structuralist activity involves two typical operations: dissection and articulation[11]. To dissect the first object, the one which is given to the simulacrum activity, is to find in it certain mobile fragments

whose differential situation engenders a certain meaning; the fragment has no meaning in itself, but it is nonetheless such that the slightest variation wrought in its configuration produces a change in the whole; a *square* by Mondrian, a *series* by Pousseur, a *versicle* of Butor's *Mobile*, the "mytheme" in Lévi-Strauss, the phoneme in the work of the phonologists, the "theme" in certain literary criticism -all these units (whatever their inner structure and their extent, quite different according to cases) have no significant existence except by their frontiers: those which separate them from other actual units of the discourse (but this is a problem of articulation) and also those which distinguish them from other virtual units, with which they form a certain class (which linguistics calls a paradigm);[12] this notion of a paradigm is essential, apparently, if we are to understand the structuralist vision: the paradigm is a group, a reservoir—as limited as possible—of objects (of units) from which one summons, by an act of citation, the object or unit one wishes to endow with an actual meaning; what characterizes the paradigmatic object is that it is, vis-à-vis other objects of its class, in a certain relation of affinity and dissimilarity: two units of the same pardigm must resemble each other somewhat *in order* that the difference which separates them be indeed evident: *s* and *z* must have both a common feature (dentality) and a distinctive feature (presence or absence of sonority) so that we cannot, in French, attribute the same meaning to *poisson* and *poison*[13]; Mondrian's squares must have both certain affinities by their shape as squares and certain dissimilarities by their proportion and color; the American automobiles (in Butor's *Mobile*) must be constantly regarded in the same way, yet they must differ each time by both their make and color; the episodes of the Oedipus myth (in Lévi-Strauss's analysis) must be both identical and varied—in order that all these languages, these works may be intelligible. The dissection operation thus produces an initial dispersed state of the simulacrum, but the units of the structure are not at all anarchic: before being distributed and fixed in the continuity of the composition, each one forms with its own virtual group or reservoir an intelligent organism, subject to a sovereign motor principle: that of the smallest difference.

Once the units are posited, structural man must discover in them or establish for them certain rules of association: this is the activity of articulation, which succeeds the summoning activity. The syntax of the arts and of discourse is, as we know, extremely varied; but what we discover in every work of structural enterprise is the submission to regular constraints whose formalism, improperly indicted, is much less important than their stability; for what is happening, at this second stage of the simulacrum-activity, is a kind of battle against chance; this is why the constraint of recurrence of the units has an almost demiurgic value: it is by the regular return of the units and of the associations of units that the work appears constructed, i.e., endowed with meaning; linguistics calls these rules of combination forms, and it would be advantageous to retain this rigorous sense of an overtaxed word: form, it has been said, is what keeps the contiguity of units from appearing as a pure effect of chance: the work of art is what man wrests from chance. This perhaps allows us to understand on the one hand why so-called nonfigurative works are nonetheless to the highest degree works of art, human thought being established not on the analogy of copies and models but with the regularity of assemblages; and on the other hand why these same works appear, precisely, fortuitous and thereby useless to those who discern in them no *form*: in front of an abstract painting, Khrushchev[14] was certainly wrong to see only the traces of a donkey's tail whisked across the canvas; at least he knew in his way, though, that art is a certain conquest of chance (he simply forgot that every rule must be learned, whether one wants to apply or interpret it).

The simulacrum, thus constructed, does not render the world as it has found it, and it is here that structuralism is important. First of all, it manifests a new category of the object, which is neither the real nor the rational, but the *functional*, thereby joining a whole scientific complex which is being developed around information theory and research. Subsequently and especially, it highlights the strictly human process by which men give meaning to things. Is this new? To a certain degree, yes; of course the world has never stopped looking for the meaning of what is given it and of what it produces; what is new is a mode of

thought (or a "poetics") which seeks less to assign completed meanings to the objects it discovers than to know how meaning is possible, at what cost and by what means. Ultimately, one might say that the object of structuralism is not man endowed with meanings, but man fabricating meanings, as if it could not be the *content* of meanings which exhausted the semantic goals of humanity, but only the act by which these meanings, historical and contingent variables, are produced. *Homo significans*[15]: such would be the new man of structural inquiry.

According to Hegel, the ancient Greek was amazed by the *natural* in nature; he constantly listened to it, questioned the meaning of mountains, springs, forests, storms; without knowing what all these objects were telling him by name, he perceived in the vegetal or cosmic order a tremendous *shudder* of meaning, to which he gave the name of a god: Pan[16]. Subsequently, nature has changed, has become social: everything that is given to man is *already* human, down to the forest and the river which we cross when we travel. But confronted with this social nature, which is quite simply culture, structural man is no different from the ancient Greek: he too listens for the natural in culture, and constantly perceives in it not so much stable, finite, "true" meanings as the shudder of an enormous machine which is humanity tirelessly undertaking to create meaning, without which it would no longer be human. And it is because this fabrication of meaning is more important, to its view, than the meanings themselves, it is because the function is extensive with the works, that structuralism constitutes itself as an activity, and refers the exercise of the work and the work itself to a single identity: a serial composition or an analysis by Lévi-Strauss are not objects except insofar as they have been *made*: their present being *is* their past act: they are *having-been-mades*; the artist, the analyst recreates the course taken by meaning, he need not designate it: his function, to return to Hegel's example, is a *manteia*[17]; like the ancient soothsayer, he *speaks* the locus of meaning but does not name it. And it is because literature, in particular, is a mantic activity that it is both

intelligible and interrogating, speaking and silent, engaged in the world by the course of meaning which it remakes with the world, but disengaged from the contingent meanings which the world elaborates: an answer to the man who consumes it yet always a question to nature, an answer which questions and a question which answers.

How then does structural man deal with the accusation of unreality which is sometimes flung at him? Are not forms in the world, are not forms responsible? Was it really his Marxism that was revolutionary in Brecht? Was it not rather the decision to link to Marxism, in the theater, the placing of a spotlight or the deliberate fraying of a costume? Structuralism does not withdraw history from the world: it seeks to link to history not only certain contents (this has been done a thousand times) but also certain forms, not only the material but also the intelligible, not only the ideological but also the aesthetic. And precisely because all thought about the historically intelligible is also a participation in that intelligibility, structural man is scarcely concerned to *last*; he knows that structuralism, too, is a certain *form* of the world, which will change with the world; and just as he experiences his validity (but not his truth) in his power to speak the old languages of the world in a new way, so he knows that it will suffice that a new language rise out of history, a new language which speaks him in his turn, for his task to be done.

注释:

1 这里指作者写作本文时的 60 年代初,当时结构主义并未形成声势浩大的运动。

2 在结构主义者看来,"结构"指的是由历史情境所决定的各种元素之间的种种关系。

3 *significans/significatum*:即下文所说的能指和所指(signifier/signified)。

4 metalanguage:原语言。

5 超现实主义(surrealism),是本世纪二三十年代以布勒东为代表的一个文艺流派,主张依靠下意识来描写梦幻世界,特别提倡"自动写作"。

6 这句话的大意是:经过结构主义对原客体的重新建构,原客体中潜在的事物(意义或原则)被揭示出来。

7 这里所说的两个客体(two objects)指的是原客体和模仿客体,两个时态(two tenses)指共时和历时。

8 特鲁别茨柯依(N. S. Troubetskoy,1890- 1938):布拉格学派斯拉夫语言学家,以所著《音位学原理》(1938)见称。他把索绪尔对"语言"和"言语"的区分应用于音位概念,指出语音是言语的一部分而音位是语言的一部分。

9 里夏尔(Jean-Pierre Richard,1928—):现象学批评家。
马拉美(Stephane Mallarmé,1842—1898):法国象征主义诗人。
马德里安(Piet Mondrian,1872- 1914):荷兰抽象派画家。

10 布雷(Pierre Boulez,1925—):法国作曲家。
布托(Michel Butor,1926—):法国小说家和批评家。

11 dissection and articulation:分割与结合。

12 在冒号后面的这部分内容里,作者探讨了索绪尔所说的横组合关系和纵聚合关系。所谓实存单位(actual unit)是指叙述话语中有横组合关系、实际出现的各个单位;虚设单位(virtual unit)指的是实际叙述话语中并不真正出现但却与实际出现的单位有着纵聚合关系且功能相同的单位。

13 *poisson*, *poison*:法文,意思分别是"鱼"和"毒药",发音分别是/pwʌsɔ̃/和/pwʌzɔ̃/。

14 赫鲁晓夫(Nikita Sergeyevich Khruschev,1894- 1971):前苏联领导人。他对现代派艺术极为反感。

15 *Homo significans*:指示者。

16 Pan:希腊神话中人身羊足、头上有角的牧神。

17 manteia:预言家。

戴维·洛奇:现实主义文本的分析与阐释:海明威的《雨中的猫》

Analysis and Interpretation of the Realist Text: Ernest Hemingway's "Cat in the Rain"

David Lodge

I

It is a commonplace that the systematic study of narrative was founded by Aristotle, and scarcely an exaggeration to say that little of significance was added to those foundations until the twentieth century.

Narrative theory in the intervening period was mainly directed (or misdirected) at deducing from Aristotle's penetrating analysis of the system of Greek tragedy a set of prescriptive rules for the writing of epic. The rise of the novel as a distinctive and eventually dominant literary form finally exposed the poverty of neoclassical narrative theory, without for a long time generating anything much more satisfactory. The realistic novel set peculiar problems for any formalist criticism because it worked by disguising or denying its own conventionality. It therefore invited—and received—criticism which was interpretative and evaluative rather than analytical. It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that something like a poetics of fiction began to evolve from the self-conscious experiments of novelists themselves, and was elaborated by literary critics. At about the same time, developments in linguistics, folklore and anthropology stimulated a more broad-ranging study of narrative, beyond the boundaries of modern literary fiction. For a long time these investigations were pursued on parallel tracks which seldom converged. In the last couple of decades, however, the Anglo-American tradition of formalist criticism, essentially empirical and text-based, theoretically rather underpowered but hermeneutically productive, has encountered the more systematic, abstract, theoretically rigorous and "scientific" tradition of European structuralist criticism. The result has been a minor "knowledge explosion" in the field of narrative theory and poeties of fiction.

The question I wish to raise in this essay is whether progress in theory and methodology means progress in the critical reading of texts. Is it possible, or useful, to bring the whole battery of modern formalism and structuralism to bear upon a single text, and what is gained by so doing? Does it enrich our reading by uncovering depths and nuances of meaning we might not otherwise have brought to consciousness, help us to solve problems of interpretation and to correct misreadings? Or does it merely encourage a pointless and selfindulgent academicism, by which the same information is shuffled from one set of categories to another, from one jargon to another, without any real advance in appreciation or understanding? The analysis offered here of a short story by

Ernest Hemingway is intended to support a positive answer to the first set of questions, a negative answer to the second set. But first it may be useful to remind ourselves of the range and variety of theories, methodologies and "approaches" now available to the critic of fiction. I would group them into three categories, according to the "depth" at which they address themselves to narrative structure.

1. *Narratology and Narrative Grammar* — i. e. the effort to discover the *langue* of narrative, the underlying system of rules and possibilities of which any narrative *parole* (text) is the realization. With a few arguable exceptions—e. g. Northrop Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957) and Frank Kermode's[1] *The Sense of an Ending* (1966)—this enterprise has been almost exclusively dominated by European scholars- Propp, Brémond,[2] Greimas, Lévi-Strauss, Todorov and Barthes, among others. Crucial to this tradition of inquiry are the ideas of function and transformation. In the theory of Greimas, for instance, all narrative consists essentially of the transfer of an object or value from one "actant" to another. An actant performs a certain function in the story which may be classified as Subject or Object, Sender or Receiver, Helper or Opponent, and is involved in doing things which may be classified as performative (tests, struggles, etc.), contractual (establishment and breaking of contracts) and disjunctional (departure and returns). These functions are not simply identifiable from the surface structure of a narrative text: for instance, several characters may perform the function of one actant, or one character may combine the functions of two actants. All concepts are semantically defined by a binary relationship with their opposites (e. g. Life/Death) or negatives (e. g. Life/Non-Life) yielding the basic semiotic model A:B::—A:—B (e. g. Life: Death:: Non-Life:Non-Death), so that all narrative can be seen as the transformation into actants and actions of a thematic four-term homology.

It is often said that this kind of approach is more rewarding when applied to narratives of a traditional, formulaic and orally transmitted type, rather than sophisticated literary narratives; and the exponents of narratology themselves frequently remind us that their aim is not the

explication of texts but the uncovering of the system that allows narrative texts to be generated and competent readers to make sense of them. Narratology does, however, bring to the attention of the literary critic factors involved in reading narrative that are important, but in a sense so obvious that they tend to be overlooked. Roland Barthes has very fruitfully applied to the analysis of literary fictions the idea, derived from structuralist narratology, that narrative is divisible into sequences that open or close possibilities for the characters, and thus for the reader. The interest of these openings and closures may be either retrospective, contributing to the solution of some enigma proposed earlier in the text (the hermeneutic code), or prospective, making the audience wonder what will happen next (the proairetic code). Curiosity and suspense are therefore the two basic "affects" aroused by narrative, exemplified in a very pure form by the classic detective story and the thriller, respectively, as Tzvetan Todorov observes. A story of any sophistication will also, as Kermode points out in *The Sense of an Ending*, make use of what Aristotle called peripeteia, or reversal, when a possibility is closed in a way that is unexpected and yet plausible and instructive. The reversal tends to produce an effect of irony, especially if it is anticipated by the audience.

Two problems arise in applying this kind of approach to realistic fiction. If we segment a text into its smallest units of information, how do we identify those which are functional on the basic narrative level, and what do we do with those units (the majority) which are not? Roland Barthes suggests one solution in his "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives" where, drawing his illustrations mainly from Ian Fleming's[3] *Goldfinger*, he classifies the narrative units as either *nuclei* or *catalysers*. Nuclei open or close alternatives that are of direct consequence for the subsequent development of the narrative and cannot be deleted without altering the story. Catalysers are merely consecutive units which expand the nuclei or fill up the space between them. They can be deleted without altering the narrative, though not, in the case of realistic narrative, without altering its meaning and effect, since segments which connect not, or not only, with segments at the same level,

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sjuzet, which may be longer, or shorter, or approximately the same. The third category concerns the relationship between the number of times an event occurs in the *fabula* and the number of times it is narrated in the *sjuzet*. There are four possibilities: telling once what happened once, telling *n* times what happened *n* times, telling *n* times what happened once, and telling once what happened *n* times.

The choices made by the narrative artist at this level are in a sense prior to, or "deeper" than his stylistic choices in composing the surface structure of the text, though they place important constraints upon what he can achieve in the surface structure. They are also of manifest importance in the realistic novel which, compared to other, earlier narrative forms, is characterised by a carefully discriminated, pseudohistorical treatment of temporality, and a remarkable depth and flexibility in its presentation of consciousness.

A good deal of Anglo-American critical theorising about the novel, from Percy Lubbock's *The Craft of Fiction* (1921) to Wayne Booth's *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (1961),[6] was implicitly, if unconsciously, based on the same distinction between *fabula* and *sjuzet*, between "story" and "way of telling it". The cross-fertilisation of the two critical traditions has produced much interesting and illuminating work, analysing and classifying novelistic techniques and covering such matters as tense, person, speech and indirect speech in fictional narrative; and we are now, it seems to me, within sight of a truly comprehensive taxonomy of fictional form at this level. Two recent books which have made particularly valuable contributions in this respect are Seymour Chatman's *Style and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film* (1978) and the more narrowly focused *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction* by Dorrit Cohn (1978).

3. *Rhetorical Analysis* By this I mean analysing the surface structure of narrative texts to show how the linguistic mediation of a story determines its meaning and effect. This is a kind of criticism in which Anglo-American tradition is comparatively strong, because of the close-reading techniques developed by the New Criticism. Mark

Shorer's[7] essays "Technique as Discovery" (1948) and "Fiction and the Analogical Matrix" (1949) are classic statements of this approach. The stylistics that developed out of Romance Philology, represented at its best by Spitzer and Auerbach,[8] also belongs in this category. When I wrote my first book of criticism, *Language of Fiction* (1966), this seemed the best route by which to achieve a formalist critique of the realistic novel.

The underlying aim of this criticism was to demonstrate that what looked like redundant or random detail in realistic fiction was in fact functional, contributing to a pattern of motifs with expressive and thematic significance. Much of this criticism was therefore concerned with tracing symbolism and keywords in the verbal texture of novels. Though very few of the New Critics were aware of the work of Roman Jakobson, he provided a theoretical justification for this kind of criticism in his famous definition of literariness, or the poetic function of language, as "the projection of the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection to the axis of combination". What the New Critics called "spatial form" was precisely a pattern of paradigmatic equivalences concealed in the narrative syntagm. Furthermore, as I tried to show in my book *The Modes of Modern Writing* (1977), in his distinction between metaphor and metonymy, Jakobson provided a key to understanding how the realistic novel contrives to build up a pattern of equivalences without violating its illusion of life.

Metaphor and metonymy (or synecdoche) are both figures of equivalence, but generated by different processes, metaphor according to similarity between things otherwise different, metonymy according to contiguity or association between part and whole, cause and effect, thing and attribute, etc. Thus, if I transform the literal sentence "Ships sail the sea" into "Keels plough the deep", *plough* is equivalent to "sail" because of the similarity between the movement of a plough through the earth and a ship through the sea, but *keel* is equivalent to "ship" because it is part of a ship (synecdoche) and *deep* is equivalent to "sea" because it is an attribute of the sea (metonymy). In fact, metonymy is a non-logical (and therefore foregrounded or rhetorical)

condensation achieved by transformations of kernel sentences by deletion (*the keels of the ships* condensed to *keels* rather than *ships*, *deep sea* to *deep* rather than *sea*). Metonymy thus plays with the combination axis of language as metaphor plays with the selection axis of language, and together they epitomise the two ways by which any discourse connects one topic with another: either because they are similar or because they are contiguous. Jakobson's distinction thus allows the analyst to move freely between deep structure and surface structure.

Realistic fiction is dominantly metonymic: it connects actions that are contiguous in time and space and connected by cause and effect, but since it cannot describe exhaustively, the narrative *sjuzet* is always in a metonymic (or synecdochic) relation to the *fabula*. The narrative text necessarily selects certain details and suppresses or deletes others. The selected details are thus foregrounded by being selected, and their recurrence and interrelation with each other in the narrative text becomes aesthetically significant (what the Prague School calls systematic internal foregrounding). Furthermore, these details may carry connotations, building up a still denser pattern of equivalences, especially (though not exclusively) when they are described in figurative language, using the verbal tropes of metonymy or metaphor. This is usually (and rather loosely) called "symbolism" in Anglo-American criticism. Barthes calls it connotation, the process by which one signified acts as the signifier of another signified not actually named. Jakobson's distinction enables us to distinguish four different ways in which it operates in literary texts, two of which are especially characteristic of realistic fiction:

1. Metonymic Signified I metonymically evokes Signified II (e. g. the hearth fire in *Jane Eyre*, an invariably selected detail in any description of domestic interiors, signifying "inhabited room", also symbolisescomfort, intimacy, security, etc., cause evoking effect).

2. Metonymic Signified I metaphorically evokes Signified II (e. g. mud and fog at the beginning of *Bleak House*, signifying "inclement weather", also symbolise the obfuscation and degradation of goodness and justice by the Law, because of the similarity between the effects of

the elements and those of the institution).

3. Metaphoric Signified I metonymically evokes Signified II (e. g. the description of the night in Llaregyb, in Dylan Thomas's *Under Milk Wood*, as "bible-black", symbolises the Protestant chapel-going religious culture of the community; part, or attribute, standing for the whole).

4. Metaphoric Signified I metaphorically evokes Signified II (e. g. in the opening lines of Yeats's poem, "The Second Coming"—

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer

where the metaphor *gyre* applied to the spiralling movement of the falcon also symbolises the cyclical movement of history).

Realistic fiction relies principally upon symbolism of types A and B, in which the primary signified is introduced into the discourse according to the metonymic principle of spatial or temporal contiguity with what has come before.

II

No choice of a text for illustrative purposes is innocent, and no analysis of a single text could possibly provide universally valid answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this essay. These questions will not he settled until we have a significant corpus of synthetic or pluralistic readings of narrative texts of various types. Two distinguished achievements of this kind come to mind: Barthes's *S/Z* and Christine Brooke-Rose's study of *The Turn of the Screw*[5]. The following discussion of Hemingway's short story "Cat in the Rain" (1925) follows the model of the latter in taking the problem of interpretation as its starting-point, but it is necessarily much more modest in scope and scale than either. Two considerations prompted the choice of this story, apart from its convenient brevity. (1) A staff seminar on it in my own department at Birmingham revealed that it presents certain problems of interpretation, though without being quite so heavily encrusted with the deposits of previous readings and misreadings as *The Turn of the*

Screw. (2) It is both realistic and modern, cutting across that historicist and tendentious distinction between the *lisible* and the *scriptible* which I personally find one of the less helpful features of the work of Barthes and his disciples.[10] The implied notion of *vraisemblance* on which Hemingway's story depends, the assumed relationship between the text and reality, is essentially continuous with that of classic bourgeois realism, yet in the experience of readers it has proved ambiguous, polyvalent and resistant to interpretative closure.

This is what Carlos Baker, in the standard critical work on Hemingway, had to say about "Cat in the Rain" (be discusses it in the context of a group of stories about men-women relationships):

> "Cat in the Rain", another story taken in part from the woman's point of view, presents a corner of the female world in which the male is only tangentially involved. It was written at Rapallo in May, 1923.
>
> From the window of a hotel room where her husband is reading and she is fidgeting, a young wife sees a cat outside in the rain. When she goes to get it, the animal (which somehow stands in her mind for comfortable bourgeois domesticity) has disappeared. This fact is very close to tragic because of the cat's association in her mind with many other things she longs for: long hair she can do in a knot at tbe back of her neck; a candle-lighted dining table where her own silver gleams; the season of spring and nice weather; and of course, some new clothes. But when she puts these wishes into words, her husband mildly advises her to shut up and find something to read. "Anyway," says the young wife, "I want a cat. I want a cat. I want a cat now. If I can't have long hair or any fun, I can have a cat." The poor girl is the referee in a faceoff between the actual and the possible. The actual is made of rain, boredom, a preoccupied husband, and irrational yearnings. The possible is made of silver, spring, fun, a new coiffure, and new dresses. Between the actual and the possible, stands the cat. It is finally sent up to her by the kindly old inn-keeper, whose sympathetic

deference is greater than that of the young husband.

There are several things to quibble with in this account of the story. Most important perhaps is Baker's assumption that the cat sent up by the hotel keeper at the end is the same as the one that the wife saw from her window. This assumption is consistent with Baker's sympathy with the wife as a character, implied by his reference to her as "the poor girl" and his description of the disappearance of the cat as "very close to tragic". The appearance of the maid with a cat is the main reversal, in Aristotelian terms, in the narrative. If it is indeed the cat she went to look for, then the reversal is a happy one for her, and confirms her sense that the hotel keeper appreciated her as a woman more than her husband. In Greimas's terms, the wife is the subject of the story and the cat the object. The hotel-keeper and the maid enact the role of helper and George is the opponent. The story is disjunctive (departure and return) and concerns the transfer of the cat to the wife.

The description of the tortoise-shell cat as "big", however, suggests that it is not the one to which the wife referred by the diminutive term "kitty", and which she envisaged stroking on her lap. We might infer that the padrone, trying to humour a client, sends up the first cat he can lay hands on, which is in fact quite inappropriate to the wife's needs. This would make the reversal an ironic one at the wife's expense, emphasising the social and cultural abyss that separates her from the padrone, and revealing her quasi-erotic response to his professional attentiveness as a delusion.

I shall return to this question of the ambiguity of the ending. One more point about Baker's commentary on the story: he says that the cat "somehow stands in [the wife's] mind for comfortable bourgeois domesticity", and speaks of its "association in her mind with many other things she longs for". In other words, he interprets the cat as a metonymic symbol of type A above. Indeed he sees the whole story as turning on the opposition between two groups of metonymies. "The actual is made of rain, boredom, a preoccupied husband, and irrational yearnings. The possible is made of silver, spring, fun, a new coiffure, and

new clothes."

John V. Hagopian gives a very different reading of this story. It is, he says, about "a crisis in the marriage ... involving the lack of fertility, which is symbolically foreshadowed by the public garden (fertility) dominated by the war monument (death)" in the first paragraph. These again are metonymic symbols of type A, effect connoting cause; but Hagopian's reading of the story hinges on the identification of the cat as a symbol of a wanted child, and of the man in the rubber cape as a symbol of contraception—symbolism of type B, in which a metonymic signified evokes a second signified metaphorically, i. e. by virtue of similarity.

> As [the wife] looks out into the wet empty square, she sees a man in a rubber cape crossing to the café in the rain... The rubber cape is a protection from rain, and rain is a fundamental necessity for fertility and fertility is precisely what is lacking in the American wife's marriage. An even more precise interpretation is possible but perhaps not necessary here.

What Hagopian is presumably hinting at is that "rubber" is an American colloquialism for contraceptive sheath, and that the wife notices the man in the rubber cape because of the subconscious association— a piece of classic Freudian "symbolism". It is an ingenious interpretation and all the more persuasive because there seems to be no very obvious reason for introducing the man in the cape into the story—he is not an actant in the narrative but an item of the descriptive background, and his appearance does not tell us anything about the weather or the square that we do not know already. Admittedly, the cape does signify, by contrast, the wife's lack of protection from the rain, thus emphasising the padrone's thoughtfulness in sending the maid with the umbrella. But if we accept Hagopian's reading then the umbrella itself, opening with almost comical opportuneness and effortlessness behind her, becomes a symbol of how the wife's way of life comes between her and a vital, fertile relationship with reality. Her later demands for new

clothes, a new hairstyle, a candle-lit dining-table are, according to Hagopian, expressions of a desire that never reaches full consciousness, for "motherhood, a home with a family, an end to the strictly companionate marriage with George". And the cat, he says, is by this stage in the story "an obvious symbol for a child".

Unlike Baker, Hagopian sees the final reversal in the story as ironic:

> The girl's symbolic wish is grotesquely fulfilled in painfully realistic terms. It is George, not the padrone, by whom the wife wants to be fulfilled, but the padrone has sent up the maid with a big tortoiseshell cat, a huge creature that swings down against her body. It is not clear whether this is exactly the same cat as the one the wife had seen from the window—probably not; in any case, it will most certainly not do. The girl is willing to settle for a child-surrogate, but the big tortoiseshell cat obviously cannot serve that purpose.

The reason why this story is capable of provoking these two very different interpretations might be expressed as follows: although it is a well-formed narrative, with a clearly defined beginning, middle and end, the primary action is not the primary vehicle of meaning. This can be demonstrated by testing upon the story Jonathan Culler's hypothesis that competent readers will tend to agree on what is and is not essential to the plot of a narrative text. Before the seminar at Birmingham University, participants were invited to summarise the action of the story in not more than thirty words of continuous prose. All the contributors mentioned the wife, the cat, the rain, and the hotel manager; most mentioned the nationality of the wife and her failure to find the cat under the table; about half mentioned the husband, located the story in Italy, and made a distinction between the two cats. None mentioned the maid, or the bickering between husband and wife.

These omissions are particularly interesting. The non-appearance of the maid is easily explained: on the narrative level her function is

indistinguishable from that of the manager both are "helpers" and the narrative would not be significantly altered *qua* narrative if the maid were deleted from the story and her actions performed by the manager himself. She does contribute to the symmetry of the story both numerically and sexually: it begins by pairing husband and wife, then pairs wife and manager, then wife and maid, then (in the wife's thoughts) maid and manager, then wife and manager again, then wife and husband again, and ends by pairing husband and maid. But this seems to be a purely formal set of equivalences with no significance in the hermeneutic or proairetic codes (such as would obtain if, for instance, there were some intrigue linking the husband with the maid and the manager, the kind of plotting characteristic of the *lisible* text). The main function of the maid in the story is to emphasise the status of the wife as a client and expatriate, and thus to act as a warning or corrective against the wife's tendency to attribute to the padrone a deeply personal interest in herself.

Both Baker and Hagopian agree that the rift between husband and wife is what the story is essentially about, even if they disagree about the precise cause. That none of the synopses should make any allusion to the bickering between the couple is striking evidence that the meaning of the story does not inhere in its basic action. In trying to preserve what is essential to that action in a very condensed summary—the quest for the cat, the failure of the quest, the reversal—one has to discard what seems most important in the story as read—the relationship between husband and wife. Adopting Barthes's terminology in "The Structural Analysis of Narratives", there are only four nuclei in the story, opening possibilities which might be closed in different ways: will the wife or the husband go to fetch the cat? will the wife get the cat? will she get wet? who is at the door? There is perhaps another possibility tacitly opened around line 115, and closed, negatively, at line 131: namely, that George will put down his book and make love to his wife. All the rest of the story consists of catalysers that are indexical or informational, and since most of the information is given more than once, these too become indexical of mood and atmosphere (for instance, we

are told more than once that it is raining). One might indeed describe the story generically as indexical; we infer its meaning indexically from its non-narrative components rather than hermeneutically or teleologically from its action. Another way of putting it would be to invoke Seymour Chatman's distinction between the resolved plot and the revealed plot:

> In the traditional narrative of resolution, there is a sense of problem solving... of a kind of ratiocinative or emotional teleology... "What will happen?" is the basic question. In the modern plot of revelation, however, the emphasis is elsewhere, the function of the discourse is not to answer that question or even to pose it... It is not that events are resolved (happily or tragically) but rather that a state of affairs is revealed.

Chatman offers *Pride and Prejudice* and *Mrs. Dalloway* as examples of each kind of plot. "Cat in the Rain" seems to share characteristics of both: it is, one might say, a plot of revelation (the relationship between husband and wife) disguised as a plot of resolution (the quest for the cat). The ambiguity of the ending is therefore crucial. By refusing to resolve the issue of whether the wife gets the cat she wants, the implied author indicates that this is not the point of the story.

There are several reasons why this ending is ambiguous. One, obviously, is that the story ends where it does, for if it continued for another line or two, or moment or two, it would become apparent from the wife's response whether the cat was the one she had seen from the window, whether she is pleased or disconcerted by its being brought to her, and so on. In other words, the *sjuzet* tantalisingly stops just short of that point in the *fabula* where we should, with our readerly desire for certainty, wish it to. In other respects there is nothing especially striking about the story's treatment of time, though we may admire the smooth transition in the first paragraph from summary of a state of affairs obtaining over a period of days or weeks to the state of affairs obtaining on a particular afternoon, and the subtle condensation of

durational time in the final scene between husband and wife, marked by changes in the light outside the window. The order of events is strictly chronological (characteristic, Chatman observes, of the resolved plot). As regards what Genette calls frequency, the story tends towards reiteration rather than summary, telling *n* times what happened *n* times or *n* times what happened once rather than telling once what happened *n* times. This is important because it reinforces the definition of the characters according to a very limited repertoire of gestures. Thus the wife is frequently described as looking out of the window, the husband as reading, the manager as bowing (and the weather as raining).

The story of the quest for the cat involves four characters, and in theory could be narrated from four points of view, each quite distinct and different in import. The story we have is written from the point of view of the American couple rather than that of the Italian hotel staff, and from the wife's point of view rather than the husband's. We must distinguish here between what Genette calls voice and perspective. The story is narrated throughout by an authorial voice which refers to the characters in the third person and uses the past tense. This is the standard mode of authorial narration and by convention the narrator is authoritative, reliable and, within the fictional world of the discourse, omniscient. The authorial voice in this story, however, renounces the privilege of authorial omniscience in two ways, firstly by abstaining from any comment or judgment or explanation of motive regarding the behaviour of the characters, and secondly by restricting itself to the perspective of only two of the characters, and for part of the story to the perspective of only one. By this I mean that the narrator describes nothing that is not seen by either husband or wife or both. Yet it is not quite true to say that the narrator has no independent angle of vision; he has. As in a film, we sometimes see the wife from the husband's angle, and the husband sometimes from the wife's angle, but much of the time we see them both from some independent, impersonal angle.

The first paragraph adopts the common perspective of the American couple, making no distinction between them. With the first sentence of the second paragraph, "The American wife stood at the

window looking out", the narrative adopts her perspective but without totally identifying with it. Note the difference between "*her* husband" in line 30, which closely identifies the narration with her perspective, and "the husband" in line 33, "the wife" in line 36, which subtly reasserts the independence of the authorial voice. From this point onwards, however, for the next fifty lines the narration identifies itself closely with the wife's perspective, following her out of the room and downstairs into the lobby, and reporting what she thinks as well as what she sees. The anaphoric sequence of sentences beginning "She liked" (lines 45—50) affect us as being a transcription rather than a description of her thoughts because they could be transposed into monologue (first person/present tense) without any illogicality or stylistic awkwardness. Sentences in free indirect speech, "The cat would be round to the right. Perhaps she could go along under the eaves" and "Of course, the hotel-keeper had sent her", mark the maximum degree of identification of the narration with the wife's point of view. When she returns to the room the narration separates itself from her again. There is a lot of direct speech from now on, no report of the wife's thoughts, and occasionally the narration seems to adopt the husband's perspective alone, e. g. "George looked up and saw the back of her neck, clipped close like a boy's" and—very importantly:

> Someone knocked on the door.
> "Avanti," George said. He looked up from his book.
> In the doorway stood the maid. She held a big tortoiseshell cat...

We can now fully understand why the ending of the story is so ambiguous: it is primarily because the narration adopts the husband's perspective at this crucial point. Since he did not rise from the bed to look out of the window at the cat sheltering from the rain, he has no way of knowing whether the cat brought by the maid is the same one hence the non-committal indefinite article, "a big tortoiseshell cat". If, however, the wife's perspective had been adopted at this point and the text had read:

> "Avanti," the wife said. She turned round from the window.
> In the doorway stood the maid. She held a big tortoiseshell cat...

Then it would be clear that this was not the cat the wife had wanted to bring in from the rain (in which case the definite article would be used). It is significant that in the title of the story, there is no article before "Cat", thus giving no support to either interpretation of the ending.

Carlos Baker's assumption that the tortoiseshell cat[11] and the cat in the rain are one and the same is therefore unwarranted. Hagopian's reading of the ending as ironic is preferable but his assumption that the wife's desire for the cat is caused by childlessness is also unwarranted. Here, it seems to me, the structuralist notion of language as a system of differences and of meaning as the product of structural oppositions can genuinely help to settle a point of interpretation. Hagopian's interpretation of the man in the rubber cape as a symbol of contraception depends in part on the association of rain with fertility. Now rain *can* symbolise fertility--when defined by opposition to drought. In this story, however (and incidentally, throughout Hemingway's work), it is opposed to "good weather" and symbolises the loss of pleasure and joy, the onset of discomfort and ennui. Hagopian's comments on the disappearance of the painters, "The rain, ironically, inhibits creativity", is a strained attempt to reconcile his reading with the text; there is no irony here unless we accept his equation, rain=fertility.

The cat as a child-surrogate is certainly a possible interpretation in the sense that it is a recognised cultural stereotype, but again Hagopian tries to enlist in its support textual evidence that is, if anything, negative. He comments on the description of the wife's sensations as she passes the hotel-keeper for the second time: "very small and tight inside... really important... of supreme importance" all phrases that might appropriately be used to describe a woman who is pregnant. But not, surely, to describe a woman who merely *wants* to be pregnant. Indeed, if we must have a gynaecological reading of the story it is much

more plausible to suppose that the wife's whimsical craving for the cat, and for other things like new clothes and long hair, is the result of her *being* pregnant. There is, in fact, some extratextual support for this hypothesis. In his biography of Hemingway, Carlos Baker states quite baldly that "Cat in the Rain" was about Hemingway, his wife Hadley and the manager and chambermaid at the Hotel Splendide in Rapallo, where the story was written in 1923. He also states, without making any connection between the two items, that the Hemingways had left the chilly thaw of Switzerland and gone to Rapallo because Hadley had announced that she was pregnant.

At about the same time, Hemingway was evolving "a new theory that you could omit anything if you knew what you omitted, and the omitted part would strengthen the story and make people feel something more than they understood". This is, I think, a very illuminating description by Hemingway of his application of the metonymic mode of classic realism to modernist literary purposes. Metonymy, as I said earlier, is a device of non-logical deletion. Hemingway's word is "omission". By omitting the kind of motivation that classic realistic fiction provided, he generated a symbolist polyvalency in his deceptively simple stories, making his readers "feel more than they understood". It would be a mistake, therefore, to look for a single clue, whether pregnancy or barrenness, to the meaning of "Cat in the Rain". That the wife's (and, for that matter, the husband's) behaviour is equally intelligible on either assumption is one more confirmation of the story's indeterminacy.

Hemingway's stories are remarkable for achieving a symbolist resonance without the use of rhetorical figures and tropes. Not only does "Cat in the Rain" contain no metaphors and similes—it contains no metonymies and synecdoches either. The story is "metonymic" in the structural sense defined above: its minimal semantic units are selected from a single context, a continuum of temporal and spatial contiguities, and all foregrounded simply by being selected, repeated and related to each other oppositionally. Consider, for example, the opening paragraph, which establishes the story's setting in diction that is

apparently severely denotative, with no metaphors or metonymies, similes or synecdoches, no elegant variation or pathetic fallacies, yet is nevertheless highly charged with connotative meaning.

There were only two Americans stopping at the hotel. Americans opposed to other nationalities: index of cultural isolation.

They did not know any of the people they passed on the stairs on their way to and from their room. Index of social isolation and mutual dependence—vulnerability to breakdown in relationship.

Their room was on the second floor facing the sea. Culture faces nature.

It also faced the public garden and the war monument. Culture paired with nature (public: garden) and opposed to nature (monument: garden). Pleasure (garden) opposed to pain (war).

There were big palms and green benches in the public garden. Culture and nature integrated. Benches same colour as vegetation.

In the good weather there was always an artist with his easel. Artists liked the way the palms grew and the bright colors of the hotels facing the gardens and the sea. Culture and nature happily fused. Image of euphoria.

Italians came from a long way off to look up at the war monument. Euphoria qualified. War monument attracts the living but commemorates the dead. Looking associated with absence (of the dead). "Italian" opposed to "American".

It was made of bronze and glistened in the rain. Inert mineral (bronze) opposed to organic vegetable (palm). Rain opposed to good weather. Euphoria recedes.

It was raining. Rain dripped from the palm trees. Euphoria recedes further. Weather uninviting.

Water stood in pools on the gravel paths. Image of stagnation.

The sea broke in a long line in the rain and slipped back down the beach to come up and break again in a long line in the rain. Excess of wetness. Monotony. Ennui.

The motor cars were gone from the square by the war monument. Across the square in the doorway of the café a waiter stood looking out

at the square. Images of absence, loss, ennui.[12]

The first paragraph, then, without containing a single narrative nucleus, establishes the thematic core of the story through oppositions between nature and culture, joy and ennui. Joy is associated with a harmonious union of culture and nature, ennui is the result of some dissociation or discontinuity between culture and nature. The wife, looking out of the window at a scene made joyless by the rain, sees a cat with whose discomfort she emotionally identifies. Her husband, though offering to fetch it, implies his indifference to her emotional needs by not actually moving. The husband is reading, a "cultural" use of the eyes. The wife is looking, a "natural" use of the eyes. Her looking, through the window, expresses a need for communion. His reading of a book is a substitute for communion, and a classic remedy for ennui. It is worth noticing that he is reading on the bed— a place made for sleeping and making love; and the perversity of this behaviour is symbolised by the fact that he is lying on the bed the wrong way round. As the story continues, the contrast between looking and reading, both activities expressing the loss or failure of love, becomes more insistent. Denied the kitty, a "natural" object (opposed to book) which she could have petted as a substitute for being petted, the wife looks in the mirror, pining for a more natural feminine self. Then she looks out of the window again, while her husband, who has not shifted his position (his immobility opposed to the padrone's punctilious bowing), reads on and impatiently recommends her to "get something to read". One could summarise this story in the style of Greimas, as follows: loving is to quarrelling as stroking a cat is to reading a book, a narrative transformation of the opposition between joy and ennui, thus:

> Loving (Joy): Quarrelling (Ennui):: stroking a cat (Non-joy, a giving but not receiving of pleasure): reading a book (Non-ennui).

Such a summary has this to recommend it, that it brings together the overt action of the story (the quest for the cat) with its implicit subject (the relationship between husband and wife). Whether it, and

the preceding comments, enhance our understanding and appreciation of Hemingway's story. I leave others to judge.

Cat in the Rain

There were only two Americans stopping at the hotel. They did not know any of the people they passed on the stairs on their way to and from their room. Their room was on the second floor facing the sea. It also faced the public garden and the war monument. There were big palms and green benches in the public garden. In the good weather there was always an artist with his easel. Artists liked the way the palms grew and the bright colors of the hotels facing the gardens and the sea. Italians came from a long way off to look up at the war monument. It was made of bronze and glistened in the rain. It was raining. The rain dripped from the palm trees. Water stood in pools on the gravel paths. The sea broke in a long line in the rain and slipped back down the beach to come up and break again in a long line in the rain. The motor cars were gone from the square by the war monument. Across the square in the doorway of the café a waiter stood looking out at the empty square.

The American wife stood at the window looking out. Outside right under their window a cat was crouched under one of the dripping green tables. The cat was trying to make herself so compact that she would not be dripped on.

"I'm going down and get that kitty," the American wife said.

"I'll do it," her husband offered from the bed.

"No, I'll get it. The poor kitty out trying to keep dry under a table."

The husband went on reading, lying propped up with the two pillows at the foot of the bed.

"Don't get wet," he said.

The wife went downstairs and the hotel owner stood up and bowed to her as she passed the office. His desk was at the far end of the office. He was an old man and very tall.

"Il piove," the wife said. She liked the hotelkeeper.

"Si, si, Signora, brutto *tempo*. It is very bad weather."

He stood behind his desk in the far end of the dim room. The wife liked him. She liked the deadly serious way he received any complaints. She liked his dignity. She liked the way he wanted to serve her. She liked the way he felt about being a hotelkeeper. She liked his old, heavy face and big hands.

Liking him she opened the door and looked out. It was raining harder. A man in a rubber cape was crossing the empty square to the café. The cat would be around to the right. Perhaps she could go along to the caves. As she stood in the doorway an umbrella opened behind her. It was the maid who looked after their room.

"You must not get wet," she smiled, speaking Italian. Of course, the hotelkeeper had sent her.

With the maid holding the umbrella over her, she walked along the gravel path until she was under their window. The table was there, washed bright green in the rain, but the cat was gone. She was suddenly disappointed. The maid looked up at her.

"Ha perduto qualque cosa, Signora?"

"There was a cat," said the American girl.

"A cat?"

"Si, il gatto."

"A cat?" the maid laughed. "A cat in the rain?"

"Yes," she said, "under the table." Then, "Oh, I wanted it so much. I wanted a kitty."

When she talked English the maid's face tightened.

"Come, Signora," she said. "We must get back inside. You will be wet."

"I suppose so," said the American girl.

They went back along the gravel path and passed in the door. The maid stayed outside to close the umbrella. As the American girl passed the office, the padrone bowed from his desk. Something felt very small and tight inside the girl. The padrone made her feel very small and at the same time really important. She had a momentary feeling of being of supreme importance. She went on up the stairs. She opened the door

of the room. George was on the bed, reading.

"Did you get the cat?" he asked, putting the book down.

"It was gone."

"Wonder where it went to," he said, resting his eyes from reading.

She sat down on the bed.

"I wanted it so much," she said. "I don't know why I wanted it so much. I wanted that poor kitty. It isn't any fun to be a poor kitty out in the rain."

George was reading again.

She went over and sat in front of the mirror of the dressing table looking at herself with the hand glass. She studied her profile, first one side and then the other. Then she studied the back of her head and her neck.

"Don't you think it would be a good idea if I let my hair grow out?"she asked, looking at her profile again.

George looked up and saw the back of her neck, clipped close like a boy's.

"I like it the way it is."

"I get so tired of it," she said. "I get so tired of looking like a boy."

George shifted his position in the bed. He hadn't looked away from her since she started to speak.

"You look pretty darn nice," he said.

She laid the mirror down on the dresser and went over to the window and looked out. It was getting dark.

"I want to pull my hair back tight and smooth and make a big knot at the back that I can feel," she said. "I want to have a kitty to sit on my lap and purr when I stroke her."

"Yeah?" George said from the bed.

"And I want to eat at a table with my own silver and I want candles. And I want it to be spring and I want to brush my hair out in front of a mirror and I want a kitty and I want some new clothes."

"Oh, shut up and get something to read," George said. He was

reading again.

His wife was looking out of the window. It was quite dark now and still raining in the palm trees.

"Anyway, I want a cat," she said, "I want a cat. I want a cat now. If I can't have long hair or any fun, I can have a cat."

George was not listening. He was reading his book. His wife looked out of the window where the light had come on in the square.

Someone knocked at the door.

"Avanti,"George said. He looked up from his book.

In the doorway stood the maid. She held a big tortoiseshell cat pressed tight against her and swung down against her body.

"Excuse me," she said, "the padrone asked me to bring this for the Signora."

注释:

1 克尔莫德(Frank Kermode,1919-):剑桥大学英国文学教授,著名文学批评家。《结尾的意义:小说理论研究》是他的一部重要著作。在本书中,作者探讨了现代主义观念及其与小说的关系。

2 普洛普(Vladimir Propp,1895—1970):俄国著名民俗学家,他最重要的著作《民间故事形态学》对后来的法国结构主义产生了巨大影响。

布雷蒙(Claude Brémond,1929-):法国叙事学家。

3 弗莱明(Ian Fleming,1908—1964):著名惊险小说家,他在007系列小说中创造出詹姆斯·邦德这一著名形象。

4 卡勒(Jonathan Culler,1944-):美国著名文学批评家,现任康奈尔大学英文及比较文学教授,代表性论著有《结构主义诗学》(1972)和《解构主义》(1982)。他对结构主义深入浅出的阐释推动了这两种理论在英语界的流行。在《结构主义诗学》中他对读者的阅读能力进行了有益探索。

5 "Discours du recit":即热耐特的"叙事话语"。

6 卢伯克(Percy Lubbock,1879—1965):批评家、传记作家。他在《小说技巧》一书中分析了托尔斯泰、福楼拜和詹姆斯等人的艺术技巧。

韦恩·布斯(Wayne Booth,1921-):芝加哥新亚里士多德流派重要批评家,《小说修辞学》为其代表作。

7 肖尔(Mark Shorer,1908-):美国著名文学批评家,主要论著有《威廉·布莱克:梦幻的政治》(1954)和《辛克莱·刘易斯:一种美国生活》(1961)。

8 斯皮策(Leo Spitzer,1887—1960):著名文体学家,有《历史语义论集》、《语言学与文学史》等著作多种。

奥尔巴赫(Erich Auerbach,1892—1957):德国学者,纳粹统治期间流亡美国,著有《模仿论》。

9《拧螺丝》(*The Turn of the Screw*,1898):亨利·詹姆斯的小说名篇。

10 作者在原注中解释说,罗兰·巴特在《S/Z》中将文本划分为"可读的"(lisible)和"可写的"(scriptible)两类。经典现实主义小说的叙事遵照事件发展逻辑和时间顺序前后保持一致。读者在阅读的时候,往往被动地跟着作者的思路走,相信前文中涉及到的问题一定能够在后文中得以解决。相反,现代文本属于"可写的"文本之列。读者不是被动地欣赏作品,而是积极地参与文本意义的建构,在阅读中填补作品中留下的大量空白。因此现代文本的意义往往具有多重性,不是单一的。

11 作者在原注中坚持认为,侍女送来的猫不是女主人公在雨中见到的那只。理由是,如果海明威希望是同一只,那么描述雨中的那只小猫时就会把它说成是"花猫"(tortoiseshell)。

12 作者在原注中说明,海明威1923年住过的那家旅馆还存在,其外观酷似小说第一段所描述的旅馆,只是有一点不同。文中所说"战争纪念碑"实际上是一尊哥伦布雕像。作者认为,海明威有意把它写成战争纪念碑是出于象征目的。本文出自海明威的短篇小说集《我们这个时代》(1925),其中的许多小说都与战争以及痛苦和死亡的体验直接相关。

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第五章 精神分析批评

从心理角度入手论述文学艺术，古已有之。柏拉图认为诗歌使人心智衰颓而诗的创作能力属于神性的迷狂，亚里士多德提出心灵净化说，柯勒律治对想像进行了一番论述，都可以证明心理批评的历史源远流长。但是真正意义上的精神分析批评始自19世纪末，在当代盛行的诸多批评模式中，它是出现得较早、影响也极为深远的一种。它将西格蒙德·弗洛伊德的精神分析学以及其他现代心理学理论应用于文学批评之中。

追溯精神分析批评的百年演变历程，考察它所研究的无意识对象，可以看出在不同发展阶段精神分析批评的侧重点有所不同。以弗洛伊德本人为代表的传统精神分析批评（本我心理学批评），主要研究作者个人（或作品中人物）的无意识心理，文学作品被当作作家的心理征候来加以分析；后弗洛伊德时代的自我心理学批评开始分析读者对文本的心理反应，突出读者与文本之间相互作用的关系；在卡尔·古斯塔夫·荣格的原型心理学批评中，文学作品既不是体现作者个人心理征候的地方，也不是满足读者的个人无意识中隐秘幻想的渠道，而是一种集体无意识的再现。雅克·拉康等人将传统的精神分析批评与结构主义语言学联系起来，从语言学角度重新阐释和改造了传统精神分析学中的许多概念，例如，“无意识”被认为是语言的产物，具有同语言一样的结构。

弗洛伊德把个人心理划分为三个部分：意识、前意识和无意识。意识是感知系统，是人对外部世界有理性、有逻辑、有目的的感觉和组织。前意识是指那些此时并不在一个人的意识中但可以通过集中注意力或在没有干扰的情况下回忆起来的个人的经验。前意识处于意识和无意识之间，起到警戒和调和作用，防止无意识的本能愿望进入意识领域。无意识由所有被排除在意识之外的愿望和意象组成。它是充满本能冲动的、非理性的和个人意识之外的内容。在弗洛伊德后来提出的心理结构模式中，他把无意识的、无理性的那一部分心理称为本我（id），有理性

的、有意识的那部分心理被称为自我(ego)。自我的主要任务是控制和约束本我,本我按照所谓"快乐原则"行事,而自我则按照所谓"现实原则"行事。而超我(superego)代表了社会道德,它与本我一道,抑制住无意识之中的各种不为社会道德所许可的思想和本能冲动。这些处于无意识状态的内容通常包括婴儿时期的性欲和恐惧,它们只能以伪装的形式出现而获得满足,出现在梦中、口误中,或出现在文学艺术的创造性活动中。在弗洛伊德看来,婴儿时代所萌生的、憎恶双亲中同性的一方而爱恋异性一方的隐秘情感,是无意识的重要组成部分。在男孩的无意识之中,他以父亲为情敌,对他有一种阉割恐惧感,而希望与母亲结合,弗洛伊德称这种情感综合体为"俄底浦斯情结",这一名称源于古希腊神话中弑父娶母的同名人物。

弗洛伊德认为,梦是被压抑的愿望的虚假满足。由于人的许多愿望得不到社会道德准则的认可,被排斥在意识层面之外,只好常常以伪装的形象,以迂回曲折的方式出现在睡梦中。梦的内容有显现内容(manifest content)和潜在内容(latent content)之分。显现内容是事后能够回忆起来的梦中事物,潜在内容是指隐藏在显现内容背后的隐秘愿望。潜在内容转化为显现内容需要采取"浓缩"(condensation)和"移置"(displacement)等形式。"浓缩"是指多种想法或形象在梦中被压缩成某一种想法或形象,"移置"指某一种焦虑、愿望或人物通过联想被替换成另外一种。

弗洛伊德本人创立的传统精神分析批评把文学作品视为作者无意识的表现,将文学文本等同于征候或梦境,将作家等同于做梦者。这种研究方法有一个理论前提。那就是,文艺作品的目的就是精神分析所揭示出的梦的目的:秘密满足童年时期所形成的、隐藏在无意识之中的某些难以启齿的愿望。在"创造性作家与白日梦"一文中,弗洛伊德把创造性作家的创作比作白日梦,作家的想像活动类似于儿童做游戏时的心理想像,两者都有自娱的性质,创造性文学作品是作家儿童时代游戏的继续或替代。作家在本能需要的压迫之下,由现实转向幻想,通过创作把自己的白日梦加工和改造,使之能够为别人所接受,使本人暂时摆脱本能的压抑,获得快乐。同时,作家的作品也成为听众或观众的快乐源泉。作家在作品中把自己的情感投射到主人公身上,把自己变成白日梦和故事的主角。有时候,他的情感还倾注到为数众多的不同人物身上,他认为"一篇作品就像一场白日梦,是我们幼年时代做过的游戏的继续或替代"。因此,仔细考察作品中的人物,就可以发掘出作者的无意识心理。

根据这种批评模式，弗洛伊德写了一些论述达·芬奇、陀斯妥耶夫斯基的文章，分析过哈姆雷特、麦克白夫妇、福斯塔夫等重要文学形象。此外，传统精神分析的代表性论著还有欧内斯特·琼斯对哈姆雷特的研究(1910)，奥托·兰克的神话分析，玛丽·波拿巴对艾伦·坡的分析(1933)。这些批评家一般来说采用的是早期精神批评的概念，例如无意识、俄底浦斯情结以及儿童性心理发展所经过口腔、肛门阶段等。有的分析竭力在文本中寻求阳物象征，往往过于简单化，常被讥为"庸俗弗洛伊德主义"。

弗洛伊德之后的自我心理学批评对传统的精神分析批评进行了修正，发展了一套探讨读者无意识心理的批评模式。传统精神分析批评强调在作者个人的心理幻想中揭示文本的意义，自我心理学批评则强调幻想也存在于阅读公众的无意识当中，读者与作者有合谋关系：文学作品的形式因素也掩饰了读者的幻想，帮助他暂时缓解压抑，获得快乐，这样一来，文学作品便成为读者无意识的投射，分析读者反应就成了文学批评的主要任务。美国批评家诺曼·霍兰德是读者反应精神分析批评的重要代表，他在《文学反应动力学》(1968)和《五种读者的阅读》(1975)等著作中，利用精神分析理论探讨了阅读过程和文学反应的动力。早期的霍兰德只是在一定程度上偏离了《创造性作家与白日梦》中阐述的正统弗洛伊德主义。他认为读者在阅读中获得的快乐来自文学作品把读者的无意识愿望和恐惧转变成文化上可以接受的事物。文本成为一同耽于幻想的作者和读者合谋的场所。《文学反应动力学》提供了"幻想词典"，他采用了弗洛伊德提出来的有关儿童性心理各个发展阶段的理论，认为每一个阶段都决定了幻想在文本中得以体现的方式。他同时也接受了自我心理学的观点，认为文学形式有防御功能和调节功能，无意识愿望正是借此来通过审查的。他力图提供一种模式来说明幻想是怎样从无意识层面上升到有意义的意识层面，并做出客观评价，以建立一种反应美学。后来霍兰德完全从关注文本转向关注读者，他不再把文本视为能够在读者身上产生可预料的效果的一个固定实体。他进一步突出了读者的作用，提出一种"交易理论"(transactive theory)来说明读者与文本之间的关系。根据他的解释，整个"交易"过程分四个阶段：读者首次接触文本("期待")，选择带人的愿望，得到满足的愿望的投射(典型的"幻想")，再把这些愿望译解成主题("转化")。霍兰德以他本人以及其他人与文本之间的相互作用做实验，指出读者对文本产生的自由联想与他们本人性格以及生活经历之间的关系。霍兰德认为读者在阅读的时

候往往把自己在生活中积累下来的心理经验投射到文本中，在文本中无意识地创造出心灵中已经存在的一个世界，读者对文本的各种阐释实际上就是他们投射到文本中的恐惧、防御、需要和欲望的产物。

荣格倡导的原型批评，迥异于传统的精神分析批评和读者反应精神分析批评，既不认为文学作品完全是作家光天化日之下个人幻想的产物，也不认为它是读者无意识心理经验的投射，而是认为它源于人类的集体无意识，作家的创作经常不自觉地受到集体无意识的左右。所谓集体无意识，就是人类自远古时代以来积淀和遗传下来的全部心理经验，即“由遗传力量形成的一种特定的心理禀赋”。集体无意识概念是荣格理论的基石。集体无意识的内容是原型。在“论分析心理学与诗歌的关系”一文中，他称原型为原始意象。这种意象可能是人物，可能是魔怪，也可能是一个过程。它在历史上不断重现。每当创造性的幻想得以自由表达的时候，它就显现出来。这些原型发生于人类祖先的经验中，作为种族的集体记忆而积淀和遗传下来。它们在远古时代表现为神话形象，逐渐地进入人类的无意识心理，以相同的形式出现在世界上不同民族的神话传说和图腾里以及文学作品和睡梦中。原型批评主要通过分析文学作品中出现的母题(motif)、象征和人物形象来发掘和建构原型，说明各个时代人类心理的暗中契合，而这正是带有原型意象的文学作品能够在读者心中激起共鸣的原因(用荣格的话说，是唤起全人类的声音)。原型批评家总结出的原型主要有：(1)各种意象，如水、太阳、各种颜色、圆形、蛇、数字、老妇人、有智慧的老者等；(2)原型主题或模式，如创造、不朽以及各类英雄原型(包括履行寻求任务的英雄原型，经历了成长过程的英雄原型和做出牺牲的英雄原型)；(3)作为文类的原型，例如弗莱在《批评的剖析》中所归纳出的春天的叙述结构(mythos)对应于喜剧，夏天的叙述结构对应于浪漫传奇，秋天的叙述结构对应于悲剧，冬天的叙述结构对应于反讽。荣格本人的文学批评著述不多，但是他的理论却启发了一个重要的文学批评流派，弗莱开创的神话原型批评，我们在前面已经简要介绍过了。

从某种程度上说，拉康的精神分析学是建立在结构主义人类学和语言学的某些重要论断基础上的，他把语言研究引入精神分析之中。他坚持的一条重要观点是，无意识同语言一样，有着潜在的结构。人们对世界、他者的认识是由语言决定的，语言也是自我认识的前提，不存在独立于语言之外的主体。他从结构主义语言学的角度阐释了俄底浦斯情结的形成过程。俄底浦斯情结是自我形成的一个重要阶段。在拉康看来，

儿童最先不仅渴望与母亲接触，而且在无意识中渴望成为母亲身上所没有的阳物的替代。由于父亲的存在，他失去了欲望的对象，接触到所谓父亲的法则，紧接着他开始与父亲相认同。父亲断绝了他想成为阳物替代物的念头，这就出现了一种象征性阉割，父亲使母子分离开来。拉康认为俄底浦斯情结是儿童开始认识自我、世界和他人所必须经历的一个过程，帮助他明确了自己在家庭中的位置。乱伦禁忌只能通过"父亲"和"母亲"等语言范畴区分出家庭成员而表现出来。拉康还借助于语言学范畴说明了无意识的活动方式。他用"隐喻"和"换喻"取代了弗洛伊德的"浓缩"和"移置"。他认为，各种无意识表现，如口误、玩笑、做梦等，都受到"隐喻"和"换喻"等语言机制的制约。在"镜像阶段在自我形成中的作用"一文中，拉康指出，婴儿在 6 到 18 个月所经历的镜像阶段中形成了对自我的初步认识。婴儿最初分不清楚与他在一起的大人的镜中形象。在有了形象观念之后，他才认识到镜中形象并不是真实的东西。最后，他能够区分出自己的形象和大人的形象，自我意识就在这一瞬间确立了。拉康的精神分析理论引发了许多女权主义批评家的兴趣。他强调性别主体性产生于文化建构(表意过程)。这就意味着，妇女在社会中的臣属地位并不是由先天的两性差异导致的，而主要是一种话语建构的结果。朱丽叶·米歇尔、朱丽娅·克里斯蒂娃等著名女权主义批评家都曾阐发和运用过拉康的理论。

西格蒙德·弗洛伊德:创造性作家与白日梦

Creative Writers and Daydreaming

Sigmund Freud

We laymen have always been intensely curious to know — like the cardinal who put a similar question to Ariosto[1] — from what sources that strange being, the creative writer, draws his material, and how he manages to make such an impression on us with it and to arouse in us emotions of which, perhaps, we had not even thought ourselves capable. Our interest is only heightened the more by the fact that, if we ask him, the writer himself gives us no explanation, or none that is satisfactory; and it is not at all weakened by our knowledge that not even

the clearest insight into the determinants of his choice of material and into the nature of the art of creating imaginative form will ever help to make creative writers of *us*. [2]

If we could at least discover in ourselves or in people like ourselves an activity which was in some way akin to creative writing! An examination of it would then give us a hope of obtaining the beginnings of an explanation of the creative work of writers. And, indeed, there is some prospect of this being possible. After all, creative writers themselves like to lessen the distance between their kind and the common run of humanity; they so often assure us that every man is a poet at heart and that the last poet will not perish till the last man does.

Should we not look for the first traces of imaginative activity as early as in childhood? The child's best-loved and most intense occupation is with his play or games. Might we not say that every child at play behaves like a creative writer, in that he creates a world of his own, or, rather, rearranges the things of his world in a new way which pleases him? It would be wrong to think he does not take that world seriously; on the contrary, he takes his play very seriously and he expends large amounts of emotion on it. The opposite of play is not what is serious but what is real. In spite of all the emotion with which he cathects his world of play, the child distinguishes it quite well from reality; and he likes to link his imagined objects and situations to the tangible and visible things of the real world. This linking is all that differentiates the child's "play" from "fantasying".

The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a world of fantasy which he takes very seriously-- that is, which he invests with large amounts of emotion—while separating it sharply from reality. Language has preserved this relationship between children's play and poetic creation. It gives the name of *Spiel* ["play"][3] to those forms of imaginative writing which require to be linked to tangible objects and which are capable of representation. It speaks of a *Lustspiel* or *Trauerspiel* ["comedy" or "tragedy"] and describes those who carry out the representation as *Schauspieler* ["players"]. The unreality of the writer's imaginative world, however, has very important consequences

for the technique of his art; for many things which, if they were real, could give no enjoyment, can do so in the play offantasy, and many excitements which, in themselves, are actually distressing, can become a source of pleasure for the hearers and spectators at the performance of a writer's work.

There is another consideration for the sake of which we will dwell a moment longer on this contrast between reality and play. When the child has grown up and has ceased to play, and after he has been laboring for decades to envisage the realities of life with proper seriousness, he may one day find himself in a mental situation which once more undoes the contrast between play and reality. As an adult he can look back on the intense seriousness with which he once carried on his games in childhood, and, by equating his ostensibly serious occupations of today with his childhood games, he can throw off the too heavy burden imposed on him by life and win the high yield of pleasure afforded by *humor*.

As people grow up, then, they cease to play, and they seem to give up the yield of pleasure which they gained from playing. But whoever understands the human mind knows that hardly anything is harder for a man than to give up a pleasure which he has once experienced. Actually, we can never give anything up; we only exchange one thing for another. What appears to be a renunciation is really the formation of a substitute or surrogate. In the same way, the growing child, when he stops playing, gives up nothing but the link with real objects; instead of *playing*, he now *fantasies*. He builds castles in the air and creates what are called *daydreams*. I believe that most people construct fantasies at times in their lives. This is a fact which has long been overlooked and whose importance has therefore not been sufficiently appreciated.

People's fantasies are less easy to observe than the play of children. The child, it is true, plays by himself or forms a closed psychical system with other children for the purposes of a game; but even though he may not play his game in front of the grown-ups, he does not, on the other hand, conceal it from them. The adult, on the

contrary, is ashamed of his fantasies and hides them from other people. He cherishes his fantasies as his most intimate possessions, and as a rule he would rather confess his misdeeds than tell anyone his fantasies. It may come about that for that reason he believes he is the only person who invents such fantasies and has no idea that creations of this kind are widespread among other people. This difference in the behavior of a person who plays and a person who fantasies is accounted for by the motives of these two activities, which are nevertheless adjuncts to each other.

A child's play is determined by wishes: in point of fact by a single wish—one that helps in his upbringing—the wish to be big and grown up. He is always playing at being "grown up", and in his games he imitates what he knows about the lives of his elders. He has no reason to conceal this wish. With the adult, the case is different. On the one hand, he knows that he is expected not to go on playing or fantasying any longer, but to act in the real world; on the other hand, some of the wishes which give rise to his fantasies are of a kind which it is essential to conceal[4]. Thus he is ashamed of his fantasies as being childish and as being unpermissible.

But, you will ask, if people make such a mystery of their fantasying, how is it that we know such a lot about it? Well, there is a class of human beings upon whom, not a god, indeed, but a stern goddess—Necessity—has allotted the task of telling what they suffer and what things give them happiness. These are the victims of nervous illness, who are obliged to tell their fantasies, among other things, to the doctor by whom they expect to be cured by mental treatment. This is our best source of knowledge, and we have since found good reason to suppose that our patients tell us nothing that we might not also hear from healthy people.

Let us make ourselves acquainted with a few of the characteristics of fantasying. We may lay it down that a happy person never fantasies, only an unsatisfied one. The motive forces of fantasies are unsatisfied wishes, and every single fantasy is the fulfillment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality. These motivating wishes according to the

sex, character, and circumstances of the person who is having the fantasy; but they fall naturally into two main groups. They are either ambitious wishes, which serve to elevate the subject's personality; or they are erotic ones. In young women the erotic wishes predominate almost exclusively, for their ambition is as a rule absorbed by erotic trends.[5] In young men egoistic and ambitious wishes come to the fore clearly enough alongside of erotic ones. But we will not lay stress on the opposition between the two trends; we would rather emphasize the fact that they are often united. Just as, in many altarpieces, the portrait of the donor is to be seen in a corner of the picture, so, in the majority of ambitious fantasies, we can discover in some corner or other the lady for whom the creator of the fantasy performs all his heroic deeds and at whose feet all his triumphs are laid. Here, as you see, there are strong enough motives for concealment; the well-brought-up young woman is only allowed a minimum of erotic desire, and the young man has to learn to suppress the excess of self-regard which he brings with him from the spoilt days of his childhood, so that he may find his place in a society which is full of other individuals making equally strong demands.

We must not suppose that the products of this imaginative activity—the various fantasies, castles in the air and daydreams—are stereotyped or unalterable. On the contrary, they fit themselves into the subject's shifting impressions of life, change with every change in his situation, and receive from every fresh active impression what might be called a "date-mark". The relation of a fantasy to time is in general very important. We may say that it hovers, as it were, between three times—the three moments of time which our ideation involves. Mental work is linked to some current impression, some provoking occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one of the subject's major wishes. From there it harks back to a memory of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in which this wish was fulfilled; and it now creates a situation relating to the future which represents a fulfillment of the wish. What it thus creates is a daydream or fantasy, which carries about it traces of its origin from the occasion which provoked it and

from the memory. Thus past, present, and future are strung together, as it were, on the thread of the wish that runs through them.

A very ordinary example may serve to make what I have said clear. Let us take the case of a poor orphan boy to whom you have given the address of some employer where he may perhaps find a job. On his way there he may indulge in a daydream appropriate to the situation from which it arises. The content of his fantasy will perpaps be something like this. He is given a job, finds favor with his new employer, makes himself indispensable in the business, is taken into his employer's family, marries the charming young daughter of the house, and then himself becomes a director of the business, first as his employer's partner and then as his successor. In this fantasy, the dreamer has regained what he possessed in his happy childhood the protecting house, the loving parents, and the first objects of his affectionate feelings. You will see from this example the way in which the wish makes use of an occasion in the present to construct, on the pattern of the past, a picture of the future.

There is a great deal more that could be said about fantasies; but I will only allude as briefly as possible to certain points. If fantasies become overluxuriant and overpowerful, the conditions are laid for an onset of neurosis or psychosis. Fantasies, moreover, are the immediate mental precursors of the distressing symptoms complained of by our patients. Here a broad bypath branches off into pathology.

I cannot pass over the relation of fantasies to dreams. Our dreams at night are nothing else than fantasies like these, as we can demonstrate from the interpretation of dreams. Language, in its unrivaled wisdom, long ago decided the question of the essential nature of dreams by giving the name of *daydreams* to the airy creations of fantasy. If the meaning of our dreams usually remains obscure to us in spite of this pointer, it is because of the circumstance that at night there also arise in us wishes of which we are ashamed; these we must conceal from ourselves, and they have consequently been repressed, pushed into the unconscious. Repressed wishes of this sort and their derivatives are only allowed to come to expression in a very distorted form. When scientific

work had succeeded in elucidating this factor of *dream distortion*, it was no longer difficult to recognize that night dreams are wish-fulfillmentsin just the same way as daydreams—the fantasies which we all know so well.

So much for fantasies. And now for the creative writer. May we really attempt to compare the imaginative writer with the "dreamer in broad daylight", and his creations with daydreams? Here we must begin by making an initial distinction. We must separate writers who, like the ancient authors of epics and tragedies, take over their material ready-made, from writers who seem to originate their own material. We will keep to the latter kind, and, for the purposes of our comparison, we will choose not the writers most highly esteemed by the critics, but the less pretentious authors of novels, romances and short stories, who nevertheless have the widest and most eager circle of readers of both sexes. One feature above all cannot fail to strike us about the creations of these story-writers: each of them has a hero who is the center of interest, for whom the writer tries to win our sympathy by every possible means and whom he seems to place under the protection of a special providence. If, at the end of one chapter of my story, I leave the hero unconscious and bleeding from severe wounds, I am sure to find him at the beginning of the next being carefully nursed and on the way to recovery; and if the first volume closes with the ship he is in going down in a storm at sea, I am certain, at the opening of the second volume, to read of his miraculous rescue —a rescue without which the story could not proceed. the feeling of security with which I follow the hero through his perilous adventures is the same as the feeling with which a hero in real life throws himself to the water to save a drowning man or exposes himself to the enemy's fire in order to storm a battery. It is the true heroic feeling, which one of our best writers has expressed in an inimitable phrase: "Nothing can happen to *me*!" It seems to me, however, that through this revealing characteristic of invulnerability we can immediately recognize His Majesty the Ego, the hero alike of every daydream and of every story.

Other typical features of these egocentric stories point to the same kinship. The fact that all the women in the novel invariably fall in love

with the hero can hardly be looked on as a portrayal of reality, but it is easily understood as a necessary constituent of a daydream. The same is true of the fact that the other characters in the story are sharply divided into good and bad, in defiance of the variety of human characters that are to be observed in real life.[9] The "good" ones are the helpers, while the "bad" ones are the enemies and rivals of the ego which has become the hero of the story.

We are perfectly aware that very many imaginative writings are far removed from the model of the naive daydream; and yet I cannot suppress the suspicion that even the most extreme deviations from that model could be linked with it through an uninterrupted series of transitional cases. It has struck me that in many of what are known as "psychological" novels only one person—once again the hero – is described from within. The author sits inside his mind, as it were, and looks at the other characters from outside. The psychological novel in general no doubt owes its special nature to the inclination of the modern writer to split up his ego, by self-observation, into many part-egos, and, in consequence, to personify the conflicting currents of his own mental life in several heroes. Certain novels, which might be described as "eccentric", seem to stand in quite special contrast to the types of the daydream. In these, the person who is introduced as the hero plays only a very small active part; he sees the actions and sufferings of other people pass before him like a spectator. Many of Zola's later works belong to this category. But I must point out that the psychological analysis of individuals who are not creative writers, and who diverge in some respects from the so-called norm, has shown us analogous variations of the daydream, in which the ego contents itself with the role of spectator.

If our comparison of the imaginative writer with the daydreamer, and of poetical creation with the daydream, is to be of any value, it must, above all, show itself in some way or other fruitful. Let us, for instance, try to apply to these authors' works the thesis we laid down earlier concerning the relation between fantasy and the three periods of time and the wish which runs through them; and, with its help, let us

try to study the connections that exist between the life of the writer and his works. No one has known, as a rule, what expectations to frame in approaching this problem; and often the connection has been thought of in much too simple terms. In the light of the insight we have gained from fantasies, we ought to expect the following state of affairs. A strong experience in the present awakens in the creative writer a memory of an earlier experience (usually belonging to his childhood) from which there now proceeds a wish which finds its fulfillment in the creative work. The work itself exhibits elements of the recent provoking occasion as well as of the old memory.

Do not be alarmed at the complexity of this formula. I suspect that in fact it will prove to be too exiguous a pattern. Nevertheless, it may contain a first approach to the true state of affairs; and, from some experiments I have made, I am inclined to think that this way of looking at creative writings may turn out not unfruitful. You will not forget that the stress it lays on childhood memories in the writer's life—a stress which may perhaps seem puzzling is ultimately derived from the assumption that a piece of creative writing, like a daydream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood.

We must not neglect, however, to go back to the kind of imaginative works which we have to recognize, not as original creations, but as the refashioning of ready-made and familiar material. Even here, the writer keeps a certain amount of independence, which can express itself in the choice of material and in changes in it which are often quite extensive. Insofar as the material is already at hand, however, it is derived from the popular treasure-house of myths, legends, and fairy tales. The study of constructions of folk psychology such as these is far from being complete, but it is extremely probable that myths, for instance, are distorted vestiges of the wishful fantasies of whole nations, the *secular dreams* of youthful humanity.

You will say that, although I have put the creative writer first in the title of my paper, I have told you far less about him than about fantasies. I am aware of that, and I must try to excuse it by pointing to the present state of our knowledge. All I have been able to do is to throw

out some encouragements and suggestions which, starting from the study of fantasies, lead on to the problem of the writer's choice of his literary material. As for the other problem—by what means the creative writer achieves the emotional effects in us that are aroused by his creations—we have as yet not touched on it at all. But I should like at least to point out to you the path that leads from our discussion of fantasies to the problems of poetical effects.

You will remember how I have said that the daydreamer carefully conceals his fantasies from other people because he feels he has reasons for being ashamed of them. I should now add that even if he were to communicate them to us he could give us no pleasure by his disclosures. Such fantasies, when we learn them, repel us or at least leave us cold. But when a creative writer presents his plays to us or tells us what we are inclined to take to be his personal daydreams, we experience a great pleasure, and one which probably arises from the confluence of many sources. How the writer accomplishes this is his innermost secret; the essential *ars poetica*[7] lies in the technique of overcoming the feeling of repulsion in us which is undoubtedly connected with the barriers that rise between each single ego and the others. We can guess two of the methods used by this technique. The writer softens the character of his egoistic daydreams by altering and disguising it, and he bribes us by the purely formal—that is, aesthetic—yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his fantasies. We give the name of an *incentive bonus*, or a *forepleasure*,[8] to a yield of pleasure such as this, which is offered to us so as to make possible the release of still greater pleasure arising from deeper psychical sources. In my opinion, all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative writer affords us has the character of a forepleasure of this kind, and our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds. It may even be that not a little of this effect is due to the writer's enabling us thenceforward to enjoy our own daydreams without selfreproach or shame. This brings us to the threshold of new, interesting, and complicated inquiries; but also, at least for the moment, to the end of our discussion.

注释:

1 阿里奥斯托(Ariosto)将他的诗作《疯狂的罗兰》(*Orlando Furioso*)献给红衣主教伊波利托·德斯特,主教却问他:"你是从哪里得到这么多故事的?"

2 大意是:就算我们完全清楚艺术家选取素材的决定因素以及创造想像形式的艺术的性质,也无助于我们成为创造性作家,即使知道这些,我们的兴趣也不会有所减弱。

3 Spiel:德文,戏剧。席勒在《审美教育书简》中使用过,但用的是不同含义。

4 大意是:使他产生幻想的某些愿望必须加以隐藏。

5 在这里,弗洛伊德认为年轻妇女比年轻男子更容易受情欲的驱动而产生幻想。他的这一观点后来招致女权主义批评的抨击。

6 大意是:这类故事不顾现实生活中人品质复杂这一事实,把除去主人公以外的其他人分为"好人"和"坏人"两类。

7 ars poetica:拉丁文,诗艺。

8 incentive bonus:刺激奖赏;forepleasure:预先尝到的快乐。

卡尔·古斯塔夫·荣格:论分析心理学与诗歌的关系

On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry

Carl Gustav Jung

In spite of its difficulty, the task of discussing the relation of analytical psychology to poetry affords me a welcome opportunity to define my views on the much debated question of the relations between psychology and art in general. Although the two things cannot be compared, the close connections which undoubtedly exist between them call for investigation. These connections arise from the fact that the practice of art is a psychological activity and, as such, can be approached from a psychological angle. Considered in this light, art, like any other human activity deriving from psychic motives, is a proper subject for psychology. This statement, however, involves a very definite limitation of the psychological viewpoint when we come to apply it in practice. Only that aspect of art which consists in the process of artistic

creation can be a subject for psychological study, but not that which constitutes its essential nature.[1] The question of what art is in itself can never be answered by the psychologist, but must be approached from the side of aesthetics.

...

Art by its very nature is not science, and science by its very nature is not art; both these spheres of the mind have something in reserve that is peculiar to them and can be explained only in its own terms. Hence when we speak of the relation of psychology to art, we shall treat only of that aspect of art which can be submitted to psychological scrutiny without violating its nature. Whatever the psychologist has to say about art will be confined to the process of artistic creation and has nothing to do with its innermost essence. He can no more explain this than the intellect can describe or even understand the nature of feeling. Indeed, art and science would not exist as separate entities at all if the fundamental difference between them had not long since forced itself on the mind.[2]

...[3]

In order to do justice to a work of art, analytical psychology must rid itself entirely of medical prejudice; for a work of art is not a disease, and consequently requires a different approach from the medical one. A doctor naturally has to seek out the causes of a disease in order to pull it up by the roots, but just as naturally the psychologist must adopt exactly the opposite attitude towards a work of art. Instead of investigating its typically human determinants, he will inquire first of all into its meaning, and will concern himself with its determinants only insofar as they enable him to understand it more fully. Personal causes have as much or as little to do with a work of art as the soil with the plant that springs from it. We can certainly learn to understand some of the plant's peculiarities by getting to know its habitat, and for the botanist this is an important part of his equipment. But nobody will maintain that everything essential has then been discovered about the plant itself. The personal orientation which the doctor needs when confronted with the question of etiology in medicine is quite out of place in dealing

with a work of art, just because a work of art is not a human being, but is something suprapersonal. It is a thing and not a personality; hence it cannot be judged by personal criteria. Indeed, the special significance of a true work of art resides in the fact that it has escaped from the limitations of the personal and has soared beyond the personal concerns of its creator.

I must confess from my own experience that it is not at all easy for a doctor to lay aside his professional bias when considering a work of art and look at it with a mind cleared of the current biological causality. But I have come to learn that although a psychology with a purely biological orientation can explain a good deal about man in general, it cannot be applied to a work of art and still less to man as creator. A purely causalistic psychology is only able to reduce every human individual to a member of the species *Homo sapiens*[4], since its range is limited to what is transmitted by heredity or derived from other sources. But a work of art is not transmitted or derived—it is a creative reorganization of those very conditions to which a causalistic psychology must always reduce it. The plant is not a mere product of the soil; it is a living, self-contained process which in essence has nothing to do with the character of the soil. In the same way, the meaning and individual quality of a work of art inhere within it and not in its extrinsic determinants. One might almost describe it as a living being that uses man only as a nutrient medium, employing his capacities according to its own laws and shaping itself to the fulfillment of its own creative purpose.

But here I am anticipating somewhat, for I have in mind a particular type of art which I still have to introduce. Not every work of art originates in the way I have just described. There are literary works, prose as well as poetry, that spring wholly from the author's intention to produce a particular result. He submits his material to a definite treatment with a definite aim in view; he adds to it and subtracts from it, emphasizing one effect, toning down another, laying on a touch of color here, another there, all the time carefully considering the overall result and paying strict attention to the laws of form and style. He exercises the keenest judgment and chooses his words with complete freedom.

His material is entirely subordinated to his artistic purpose; he wants to express this and nothing else. He is wholly at one with the creative process, no matter whether he has deliberately made himself its spearhead, as it were, or whether it has made him its instrument so completely that he has lost all consciousness of this fact.[5] In either case, the artist is so identified with his work that his intentions and his faculties are indistinguishable from the act of creation itself. There is no need, I think, to give examples of this from the history of literature or from the testimony of the artists themselves.

Nor need I cite examples of the other class of works which flow more or less complete and perfect from the author's pen. They come as it were fully arrayed into the world, as Pallas Athene sprang from the head of Zeus.[6] These works positively force themselves upon the author; his hand is seized, his pen writes things that his mind contemplates with amazement. The work brings with it its own form; anything he wants to add is rejected, and what he himself would like to reject is thrust back at him. While his conscious mind stands amazed and empty before this phenomenon, he is overwhelmed by a flood of thoughts and images which he never intended to create and which his own will could never have brought into being. Yet in spite of himself he is forced to admit that it is his own self speaking, his own inner nature revealing itself and uttering things which he would never have entrusted to his tongue. He can only obey the apparently alien impulse within him and follow where it leads, sensing that his work is greater than himself, and wields a power which is not his and which he cannot command. Here the artist is not identical with the process of creation; he is aware that he is subordinate to his work or stands outside it, as though he were a second person; or as though a person other than himself had fallen within the magic circle of an alien will.

So when we discuss the psychology of art, we must bear in mind these two entirely different modes of creation, for much that is of the greatest importance in judging a work of art depends on this distinction. It is one that had been sensed earlier by Schiller, who as we know attempted to classify it in his concept of the *sentimental* and the

native[7]. The psychologist would call "sentimental" art *introverted* and the "native" kind *extraverted*. The introverted attitude is characterized by the subject's assertion of his conscious intentions and aims against the demands of the object, whereas the extraverted attitude is characterized by the subject's subordination to the demands which the object makes upon him. In my view, Schiller's plays and most of his poems give one a good idea of the introvetred attitude: the material is mastered by the conscious intentions of the poet. The extraverted attitude is illustrated by the second part of *Faust*: here the material is distinguished by its refractoriness. A still more striking example is Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*[8], where the author himself observed how "one became two".

From what I have said, it will be apparent that a shift of psychological standpoint has taken place as soon as one speaks not of the poet as a person but of the creative process that moves him. When the focus of interest shifts to the latter, the poet comes into the picture only as a reacting subject. This is immediately evident in our second category of works, where the consciousness of the poet is not identical with the creative process. But in works of the first category the opposite appears to hold true. Here the poet appears to be the creative process itself, and to create of his own free will without the slightest feeling of compulsion. He may even be fully convinced of his freedom of action and refuse to admit that his work could be anything else than the expression of his will and ability.

Here we are faced with a question which we cannot answer from the testimony of the poets themselves. It is really a scientific prohlem that psychology alone can solve. As I hinted earlier, it might well be that the poet, while apparently creating out of himself and producing what he consciously intends, is nevertheless so carried away by the creative impulse that he is no longer aware of an "alien" will, just as the other type of poet is no longer aware of his own will speaking to him in the apparently "alien" inspiration, although this is manifestly the voice of his own self. The poet's conviction that he is creating in absolute freedom would then be an illusion: he fancies he is swimming, but in reality an unseen current sweeps him along.

This is not by any means an academic question, but is supported by the evidence of analytical psychology. Researches have shown that there are all sorts of ways in which the conscious mind is not only influenced by the unconscious but actually guided by it. Yet is there any evidence for the supposition that a poet, despite his self-awareness, may be taken captive by his work? The proof may be of two kinds, direct or indirect. Direct proof would be afforded by a poet who thinks he knows what he is saying but actually says more than he is aware of. Such cases are not uncommon. Indirect proof would be found in cases where behind the apparent free will of the poet there stands a higher imperative that renews its peremptory demands as soon as the poet voluntarily gives up his creative activity, or that produces psychic complications whenever his work has to be broken off against his will.

Analysis of artists consistently shows not only the strength of the creative impulse arising from the unconscious, but also its capricious and willful character. The biographies of great artists make it abundantly clear that the creative urge is often so imperious that it battens on their humanity and yokes everything to the service of the work, even at the cost of health and ordinary human happiness. The unborn work in the psyche of the artist is a force of nature that achieves its end either with tyrannical might or with the subtle cunning of nature herself, quite regardless of the personal fate of the man who is its vehicle. The creative urge lives and grows in him like a tree in the earth from which it draws its nourishment. We would do well, therefore, to think of the creative process as a living thing implanted in the human psyche. In the language of analytical psychology this living thing is an *autonomous complex*[2]. It is a split-off portion of the psyche, which leads a life of its own outside the hierarchy of consciousness. Depending on its energy charge, it may appear either as a mere disturbance of conscious activities or as a supraordinate authority which can harness the ego to its purpose. Accordingly, the poet who identifies with the creative process would be one who acquiesces from the start when the unconscious imperative begins to function. But the other poet, who feels the creative force as something alien, is one who for various reasons cannot

acquiesce and is thus caught unawares.

It might be expected that this difference in its origins would be perceptible in a work of art. For in the one case it is a conscious product shaped and designed to have the effect intended. But in the other we are dealing with an event originating in unconscious nature; with something that achieves its aim without the assistance of human consciousness, and often defies it by willfully insisting on its own form and effect. We would therefore expect that works belonging to the first class would nowhere overstep the limits of comprehension, that their effect would be bounded by the author's intention and would not extend beyond it. But with works of the other class we would have to be prepared for something suprapersonal that transcends our understanding to the same degree that the author's consciousness was in abeyance during the process of creation. We would expect a strangeness of form and content, thoughts that can only be apprehended intuitively, a language pregnant with meanings, and images that are true symbols because they are the best possible expressions for something unknown -bridges thrown out towards an unseen shore.

These criteria are, by and large, corroborated in practice. Whenever we are confronted with a work that was consciously planned and with material that was consciously selected, we find that it agrees with the first class of qualities, and in the other case with the second. The example we gave of Schiller's plays, on the one hand, and *Faust II* on the other, or better still *Zarathustra*, is an illustration of this. But I would not undertake to place the work of an unknown poet in either of these categories without first having examined rather closely his personal relations with his work. It is not enough to know whether the poet belongs to the introverted or to the extraverted type, since it is possible for either type to work with an introverted attitude at one time, and an extraverted attitude at another. This is particularly noticeable in the difference between Schiller's plays and his philosophical writings, between Goethe's perfectly formed poems and the obvious struggle with his material in *Faust II*, and between Nietzsche's well-turned aphorisms and the rushing torrent of *Zarathustra*. The same poet can adopt

different attitudes to his work at different times, and on this depends the standard we have to apply.

The question, as we now see, is exceedingly complicated, and the complication grows even worse when we consider the case of the poet who identifies with the creative process. For should it turn out that the apparently conscious and purposeful manner of composition is a subjective illusion of the poet, then his work would possess symbolic qualities that are outside the range of his consciousness.[10] They would only be more difficult to detect, because the reader as well would be unable to get beyond the bounds of the poet's consciousness which are fixed by the spirit of the time. There is no Archimedean point outside his world by which he could lift his time-bound consciousness off its hinges and recognize the symbols hidden in the poet's work. For a symbol is the intimation of a meaning beyond the level of our present powers of comprehension.

I raise this question only because I do not want my typological classification to limit the possible significance of works of art which apparently mean no more than what they say. But we have often found that a poet who has gone out of fashion is suddenly rediscovered. This happens when our conscious development has reached a higher level from which the poet can tell us something new. It was always present in his work but was hidden in a symbol, and only a renewal of the spirit of the time permits us to read its meaning. It needed to be looked at with fresher eyes, for the old ones see in it only what they were accustomed to see. Experiences of this kind should make us cautious, as they bear out my earlier argument. But works that are openly symbolic do not require this subtle approach; their pregnant language cries out at us that they mean more than they say. We can put our finger on the symbol at once, even though we may not be able to unriddle its meaning to our entire satisfaction. A symbol remains a perpetual challenge to our thoughts and feelings. That probably explains why a symbolic work is so stimulating, why it grips us so intensely, but also why it seldom affords us a purely aesthetic enjoyment. A work that is manifestly not symbolic appeals much more to our aesthetic sensibility because it is

complete in itself and fulfills its purpose.

What then, you may ask, can analytical psychology contribute to our fundamental problem, which is the mystery of artistic creation? All that we have said so far has to do only with the psychological phenomenology of art. Since nobody can penetrate to the heart of nature, you will not expect psychology to do the impossible and offer a valid explanation of the secret of creativity. Like every other science, psychology has only a modest contribution to make towards a deeper understanding of the phenomena of life, and is no nearer than its sister sciences to absolute knowledge.

We have talked so much about the meaning of works of art that one can hardly suppress a doubt as to whether art really "means" anything at all. Perhaps art has no "meaning", at least not as we understand meaning. Perhaps it is like nature, which simply *is* and "means" nothing beyond that. Is "meaning" necessarily more than mere interpretation— an interpretation secreted into something by an intellect hungry for meaning? Art, it has been said, is beauty, and "a thing of beauty is a joy forever". It needs no meaning, for meaning has nothing to do with art. Within the sphere of art, I must accept the truth of this statement. But when I speak of the relation of psychology to art we are outside its sphere, and it is impossible for us not to speculate. We must interpret, and we must find meanings in things, otherwise we would be quite unable to think about them. We have to break down life and events, which are self-contained processes, into meanings, images, concepts, well knowing that in doing so we are getting further away from the living mystery. As long as we ourselves are caught up in the process of creation, we neither see nor understand; indeed we ought not to understand, for nothing is more injurious to immediate experience than cognition. But for the purpose of cognitive understanding we must detach ourselves from the creative process and look at it from the outside; only then does it become an image that expresses what we are bound to call "meaning". What was a mere phenomenon before becomes something that in association with other phenomena has meaning, that has a definite role to play, serves certain ends, and exerts meaningful effects.[11]

And when we have seen all this we get the feeling of having understood and explained something. In this way we meet the demands of science.

When, a little earlier, we spoke of a work of art as a tree growing out of the nourishing soil, we might equally well have compared it to a child growing in the womb. But as all comparisons are lame, let us stick to the more precise terminology of science. You will remember that I described the nascent work in the psyche of the artist as an autonomous complex. By this we mean a psychic formation that remains subliminal until its energy-charge is sufficient to carry it over the threshold into consciousness. Its association with consciousness does not mean that it is assimilated, only that it is perceived; but it is not subject to conscious control, and can be neither inhibited nor voluntarily reproduced. Therein lies the autonomy of the complex: it appears and disappears in accordance with its own inherent tendencies, independently of the conscious will. The creative complex shares this peculiarity with every other autonomous complex. In this respect it offers an analogy with pathological processes, since these too are characterized by the presence of autonomous complexes, particularly in the case of mental disturbances. The divine frenzy of the artist comes perilously close to a pathological state, though the two things are not identical. The *tertium comparationis*[12] is the autonomous complex. But the presence of autonomous complexes is not in itself pathological, since normal people, too, fall temporarily or permanently under their domination. This fact is simply one of the normal peculiarities of the psyche, and for a man to be unaware of the existence of an autonomous complex merely betrays a high degree of unconsciousness. Every typical attitude that is to some extent differentiated shows a tendency to become an autonomous complex, and in most cases it actually does. Again, every instinct has more or less the character of an autonomous complex. In itself, therefore, an autonomous complex has nothing morbid about it; only when its manifestations are frequent and disturbing is a symptom of illness.

How does an autonomous complex arise? For reasons which we cannot go into here, a hitherto unconscious portion of the psyche is

thrown into activity, and gains ground by activating the adjacent areas of association. The energy needed for this is naturally drawn from consciousness—unless the latter happens to identify with the complex. But where this does not occur, the drain of energy produces what Janet calls an *abaissement du niveau mental*[13]. The intensity of conscious interests and activities gradually diminishes, leading either to apathy—a condition very common with artists—or to a regressive development of the conscious functions, that is, they revert to an infantile and archaic level and undergo something like a degeneration. The "inferior parts of the functions", as Janet calls them, push to the fore; the instinctual side of the personality prevails over the ethical, the infantile over the mature, and the unadapted over the adapted. This too is something we see in the lives of many artists. The autonomous complex thus develops by using the energy that has been withdrawn from the conscious control of the personality.

But in what does an autonomous *creative* complex consist? Of this we can know next to nothing so long as the artist's work affords us no insight into its foundations. The work presents us with a finished picture, and this picture is amenable to analysis only to the extent that we can recognize it as a symbol. But if we are unable to discover any symbolic value in it, we have merely established that, so far as we are concerned, it means no more than what it says, or to put it another way, that it *is* no more than what it *seems* to be. I used the word *seems* because our own bias may prevent a deeper appreciation of it. At any rate we can find no incentive and no starting point for an analysis. But in the case of a symbolic work we should remember the dictum of Gerhard Hauptmann[14]: "Poetry evokes out of words the resonance of the primordial word." The question we should ask, therefore, is: what primordial image lies behind the imagery of art?

This question needs a little elucidation. I am assuming that the work of art we propose to analyze, as well as being symbolic, has its source not in the *personal unconscious* of the poet, but in a sphere of unconscious mythology whose primordial images are the common heritage of mankind. I have called this sphere the *collective unconscious*, to

distinguish it from the personal unconscious. The latter I regard as the sum total of all those psychic processes and contents which are capable of becoming conscious and often do, but are then suppressed because of their incompatibility and kept subliminal. Art receives tributaries from this sphere too, but muddy ones; and their predominance, far from making a work of art a symbol, merely turns it into a symptom. We can leave this kind of art without injury and without regret to the purgative methods employed by Freud.

In contrast to the personal unconscious, which is a relatively thin layer immediately below the threshold of consciousness, the collective unconscious shows no tendency to become conscious under normal conditions, nor can it be brought back to recollection by any analytical technique[15], since it was never repressed or forgotten. The collective unconscious is not to be thought of as a self-subsistent entity; it is no more than a potentiality handed down to us from primordial times in the specific form of mnemonic images or inherited in the anatomical structure of the brain. There are no inborn ideas, but there are inborn possibilities of ideas that set bounds to even the boldest fantasy and keep our fantasy activity within certain categories: a priori ideas, as it were, the existence of which cannot be ascertained except from their effects. They appear only in the shaped material of art as the regulative principles that shape it; that is to say, only by inferences drawn from the finished work can we reconstruct the age-old original of the primordial image.

The primordial image, or archetype, is a figure—be it a demon, a human being, or a process—that constantly recurs in the course of history and appears wherever creative fantasy is freely expressed. Essentially, therefore, it is a mythological figure. When we examine these images more closely, we find that they give form to countless typical experiences of our ancestors. They are, so to speak, the psychic residua of innumerable experiences of the same type. They present a picture of psychic life in the average, divided up and protected into the manifold figures of the mythological pantheon. But the mythological figures are themselves products of creative fantasy and still have to be translated

into conceptual language. Only the beginnings of such a language exist, but once the necessary concepts are created they could give us an abstract, scientific understanding of the unconscious processes that lie at the roots of the primordial images. In each of these images there is a little piece of human psychology and human fate, a remnant of the joys and sorrows that have been repeated countless times in our ancestral history, and on the average follow ever the same course. It is like a deeply graven river-bed in the psyche, in which waters of life, instead of flowing along as before in a broad but shallow stream, suddenly swell into a mighty river. This happens whenever that particular set of circumstances is encountered which over long periods of time has helped to lay down the primordial image.

The moment when this mythological situation reappears is always characterized by a peculiar emotional intensity; it is as though chords in us were struck that had never resounded before, or as though forces whose existence we never suspected were unloosed. What makes the struggle for adaptation so laborious is the fact that we have constantly to be dealing with individual and atypical situations. So it is not surprising that when an archetypal situation occurs we suddenly feel an extraordinary sense of release, as though transported, or caught up by an overwhelming power. At such moments we are no longer individuals, but the race; the voice of all mankind resounds in us. The individual man cannot use his powers to the full unless he is aided by one of those collective representations we call ideals, which releases all the hidden forces of instinct that are inaccessible to his conscious will. The most effective ideals are always fairly obvious variants of an archetype, as is evident from the fact that they lend themselves to allegory. The ideal of the "mother country", for instance, is an obvious allegory of the mother, as is the "fatherland" of the father. Its power to stir us does not derive from the allegory, but from the symbolical value of our native land. The archetype here is the *participation mystique* of primitive man with the soil on which he dwells, and which contains the spirits of his ancestors.

The impact of an archetype, whether it takes the form of

immediate experience or is expressed through the spoken word, stirs us because it summons up a voice that is stronger than our own. Whoever speaks in primordial images speaks with a thousand voices; he enthralls and overpowers, while at the same time he lifts the idea he is seeking to express out of the occasional and the transitory into the realm of the ever-enduring. He transmutes our personal destiny into the destiny of mankind, and evokes in us all those beneficent forces that ever and anon have enabled humanity to find a refuge from every peril and to outlive the longest night.

That is the secret of great art, and of its effect upon us. The creative process, so far as we are able to follow it at all, consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping this image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the language of the present, and so makes it possible for us to find our way back to the deepest springs of life. Therein lies the social significance of art: it is constantly at work educating the spirit of the age, conjuring up the forms in which the age is most lacking. The unsatisfied yearning of the artist reaches back to the primordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to compensate the inadequacy and one-sidedness of the present. The artist seizes on this image, and in raising it from deepest unconsciousness he brings it into relation with conscious values, thereby transforming it until it can be accepted by the minds of his contemporaries according to their powers.

People and times, like individuals, have their own characteristic tendencies and attitudes. The very word *attitude* betrays the necessary bias that every marked tendency entails.[16] Direction implies exclusion, and exclusion means that very many psychic elements that could play their part in life are denied the right to exist because they are incompatible with the general attitude. The normal man can follow the general trend without injury to himself; but the man who takes to the back streets and alleys because he cannot endure the broad highway will be the first to discover the psychic elements that are waiting to play their part in the life of tbe collective. Here the artist's relative lack of adaptation turns out to his advantage; it enables him to follow his own

yearnings far from the beaten path, and to discover what it is that would meet the unconscious needs of his age. Thus, just as the one-sidedness of the individual's conscious attitude is corrected by reactions from the unconscious, so art represents a process of self-regulation in the life of nations and epochs.

...

注释：

1 大意是：心理学批评只能探讨艺术的创作过程，至于艺术的本质问题则属于美学讨论的范围。

2 大意是：要不是长期以来科学与艺术之间存在差异这种看法已经深入人心，否则就不会出现科学与艺术的分离。

3 在省略部分中，荣格猛烈抨击了弗洛伊德派的精神分析批评。

4 *Homo sapiens*：人类。

5 大意是：作家与创作过程保持一致，无论他有意使自己成为创作过程的开路先锋，还是创作过程使他彻底成为工具，以至于自己没有意识到这一点。

6 Pallas Athene：雅典娜，根据古希腊神话，她从宙斯的脑袋中生出来。

7 "感伤的"(sentimental)和"朴素的"(native)：出自席勒《论感伤诗和朴素诗》。

8 *Zarathustra*：即尼采的名著《查拉图斯特拉如是说》，作于1883—1885。书中假托波斯宗教家、索罗亚斯德教创始人查拉图斯特拉（约公元前628—公元前551）修行多年后下降人间传经布道的传奇故事，叙述作者的哲学、伦理思想，如"上帝之死"、"重估一切价值"、"强力意志"、"英雄道德"、"超人"、"永恒循环"等。

9 自主情结(autonomous complex)：荣格心理学批评中常用的术语，指作家的创作过程不受作家自觉意识的羁绊，而受到集体无意识的控制。

10 大意是：那种貌似自觉和有目的写作方式，不过是诗人主观幻想而已，他的作品中会包含有许多自己意识不到的象征事物。

11 大意是：从前的某种纯粹现象变成因与其他现象相关而有意义的事物，它扮演着特定的角色，服务于某些目的，产生有意义的影响。

12 *tertium comparationis*：英译本注释的解释是"第三种情结"(Third Complex)。

13 *abaissement du niveau mental*：英译本释义为"精神水准下降"(abatement of the mental level)。

14 霍普曼(Gerhard Hauptmann, 1862—1946)：德国剧作家、诗人和小说家，1912年诺贝尔文学奖得主。

15 荣格在此批评的分析技巧可能是当时(1922)所采用的弗洛伊德派的精神分析技巧。

16 大意是：恰是"态度"这个词暴露了每一种明显倾向所必然带有的偏见。

雅克·拉康:《哈姆雷特》中的欲望与欲望阐释

Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in *Hamlet*[1]

Jacques Lacan

The Object Ophelia

As a sort of come-on, I announced that I would speak today about that piece of bait named Ophelia, and I'll be as good as my word.

Our purpose, as you remember, is to show the tragedy of desire as it appears in *Hamlet*, human desire, that is, such as we are concerned with in psychoanalysis.

...

Shakespeare's play contains one shift in the plot that distinguishes it from previous treatments of the story, including both the narratives of Saxo Grammaticus and Belleforest and the other plays of which we possess fragments. This shift involves the character Ophelia.

...

she thus becomes one of the innermost elements in Hamlet's drama, the drama of *Hamlet* as the man who has lost the way of his desire. She provides an essential pivot in the hero's progress toward his mortal rendezvous with his act—an act that he carries out, in some sense, in spite of himself.

...

The principal subject of the play is beyond all doubt Prince Hamlet. The play is the drama of an individual subjectivity, and the hero is always present on stage, more than in any other play. How is the desire of the Other manifested in the very perspective of this subject, Prince Hamlet? This desire, of the mother, is essentially manifested in the fact that, confronted on one hand with an eminent, idealized, exalted object—his father—and on the other with the degraded, despicable

object Claudius, the criminal and adulterous brother. Hamlet does not choose.

His mother does not choose because of something present inside her, like an instinctive voracity. The sacrosanct genital object that we recently added to our technical vocabulary appears to her as an object to be enjoyed [*objet d'une jouissance*] in what is truly the direct satisfaction of a need, and nothing else. This is the aspect that makes Hamlet waver in his abjuration of his mother. Even when he transmits to her—in the crudest, cruellest terms—the essential message with which the ghost, his father, has entrusted him, he still first appeals to her to abstain. Then, a moment later, his appeal fails, and he sends her to Claudius' bed, into the arms of the man who once again will not fail to make her yield.

This fall, this abandon, gives us a model that enables us to conceive how it is that Hamlet's desire—his zeal with respect to an act that he so longs to carry out that the whole world becomes for him a living reproach for his perpetual inadequacy to his own will—how this zeal always flags. The dependence of his desire on the Other subject forms the permanent dimension of Hamlet's drama.

...

Lacan goes on to present a psychoanalytic commentary, supported by illustration, on the topology of the subject's relation to the Other. The object of the subject's desire (Gertrude Ophelia in the play) takes the place of what that subject is symbolically deprived of: namely the phallus. He also adds a distinction between perversity and neurosis: the fantasy of the first is nameable and out of time, that of the second occurs in (delayed) time.

...

Hysteria is characterized by the function of an unsatisfied desire and obsession by the function of an impossible desire. But beyond these two terms the two cases are distinguished by inverse relationships with time: the obsessive neurotic always repeats the initial germ of his trauma, i.e., a certain precipitancy, a fundamental lack of maturation.

This is at the base of neurotic behavior, in its most general form:

the subject tries to find his sense of time [*lire son heure*] in his object, and it is even in the object that he will learn to tell time [*lire l'heure*]. This is where we get back to our friend Hamlet, to whom everyone can attribute at will all the forms of neurotic behavior, as far as you want to go, i.e., up to character neurosis. The first factor that I indicated to you in *Hamlet*'s structure was his situation of dependence with respect to the desire of the Other, the desire of his mother. Here now is the second factor that I ask you to recognize: Hamlet is constantly suspended in the time of the Other, throughout the entire story until the very end.

Do you remember one of the first turning-points we focussed on when we were beginning to decipher the text of *Hamlet*? During the play scene the king becomes unsettled and visibly reveals his own guilt, incapable of viewing the dramatization of his own crime. Hamlet relishes his triumph and mocks the king. But on the way to the meeting he has already arranged with his mother, he comes upon his stepfather in prayer: Claudius is shaken to the depths of his being by the scene that has just shown him the very countenance and program of his deed. Hamlet stands before this Claudius, who by every indication is not only in no state to defend himself but also does not even see the threat that hangs over his bead. And Hamlet stops, because it's not time. It's not the hour of the Other: not time for the Other to render his "audit" to heaven. That would be too kind, from one point of view, or too cruel, from another. That might not avenge his father properly, because prayer, being a gesture of repentance, might open up the way to salvation for Claudius. In any case, one thing is sure: Hamlet, who has just managed to "catch the conscience of the king" as planned stops. Not for a moment does he think that his time has come. Whatever may happen later, this is not the hour of the Other, and he suspends his action. Whatever Hamlet may do, he will do it only at the hour of the Other.

Hamlet accepts everything. Let's not forget that at the beginning, in the state of disgust he was already in (even before his meeting with the ghost) because of his mother's remarriage, he thought only of leaving for Wittenberg. A recent commentary on a certain practicality that

is becoming more and more typical of present-day life, used this as an illustration, noting that Hamlet was the best example of the fact that many dramatic crises can be avoided by the prompt issuance of passports. If Hamlet had been given his papers to travel to Wittenberg, there would have been no drama.

When he stays on, it is the hour of his parents. When he suspends his crime, it is the hour of the Others. When he leaves for England, it is the hour of his stepfather. It's the hour of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern when he sends them on ahead to death—with a casualness that amazed Freud—by means of a bit of hocus-pocus that he brings off not half badly. And it is the hour of Ophelia, the hour of her suicide, when the tragedy will run its course, in a moment when Hamlet has just realized that it's not hard to kill a man, the time to say "one" . . . he won't know what hit him.

He receives word of an event that in no way seems to promise an opportunity to kill Claudius: a tournament, the rules of which have been worked out to the last detail. They tempt him with the stakes—all precious objects, swords, fittings, and other things that have value only as luxuries; this should be followed in the text, for these are the nuances of the world of the collector. Hamlet's sense of rivalry and honor is aroused by the assumption that Laertes is the more skillful swordsman and by the handicap thus granted to Hamlet in the terms of the wager. This complicated ceremony is a trap for him to fall into, laid by his stepfather and his friend Laertes: we know this, but Hamlet does not.

. . .

Thus he rushes into the trap laid by the Other. All that's changed is the energy and fire with which he rushes into it. Until the last term, until the final hour, Hamlet's hour, in which he is mortally wounded before he wounds his enemy, the tragedy follows its course and attains completion at the hour of Other: this is the absolutely essential framework for our conception of what is involved here.

This is the sense in which Hamlet's drama has the precise metaphysical resonance of the question of the modern hero. Indeed,

something has changed since classical antiquity in the relationship of the hero to his fate.

As I have said, the thing that distinguishes Hamlet from Oedipus is that Hamlet *knows*. This characteristic explains, for example, Hamlet's madness. In the tragedies of antiquity, there are mad heroes, but, to the best of my knowledge, there are no heroes—in tragedy, I say, not in legends– no heroes who feign madness. Hamlet, however, does.

I am not saying that everything in his madness comes down to feigning, but I do underscore the fact that the essential characteristic in the original legend, i. e., in the versions of Saxo Grammaticus and Belleforest, is that the hero feigns madness because he knows that he is in a position of weakness. And from that moment on, everything hinges on the question of what's going on in his mind.

...

Thus we arrive at the point at which Ophelia must fulfill her role. If the structure of the play is really as complex as I have just portrayed it as being, you may be wondering, what is the point of the character Ophelia? Ophelia is obviously essential. She is linked forever, for centuries, to the figure of Hamlet.

...

We first encounter Ophelia—and this makes her quite a remarkable figure already—in the context of a clinical observation. She indeed has the good fortune to be the first person Hamlet runs into after his unsettling encounter with the ghost, and she reports his behavior in terms that are worth noting:

My lord, as I was sewing in my closet,
Lord Hamlet, with his doublet all unbraced,
No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled,
Ungartered, and down-gyvèd to his ankle,
Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other,
And with a look so piteous in purport
As if he had been loosed out of hell

To speak of horrors—he comes before me.
...
He took me by the wrist and held me hard.
Then goes he to the length of all his arm,
And with his other hand thus o'er his brow
He falls to such perusal of my face
As'a would draw it. Long stayed he so.
At last, a little shaking of mine arm
And thrice his head thus waving up and down,
He raised a sigh so piteous and profound
As it did seem to shatter all his bulk
And end his being. That done, he lets me go,
And with his head over his shoulder turned
He seemed to find his way without his eyes,
For out o'doors he went without their helps
And to the last bended their light on me.
(Act II, Sc. I)

And Polonius cries our: This is love!

This distance from the object that Hamlet takes in order to move on to whatever new and henceforth difficult identification, his vacillation in the presence of what has been until now the object of supreme exaltation, gives us the first stage, which is, to use the English word, one of "estrangement".

That's all we can say. Nevertheless, I don't believe that it's excessive to designate this moment as pathological, related to those periods of irruption, of subjective disorganization which occur when something in the fantasy wavers and makes the components of the fantasy appear. This experience, called depersonalization, in the course of which the imaginary limits between subject and object change, leads us to what is called in the strict sense the fantastic dimension [*le fantastique*].

...

In the case of Hamlet, Ophelia is after this episode completely null and dissolved as a love object. "I did love you once," Hamlet says.

Henceforth his relations with Ophelia will be carried on in that sarcastic style of cruel aggression which makes these scenes and particularly the scene that occupies the middle of the play the strangest in all of classical literature.

In this attitude we find a trace of what I mentioned a moment ago, the perverse imbalance of the fantasmatic relationship, when the fantasy is tipped toward the object. Hamlet no longer treats Ophelia like a woman at all. She becomes in his eyes the childbearer to every sin, a future "breeder of sinners", destined to succumb to every calumny. She is no longer the reference-point for a life that Hamlet condemns in its essence. In short, what is taking place here is the destruction and loss of the object. For the subject the object appears, if I may put it this way, on the outside. The subject is no longer the object: he rejects it with all the force of his being and will not find it again until he sacrifices himself. It is in this sense that the object is here the equivalent of, assumes the place of, indeed is—the phallus.

This is the second stage in the relationship of the subject to the object. Ophelia is at this point the phallus, exteriorized and rejected by the subject as a symbol signifying life.

What is the indication of this? There's no need to resort to the etymology of "Ophelia". Hamlet speaks constantly of one thing: childbearing. "Conception is a blessing," he tells Polonius, but keep an eye on your daughter. And all of his dialogue with Ophelia is directed at woman conceived as the bearer of that vital swelling that he curses and wishes dried up forever. The use of the word "nunnery" in Shakespeare's time indicates that it can also refer to a brothel. And isn't the relationship of the phallus and the object of desire also indicated in Hamlet's attitude during the play scene? In Ophelia's presence he says of her to his mother "Here's metal more attractive", and wants to place his head between the girl's legs: "Lady, shall I lie in your lap?"

Considering the great interest of iconographers in the subject, I don't think it excessive to note that the list of flowers in the midst of which Ophelia drowns herself, explicitly includes "dead men's fingers". The plant in question is the *Orchis mascula*,[2] which is related to the

mandrake and hence to the phallic element.

...

The third stage, ... is the graveyard scene, in the course of which Hamlet is finally presented with the possibility of winding things up, of rushing to his fate. The whole scene is directed toward that furious battle at the bottom of the tomb, which I have stressed repeatedly, and which is entirely of Shakespeare's own invention. Here we see something like a reintegration of the object ... won back here at het price of mourning and death.

...

Desire and Mourning

...

For Hamlet there is no hour but his own. Moreover, there is only one hour, the hour of his destruction. The entire tragedy of *Hamlet* is constituted in the way it shows us the unrelenting movement of the subject toward that hour.

Yet the subject's appointment with the hour of his destruction is the common lot of everyone, meaningful in the destiny of every individual. Without some distinguishing sign, Hamlet's fate would not be of such great importance to us. That's the next question: what is the specificity of Hamlet's fate? What makes it so extraordinarily problematic?

What does Hamlet lack? Can we, on the basis of the plan of the tragedy, as composed by Shakespeare, pin down and spell out this lack?

...

Let's start with an approximation. You can say in simple, everyday terms what Hamlet lacks: he's never set a goal for himself, an object—a choice that always has something "arbitrary" about it.

To put it in commonsensical terms, Hamlet just doesn't know what he wants. This aspect is brought out in the speech that Shakespeare has him pronounce at one of the turning-points in the drama, the moment when he drops out of sight, the brief interval when he goes away on this nautical excursion from which he will return most rapidly. He has no sooner left for England, still obediant, in compliance with

the king's orders, than he encounters the troops of Fortinbras, who has been present from the beginning in the background of the tragedy and who at the end will come to gather the dead, to tidy up, to restore order. In this scene our friend Hamlet is struck by the sight of these courageous troops going off to conquer a few acres of Polish soil for the sake of some more or less pointless military pretext. This gives Hamlet pause to consider his own behavior:

How all occasions do inform against me
And spur my dull revenge! What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.
Sure he that made us with such large discourse,

—the expression that is glossed "reason" is "large discourse", fundamental discourse, what I have referred to in other seminars as "concrete discourse"—

. . . such large discourse,
Looking before and after. . .
—now here's where the word "reason" comes in—

. . . gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fust in us unused. Now, whether it be
Bestial oblivion. . .

—"bestial oblivion", one of the key-words by which to measure Hamlet's existence in the tragedy —

. . . or some craven scruple
Of thinking too precisely on th' event—
A thought which, quartered, hath but one part wisdom
And ever three parts coward—I do not know
Why yet I live to say, "This thing's to do,"

Sith I have cause, and will, and strength, and means
To do't. Examples gross as earth exhort me.
Witness this army of such mass and charge,
Led by a delicate and tender prince,
Whose spirit, with divine ambition puffed,
Makes mouths at the invisible event.
Exposing what is mortal and unsure
To all that fortune, death, and danger dare,
Even for an eggshell. Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
When honor's at the stake. How stand I then,
That have a father killed, a mother stained,
Excitements of my reason and my blood,
And let all sleep, while to my shame I see
The imminent death of twenty thousand men
That for a fantasy and trick of fame
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause,
Which is not tomb enough and continent
To hide the slain? O, from this time forth,
My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!

(Act IV, Sc. IV)

Such is Hamlet's meditation on the object of human action. This object leaves the door wide open to us for all of what I shall call the particularizations that we shall consider. That is true dedication—shedding one's blood for a noble cause, for honor. Honor, too, is portrayed correctly: being totally committed by one's word. As for the gift, we as analysts cannot overlook this concrete determination, cannot help being struck by its weight, be it in flesh or in commitment.

What I'm trying to show you here is not merely the common form of all this, the least common denominator; it's not a question of formalism. When I write the formula $\$ \diamond a$ at the end of the question that the

subject, in search of his last word, asks in the Other, this is not something that is actually open to investigation, except in that special experience. Which we call psychoanalytic experience and which makes possible the exploration of the unconscious circuit running along the upper track of the graph.

What we're concerned with is the short circuit in the imaginary register between desire and that which is across from it, i. e., the fantasy. I express the general structure of the fantasy by $\$ \Diamond a$, where $\$$ is a certain relationship of the subject to the signifier—it is the subject as irreducibly affected by the signifier—and where $\Diamond$ indicates the subject's relationship to an essentially imaginary juncture [*conjoncture*], designated by a, not the object of desire but the object *in* desire.

Let's try to get some notion of this function of the object in desire. The drama of *Hamlet* makes it possible for us to arrive at an exemplary articulation of this function, and this is why we have such a persistent interest in the structure of Shakespeare's play.

This is our starting point: through his relationship to the signifier, the subject is deprived of something of himself, of his very life, which has assumed the value of that which binds him to the signifier. The phallus is our term for the signifier of his alienation in signification. When the subject is deprived of this signifier, a particular object becomes for him an object of desire. This is the meaning of $\$ \Diamond a$.

...

Lacan glosses this relationship further and returns in Part 2 of this section to the tournament in the final act. in this scene Laertes and Hamlet are in a "mirror relationship". In particular, Hamlet is Laertes' "foil": a pun that makes him Laertes' double as well as the sword that kills him, and implies "ultimately an identification with the mortal phallus".

...

What is the connection between mourning and the constitution of the object in desire? Let's go at the question by way of what is most obvious to us, which will perhaps seem the most remote from the center of what we're seeking here.

Hamlet has acted scornfully and cruelly toward Ophelia, and then some. I have already stressed the demeaning aggression and the humiliation that he constantly imposes on her, once she has become for him the very symbol of the rejection of his desire. Then, suddenly, the object regains its immediacy and its worth for him:

I loved Ophelia. Forty thousand brothers
Could not with all their quantity of love
Make up my sum. What wilt thou do for her?
(Act V, Sc. I)

These are the terms in which he begins his challenge to Laertes. Here, too, is a characteristic that presents *Hamlet*'s structure in a different form and completes it: only insofar as the object of Hamlet's desire has become an impossible object can it become once more the object of his desire.

In the desires of obsessional neurotics we have already encountered the impossible as object of desire. But let's not be too easily satisfied with these overly obvious appearances. The very structure at the basis of desire always lends a note of impossibility to the object of human desire. What characterizes the obsessional neurotic in particular is that he emphasizes the confrontation with this impossibility. In other words, he sets everything up so that the object of his desire becomes the signifier of this impossibility.

But something even deeper demands our attention.

...

The object of mourning derives its importance for us from a certain identification relationship that Freud attempted to define most precisely with the term "incorporation". Let's see if we can rearticulate the identification that takes place in mourning, in the vocabulary that we've learned to use in our work so far.

If we pursue this route, armed with our symbolical apparatus, we will gain perspectives on the function of mourning that I believe to be new and eminently suggestive.

...

Let's stay with the most obvious aspects of the experience of mourning. The subject who descends into the maelstrom of sorrow finds himself in a certain relationship to the object which is illustrated most clearly in the graveyard scene: Laertes leaps into the grave and embraces the object whose loss is the cause of his desire, an object that has attained an existence that is all the more absolute because it no longer corresponds to anything in reality. The one unbearable dimension of possible human experience is not the experience of one's own death, which no one has, but the experience of the death of another.

Where is the gap, the hole that results from this loss and that calls forth mourning on the part of the subject? It is a hole in the real, by means of which the subject enters into a relationship that is the inverse of what I have set forth in earlier seminars under the name of *Verwerfung* [repudiation, foreclosure].

Just as what is rejected from the symbolic register reappears in the real, in the same way the hole in the real that results from loss, sets the signifier in motion. This hole provides the place for the projection of the missing signifier, which is essential to the structure of the Other. This is the signifier whose absence leaves the Other incapable of responding to your question, the signifier that can be purchased only with your own flesh and your own blood, the signifier that is essentially the veiled phallus.

It is there that this signifier finds its place. Yet at the same time it cannot find it, for it can be articulated only at the level of the Other. It is at this point that, as in psychosis—this is where mourning and psychosis are related—that swarms of images, from which the phenomena of mourning arise, assume the place of the phallus: not only the phenomena in which each individual instance of madness manifests itself, but also those which attest to one or another of the most remarkable collective madnesses of the community of men, one example of which is brought to the fore in *Hamlet*, i. e., the ghost, that image which can catch the soul of one and all unawares when someone's departure from this life has not been accompanied by the rites that it calls for.

What are these rites, really, by which we fulfill our obligation to what is called the memory of the dead—if not the total mass intervention, from the heights of heaven to the depths of hell, of the entire play of the symbolic register.

...

Indeed, there is nothing of significance that can fill that hole in the real, except the totality of the signifier.

...

Here we see a new dimension in the tragedy of *Hamlet*: it is a tragedy of the underworld. The ghost arises from an inexpiable offense. From this perspective, Ophelia appears as a victim offered in expiation of that primordial offense. The same holds for the murder of Polonius and the ridiculous dragging around of his body by the feet.

Hamlet then suddenly cuts loose and mocks everyone, proposing a series of riddles in particularly bad taste which culminates in the expression "Hide fox, and all after", a reference to a sort of game of hide-and-seek. Hamlet's hiding of this body in defiance of the concerned feelings of everyone around him, is here just another mockery of that which is of central importance: insufficient mourning.

...

Phallophany

...

The introduction and Parts 1 and 2 of this section are concerned with the theme of "insufficient mourning" (the rites of mourning in the play having been cut short or performed in secret) and the implications beneath this of the crime—the killing of the father which makes Hamlet an Oedipal drama. An account of differences between the play texts of Oedipus *and* Hamlet *and of Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex leads Lacan to conclude that the Oedipus complex finds its resolution or "goes into its decline in so far as the subject must mourn the phallus". This he seeks to explore further in the play.*

...

The ghost of Hamlet's father has an inexpiable grievance. He was, he says, eternally wronged, having been taken unawares and this is

not one of the lesser mysteries as to the meaning of this tragedy—"in the blossoms of [his] sin". He had no time before his death to summon up the composure or whatever that would have prepared him to go before the throne of judgment.

...

The "something rotten" with which poor Hamlet is confronted is most closely connected with the position of the subject with regard to the phallus. And the phallus is everywhere present in the disorder in which we find Hamlet each time he approaches one of the crucial moments of his action.

There's something very strange in the way Hamlet speaks about his dead father, an exaltation and idealization of his dead father which comes down to something like this: Hamlet has no voice with which to say whatever he may have to say about him. He actually chokes up and finally concludes by saying—in a particular form of the signifier that is called "pregnant" in English, referring to something that has a meaning beyond its meaning—that he can find nothing to say about his father except that he was like anyone else. What he means is very obviously the opposite. This is the first indication, the first trace, of what I want to talk about here.

Another trace is that the rejection, deprecation, contempt that he casts on Claudius has every appearance of *dénégation*. [Lacan's translation of Freud's term *Verneinung*, usually translated in English as "negation". Its use here suggests that Hamlet's hostile references to Claudius can be interpreted as indications of repressed admiration. *Translator's note*] The torrent of insults that he unleashes on Claudius—in the presence of his mother, namely—culminates in the phrase "a king of shreds and patches". We surely cannot fail to relate this to the fact that, in the tragedy of Hamlet, unlike that of Oedipus, after the murder of the father, the phallus is still there. It's there indeed, and it is precisely Claudius who is called upon to embody it.

Claudius' real phallus is always somewhere in the picture. What does Hamlet have to reproach his mother for, after all, if not for having filled herself with it? And with dejected arm and speech he sends

her back to that fatal, fateful object, here real indeed, around which the play revolves.

For this woman—who doesn't seem to us so very different from other women, and who shows considerable human feelings—there must be something very strong that attaches her to her partner. And doesn't it seem that that is the point around which Hamlet's action turns and lingers? His astounded spirit, so to speak, trembles before something that is utterly unexpected; the phallus is located here in a position that is entirely out of place in terms of its position in the Oedipus complex. Here, the phallus to be struck at is real indeed. And Hamlet always stops. The very source of what makes Hamlet's arm waver at every moment, is the narcissistic connection that Freud tells us about in his text on the decline of the Oedipus complex: one cannot strike the phallus, because the phallus, even the real phallus, is a *ghost*.

...

The question at hand is the enigmatic manifestation of the signifier of power, of potency: the Oedipal situation, when it appears in the particularly striking form in the real that we have in *Hamlet*, with the criminal, the usurper, in place and functioning as usurper. What stays Hamlet's arm? It's not fear—he has nothing but contempt for the guy —it's because he knows that he must strike something other than what's there. Indeed, two minutes later, when he arrives at his mother's chamber and is beginning to give her all holy hell, he hears a noise behind the curtain, and he lunges out without looking first.

I don't recall now what astute commentator pointed out that Hamlet cannot possibly believe that it's Claudius, because he's just left him in the next room. Nevertheless, when he has disemboweled poor Polonius, he remarks: "Thou wretched, rash, intruding fool.../I took thee for thy better." Everyone thinks that he meant to kill the king, but in the presence of Claudius, the real king and the usurper as well, he did after all hold back; he wanted something or someone better, wanted to cut him off, too, in the blossoms of his sin. Claudius, as he knelt there before him, wasn't quite what Hamlet was after—he wasn't the right one.

It's a question of the phallus, and that's why he will never be able to strike it, until the moment when he has made the complete sacrifice —without wanting to, moreover—of all narcissistic attachments, i. e., when he is mortally wounded and knows it. The thing is strange and obvious, recorded in all sorts of little riddles in Hamlet's style.

Polonius for him is merely a "calf", one that he has in some sense sacrificed to the spirit of his father. When he's stashed him under the stairs and everyone asks him what's going on, he goes into a few of his jokes, which are always so disconcerting for his adversaries. Everyone wonders whether what he says is really what he means, because what he says gets them all where they're the touchiest. But for him to say it, he must know so much that they can't believe it, and so on and so forth.

This is a position that must be quite familiar to us from the phenomenon of the avowal made by the subject. He speaks these words which up till now have remained as good as sealed to the commentators: "The body is with the king" — he doesn't use the word "corpse", please notice— "but the king is not with the body". Replace the word "king" with the word "phallus", and you'll see that that's exactly the point — the body is bound up [*engagé*] in this matter of the phallus — and how — but the phallus, on the contrary, is bound to nothing: it always slips through your fingers:

Hamlet: The king is a thing—
Guildenstern: A thing, my lord?
Hamlet: Of nothing.

注释:

1 本文是作者 1959 年 4 月所作的三次系列讲座的内容,文中的三个小标题即每次讲座的题目。为了便于读者把握拉康论证的主要线索,英文编者进行了一些删节。

2 *Orchis mascula*:在《哈姆雷特》第 4 幕第 7 场,原文是 the long purples(长颈兰),拉康把它改写成 *Orchis mascula*。

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第六章　接受美学与读者反应理论

有人曾把现代文学理论的发展史粗略地划分为三个阶段：专门研究作者的阶段，例如浪漫主义和19世纪的传记式批评、历史主义批评等理论和实践；专注于文本的阶段，例如新批评和俄国形式主义；以及70年代以来专注于研究读者的批评理论，例如以接受美学和读者反应理论为代表的读者取向的理论(reader-oriented theory)阶级。

其实，纵观古希腊以来西方文论的发展态势，读者并未完全为批评家所忽视，只不过并不像在接受美学和读者反应理论中那样，读者的作用被刻意突出和强调，其地位骤然上升，成为文学批评的重心。柏拉图、亚里士多德、贺拉斯以及朗吉努斯等古典批评家在探讨文学的时候，主要从文学对读者(或观众)的影响入手。在20世纪前期的文论中，尽管美国新批评主张关注“诗歌本身”、“具体作品”，反对从心理效果入手来研究诗歌，认为读者兴趣多样，反应不一，对作品的意义很难得出一致的结论，并将此类批评斥为“情感谬误”，但是与美国新批评有重要理论渊源的I. A. 理查兹和威廉·燕卜荪却很注重读者对诗歌的情感反应。另外，在读者理论兴起之前，符号学研究就已经注意到了读者的重要作用。例如，艾珂认为，有些文本(如《菲尼根守灵夜》)是“开放式的”，它的意义的产生需要读者合作，而有些文本(如侦探小说)是“封闭式的”，读者对作品的反应基本上是可以预见的。

在70年代以来兴起的诸多读者取向的理论中，德国康斯坦茨大学的汉斯·罗伯特·尧斯的接受美学理论和沃尔夫冈·伊瑟尔的读者反应理论最具有原创意义，影响也最大。一般说来，文学阐释的惯常做法是力图揭示文本中深藏的意义，而读者取向的理论则认为，文本的意义决不是自我生成的，而是文本与读者之间相互交流的结果。用伊瑟尔的话说，文学文本总是有许多空白，等待读者在阅读过程中调动想像力去填充。这就好比是看一幅未完成的山水长卷，为了览其全貌，只好根据以往的欣赏经验挖空心思构想其余的部分。伊瑟尔还认为，对审美客体

的建构只有通过读者一方的认识才能完成，也就是说，文本的完整意义是读者期待的结果。这样一来，文学研究的对象便从形式主义专注的文本转向读者的阅读行为。尽管读者取向的理论内部流派众多，对阅读过程这个问题的看法也不尽相同，却一致认为在理解文学作品的过程中读者的作用不可忽视，读者非但没有被动地接受文本呈现出的意义，他们积极参与了文本意义的建构。

尧斯的接受美学试图调和马克思主义批评与形式主义批评之间的对立。在他看来，马克思主义批评诚然重视历史，只是在社会生产和再现的方面涉及到历史；长于文本分析的形式主义却忽略了历史，它们有一个共同的缺陷，那就是忽略了作者—作品—公众这个重要的三角关系中的读者（公众），而读者的维度正是接受美学着力引入批评实践的。尧斯从科学哲学中借用了"范式"这个概念，来解释同一时代的读者对文学的看法比较类似这种现象。按照科学哲学家托马斯·库恩的观点，每一历史时期的科学家们的科研工作都遵照由特定的科学概念和认识所构成的"范式"。一旦这个范式出现了危机，解释不了大量新出现的问题，新的研究范式就会应运而生。尧斯认为文学上也有类似现象，一定时期的读者和作家的阅读和写作都要受到这一时期人们所特有的看法和文学成规的规约，这些看法既包括对文学自身（如体裁、风格、形式等）的看法，也包括对文学产生背景的看法。在此基础上形成了读者对文学作品的期待视域，使得读者带着一定的先入之见去读作品。每一部文学作品的读者都是在这一时期主导的"期待视域"之下进行阅读的。当一部作品与读者的期待视域相吻合，就易于被同时代的人理解；如果读者的期待视域与作品不一致，为了完整地认识它，读者在阅读时只好调整或打破旧有的期待视域，从而形成新的期待视域。

尧斯的接受美学深受海德格尔和伽达默尔阐释学思想的启发和影响。海德格尔认为，超越历史和时间的纯粹客观性理解是不存在的，对世界上事物的认识必然带着先入之见，因为这些事物都是我们思想的投射，在理解和认识它们的时候必然受到既有观念的影响。我们的思考总是受到所处历史环境的制约，因而它总是历史的，尽管这种历史并不是社会性的和外在的，而是个人的和内在的。海德格尔的这些思想被伽达默尔贯彻到文学理论之中。伽达默尔认为，文学作品的意义不仅仅限于作者的意图，而是被后来的阅读不断地引申和丰富，受制于读者所处的历史环境。他刻意强调了历史环境对读者理解的塑造作用：作为历史的存在，我们的所作所为都被刻写上时代的印记；主体和客体难分轩轾，我

们无法以完全公正和客观的眼光来检视过去，我们所研究的对象无法摆脱我们的主观性；我们对过去文学的理解只能从有局限的当下视角出发。尧斯秉承了伽达默尔的这一思想。他认为，文学文本处在过去与当下之间不断地对话过程中，阐释者当下的立场影响到他对过去文学的理解和接受。对过去文学的认识和接受是在当下文化视域之内进行的，为此尧斯提出了"视域融合"这个概念，把过去和当下结合起来。如果说"期待视域"只能解释文学作品的理解和接受情况，尚不足以说明作品的终极意义和价值，"视域融合"正好可以解决这一难题。在尧斯看来，文本的意义与价值最终产生于文本的接受历史中。

尧斯从文学接受历史的宏观角度入手，发展了考察文学演变历史性的接受美学，同属康斯坦茨学派的伊瑟尔另辟蹊径，从微观的文本结构分析出发，提出读者反应理论，具体来研究阅读活动。尧斯经常关注广义上的社会和历史的本质问题，他的接受美学有着浓厚的文学社会学的色彩。伊瑟尔主要关心的是个别的文本，以及读者与它的关系，他的读者反应理论固然考虑社会与历史的因素，但是这些因素还是从属性质的，它们主要与细致入微的文本性探讨联系在一起。

总的说来，伊瑟尔的读者反应理论主要探讨的是阅读过程，而不是考察文学作品在不同历史阶段的接受状况。新批评细读文本志在阐释文本和总结出文本的意义。他则以为，任何解读只能是文学文本的一种可能实现，文本意义是文本与读者之间相互作用的产物，而不是隐藏在文本内部的属性。批评的主要任务在于，揭示读者阅读时支配思想和认识的各种规范和法则。波兰文学理论家罗曼·英伽登认为，一部文学作品就是一个"图式化的结构"，或者说是一整套"纲要"，等待读者具体实施。伊瑟尔吸收了英伽登的观点，进而认为读者的具体化过程不是去揭示文本的统一性而是去揭示文本中的间隙和各种不确定因素。在他看来，阅读是一个能动的过程，随着阅读的展开文本中的这些间隙和不确定因素不断地向读者头脑中的规范和法则提出挑战和质疑，迫使读者修正和改变那些先入之见，对自己所习惯的理解规范和法则产生一种批评性的再认识，从而形成新的理解规范和法则。优秀的作品经常否定作者通常所持的理解规范和法则，打破读者的习惯性期待。

伊瑟尔主要受胡塞尔的现象学思想、尤其是胡塞尔的学生英伽登的现象学美学思想的启发和影响。胡塞尔提出了一套极为主观的认识理论，强调人的意识的建构特征。他认为，我们对世界的认识不是被动地接受事物的存在，就好像镜子反射物体一样，而是根据自己的意向主动

去构想世界，一切对象都是意向性的。伊瑟尔接受了英伽登提出的，文学作品是一个充满间隙和不确定因素的“图式化结构”而需要读者的想像和加工来填充这一观点，进而提出“文本的召唤结构”这一术语和观念，想说明文本中的不确定因素和空白本身即是文本召唤读者去阅读的结构机制。他指出，在阅读过程中，读者的阅读期待被充分调动起来去填补那些空白点，完成具体化过程。随着阅读的深入，读者固有的期待视域不断改变，新的期待视域不断形成，这都是“文本的召唤结构”发生作用的结果。此外，伊瑟尔还提出“隐含的读者”这个术语，以表明阅读暗含于文本的构成之中。隐含的读者不是实际阅读文本的具体某一个或某些读者，而是作家想像中的被理想化了的读者，完全符合对阅读的期待。隐含的读者这一观念把文本中潜在的意义与读者在阅读中对这些潜在意义的实现结合起来。

读者反应理论在70年代迅速传播到英美批评界，英语世界中卓有建树的读者反应批评家有诺曼·霍兰德和斯坦利·费什等人。霍兰德主要从本我心理学角度来研究读者的反应。有关他的一些观点，我们在“精神分析批评”一章中另作简单介绍。费什早年倡导一种“感受文体学”(affective stylistics)研究方法，强调文学文本是时间的存在，即认为文学文本形成于阅读之时，反倒不是以空间形式存在的客体。费什认为作品的意义是在阅读的过程中得以实现的，是文本与读者的期待、心理投射、结论和判断相互作用的结果。这种批评实践经常逐字逐句地仔细分析文本，考察文本中的一些因素对读者阅读心理的影响。进入80年代以后，费什又提出所谓“阐释群体”(interpretative community)观念。他认为，使用同样阐释策略的读者组成了阐释群体，读者对作品的主观反应实际上是受到他们所在的阐释群体影响的结果。

汉斯·罗伯特·尧斯:向文学理论挑战的文学史

Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory

Hans Robert Jauss

V

In the question thus posed, I see the challenge to literary studies of taking up once again the problem of literary history, which was left unresolved in the dispute between Marxist and Formalist methods. My attempt to bridge the gap between literature and history, between historical and aesthetic approaches, begins at the point at which both schools stop. Their methods conceive the *literary fact* within the closed circle of an aesthetics of production and of representation. In doing so, they deprive literature of a dimension that inalienably belongs to its aesthetic character as well as to its social function: the dimension of its reception and influence. Reader, listener, and spectator—in short, the factor of the audience--play an extremely limited role in both literary theories. Orthodox Marxist aesthetics treats the reader--if at all--no differently from the author; it inquires about his social position or seeks to recognize him in the structure of a represented society. The Formalist school needs the reader only as a perceiving subject who follows the directions in the text in order to distinguish the [literary] form or discover the [literary] procedure. It assumes that the reader has the theoretical understanding of the philologist who can reflect on the artistic devices, already knowing them; conversely, the Marxist school candidly equates the spontaneous experience of the reader with the scholarly interest of historical materialism, which would discover relationships between superstructure and basis in the literary work. However, as Walther Bulst has stated, "no text was ever written to be read and

interpreted philologically by philologists" , nor, may I add, historically by historians. Both methods lack the reader in his genuine role, a role as unalterable for aesthetic as for historical knowledge: as the addressee for whom the literary work is primarily destined.

For even the critic who judges a new work, the writer who conceives of his work in light of positive or negative norms of an earlier work, and the literary historian who classifies a work in its tradition and explains it historically are first simply readers before their reflexive relationship to literature can become productive again. In the triangle of author, work, and public the last is no passive part, no chain of mere reactions, but rather itself an energy formative of history. The historical life of a literary work is unthinkable without the active participation of its addressees. For it is only through the process of its mediation that the work enters into the changing horizon-of-experience of a continuity in which the perpetual inversion occurs from simple reception to critical understanding, from passive to active reception, from recognized aesthetic norms to a new production that surpasses them. The historicity of literature as well as its communicative character presupposes a dialogical and at once processlike relationship between work, audience, and new work that can be conceived in the relations between message and receiver as well as between question and answer, problem and solution. The closed circle of production and of representation within which the methodology of literary studies has mainly moved in the past must therefore be opened to an aesthetics of reception and influence if the problem of comprehending the historical sequence of literary works as the coherence of literary history is to find a new solution.

The perspective of the aesthetics of reception mediates between passive reception and active understanding, experience formative of norms, and new production. If the history of literature is viewed in this way within the horizon of a dialogue between work and audience that forms a continuity, the opposition between its aesthetic and its historical aspects is also continually mediated. [1] Thus the thread from the past appearance to the present experience of literature, which historicism had cut, is tied back together.

The relationship of literature and reader has aesthetic as well as historical implications. The aesthetic implication lies in the fact that the first reception of a work by the reader includes a test of its aesthetic value in comparison with works already read. The obvious historical implication of this is that the understanding of the first reader will be sustained and enriched in a chain of receptions from generation to generation; in this way the historical significance of a work will be decided and its aesthetic value made evident. In this process of the history of reception, which the literary historian can only escape at the price of leaving unquestioned the presuppositions that guide his understanding and judgment, the reappropriation of past works occurs simultaneously with the perpetual mediation of past and present art and of traditional evaluation and current literary attempts.[7] The merit of a literary history based on an aesthetics of reception will depend upon the extent to which it can take an active part in the ongoing totalization of the past through aesthetic experience. This demands on the one hand—in opposition to the objectivism of positivist literary history—a conscious attempt at the formation of a canon, which, on the other hand—in opposition to the classicism of the study of traditions—presupposes a critical revision if not destruction of the received literary canon. The criterion for the formation of such a canon and the ever necessary retelling of literary history is clearly set out by the aesthetics of reception. The step from the history of the reception of the individual work to the history of literature has to lead to seeing and representing the historical sequence of works as they determine and clarify the coherence of literature, to the extent that it is meaningful for us, as the prehistory of its present experience.

From this premise, the question as to how literary history can today be methodologically grounded and written anew will be addressed in the following seven theses.

VI

Thesis 1. A renewal of literary history demands the removal of the

prejudices of historical objectivism and the grounding of the traditional aesthetics of production and representation in an aesthetics of reception and influence. The historicity of literature rests not on an organization of "literary facts" that is established *post festum*, but rather on the preceding experience of the literary work by its readers.

R. G. Collingwood's[3] postulate, posed in his critique of the prevailing ideology of objectivity in history—"History is nothing but the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's mind" - is even more valid for literary history. For the positivistic view of history as the "objective" description of a series of events in an isolated past neglects the artistic character as well as the specific historicity of literature. A literary work is not an object that stands by itself and that offers the same view to each reader in each period. It is not a monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence. It is much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence: "words that must, at the same time that they speak to him, create an interlocutor capable of understanding them". This dialogical character of the literary work also establishes why philological understanding can exist only in a perpetual confrontation with the text, and cannot be allowed to be reduced to a knowledge of facts. Philological understanding always remains related to interpretation that must set as its goal, along with learning about the object, the reflection on and description of the completion of this knowledge as a moment of new understanding.

History of literature is a process of aesthetic reception and production that takes place in the realization of literary texts on the part of the receptive reader, the reflective critic, and the author in his continuing productivity. The endlessly growing sum of literary "facts" that winds up in the conventional literary histories is merely left over from this process; it is only the collected and classified past and therefore not history at all, but pseudo-history. Anyone who considers a series of such literary facts as a piece of the history of literature confuses the eventful character of a work of art with that of historical matter-of-factness. The

Perceval of Chrétien de Troyes[4], as a literary event, is not "historical" in the same sense as, for example, the Third Crusade, which was occuring at about the same time. It is not a "fact" that could be explained as caused by a series of situational preconditions and motives, by the intent of a historical action as it can be reconstructed, and by the necessary and secondary consequences of this deed. The historical context in which a literary work appears is not a factical, independent series of events that exists apart from an observer. *Perceval* becomes a literary event only for its reader, who reads this last work of Chrétien with a memory of his earlier works and who recognizes its individuality in comparison with these and other works that he already knows, so that he gains a new criterion for evaluating future works. In contrast to a political event, a literary event has no unavoidable consequences subsisting on their own that no succeeding generation can ever escape.[5] A literary event can continue to have an effect only if those who come after it still or once again respond to it— if there are readers who again appropriate the past work or authors who want to imitate, outdo, or refute it. The coherence of literature as an event is primarily mediated in the horizon of expectations of the literary experience of contemporary and later readers, critics, and authors. Whether it is possible to comprehend and represent the history of literature in its unique historicity depends on whether this horizon of expectations can be objectified.

VII

Thesis 2. The *analysis of the literary experience of the reader* avoids the threatening pitfalls of psychology if it describes the reception and the influence of a work within the objectifiable system of expectations that arises for each work in the historical moment of its appearance, from a pre-understanding of the genre, from the form and themes of already familiar works, and from the opposition between poetic and practical language.

My thesis opposes a widespread skepticism that doubts whether an

analysis of aesthetic influence can approach the meaning of a work of art at all or can produce, at best, more than a simple sociology of taste. René Wellek in particular directs such doubts against the literary theory of I. A. Richards. Wellek argues that neither the individual state of consciousness, since it is momentary and only personal, nor a collective state of consciousness, as Jan Mukarovsky[6] assumes the effect a work of art to be, can be determined by empirical means. Roman Jakobson wanted to replace the "collective state of consciousness" by a "collective ideology" in the form of a system of norms that exists for each literary work as *langue* and that is actualized as *parole* by the receiver—although incompletely and never as a whole. This theory, it is true, limits the subjectivity of the influence, but it still leaves open the question of which data can be used to comprehend the influence of a particular work on a certain public and to incorporate it into a system of norms. In the meantime there are empirical means that had never been thought of before—literary data that allow one to ascertain a specific disposition of the audience for each work (a disposition that precedes the psychological reaction as well as the subjective understanding of the individual reader). As in the case of every actual experience, the first literary experience of a previously unknown work also demands a "foreknowledge which is an element of the experience itself, and on the basis of which anything new that we come across is available to experience at all, i. e., as it were readable in a context of experience".

A literary work, even when it appears to be new, does not present itself as something absolutely new in an informational vacuum, but predisposes its audience to a very specific kind of reception by announcements, overt and covert signals, familiar characteristics, or implicit allusions. It awakens memories of that which was already read, brings the reader to a specific emotional attitude, and with its beginning arouses expectations for the "middle and end", which can then be maintained intact or altered, reoriented, or even fulfilled ironically in the course of the reading according to specific rules of the genre or type of text. The psychic process in the reception of a text is, in the primary horizon of aesthetic experience, by no means only an arbitrary series of merely

subjective impressions, but rather the carrying out of specific instructions in a process of directed perception, which can be comprehended according to its constitutive motivations and triggering signals, and which also can be described by a textual linguistics. If, along with W. D. Stempel, one defines the initial horizon of expectations of a text as paradigmatic isotopy, which is transposed into an immanent syntagmatic horizon of expectations to the extent that the utterance grows, then the process of reception becomes describable in the expansion of a semiotic system that accomplishes itself between the development and the correction of a system. A corresponding process of the continuous establishing and altering of horizons also determines the relationship of the individual text to the succession of texts that forms the genre. The new text evokes for the reader (listener) the horizon of expectations and rules familiar from earlier texts, which are then varied, corrected, altered, or even just reproduced. Variation and correction determine the scope, whereas alteration and reproduction determine the borders of a genre-structure. The interpretative reception of a text always presupposes the context of experience of aesthetic perception: the question of the subjectivity of the interpretation and of the taste of different readers or levels of readers can be asked meaningfully only when one has first clarified which transsubjective horizon of understanding conditions the influence of the text.

The ideal cases of the objective capability of such literary-historical frames of reference are works that evoke the reader's horizon of expectations, formed by a convention of genre, style, or form, only in order to destroy it step by step--which by no means serves a critical purpose only, but can itself once again produce poetic effects. Thus Cervantes allows the horizon of expectations of the favorite old tales of knighthood to arise out of the reading of *Don Quixote*[7], which the adventure of his last knight then seriously parodies. Thus Diderot, at the beginning of *Jacques le Fataliste*[8], evokes the horizon of expectations of the popular novelistic schema of the "journey" (with the fictive questions of the reader to the narrator) along with the (Aristotelian) convention of the romanesque fable and the providence unique to it, so that he can then

provocatively oppose to the promised journey -and love- novel a completely unromanesque "vérité de l'histoire"": the bizarre reality and moral casuistry of the enclosed stories in which the truth of life continually denies the mendacious character of poetic fiction...

There is also the possibility of objectifying the horizon of expectations in works that are historically less sharply delineated. For the specific disposition toward a particular work that the author anticipates from the audience can also be arrived at, even if explicit signals are lacking, through three generally presupposed factors: first, through familiar norms or the immanent poetics of the genre; second, through the implicit relationships to familiar works of the literary-historical surroundings; and third, through the opposition between fiction and reality, between the poetic and the practical function of language, which is always available to the reflective reader during the reading as a possibility of comparison. The third factor includes the possibility that the reader of a new work can perceive it within the narrower horizon of literary expectations, as well as within the wider horizon of experience of life...

VIII

Thesis 3. Reconstructed in this way, the horizon of expectations of a work allows one to determine its artistic character by the kind and the degree of its influence on a presupposed audience. If one characterizes as aesthetic distance the disparity between the given horizon of expectations and the appearance of a new work, whose reception can result in a "change of horizons" through negation of familiar experiences or through raising newly articulated experiences to the level of consciousness, then this aesthetic distance can be objectified historically along the spectrum of the audience's reactions and criticism's judgment (spontaneous success, rejection or shock, scattered approval, gradual or belated understanding).

The way in which a literary work, at the historical moment of its appearance, satisfies, surpasses, disappoints, or refutes the expectations

of its first audience obviously provides a criterion for the determination of its aesthetic value. The distance between the horizon of expectations and the work, between the familiarity of previous aesthetic experience and the "horizonal change" demanded by the reception of the new work, determines the artistic character of a literary work, according to an aesthetics of reception; to the degree that this distance decreases, and no turn toward the horizon of yet unknown experience is demanded of the receiving consciousness, the closer the work comes to the sphere of "culinary" or entertainment art [*Unterhaltungskunst*]. This latter work can be characterized by an aesthetics of reception as not demanding any horizonal change, but rather as precisely fulfilling the expectations prescribed by a ruling standard of taste, in that it satisfies the desire for the reproduction of the familiarly beautiful; confirms familiar sentiments; sanctions wishful notions; makes unusual experiences enjoyable as "sensations"; or even raises moral problems, but only to "solve" them in an edifying manner as predecided questions. If, conversely, the artistic character of a work is to be measured by the aesthetic distance with which it opposes the expectations of its first audience, then it follows that this distance, at first experienced as a pleasing or alienating new perspective, can disappear for later readers, to the extent that the original negativity of the work has become self-evident and has itself entered into the horizon of future aesthetic experience, as a henceforth familiar expectation. The classical character of the so-called masterworks especially belongs to this second horizonal change; their beautiful form that has become self-evident, and their seemingly unquestionable "eternal meaning" bring them, according to an aesthetics of reception, dangerously close to the irresistibly convincing and enjoyable "culinary" art, so that it requires a special effort to read them "against the grain" of the accustomed experience to catch sight of their artistic character once again (see section X).

The relationship between literature and audience includes more than the facts that every work has its own specific, historically and sociologically determinable audience, that every writer is dependent on the milieu, views, and ideology of his audience, and that literary *success*

presupposes a book "which expresses what the group expects, a book which presents the group with its own image". This objectivist determination of literary success according to the congruence of the work's intention with the expectations of a social group always leads literary sociology into a dilemma whenever later or ongoing influence is to be explained. Thus R. Escarpit[10] wants to presuppose a "collective basis in space or time" for the "illusion of the lasting quality"[11] of a writer, which in the case of Molière leads to an astonishing prognosis: "Molière is still young for the Frenchman of the twentieth century because his world still lives, and a sphere of culture, views, and language still binds us to him... But the sphere becomes ever smaller, and Molière will age and die when the things which our culture still has in common with the France of Molière die." As if Molière had only mirrored the "mores of his time" and had only remained successful through this supposed intention! Where the congruence between work and social group does not exist, or no longer exists, as for example with the reception of a work in a foreign language, Escarpit is able to help himself by inserting a "myth" in between: "myths that are invented by a later world for which the reality that they substitute for has become alien". As if all reception beyond the first, socially determined audience for a work were only a "distorted echo", only a result of "subjective myths", and did not itself have its objective a priority once again in the received work as the limit and possibility of later understanding! The sociology of literature does not view its object dialectically enough when it determines the circle of author, work, and audience so one-sidedly. The determination is reversible: there are works that at the moment of their appearance are not yet directed at any specific audience, but that break through the familiar horizon of literary expectations so completely that an audience can only gradually develop for them. When, then, the new horizon of expectations has achieved more general currency, the power of the altered aesthetic norm can be demonstrated in that the audience experiences formerly successful works as outmoded, and withdraws its appreciation. Only in view of such horizonal change does the analysis of literary influence achieve the dimension of a literary history of readers, and do the

statistical curves of the bestsellers provide historical knowledge.

A literary sensation from the year 1857 may serve as an example. Alongside Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, which has since become world-famous, appeared his friend Feydeau's *Fanny*, today forgotten. Although Flaubert's novel brought with it a trial for offending public morals, *Madame Bovary* was at first overshadowed by Feydeau's novel: *Fanny* went through thirteen editions in one year, achieving a success the likes of which Paris had not experienced since Chateaubriand's[12] *Atala*. Thematically considered, both novels met the expectations of the audience that—in Baudelaire's[13] analysis had foresworn all romanticism, and despised great as well as naive passions equally: they treated a trivial subject, infidelity in a bourgeois and provincial milieu. Both authors understood how to give to the conventional, ossified triangular relationship a sensational twist that went beyond the expected details of the erotic scenes. They put the worn-out theme of jealousy in a new light by reversing the expected relationship between the three classic roles: Feydeau has the youthful lover of the *femme de trente ans*[14] become jealous of his lover's husband despite his having already fulfilled his desires, and perishing over this agonizing situation; Flaubert gives the adulteries of the doctor's wife in the provinces—interpreted by Baudelaire as a sublime form of *dandysme*—the surprise ending that precisely the laughable figure of the cuckolded Charles Bovary takes on dignified traits at the end. In the official criticism of the time, on finds voices that reject *Fanny* as well as *Madame Bovary* as a product of the new school of *réalisme*, which they reproach for denying everything ideal and attacking the ideas on which the social order of the Second Empire was founded. The audience's horizon of expectations in 1857, here only vaguely sketched in, which did not expect anything great from the novel after Balzac's death, explains the different success of the two novels only when the question of the effect of their narrative form is posed. Flaubert's formal innovation, his principle of "impersonal narration" (*impassibilite*) attacked by Barbey d'Aurevilly with the comparison that if a story-telling machine could be cast of English steel it would function no differently than Monsieur Flaubert- must have

shocked the same audience that was offered the provocative contents of *Fanny* in the inviting tone of a confessional novel. It could also find incorporated in Feydeau's descriptions the modish ideals and surpressed desires of a stylish level of society, and could delight without restraint in the lascivious central scene which Fanny (without suspecting that her lover is watching from the balcony) seduces her husband—for the moral indignation was already diminished for them through the reaction of the unhappy witness. As *Madame Bovary*, however, became a worldwide success, when at first it was understood and appreciated as a turning-point in the history of the novel by only a small circle of connoisseurs, the audience of novel-readers that was formed by it came to sanction the new canon of expectations; this canon made Feydeau's weaknesses—his flowery style, his modish effects, his lyrical-confessional cliches—unbearable, and allowed *Fanny* to fade into yesterday's bestseller...

Thus a literary work with an unfamiliar aesthetic form can break through the expectations of its readers and at the same time confront them with a question, the solution to which remains lacking for them in the religiously or officially sanctioned morals. Instead of further examples, let one only recall here that it was not first Bertolt Brecht, but rather already the Enlightenment that proclaimed the competitive relationship between literature and canonized morals, as Friedrich Schiller not least of all bears witness to when he expressly claims for the bourgeois drama: "The laws of the stage begin where the sphere of worldly laws end." But the literary work can also and in the history of literature this possibility characterizes the latest period of our modernity—reverse the relationship of question and answer and in the medium of art confront the reader with a new, "opaque" reality that no longer allows itself to be understood from a pregiven horizon of expectations. Thus, for example, the latest genre of novels, the much-discussed *nouveau roman*, presents itself as a form of modern art that according to Edgar Wind's formulation, represents the paradoxical case "that the solution is given, but the problem is given up, so that the solution might be understood as a problem". Here the reader is excluded from the situation of the immediate audience and put in the position of an uninitiated third

party who in the face of a reality still without significance must himself find the questions that will decode for him the perception of the world and the interpersonal problem toward which the answer of the literature is directed.

It follows from all of this that the specific achievement of literature in social existence is to be sought exactly where literature is not absorbed into the function of a *representational* art. If one looks at the moments in history when literary works toppled the taboos of the ruling morals or offered the reader new solutions for the moral casuistry of his lived praxis, which thereafter could be sanctioned by the consensus of all readers in the society, then a still-little-studied area of research opens itself up to the literary historian. The gap between literature and history, between aesthetic and historical knowledge, can be bridged if literary history does not simply describe the process of general history in the reflection of its works one more time, but rather when it discovers in the course of "literary evolution" that properly *socially formative* function that belongs to literature as it competes with other arts and social forces in the emancipation of mankind from its natural, religious, and social bonds.

If it is worthwhile for the literary scholar to jump over his ahistorical shadow for the sake of this task, then it might well also provide an answer to the question: toward what end and with what right can one today still—or again—study literary history?

注释：

1 这句话的大意是：如果从作品与读者之间不断对话这个视野看待文学史，文学的美学内容与历史内容的对立也会不断得到调和。

2 这句话的大意是：文学史家无法回避这一接受历史的过程，除非他不理会制约他理解和判断的前提。在这一过程中，过去的作品被重新利用，同时过去的艺术和当前的艺术之间、传统的评价和时下的文学探讨之间一直得到调和。

3 科林伍德(Robin George Collingwood，1889—1943)：英国哲学家、历史学家。他认为历史就是思想史，自始至终都贯穿着人的思想。只有认识了思想，历史才是可以理解的。历史学家的工作就是要设身处地重演古人的思想，并把古代纳入现代的轨道上。"历史只不过是过去的思想在历史学家头脑中的重现"，这句话出自他死后出版的名著《历史的观念》(1946)。

4 特罗亚(Chrétien de Troyes,约 1135—1183):法国中世纪诗人,*Perceval* 是他的一部故事诗,全名为《伯斯华,或圣杯的故事》。

5 大意是:文学事件不同于政治事件,它无法单独产生不可避免的后果,这些后果是后代人无法回避的。

6 穆卡洛夫斯基(Jan Mukarovsky,1891—1975):捷克语文学家、文学批评家和文学理论家,布拉格学派美学代表人物。

7 塞万提斯的《堂吉诃德》对当时颇为盛行的骑士文学进行了滑稽模仿,从另一个角度暴露出骑士文学的荒唐可笑。

8 *Jacques le Fataliste*:法国启蒙思想家狄德罗的小说《命定论者雅各》。

9 vérité de l'histoire:法文,历史的真相。

10 艾斯卡配(R. Escarpit):20 世纪法国批评家,著有《书籍与读者:文学社会学纲要》。

11 illusion of the lasting quality:(文学作品)经久不衰的幻想。

12 夏多布里昂(Francois Auguste Rene Chateaubriand,1714—1848):法国浪漫主义作家,1801 年发表《阿塔拉》,以印第安史诗的一个片段为原型写成,大获成功。

13 波德莱尔(Charles Baudelaire,1821—1867):法国诗人,1857 年出版诗集《恶之花》。

14 *femme de trente ans*:法文,三十多岁的女人。

沃尔夫冈·伊瑟尔:阅读过程:一种现象学研究方法

The Reading Process: a Phenomenological Approach

Wolfgang Iser

I

The phenomenological theory of art lays full stress on the idea that, in considering a literary work, one must take into account not only the actual text but also, and in equal measure, the actions involved in responding to that text. Thus Roman Ingarden confronts the structure of the literary text with the ways in which it can be *konkretisiert* (realized). The text as such offers different "schematised views" through which the subject matter of the work can come to light, but the actual bringing to light is an action of *konkretisation*[1]. If this is so, then the

literary work has two poles, which we might call the artistic and the esthetic: the artistic refers to the text created by the author, and the esthetic to the realization accomplished by the reader. From this polarity it follows that the literary work cannot be completely identical with the text, or with the realization of the text, but in fact must lie halfway between the two. The work is more than the text, for the text only takes on life when it is realized, and furthermore the realization is by no means independent of the individual disposition of the reader—though this in turn is acted upon by the different patterns of the text. The convergence of text and reader brings the literary work into existence, and this convergence can never be precisely pinpointed, but must always remain virtual, as it is not to be identified either with the reality of the text or with the individual disposition of the reader.

It is the virtuality of the work that gives rise to its dynamic nature, and this in turn is the precondition for the effects that the work calls forth. As the reader uses the various perspectives offered him by the text in order to relate the patterns and the "schematised views" to one another, he sets the work in motion, and this very process results ultimately in the awakening of responses within himself. Thus, reading causes the literary work to unfold its inherently dynamic character. That this is no new discovery is apparent from references made even in the early days of the novel. Laurence Sterne remarks in *Tristram Shandy*[2]: "No author, who understands the just boundaries of decorum and good breeding, would presume to think all: The truest respect which you can pay to the reader's understanding, is to halve this matter amicably, and leave him something to imagine, in his turn, as well as yourself. For my own part, I am eternally paying him compliments of this kind, and do all that lies in my power to keep his imagination as busy as my own." Sterne's conception of a literary text is that it is something like an arena in which reader and author participate in a game of the imagination. If the reader were given the whole story, and there were nothing left for him to do, then his imagination would never enter the field, the result would be the boredom which inevitably arises when everything is laid out cut and dried before us. A literary text must therefore be conceived

in such a way that it will engage the reader's imagination in the task of working things out for himself, for reading is only a pleasure when it is active and creative. In this process of creativity, the text may either not go far enough, or may go too far, so we may say that boredom and overstrain form the boundaries beyond which the reader will leave the field of play.

The extent to which the "unwritten" part of a text stimulates the reader's creative participation is brought out by an observation of Virginia Woolf's in her study of *Jane Austen*:

> Jane Austen is thus a mistress of much deeper emotion than appears upon the surface. She stimulates us to supply what is not there. What she offers is, apparently, a trifle, yet is composed of something that expands in the reader's mind and endows with the most enduring form of life scenes which are outwardly trivial. Always the stress is laid upon character... The turns and twists of the dialogue keep us on the tenterhooks of suspense. Our attention is half upon the present moment, half upon the future... Here, indeed, in this unfinished and in the main inferior story, are all the elements of Jane Austen's greatness.

The unwritten aspects of apparently trivial scenes and the unspoken dialogue within the "turns and twists" not only draw the reader into the action but also lead him to shade in the many outlines suggested by the given situations, so that these take on a reality of their own. But as the reader's imagination animates these "outlines", they in turn will influence the effect of the written part of the text. Thus begins a whole dynamic process: the written text imposes certain limits on its unwritten implications in order to prevent these from becoming too blurred and hazy, but at the same time these implications, worked out by the reader's imagination, set the given situation against a background which endows it with far greater significance than it might have seemed to possess on its own. In this way, trivial scenes suddenly take on the shape of an "enduring form of life". What constitutes this form is never

named, let alone explained in the text, although in fact it is the end product of the interaction between text and reader.

II

The question now arises as to how far such a process can be adequately described. For this purpose a phenomenological analysis recommends itself, especially since the somewhat sparse observations hitherto made of the psychology of reading tend mainly to be psychoanalytical, and so are restricted to the illustration of predetermined ideas concerning the unconscious. We shall, however, take a closer look later at some worthwhile psychological observations.

As a starting point for a phenomenological analysis we might examine the way in which sequent sentences act upon one another. This is of especial importance in literary texts in view of the fact that they do not correspond to any objective reality outside themselves. The world presented by literary texts is constructed out of what Ingarden has called *intentionale Satzkorrelate* (intentional sentence correlatives):

> Sentences link up in different ways to form more complex units of meaning that reveal a very varied structure giving rise to such entities as a short story, a novel, a dialogue, a drama, a scientific theory... In the final analysis, there arises a particular world, with component parts determined in this way or that, and with all the variations that may occur within these parts —*all* this as a purely intentional correlative of a complex of sentences. If this complex finally forms a literary work, I call the whole sum of sequent intentional sentence correlatives the "world presented" in the work.

This world, however, does not pass before the reader's eyes like a film. The sentences are "component parts" insofar as they make statements, claims, or observations, or convey information, and so establish *various* perspectives in the text. But they remain only "component parts" —they are not the sum total of the text itself. For the intentional correlatives

disclose subtle connections which individually are less concrete than the statements, claims, and observations, even though these only take on their real meaningfulness through the interaction of their correlatives.

How is one to conceive the connection between the correlatives? It marks those points at which the reader is able to "climb aboard" the text. He has to accept certain given perspectives, but in doing so he inevitably causes them to interact. When Ingarden speaks of intentional sentence correlatives in literature, the statements made or information conveyed in the sentence is already in a certain sense qualified: the sentence does not consist solely of a statement -which, after all, would be absurd, as one can only make statements about things that exist— but aims at something beyond what it actually says. This is true of all sentences in literary works, and it is through the interaction of these sentences that their common aim is fulfilled. This is what gives them their own special quality in literary texts. In their capacity as statements, observations, purveyors of information, etc., they are always indications of something that is to come, the structure of which is foreshadowed by their specific content.

They set in motion a process out of which emerges the actual content of the text itself. In describing man's inner consciousness of time, Husserl once remarked: "Every originally constructive process is inspired by pre-intentions, which construct and collect the seed of what is to come, as such, and bring it to fruition." For this bringing to fruition, the literary text needs the reader's imagination, which gives shape to the interaction of correlatives foreshadowed in structure by the sequence of the sentences. Husserl's observation draws our attention to a point that plays a not insignificant part in the process of reading. The individual sentences not only work together to shade in what is to come; they also form an expectation in this regard. Husserl calls this expectation "pre intentions". As this structure is characteristic of *all* sentence correlatives, the interaction of these correlatives will not be a fulfillment of the expectation so much as a continual modification of it.

For this reason, expectations are scarcely ever fulfilled in truly literary texts. If they were, then such texts would be confined to the

individualization of a given expectation, and one would inevitably ask what such an intention was supposed to achieve. Strangely enough, we feel that any confirmative effect—such as we implicitly demand of expository texts, as we refer to the objects they are meant to present—is a defect in a literary text. For the more a text individualizes or confirms an expectation it has initially aroused, the more aware we become of its didactic purpose, so that at best we can only accept or reject the thesis forced upon us. More often than not, the very clarity of such texts will make us want to free ourselves from their clutches. But generally the sentence correlatives of literary texts do not develop in this rigid way, for the expectations they evoke tend to encroach on one another in such a manner that they are continually modified as one reads. One might simplify by saying that each intentional sentence correlative opens up a particular horizon, which is modified, if not completely changed, by succeeding sentences. While these expectations arouse interest in what is to come, the subsequent modification of them will also have a retrospective effect on what has already been read. This may now take on a different significance from that which it had at the moment of reading.

Whatever we have read sinks into our memory and is foreshortened. It may later be evoked again and set against a different background with the result that the reader is enabled to develop hitherto unforeseeable connections. The memory evoked, however, can never reassume its original shape, for this would mean that memory and perception were identical, which is manifestly not so. The new background brings to light new aspects of what we had committed to memory; conversely these, in turn, shed their light on the new background, thus arousing more complex anticipations. Thus, the reader, in establishing these inter-relations between past, present, and future, actually causes the text to reveal its potential multiplicity of connections. These connections are the product of the reader's mind working on the raw material of the text, though they are not the text itself—for this consists just of sentences, statements, information, etc.

...

The literary text activates our own faculties, enabling us to recreate

the world it presents. The product of this creative activity is what we might call the virtual dimension of the text, which endows it with its reality. This virtual dimension is not the text itself, nor is it the imagination of the reader; it is the coming together of text and imagination.

As we have seen, the activity of reading can be characterized as a sort of kaleidoscope of perspectives, preintentions, recollections. Every sentence contains a preview of the next and forms a kind of viewfinder for what is to come; and this in turn changes the "preview" and so becomes a "viewfinder" for what has been read. This whole process represents the fulfillment of the potential, unexpressed reality of the text, but it is to be seen only as a framework for a great variety of means by which the virtual dimension may be brought into being. The process of anticipation and retrospection itself does not by any means develop in a smooth flow. Ingarden has already drawn attention to this fact and ascribes a quite remarkable significance to it:

> Once we are immersed in the flow of *Satzdenken* (sentence-thought), we are ready, after completing the thought of one sentence, to think out the "continuation", also in the form of a sentence—and that is, in the form of a sentence that connects up with the sentence we have just thought through. In this way the process of reading goes effortlessly forward. But if by chance the following sentence has no tangible connection whatever with the sentence we have just thought through, there then comes a blockage in the stream of thought. This hiatus is linked with a more or less active surprise, or with indignation. This blockage must be overcome if the reading is to flow once more.

The hiatus that blocks the flow of sentences is, in Ingarden's eyes, the product of chance, and is to be regarded as a flaw; this is typical of his adherence to the classical idea of art. If one regards the sentence sequence as a continual flow, this implies that the anticipation aroused by one sentence will generally be realized by the next, and the frustration of one's expectations will arouse feelings of exasperation. And yet

literary texts are full of unexpected twists and turns, and frustration of expectations. Even in the simplest story there is bound to be some kind of blockage, if only because no tale can ever be told in its entirety. Indeed, it is only through inevitable omissions that a story gains its dynamism. Thus whenever the flow is interrupted and we are led off in unexpected directions, the opportunity is given to us to bring into play our own faculty for establishing connections—for filling in the gaps left by the text itself.

These gaps have a different effect on the process of anticipation and retrospection, and thus on the "gestalt" of the virtual dimension, for they may be filled in different ways. For this reason, one text is potentially capable of several different realizations, and no reading can ever exhaust the full potential, for each individual reader will fill in the gaps in his own way, thereby excluding the various other possibilities; as he reads, he will make his own decision as to how the gap is to be filled. In this very act the dynamics of reading are revealed. By making his decision he implicitly acknowledges the inexhaustibility of the text; at the same time it is this very inexhaustibility that forces him to make his decision. With "traditional" texts this process was more or less unconscious, but modern texts frequently exploit it quite deliberately. They are often so fragmentary that one's attention is almost exclusively occupied with the search for connections between the fragments; the object of this is not to complicate the "spectrum" of connections, so much as to make us aware of the nature of our own capacity for providing links. In such cases, the text refers back directly to our own preconceptions—which are revealed by the act of interpretation that is a basic element of the reading process. With all literary texts, then, we may say that the reading process is selective, and the potential text is infinitely richer than any of its individual realizations. This is borne out by the fact that a second reading of a piece of literature often produces a different impression from the first. The reasons for this may lie in the reader's own change of circumstances, still; the text must be such as to allow this variation. On a second reading familiar occurrences now tend to appear in a new light and seem to be at times corrected, at times enriched.

In every text there is a potential time sequence which the reader must inevitably realize, as it is impossible to absorb even a short text in a single moment. Thus the reading process always involves viewing the text through a perspective that is continually on the move, linking up the different phases, and so constructing what we have called the virtual dimension. This dimension, of course, varies all the time we are reading. However, when we have finished the text, and read it again, clearly our extra knowledge will result in a different time sequence; we shall tend to establish connections by referring to our awareness of what is to come, and so certain aspects of the text will assume a significance we did not attach to them on a first reading, while others will recede into the background. It is a common enough experience for a person to say that on a second reading he noticed things he had missed when he read the book for the first time, but this is scarcely surprising in view of the fact that the second time he is looking at the text from a different perspective. The time sequence that he realized on his first reading cannot possibly be repeated on a second reading, and this unrepeatability is bound to result in modifications of his reading experience. This is not to say that the second reading is "truer" than the first—they are, quite simply, different; the reader establishes the virtual dimension of the text by realizing a new time sequence. Thus even on repeated viewings a text allows and, indeed, induces innovative reading.

In whatever way, and under whatever circumstances the reader may link the different phases of the text together, it will always be the process of anticipation and retrospection that leads to the formation of the virtual dimension, which in turn transforms the text into an experience for the reader.

...

The manner in which the reader experiences the text will reflect his own disposition, and in this respect the literary text acts as a kind of mirror; but at the same time, the reality which this process helps to create is one that will be *different* from his own (since, normally, we tend to be bored by texts that present us with things we already know perfectly well ourselves). Thus we have the apparently paradoxical

situation in which the reader is forced to reveal aspects of himself in order to experience a reality which is different from his own. The impact this reality makes on him will depend largely on the extent to which he himself actively provides the unwritten part of the text, and yet in supplying all the missing links, he must think in terms of experiences different from his own; indeed, it is only by leaving behind the familiar world of his own experience that the reader can truly participate in the adventure the literary text offers him.

III

We have seen that, during the process of reading, there is an active interweaving of anticipation and retrospection, which on a second reading may turn into a kind of advance retrospection. The impressions that arise as a result of this process will vary from individual to individual, but only within the limits imposed by the written as opposed to the unwritten text. In the same way, two people gazing at the night sky may both be looking at the same collection of stars, but one will see the image of a plough, and the other will make out a dipper. The "stars" in a literary text are fixed; the lines that join them are variable. The author of the text may, of course, exert plenty of influence on the reader's imagination—he has the whole panoply of narrative techniques at his disposal—but no author worth his salt will ever attempt to set the *whole* picture before his reader's eyes. If he does, he will very quickly lose his reader, for it is only by activating the reader's imagination that the author can hope to involve him and so realize the intentions of his text.

Gilbert Ryle, in his analysis of imagination, asks: "How can a person fancy that he sees something, without realizing that he is not seeing it?" He answers as follows:

> Seeing Helvellyn [the name of a mountain] in one's mind's eye does not entail, what seeing Helvellyn and seeing snapshots of Helvellyn entail, the having of visual sensationsl. It does involve

> the thought of having a view of Helvellyn and it is therefore a more sophisticated operation than that of having a view of Helvellyn. It is one utilization among others of the knowledge of how Helvellyn should look, or, in one sense of the verb, it is thinking how it should look. The expectations which are fulfilled in the recognition at sight of Helvellyn are not indeed fulfilled in picturing it, but the picturing of it is something like a rehearsal of getting them fulfilled. So far from picturing involving the having of faint sensations, or wraiths of sensations, it involves missing just what one would be due to get, if one were seeing the mountain.

If one sees the mountain, then of course one can no longer imagine it, and so the act of picturing the mountain presupposes its absence. Similarly, with a literary text we can only picture things which are not there; the written part of the text gives us the knowledge, but it is the unwritten part that gives us the opportunity to picture things; indeed without the elements of indeterminacy, the gaps in the texts, we should not be able to use our imagination.

The truth of this observation is borne out by the experience many people have on seeing, for instance, the film of a novel. While reading *Tom Jones*, they may never have had a clear conception of what the hero actually looks like, but on seeing the film, some may say, "That's not how I imagined him." The point here is that the reader of *Tom Jones* is able to visualize the hero virtually for himself, and so his imagination senses the vast number of possibilities; the moment these possibilities are narrowed down to one complete and immutable picture, the imagination is put out of action, and we feel we have somehow been cheated. This may perhaps be an oversimplification of the process, but it does illustrate plainly the vital richness of potential that arises out of the fact that the hero in the novel must be pictured and cannot be seen. With the novel the reader must use his imagination to synthesize the information given him, and so his perception is simultaneously richer and more private; with the film he is confined merely to physical perception, and so whatever he remembers of the world he had pictured is brutally

cancelled out.

IV

The "picturing" that is done by our imagination is only one of the activities through which we form the "gestalt" of a literary text. We have already discussed the process of anticipation and retrospection, and to this we must add the process of grouping together all the different aspects of a text to form the consistency that the reader will always be in search of. While expectations may be continually modified, and images continually expanded, the reader will still strive, even if unconsciously, to fit everything together in a consistent pattern. "In the reading of images, as in the hearing of speech, it is always hard to distinguish what is given to us from what we supplement in the process of projection which is triggered off by recognition... it is the guess of the beholder that tests the medley of forms and colours for coherent meaning, crystalizing it into shape when a consistent interpretation has been found." By grouping together the written parts of the text, we enable them to interact, we observe the direction in which they are leading us, and we project onto them the consistency which we, as readers, require. This "gestalt" must inevitably be colored by our own characteristic selection process. For it is not given by the text itself; it arises from the meeting between the written text and the individual mind of the reader with its own particular history of experience, its own consciousness, its own outlook. The "gestalt" is not the true meaning of the text; at best it is a configurative meaning; "comprehension is an individual act of seeing-things-together, and only that". With a literary text such comprehension is inseparable from the reader's expectations, and where we have expectations, there too we have one of the most potent weapons in the writer's armory -illusion.

Whenever "consistent reading suggests itself... illusion takes over". Illusion, says Northrop Frye, is "fixed or definable, and reality is best understood as its negation". The "gestalt" of a text normally takes on (or, rather, is given) this fixed or definable outline, as this is

essential to our own understanding, but on the other hand, if reading were to consist of nothing but an uninterrupted building up of illusions, it would be a suspect, if not downright dangerous, process; instead of bringing us into contact with reality, it would wean us away from realities. Of course, there is an element of "escapism" in all literature, resulting from this very creation of illusion, but there are some texts which offer nothing but a harmonious world, purified of all contradiction and deliberately excluding anything that might disturb the illusion once established, and these are the texts that we generally do not like to classify as literary. Women's magazines and the brasher forms of the detective story might be cited as examples.

However, even if an overdose of illusion may lead to triviality, this does not mean that the process of illusion building should ideally be dispensed with altogether. On the contrary, even in texts that appear to resist the formation of illusion, thus drawing our attention to the cause of this resistance, we still need the abiding illusion that the resistance itself is the consistent pattern underlying the text. This is especially true of modern texts, in which it is the very precision of the written details wheih increases the proportion of indeterminacy; one detail appears to contradict another, and so simultaneously stimulates and frustrates our desire to "picture", thus continually causing our imposed "gestalt" of the text to disintegrate. Without the formation of illusions, the unfamiliar world of the text would remain unfamiliar; through the illusions, the experience offered by the text becomes accessible to us, for it is only the illusion, on its different levels of consistency, that makes the experience "readable". If we cannot find (or impose) this consistency, sooner or later we will put the text down. The process is virtually hermeneutic. The text provokes certain expectations which in turn we project onto the text in such a way that we reduce the polysemantic possibilities to a single interpretation in keeping with the expectations aroused, thus extracting an individual, configurative meaning. The polysemantic nature of the text and the illusion-making of the reader are opposed factors. If the illusion were complete, the polysemantic nature would vanish; if the polysemantic nature were all-powerful, the illusion would be totally

destroyed. Both extremes are conceivable, but in the individual literary text we always find some form of balance between the two conflicting tendencies. The formation of illusions, therefore, can never be total, but it is this very incompleteness that in fact gives it its productive value.

...

Even while the reader is seeking a consistent pattern in the text, he is also uncovering other impulses which cannot be immediately integrated or will even resist final integration. Thus the semantic possibilities of the text will always remain far richer than any configurative meaning formed while reading. But this impression is, of course, only to be gained through reading the text. Thus the configurative meaning can be nothing but a *pars pro toto* fulfillment of the text, and yet this fulfillment gives rise to the very richness which it seeks to restrict, and indeed in some modern texts, our awareness of this richness takes precedence over any configurative meaning.

This fact has several consequences which, for the purpose of analysis, may be dealt with separately, though in the reading process they will all be working together. As we have seen, a consistent, configurative meaning is essential for the apprehension of an unfamiliar experience, which through the process of illusion-building we can incorporate in our own imaginative world. At the same time, this consistency conflicts with the many other possibilities of fulfillment it seeks to exclude, with the result that the configurative meaning is always accompanied by "alien associations" that do not fit in with the illusions formed. The first consequence, then, is the fact that in forming our illusions, we also produce at the same time a latent disturbance of these illusions. Strangely enough, this also applies to texts in which our expectations are actually fulfilled —though one would have thought that the fulfillment of expectations would help to complete the illusion. "Illusion wears off once the expectation is stepped up; we take it for granted and want more."

The experiments in gestalt psychology referred to by Gombrich in *Art and Illusion* make one thing clear: "though we may be intellectually aware of the fact that any given experience *must* be an illusion, we cannot, strictly speaking, watch ourselves having an illusion". Now, if

illusion were not a transitory state, this would mean that we could be, as it were, permanently caught up in it. And if reading were exclusively a matter of producing illusion—necessary though this is for the understanding of an unfamiliar experience—we should run the risk of falling victim to a gross deception. But it is precisely during our reading that the transitory nature of the illusion is revealed to the full.

As the formation of illusions is constantly accompanied by "alien associations" which cannot be made consistent with the illusions, the reader constantly has to lift the restrictions he places on the "meaning" of the text. Since it is he who builds the illusions, he oscillates between involvement in and observation of those illusions; he opens himself to the unfamiliar world without being imprisoned in it. Through this process the reader moves into the presence of the fictional world and so experiences the realities of the text as they happen.

In the oscillation between consistency and "alien associations", between involvement in and observation of the illusion, the reader is bound to conduct his own balancing operation, and it is this that forms the esthetic experience offered by the literary text. However, if the reader were to achieve a balance, obviously he would then no longer be engaged in the process of establishing and disrupting consistency. And since it is this very process that gives rise to the balancing operation, we may say that the inherent nonachievement of balance is a prerequisite for the very dynamism of the operation. In seeking the balance we inevitably have to start out with certain expectations, the shattering of which is integral to the esthetic experience.

> Furthermore, to say merely that "our expectations are satisfied" is to be guilty of another serious ambiguity. At first sight such a statement seems to deny the obvious fact that much of our enjoyment is derived from surprises, from betrayals of our expectations. The solution to this paradox is to find some ground for a distinction between "surprise" and "frustration". Roughly, the distinction can be made in terms of the effects which the two kinds of experiences have upon us. Frustration blocks or checks activity. It

> necessitates new orientation for our activity, if we are to escape the *cul de sac*. Consequently, we abandon the frustrating object and return to blind impulse activity. On the other hand, surprise merely causes a temporary cessation of the exploratory phase of the experience, and a recourse to intense contemplation and scrutiny. In the latter phase the surprising elements are seen in their connection with what has gone before, with the whole drift of the experience, and the enjoyment of these values is then extremely intense. Finally, it appears that there must always be some degree of novelty or surprise in all these values if there is to be a progressive specification of the direction of the total act... and any aesthetic experience tends to exhibit a continuous interplay between "deductive" and "inductive" operations.

It is this interplay between "deduction" and "induction" that gives rise to the configurative meaning of the text, and not the individual expectations, surprises, or frustrations arising from the different perspectives. Since this interplay obviously does not take place in the text itself, but can only come into being through the process of reading, we may conclude that this process formulates something that is unformulated in the text and yet represents its "intention". Thus, by reading we uncover the unformulated part of the text, and this very indeterminacy is the force that drives us to work out a configurative meaning while at the same time giving us the necessary degree of freedom to do so.

As we work out a consistent pattern in the text, we will find our "interpretation" threatened, as it were, by the presence of other possibilities of "interpretation", and so there arise new areas of indeterminacy (though we may only be dimly aware of them, if at all, as we are continually making "decisions" which will exclude them). In the course of a novel, for instance, we sometimes find that characters, events, and backgrounds seem to change their significance; what really happens is that the other "possibilities" begin to emerge more strongly, so that we become more directly aware of them. Indeed, it is this very shifting of perspectives that makes us feel that a novel is much more "true-to-life".

Since it is we ourselves who establish the levels of interpretation and switch from one to another as we conduct our balancing operation, we ourselves impart to the text the dynamic lifelikeness which, in turn, enables us to absorb an unfamiliar experience into our personal world.

As we read, we oscillate to a greater or lesser degree between the building and the breaking of illusions. In a process of trial and error, we organize and reorganize the various data offered us by the text. These are the given factors, the fixed points on which we base our "interpretation", trying to fit them together in the way we think the author meant them to be fitted. "For to perceive, a beholder must *create* his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent. They are not the same in any literal sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the same as the process of organization the creator of the work consciously experienced. Without an act of recreation the object is not perceived as a work of art."

The act of recreation is not a smooth or continuous process, but one which, in its essence, relies on *interruptions* of the flow to render it efficacious. We look forward, we look back, we decide, we change our decisions, we form expectations, we are shocked by their nonfulfillment, we question, we muse, we accept, we reject; this is the dynamic process of recreation. This process is steered by two main structural components within the text: first, a repertoire of familiar literary patterns and recurrent literary themes, together with allusions to familiar social and historical contexts; second, techniques or strategies used to set the familiar against the unfamiliar. Elements of the repertoire are continually backgrounded or foregrounded with a resultant strategic overmagnification, trivialization, or even annihilation of the allusion. This defamiliarization of what the reader thought he recognized is bound to create a tension that will intensify his expectations as well as his distrust of those expectations. Similarly, we may be confronted by narrative techniques that establish links between things we find difficult to connect, so that we are forced to reconsider data we at first held to be perfectly

straightforward. One need only mention the very simple trick, so often employed by novelists, whereby the author himself takes part in the narrative, thus establishing perspectives which would not have arisen out of the mere narration of the events described. Wayne Booth once called this the technique of the "unreliable narrator" , to show the extent to which a literary device can counter expectations arising out of the literary text. The figure of the narrator may act in permanent opposition to the impressions we might otherwise form. The question then arises as to whether this strategy, opposing the formation of illusions, may be integrated into a consistent pattern, lying, as it were, a level deeper than our original impressions. We may find that our narrator, by opposing us, in fact turns us against him and thereby strengthens the illusion he appears to be out to destroy; alternatively, we may be so much in doubt that we begin to question all the processes that lead us to make interpretative decisions. Whatever the cause may be, we will find ourselves subjected to this same interplay of illusion-forming and illusion-breaking that makes reading essentially a recreative process.

We might take, as a simple illustration of this complex process, the incident in Joyce's *Ulysses* in which Bloom's cigar alludes to Ulysses's spear. The context (Bloom's cigar) summons up a particular element of the repertoire (Ulysses's spear); the narrative technique relates them to one another as if they were identical. How are we to "organize" these divergent elements, which, through the very fact that they are put together, separate one element so clearly from the other? What are the prospects here for a consistent pattern? We might say that it is ironic—at least that is how many renowned Joyce readers have understood it. In this case, irony would be the form of organization that integrates the material. But if this is so, what is the object of the irony? Ulysses's spear, or Bloom's cigar? The uncertainty surrounding this simple question already puts a strain on the consistency we have established and, indeed, begins to puncture it, especially when other problems make themselves felt as regards the remarkable conjunction of spear and cigar. Various alternatives come to mind, but the variety alone is sufficient to leave one with the impression that the consistent pattern has

been shattered. And even if, after all, one can still believe that irony holds the key to the mystery, this irony must be of a very strange nature; for the formulated text does not merely mean the opposite of what has been formulated. It may even mean something that cannot be formulated at all. The moment we try to impose a consistent pattern on the text, discrepancies are bound to arise. These are, as it were, the reverse side of the interpretative coin, an involuntary product of the process that creates discrepancies by trying to avoid them. And it is their very presence that draws us into the text, compelling us to conduct a creative examination not only of the text but also of ourselves.

This entanglement of the reader is, of course, vital to any kind of text, but in the literary text we have the strange situation that the reader cannot know what his participation actually entails. We know that we share in certain experiences, but we do not know what happens to us in the course of this process. This is why, when we have been particularly impressed by a book, we feel the need to talk about it; we do not want to get away from it by talking about it—we simply want to understand more clearly what it is in which we have been entangled. We have undergone an experience, and now we want to know consciously *what* we have experienced. Perhaps this is the prime usefulness of literary criticism— it helps to make conscious those aspects of the text which would otherwise remain concealed in the subconscious; it satisfies (or helps to satisfy) our desire to talk about what we have read.

The efficacy of a literary text is brought about by the apparent evocation and subsequent negation of the familiar. What at first seemed to be an affirmation of our assumptions leads to our own rejection of them, thus tending to prepare us for a re-orientation. And it is only when we have outstripped our preconceptions and left the shelter of the familiar that we are in a position to gather new experiences. As the literary text involves the reader in the formation of illusion and the simultaneous formation of the means whereby the illusion is punctured, reading reflects the process by which we gain experience. Once the reader is entangled, his own preconceptions are continually overtaken, so that the text becomes his "present" while his own ideas fade into the "past"; as

soon as this happens he is open to the immediate experience of the text, which was impossible so long as his preconceptions were his "present".

V

In our analysis of the reading process so far, we have observed three important aspects that form the basis of the relationship between reader and text: the process of anticipation and retrospection, the consequent unfolding of the text as a living event, and the resultant impression of lifelikeness.

Any "living event" must, to a greater or lesser degree, remain open. In reading, this obliges the reader to seek continually for consistency, because only then can he close up situations and comprehend the unfamiliar. But consistency-building is itself a living process in which one is constantly forced to make selective decisions —and these decisions in their turn give a reality to the possibilities which they exclude, insofar as they may take effect as a latent disturbance of the consistency established. This is what causes the reader to be entangled in the text—"gestalt" that he himself has produced.

Through this entanglement the reader is bound to open himself up to the workings of the text and so leave behind his own preconceptions. This gives him the chance to have an experience in the way George Bernard Shaw once described it: "You have learnt something. That always feels at first as if you had lost something." Reading reflects the structure of experience to the extent that we must suspend the ideas and attitudes that shape our own personality before we can experience the unfamiliar world of the literary text. But during this process, something happens to us.

This "something" needs to be looked at in detail, especially as the incorporation of the unfamiliar into our own range of experience has been to a certain extent obscured by an idea very common in literary discussion: namely, that the process of absorbing the unfamiliar is labeled as the *identification* of the reader with what he reads. Often the term "identification" is used as if it were an explanation, whereas in

actual fact it is nothing more than a description. What is normally meant by "identification" is the establishment of affinities between oneself and someone outside oneself—a familiar ground on which we are able to experience the unfamiliar. The author's aim, though, is to convey the experience and, above all, an attitude toward that experience. Consequently, "identification" is not an end in itself, but a stratagem by means of which the author stimulates attitudes in the reader.

This of course is not to deny that there does arise a form of participation as one reads; one is certainly drawn into the text in such a way that one has the feeling that there is no distance between oneself and the events described. This involvement is well summed up by the reaction of a critic to reading Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre*: "We took up *Jane Eyre* one winter's evening, somewhat piqued at the extravagant commendations we had heard, and sternly resolved to be as critical as Croker[3]. But as we read on we forgot both commendations and criticism, identified ourselves with Jane in all her troubles, and finally married Mr. Rochester about four in the morning." The question is how and why did the critic identify himself with Jane?

In order to understand this "experience", it is well worth considering Georges Poulet's[4] observations on the reading process. He says that books only take on their full existence in the reader. It is true that they consist of ideas thought out by someone else, but in reading the reader becomes the subject that does the thinking. Thus there disappears the subject-object division that otherwise is a prerequisite for all knowledge and all observation, and the removal of this division puts reading in an apparently unique position as regards the possible absorption of new experiences. This may well be the reason why relations with the world of the literary text have so often been misinterpreted as identification. From the idea that in reading we must think the thoughts of someone else, Poulet draws the following conclusion: "Whatever I think is a part of *my* mental world. And yet here I am thinking a thought which manifestly belongs to another mental world, which is being thought in me just as though I did not exist. Already the notion is inconceivable and seems even more so if I reflect that, since every thought must have a

subject to think it, this *thought* which is alien to me and yet in me, must also have in me a *subject* which is alien to me... Whenever I read, I mentally pronounce an *I*, and yet the *I* which I pronounce is not myself."

But for Poulet this idea is only part of the story. The strange subject that thinks the strange thought in the reader indicates the potential presence of the author, whose ideas can be "internalized" by the reader: "Such is the characteristic condition of every work which I summon back into existence by placing my consciousness at its disposal. I give it not only existence, but awareness of existence." This would mean that consciousness forms the point at which author and reader converge, and at the same time it would result in the cessation of the temporary self-alienation that occurs to the reader when his consciousness brings to life the ideas formulated by the author. This process gives rise to a form of communication which, however, according to Poulet, is dependent on two conditions: the life-story of the author must be shout out of the work and the individual disposition of the reader must be shut out of the act of reading. Only then can the thoughts of the author take place subjectively in the reader, who thinks what he is not. It follows that the work itself must be thought of as a consciousness, because only in this way is there an adequate basis for the author-reader relationship—a relationship that can only come about through the negation of the author's own life-story and the reader's own disposition. This conclusion is actually drawn by Poulet when he describes the work as the self-presentation or materialization of consciousness: "And so I ought not to hesitate to recognize that so long as it is animated by this vital inbreathing inspired by the act of reading, a work of literature becomes (at the expense of the reader whose own life it suspends) a sort of human being, that it is a mind conscious of itself and constituting itself in me as the subject of its own objects." Even though it is difficult to follow such a substantialist conception of the consciousness that constitutes itself in the literary work, there are, nevertheless, certain points in Poulet's argument that are worth holding onto. But they should be developed along somewhat different lines.

If reading removes the subject-object division that constitutes all perception, it follows that the reader will be "occupied" by the thoughts of the author, and these in their turn will cause the drawing of new "boundaries". Text and reader no longer confront each other as object and subject, but instead the "division" takes place within the reader himself. In thinking the thoughts of another, his own individuality temporarily recedes into the background, since it is supplanted by these alien thoughts, which now become the theme on which his attention is focussed. As we read, there occurs an artificial division of our personality, because we take as a theme for ourselves something that we are not. Consequently when reading we operate on different levels. For although we may be thinking the thoughts of someone else, what we are will not disappear completely—it will merely remain a more or less powerful virtual force. Thus, in reading there are these two levels · the alien "me" and the real, virtual "me" —which are never completely cut off from each other. Indeed, we can only make someone else's thoughts into an absorbing theme for ourselves, provided the virtual background of our own personality can adapt to it. Every text we read draws a different boundary within our personality, so that the virtual background (the real "me") will take on a different form, according to the theme of the text concerned. This is inevitable, if only for the fact that the relationship between alien theme and virtual background is what makes it possible for the unfamiliar to be understood.

In this context there is a revealing remark made by D. W. Harding, arguing against the idea of identification with what is read: "What is sometimes called wish-fulfilment in novels and plays can... more plausibly be described as wish-formulation or the definition of desires. The cultural levels at which it works may vary widely; the process is the same... It seems nearer the truth... to say that fictions contribute to defining the reader's or spectator's values, and perhaps stimulating his desires, rather than to suppose that they gratify desire by some mechanism of vicarious experience." In the act of reading, having to think something that we have not yet experienced does not mean only being in a position to conceive or even understand it; it also means that such acts

of conception are possible and successful to the degree that they lead to something being formulated in us. For someone else's thoughts can only take a form in our consciousness if, in the process, our unformulated faculty for deciphering those thoughts is brought into play—a faculty which, in the act of deciphering, also formulates itself. Now since this formulation is carried out on terms set by someone else, whose thoughts are the theme of our reading, it follows that the formulation of our faculty for deciphering cannot be along our own lines of orientation.

Herein lies the dialectical structure of reading. The need to decipher gives us the chance to formulate our own deciphering capacity—i. e. , we bring to the fore an element of our being of which we are not directly conscious. The production of the meaning of literary texts—which we discussed in connection with forming the "gestalt" of the text—does not merely entail the discovery of the unformulated, which can then be taken over by the active imagination of the reader; it also entails the possibility that we may formulate ourselves and so discover what had previously seemed to elude our consciousness. These are the ways in which reading literature gives us the chance to formulate the unformulated.

注释：

1 konkretisation：realization。

2 斯特恩(Laurence Sterne，1713－1768)：英国小说家，感伤主义文学的主要代表，1759—1767 年写成长篇小说《项狄传》，名噪一时，另著有《伤感之旅》(1768)。

3 克罗克(John Wilson Croker，1780—1857)：英国保守党人，历史学家，《评论季刊》主要评论员，反对 1832 年改革提案，著书攻击法国革命，以编辑鲍斯威尔的《约翰逊传》闻名。

4 布莱(Georges Poulet，1902—1990)：比利时人，日内瓦学派的重要批评家，著有《批评意识》等著作多种。就哲学渊源而言，他的批评属于现象学批评，对读者理论产生一定的影响。

沃尔夫冈·伊瑟尔：
菲尔丁的《约瑟夫·安德鲁斯》中读者的作用

The Role of The Reader in Fielding's *Joseph Andrews*

Wolfgang Iser

I

"A new province of writing" : this is what Fielding called his novels. In what way new? Innovations as such in literature are very difficult to perceive; it is only when they are set against a familiar background that we can get some idea of their novelty. Once the new is distinguished from the old, there arises a certain tension, because we have lost the security of the familiar without knowing for sure the precise nature of the innovation. For what is new comes into being through changes in the reader's mind—the casting aside of old assumptions and preconceptions. It is difficult for Fielding as an author to define these changes, since he is concerned with presenting the new and not with merely changing the old.

For innovation itself to be a subject in a novel, the author needs direct cooperation from the person who is to perceive that innovation—namely, the reader. This is why it is hardly surprising that Fielding's novels, and those of the eighteenth century in general, are so full of direct addresses to the reader, which certainly have a rhetorical function, though this is by no means their only function. John Preston's book *The Created Self* is the first full-length study of these apostrophies, which he interprets in terms of rhetoric only: "I make no attempt to provide a 'rhetoric of reading', though no doubt this would be worth doing. Rather I trust that the rhetorical principles in question will provide a unifying point of view for these four novels (i. e. *Moll Flanders*,

Clarissa, *Tom Jones*, and *Tristram Shandy*), and yet not seem unduly arbitrary or restrictive. And I should be glad to feel that such an approach might prompt other more radical enquiries into the nature of the reader's role in fiction."

This recommendation for a more radical enquiry can be taken as a starting-point for our discussion. The role which the Fielding novel assigns to its readers is not confined to a willingness to be persuaded. In the act of reading, we are to undergo a kind of transformation, such as W. Booth has described in connection with fiction in general: "The author creates, in short, an image of himself and another image of his reader; he makes his reader, as he makes his second self, and the most successful reading is one in which the createdselves, author and reader, can find complete agreement." But this transformation of the reader into the image created by the author does not take place through rhetoric alone. The reader has to be stimulated into certain activities, which may be guided by rhetorical signposts, but which lead to a process that is not merely rhetorical. Rhetoric, if it is to be successful, needs a clearly formulated purpose, but the "new province of writing" that Fielding is trying to open up to his readers is in the nature of a promise, and it can only rouse the expectations necessary for its efficacy if it is not set out in words. The reader must be made to feel for himself the new meaning of the novel. To do this he must actively participate in bringing out the meaning and this participation is an essential precondition for communication between the author and the reader. Rhetoric, then, may be a guiding influence to help the reader produce the meaning of the text, but his participation is something that goes far beyond the scope of this influence. Northrop Frye has referred to an attack on Jakob Böhme which aptly describes the conditions leading to the reader's act of production: "It has been said of Boehme that his books are like a picnic to which the author brings the words and the reader the meaning. The remark may have been intended as a sneer at Boehme, but it is an exact description of all works of literary art without exception."

Eighteenth-century novelists were deeply conscious of this interplay

with the reader. Richardson once wrote · admittedly in a letter, and not in the novel itself- that the story must leave something for the reader to do. Laurence Sterne, in *Tristram Shandy*, describes this vital process with the same unmistakable clarity with which he disclosed the principles of fiction as practiced in the novel during the first half of the eighteenth century. He writes in II, 11: "No author, who understands the just boundaries of decorum and good-breeding, would presume to think all: The truest respect which you can pay to the reader's understanding, is to halve this matter amicably, and leave him something to imagine, in his turn, as well as yourself. For my own part, I am eternally paying him compliments of this kind, and do all that lies in my power to keep his imagination as busy as my own." The participation of the reader could not be stimulated if everything were laid out in front of him. This means that the formulated text must shade off. through allusions and suggestions, into a text that is unformulated though nonetheless intended. Only in this way can the reader's imagination be given the scope it needs; the written text furnishes it with indications which enable it to conjure up what the text does not reveal.

Fielding, too, often speaks of the offer of participation that must be made to the reader, if he is to learn to fulfill the promise of the novel. There is a clear reference to this in *Tom Jones*:

> Bestir thyself therefore on this occasion; for, though we will always lend thee proper assistance in difficult places, as we do not, like some others, expect thee to use the arts of divination to discover our meaning, yet we shall not indulge thy laziness where nothing but thy own attention is required; for thou art highly mistaken if thou dost imagine that we intended, when we began this great work, to leave thy sagacity nothing to do; or that, without sometimes exercising this talent, thou wilt be able to travel through our pages with any pleasure or profit to thyself.

This typical appeal to the reader's "sagacity" aims at arousing a sense of discernment. This is to be regarded as a pleasure, because in this way

the reader will be able to test his own faculties. It also promises to be profitable, because the need for discernment stimulates a process of learning in the course of which one's own sense of judgment may come under scrutiny. Here we have a clear outline of the role of the reader, which is fulfilled through the continual instigation of attitudes and reflections on those attitudes. As the reader is maneuvered into this position, his reactions—which are, so to speak, prestructured by the written text—bring out the meaning of the novel; it might be truer to say that the meaning of the novel only materializes in these reactions, since it does not exist per se.

II

This rough outline of the reader's role is something we can elaborate on, in more detail with reference to *Joseph Andrews* and *Tom Jones*, so that we can see more clearly the nature of the activity required of the reader as he produces the meaning of the novel. In the very first sentence of *Joseph Andrews*, the author mentions the fact that the "mere English reader" will certainly have different conceptions and also different expectations regarding the reading that lies ahead of him. For his reading habits are conditioned by epics, tragedies, and comedies, the underlying principles of which are called to mind so that the enterprise of our own author can be separated from them. Certainly the association of this novel with the hallowed forms of traditional literature was intended by Fielding, primarily, to raise the status of his tale in prose; but just as clear is the intention underlying his description of his work as a "comic epic poem in prose". By listing his deviations from the classical models, he is drawing attention to the unique features of his enterprise. And so the "classical reader" will find pleasure in the "parodies or burlesque imitations" precisely because they conjure up the very "genre" which they set out to transform.

This process can be linked with what Gombrich[1] terms in esthetics "schema and correction". Fielding calls to mind a whole repertoire of familiar literary "genres", so that these allusions will arouse particular

expectations from which his novel then proceeds to diverge. These subsequent divergences are the first step toward innovation.

In the preface, Fielding specifies the differences between his novel and classical predecessors, but these informative indications gradually disappear as the reader begins to fall in with the book. In the first of the initial essays of the novel, again he makes use of a familiar repertoire. But here the starting-point is contemporary rather than ancient literature. It is true that he alludes to classical and medieval lives, but his main concern here is with Colley Cibber's *Autobiography* and Richardson's *Pamela*,[7] which both fit in perfectly with Fielding's intentions, since they each present a life-story. But here it is no longer a question of Fielding showing the differences between his work and the models alluded to. Instead they are shown to be exemplary in a way that Fielding pretends he wants to emulate with his *Joseph Andrews*—and this regardless of the fact that one biography is fictitious and the other real, though it is ironically pointed out that there is much fiction in the real one, and in the fictitious much that presumes to be exemplary for real life.

If the beginning of the introduction emphasized the divergences from the established repertoire, now the stress is laid on the similarities, so that the reader is left to discover the differences for himself—though these always remain clearly visible thanks to the ever-present irony. *Joseph Andrews* is not to be read, then, as a glorification of the hero—in the mould of the Cibber *Autobiography*—or as a moral vade mecum for worldly success, like Richardson's novel. Here, too, schemata are corrected, though the correction is never formulated. As a result there appears a gap between the familiar repertoire in the novel and one's own observation of it.

These gaps heighten our awareness, and their effectiveness lies in the fact that they conceal something of vital importance. As we have seen, the reader is forced to discover for himself the divergences from the established repertoire, and at first sight this seems simple enough. The ironic style is sufficient to show us that the text means the opposite of what it says; but the situation becomes rather more complicated

when we ask, "What will the opposite of Richardson's *Pamela* and Colley Cibber's *Autobiography* look like?" The answer to this is far from obvious, and so the ironic alusions can no longer be regarded as a mere reversal of the written statement.

By negating the familiar, the irony indicates that now something is to be communicated of which hitherto there has been no proper conception. Our attention is drawn to the difficulty of deducing the exemplary from the private. Consequently, this negating irony drives us to seek the proper conception beyond the confines of the familiar models; and in this way, the nonfulfillment of those expectations aroused by the presence of the familiar. becomes the spur that pricks our imagination into action.

The repertoire of the familiar in *Joseph Andrews* is not confined to established literary patterns; it also incorporates various norms that were generally accepted in Fielding's day. The transplanting of these norms into the novel results in their transformation, for here they are presented in a different light from that in which they appeared at the time within the "collective consciousness" we call society. This esthetic arrangement of social norms has certain consequences for the reader which can best be illustrated through the character of Abraham Adams, the real hero of the novel. The list of virtues that Fielding unfolds contains nearly all the qualities that would make up the perfect man. And yet it is his very possession of all these qualities that makes Adams totally incapable of dealing with this world, as Fielding actually points out. The list of virtues is not seen from a Christian or a Platonic standpoint now, but from a worldly one, and from this totally different perspective the virtues appear to lose all their validity; they seem to belong to the past, for they are no longer capable of inspiring sensible conduct in the present. The question now arises as to whether this means that amoral conduct is best suited to this world. Or does it mean that we have to find a compromise relationship between norm and world? If this were so, surely any such compromise would be an intolerable strain, since the two factors— contemporary norms and worldly demands— would forever be tugging us in opposite directions. Virtues cannot be

contemplated separately from the world, and the world cannot be viewed without the background of virtue. Is the conflict to be resolved? If so, how, and why? The answers are not given us. They are the gaps in the text. They give the reader the motivation and the opportunity to bring the two poles meaningfully together for himself.

Here, then, we have our first insight into the nature of the reader's active participation, as mobilized by the novel. The repertoire of the familiar—whether it be literary tradition, contemporary "Weltanschauung", or social reality—forms the background of the novel. The familiar is reproduced in the text, but in its reproduction it seems different, for its component parts have been altered, its frame of reference has changed, its validity has, to a degree, been negated. But if the starting-point of the novel is a set of negations, then the reader is impelled to counterbalance these negations by seeking their positive potential, the alternate fulfillment of which we shall henceforth call the realization of the text.

Fielding's preoccupation with this aspect of the reader's role can be traced from the remarks in the preface right through the initial essays in the novel. After drawing distinctions between his own novel and traditional writings, he continues: "Having thus distinguished *Joseph Andrews* from the productions of romance writers on the one hand and burlesque writers on the other, and given some few very short hints (for I intended no more) of this species of writing, which I have affirmed to be hitherto unattempted in our language; I shall leave to my good-natured reader to apply my piece to my observations." The reader, then, must apply the author's remarks to his novel, but the text will not tell him how to do this. The application will coincide largely with the realization. In the preface, however, Fielding does outline the sphere in which this application is to take place, for he promises that the reader will have revealed to him the sources of the ridiculous which, he says, spring from the discovery of affectation and hypocrisy. The intention of the novel, then, is not the presentation of affectation and hypocrisy, but the uncovering of their ridiculousness, which always occurs with the penetration of those false appearances that mask all social vices.

However, a discovery of this nature does not end with the unmasking of vice. Fielding simply says that the veil will fall from the ridiculous, without saying that this absurdity might carry with it some indication as to the proper way to conduct oneself. So far the reaction of the reader will signify no more than a feeling of superiority, and the question arises as to what lies behind this superiority evinced by our laughter. At best it is an awareness of the potential presence of what proper conduct should be, although we cannot discount the possibility that our superiority is also based on a misunderstanding. The reader, therefore must not only see through the original false appearances; he must also set out even more intensively to discover the preconditions for model conduct, to make sure that this superiority, obtained through the unmasking of absurd vices, does not in its turn become a false appearance. In this process, ridicule performs a very different function from its function in the literature of the past: it ceases to stigmatize the lower classes and instead stimulates the reader's mind into trying to formulate the potential morality contained in the unmasking. In order to set such a mental process into operation, the intention of the novel cannot be the subject of narration, for it is only by reconstructing for himself the unformulated part of the text—in this case, the correct mode of conduct—that the reader can experience this intention as a reality.

How this reality is constituted is indicated about half-way through *Joseph Andrews* in Fielding's final theoretical essay (III,1). He would like to feel that the novel is a kind of mirror, in which the reader can see himself, as it were, through the characters he has been laughing at in apparent superiority. It is his purpose "not to expose one pitiful wretch to the small and contemptible circle of his acquaintance; but to hold the glass to thousands in their closets, that they may contemplate their deformity, and endeavour to reduce it, and thus by suffering private mortification may avoid public shame".

If looking in the glass gives the reader the opportunity for self-correction, then the role assigned to him is clear. In taking this opportunity, he is bound to encounter sides of himself that he had not known

about or—worse still—had not wanted to know about; only then can he see that the correct mode of conduct first involves shaking off the familiar. However, it is obvious that correct conduct as such is only a potential thing, which will come into being in as many different ways as there are situations. Fielding makes his characters react almost mechanically and invariably, following the straight and narrow path of their own habits, and in this way the reader is called upon to replace the motivation presented by a motivation that will remove the imbalance of the characters' conduct.

The text, however, leaves out this corrective motivation, although it is not difficult to find. These omissions are repaired by the reader's own imagination. As the text invites him to imagine for himself what would be the right reaction to the given situation, he is bound to make the necessary adjustments consciously, and this process must in turn make him conscious of himself, of his own conduct, and of the customs and prejudices that condition it. This new awareness, Fielding hopes, will make the reader suddenly see himself as he really is, and so the role that he is to play in uncovering the hidden reality of the text will lead ultimately to his uncovering and correcting the hidden reality of himself.

III

If this intention is to be realized, the process of change cannot be left entirely to the subjective discretion of the reader—he must, rather, be gently guided by indications in the text, though he must never have the feeling that the author wants to lead him by the nose. If he responds as the author wants him to, then he will play the part assigned to him, and in order to elicit the correct response, the author has certain stratagems at his disposal. One of them we have already seen in connection with the repertoire of the familiar—namely, negation. Expectations aroused in the reader by allusions to the things he knows or thinks he knows are frustrated; through this negation, we know that the standards and models alluded to are somehow to be transcended.

though no longer on their own terms. These now appear to be, as it were, things of the past; what follows cannot be stated, but has to be realized. Thus negation can be seen as the inducement to realization—which is the reader's production of the meaning of the text. It initiates the act of imagination by which the reader makes the virtual actual, proceeding from the now obsolete norms of the past right through to the "configurative" meaning of the newly formed present. This is why we often have the impression when reading that we are experiencing the story as an event in our own lives.

...

In *Joseph Andrews*, Fielding makes various observations about the reader's role as a producer. In the second theoretical essay, for example, he says that reading his book is like a journey, during which the occasional reflections of the author are to be regarded as resting places which will give the reader the chance to think back over what has happened so far. As these chapters interrupt the narrative, Fielding quite logically calls them "vacant pages". Now these "vacant pages" are themselves largescale versions of vacancies that occur right through the text, for instance in the Lady Booby scene. And just as the reader is to "reflect" during these "vacant pages", so too must he reflect during all the other vacancies or gaps in the text. The gaps, indeed, are those very points at which the reader can enter into the text, forming his own connections and conceptions and so creating the configurative meaning of what he is reading. Thanks to the "vacant pages", he can reflect, and through reflection create the motivation through which he can experience the text as a reality. He forms what we might call the "gestalt"[3] of the text, and it is worth noting that this, too, is indicated by Fielding in *Joseph Andrews*.

When, toward the end of the novel, Adams holds in his arms the son whom he had presumed to be drowned, his overwhelming joy causes him to forget the virtues of moderation and self-control that he has always preached, regardless of what was going on around him; but Fielding intervenes on his hero's behalf: "No, reader; he felt the ebullition, the overflowings of a full, honest, open heart, towards the

person who had conferred a real obligation, and of which, if thou canst not conceive an idea within, I will not vainly endeavour to assist thee." The reader is shown the event and the outer appearance, but he is invited, almost exhorted, to penetrate behind that appearance, and finally to thrust it aside altogether, by conceiving the idea *within*. This is an almost direct statement of the role of the reader in this novel. From the given material he must construct his own conception of the reality and hence of the meaning of the text.

This process can perhaps be seen most clearly in the character of Parson Adams and his contacts with the outside world.' The vitality of his character is derived largely from the surprises he offers the reader. Even his name, Abraham Adams, suggests conflicting elements in him. The unshakable faith of the biblical Abraham applies to all the parson's convictions, and yet at times these are thwarted by the Adam in him. These contrasting schemata encroach on each other, and one sometimes represses the other, so that the character cannot be regarded either as Abraham or as Adam; it seems, indeed, as if the character keeps freeing itself from its apparent characteristics. Through the conflict of schemata, the character takes on a definite individuality, at times approaching caricature, and always full of potential surprises for the reader. Caricature depends for its effect on distortion, but distortion in turn depends for its effect on our conception of what is normal. Otherwise, how should we know something was being distorted? In the case of Parson Adams, the unshakable faith of Abraham is blended with the human weakness of Adam—Adam's pragmatic difficulties with Abraham's abstract resolution. These features are emphasized to the point of caricature, but it is for us to decide what the "normal picture" should look like. At the same time, it is the very oddness of the picture presented that surprises us, and this unexpectedness stimulates those reactions that bring the character to life.

This bringing to life, however, is not an end in itself. It has the function of involving the reader in an action, the meaning of which he must discover for himself. The character is not aware of the conflicting schemata within himself, and the results of this ignorance are apparent

right through the novel. Parson Adams, not knowing what he is, takes part in a variety of confrontations with the world, always reacting quite spontaneously, and nearly always reacting inappropriately. The reader, though, is "in the picture"; not only is he aware of Adams's polarity but also, thanks to the author's numerous directions, he is aware of how inadequately Adams applies his ideal qualities in dealing with the world. Now what does the reader do with this knowledge? The episodes in the novel often become a test for the reader's own capabilities. He sees the world through the eyes of the hero, and the hero through the eyes of a pragmatic world. The result is conflicting views, linked only by their completely negative nature. From Adams's point of view, the weddly conduct of people seems underhand, selfish, and sordid; in the eyes of the world, Adams is ingenuous, narrow-minded, and naive. These two perspectives are completely dominant, and there is no indication whatsoever as to how people really *should* behave. This total absence of balance is intensified by the fact that the characters themselves remain quite unaware of the shamelessness of their so-called worldly wisdom or, in the case of Adams, the impracticality of his idealism.

And so the narrative itself has distinctly negative features, although one cannot go so far as to say that the text actually proclaims the sordidness of the world or the stupidity of virtue. The overprecision with which the two negative poles have been presented inevitably adumbrates the positive features that are not formulated in the text. The form, then, of this unwritten text, becomes apparent to the reader as he reads, and so he begins to uncover what we might call the virtual dimension of the text. Virtual, as it is not described in the text; a dimension, insofar as it balances even if it cannot reconcile the two conflicting, mutually negating poles. The virtual dimension is brought about through our forming the "gestalt" of the text; here we establish consistency between contrasting positions; this is the configurative meaning of the text, where the unformulated becomes concrete; and finally this is the point at which the text becomes an experience for the reader.

At first sight, the configurative meaning may appear simple enough to find: the polarity shows all too clearly the inadequacy of

Adams's virtuous conduct and the baseness of worldly behavior. Adams should learn to adapt himself better to the world, and worldly people should realize the depravity of their vices. The reader sees the faults of both sides. However, on closer analysis, this apparent simplicity and symmetry will be seen to be misleading—a fact which enables our virtual dimension to take on a far more complex reality. The fact that Adams's steadfast virtur prevents him from adapting himself to the situations that arise, does not mean that the virtual balance would be found in continual adaptation to circumstances. For those characters who do adapt themselves to each new situation unmask their own worldly corruption. And so although a balancing of the two poles will take place in the virtual dimension, this will not be in the sense of reconciling steadfastness with inconstancy, cunning with virtue; it will be a convergence at a point somewhere between or even above the two poles. It is possible simply because the reader has that which both poles lack and, in equal measure, need: insight into themselves. The acquisition of this insight is the aim that Fielding pursues, and the process of bringing characters and scenes to life is the means to this end.

As the reading process coincides with the establishment of the virtual dimension of the text, the impression might arise that the reader's balancing of the poles will gradually endow him with a degree of superiority over the characters. In the matter of overall observation, he *is* superior, but in another sense the superiority must be shown to be illusory or else the novel could not work as a glass reflecting the reader's own weaknesses as Fielding intends it to do. Furthermore, it would be impossible to gain the right kind of insight, since this can only come about through awareness of one's own inadequacy and not in an affirmation of one's own superiority. And so the strategy of the novelist must be such that the reader, in bringing about the virtual dimension, is actually entangled in what he has produced. Only in this way does the reading process become something alive and dramatic, and this is vital since its meaning is not to be illustrated by the characters, but is to take place within the reader.

For this purpose, the author must employ strategems of various

types, with a view to involving the reader on as many levels as possible. First, the reader must be given this feeling of superiority, and so the author takes care to supply him with knowledge that is unavailable to the characters. This privileged position is necessary because if the reader is to play the part intended for him, then for the duration of his reading he must be, so to speak, taken out of himself. The easiest way to entice him into opening himself up is to give him a grandstand view of all the proceedings. This is achieved by a simple strategem: putting Adams in a variety of situations that he cannot see through. For instance, even at the end, when he meets Peter Pounce, Lady Booby's steward, we read: "Peter was a hypocrite, a sort of people whom Mr. Adams never saw through." The very character who is possessed of the highest degree of integrity is devoid of the faculty emphasized in Fielding's preface as the intention of the novel: seeing through hypocrisy.

This defect in Adams runs through all the episodes of the novel in so unmistakable a fashion that the reader inevitably begins to look down on this, the novel's ambassador of morality. He feels that he has a far better grasp of Adams's situation than the parson himself, confined as he is within the limitations of his own steadfast convictions; the reader's feeling of superiority begins to grow. But his recognition of the unsuitability of Adams's mode of conduct has two sides, for it puts the reader in the position of the worldly wise, thrusting him closer to those characters to whom Adams seems ridiculous. In condemning Adams's lack of pragmatic sense, the reader unexpectedly finds himself on the side of those very people whose pretensions he should be seeing through and who can hardly represent the proper perspective from which he is to judge Adams.

And so the reader's insight becomes distinctly ambivalent. He cannot identify himself with the viewpoint of the worldly wise, for that would mean abandoning the insight he had gained in the unmasking of their hypocrisy. But when throughout a whole series of situations he finds himself sharing their views, which nevertheless he cannot allow to be his guide, then he is left in a state of suspense; his superiority

becomes an embarrassment. The problems thus aroused are necessary to entangle him in the configurative meaning he is producing; only when this happens, can the effect of the novel really begin to work on the reader.

If Adams's conduct often strikes the reader as naive, such an impression naturally shows Adams in a negative light, and the question arises as to whether the reader is in a position to nullify this negative impression. The reason for what we regard as Adams's impracticality lies, after all, in his moral steadfastness; and this is what the reader comes up against in all those situations that reveal the impracticality. Is moral steadfastness to be regarded, then, as a condition for doing the wrong thing? Or does the reader now discover how small a part morality plays in the formation and application of his insight, even though he thinks he knows opportunism cannot be the criterion, either? At such moments he lacks orientation, which is something Adams has, without any self-doubts; he begins to fall from his position of superiority, and the configurative meaning of the novel becomes altogether richer. For now the moral conflict—of which the characters are generally relieved, thanks largely to the intervention of providence—takes place in the reader himself.

The conflict can only be resolved by the realization of the virtual morality. This has already been prestructured by the strategems of the text insofar as the reader's acquired insight separates him from the society of the worldly wise and also shows him that his supposed superiority over Adams can only be based on a lack of moral steadfastness within himself. This is how the reader becomes trapped by his superiority. If he feels superior to the worldly wise, because he can see through them, then when he turns his attention to Adams, he is obliged to see through himself, because in the various situations he reacted differently from Adams. And if he wants to see through Adams, in order to maintain his superiority, then he is obliged to share the views of those whom he is continually unmasking. The worldly wise are lacking in morality, the moralist in self-awareness, and these two negative poles carry with them a virtual ideality against which the reader must measure himself;

this ideality is the configurative meaning of the text, the product of the reader's own insight, creating standards below which he must not fall. This process, whereby the reader formulates the unwritten text, requires active participation on his part, and thus the formulated meaning becomes a direct product and a direct experience of the reader.

"A book is a machine to think with." So said I. A. Richards, and it seems that *Joseph Andrews* is one of the first novels of the eighteenth century to which this description can be well and truly applied. We can see clearly from the role of the reader, as we have observed it, that the novel is no longer confined to the presentation of exemplary models, à la Richardson, inviting emulation; instead the text offers itself as an instrument by means of which the reader can make a number of discoveries for himself that will lead him to a reliable sense of orientation. A theme in *Joseph Andrews* that lends support to this conception of the novel is that of the relationship between book and world.

There are a number of situations in which Adams thinks he can settle the controversies and supply the urgently needed elucidations by referring to books—especially to Homer and Aeschylus[5]. For him, books and the world are the same thing; he still clings to the time-honored view that the world is a book, and so the meaning of the world must be present in a book. For Adams it goes without saying that literature, as an imitation of Nature, is a great storehouse of good conduct, so that the actual deeds of men can only be measured against this criterion and are naturally always found wanting. This explicit affirmation of the value of literature involves implicitly imprisoning oneself in a fabric of phantasy and delusion. This in turn prevents one from making a correct assessment of empirical situations, since these are generally far too complex to be dealt with in accordance with one set formula. Very few issues are so cut-and-dried that they can be settled by reference to fictional example, and so Fielding's hero becomes quite absurd whenever he tries to supply a literary reduction of some empirical problem and believes that he has thus found the solution.

Occasionally, however, Adams seems to depart spontaneously from his models, for instance in the scene when he throws his beloved

Aeschylus into the fire. In a different context, Mark Spilka says of this scene: "Here Adams has literally stripped off an affectation while revealing his natural goodness—the book is a symbol, that is, of his pedantry, of his excessive reliance upon literature as a guide to life, and this is what is tossed aside during the emergency. Later on, when the book is fished out of the fire, it has been reduced to its simple sheepskin covering—which is Fielding's way of reminding us that the contents of the book are superficial, at least in the face of harsh experience." This spontaneous gesture is a manifestation of the incongruity of book and world, which Adams is not yet conscious of, even though he occasionally acts accordingly. The reader, however, is aware that the old equation of book and world has been negated and that the book has taken on a new function. Instead of representing the whole world, the novel illustrates points of access to the world; to do this it must offer the reader a kind of lens by means of which he will learn to see the world clearly and be able to adapt himself to it. Since the world is far greater in scope than the book can ever be, the book can no longer offer panacea-like models, but must open up representative approaches to which the reader must adjust for himself. This is the didactic basis of Fielding's novel, made necessary by the empiric variety of the world. The right mode of conduct can be extracted from the novel through the interplay of attitudes and discoveries; it is not presented explictily. And so the meaning of the novel is no longer an independent, objective reality; it is something that has to be formulated by the reader. In the past, when book and world were regarded as identical, the book formulated its own exemplary meaning, which the reader had only to contemplate; but now that the reader has to produce the meaning for himself, the novel discloses its attitudes through degrees of negation, thwarting the reader's expectations and stimulating him to reflection which in turn creates a counterbalance to the negativity of the text. Out of this whole process emerges the meaning of the novel. Historically speaking, perhaps one of the most important differences between Richardson and Fielding lies in the fact that with *Pamela* the meaning is clearly formulated; in *Joseph Andrews* the meaning is clearly waiting to be formulated.

注释：

1 贡布里希(Sir Ernest Gombrich,1909-)：杰出的英国艺术史家，关于艺术理论和艺术心理学的著述颇丰。

2 科利·西伯(Colley Cibber,1617—1711)，英国演员，剧院经理，桂冠诗人。

《帕梅拉》，塞缪尔·理查森的书信体小说，是一部道德说教故事。

下文提到的《约瑟夫·安德鲁斯》，全名为《约瑟夫·安德鲁斯和朋友亚伯拉罕·亚当斯历险记》。菲尔丁摈弃了当时感伤故事的创作模式，真实地描绘了18世纪英国社会的风俗。这部小说模仿了理查森的《帕梅拉》，属于"滑稽英雄传奇"。约瑟夫以理查森笔下的女主人公帕梅拉之弟的身份出现。小说中，年轻英俊的男仆安德鲁斯像他那守身如玉的姐姐帕梅拉一样，拒绝了女主人布比太太的引诱。

3 格式塔是德文 gestalt 的音译，意为"形式"、"形状"。格式塔心理学是强调意识的整体组织性，反对把意识分析为感觉元素。格式塔心理学美学强调艺术作品的整体性和人的心理对认识对象的组织构造和整体化作用，即完形作用。

4 在《约瑟夫·安德鲁斯》中，亚当斯牧师是约瑟夫的导师兼朋友，是一个喜剧色彩极为浓厚的人物。此人虽说外表矫饰，好卖弄学问，内心却极为真诚，笃信人性皆善，忠诚于基督教信仰，与小说中另一貌似虔诚、实则虚伪的牧师形成鲜明对照。

5 埃斯库罗斯(Aeschylus,公元前525—公元前456)：古希腊三大悲剧作家之一，相传写了八十多个剧本，存世的有《被缚的普罗米修斯》、《波斯人》、《阿伽门农》等悲剧七部。

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第七章　后结构主义

粗略地讲，直到 20 世纪 60 年代，西方文学批评主要是论述作品的文本，确定文本所表现的意义。批评家之间的分歧，也主要表现在确定文本意义的做法上：如何确定文本的意义？什么是最可靠的途径？应该注意作品的历史背景还是其风格特征？应该注重作者的意图和动机还是作品的门类和规则？是注重个人的经验还是作品本身？……虽然结构主义对人文主义传统提出了挑战，但并未引起根本性的变化，它仍然没有超出确定文本意义的范畴。它强调符号系统的整体性，只不过是把作品作为“有机整体”的另一种看法，仍然与其他批评方式有些共同的东西。

西方文学批评真正突破性的发展是后结构主义。但后结构主义一词很不确切，似乎既包含对结构主义的延续，也包含对它的超越和发展，而实际上却标志着它的终结。一般说，后结构主义不是一个具有统一思想的学派，甚至谈不上一次思想运动。列入后结构主义名下的最著名的一些学者，例如米歇尔·福柯、雅克·德里达和罗兰·巴特等，无一承认他们有共同信条和方法。然而，他们对现代性的传统的怀疑和颠覆的态度却是一致的：福柯对权力和知识构成的探索，德里达对形而上学的批判，巴特对封闭结构的质疑，以及受他们影响的女权主义对男性中心主义的批判等，都表现出一种反传统的姿态。

后结构主义常常与后现代主义交叉使用，这表明理论的“后”转常常被视为它说明的病态的一个症状，即社会所经历的“后现代状况”、“仿真时代”、“危机”或“意义消解的过程”。这种生活和理论的混淆，或者说一种独特的领域，常常产生出另一种批评领域：是把“后”理论读作对一个时代的分析（以社会现实作为它的指涉）还是理论的根本转向（反对再现和指涉）？当后现代文化研究发现前卫绘画、电影、音乐和叙事中同样有这种“颠覆”精神时，这种混淆进一步加剧。因此后结构主义是一个很难界定的概念。

在后现代时期，艺术也采取"理论的转向"，并加入对正在发展的现实的抨击。这种关于"真实"、稳定的参照、经验和意义的弱化，虽然既是后结构主义探讨的主题又是其探讨的后果，但不同领域的混淆，如能指和所指、事件和概念，或许是后结构主义最突出的特点。而抹杀或至少削弱不同领域的区分，如能指和所指、阅读和写作、文学和批评等，可以说是后现代时期理论作用的标志。

前缀词"后"的多种用法都表明了过去（包括尼采、海德格尔、弗洛伊德的理论，西方形而上学和结构主义等）对后结构主义理论的重要意义。德里达、利奥塔和巴特都曾不断地转向这一问题，拒绝谴责或促进超越前人的建议。德里达指出，探索的作用是对过去的回忆，是一种话语系统的断裂。利奥塔认为，种种所谓新的开始、超越或进步的概念，都要谈到现代性中的"英雄模式"，它们本身就是"后"理论希望取代的观念。因此他把后结构主义描述为对现代性的重写，提出今天的作品要想成为现代的，必须首先是后现代的。然而自相矛盾的是，后理论所关注的只是当前的现在。

结构主义对语言学和人类学产生了重大影响，尤其是索绪尔的语言学和斯特劳斯人类学，虽然后者以其自身的形式发展了与语言学的类比。索绪尔通过把语言展现为符号和符号系统，为语言科学提供了一种共时性的基础。一个结构由分开的能指和所指组成，语言符号在物质符号（字母或声音）和非物质的概念（所指）之间假定一种任意的关系。由于结构主义语言学脱离意义转而关注构成，意义便不再是表意因素固有的东西。符号的意义只能在与其他符号的关系（不同于其他符号）中生成，因此意义存在于语言的形式之中。

结构主义从两方面破坏了现代性的话语。首先，结构规定了所有的现象——具体的、特殊的、历史的。它谋求获得某种经验和历史之外的"利益"。由于结构规定历史，所以它超越历史。于是结构使时间静止，排除历史中的现代性概念（如复兴、进步等）。正如德里达的批判所表明的，结构作为一个封闭的领域，既不接受任何内在的秘密，也不接受任何外在的限制。其次，语言科学（与个人的言语相对）使意义与符号分离，将前者重构为结构作用的后果。因此它置换了说话主体的位置，使之在话语中不再是赋予意义的主体。

然而，正如福柯所指出的，结构主义仍然保留着最后的幻觉，即它试图把世界呈现给意识，仿佛它必须由人来阅读似的。结构主义或许实现了说话主体的死亡，但却不是以主体为中心的话语的死亡。各种形式的

后结构主义理论的任务，就是要打破这种最后的幻觉。因此后结构主义超越了已经显示出来的索绪尔思想的局限。后结构主义的思想先驱包括尼采的“系谱学”、巴塔耶的“不良部分说”和莫斯的“天赋论”，所有这些都是打破秩序和体系的理论，它们以自己的概念反对自己的话语。一般认为，德里达是后结构主义第一个阶段的发起者，他在《文字学》和《书写与差异》里所倡导的解构主义首先把矛头指向索绪尔和施特劳斯的基础文本，颠覆了符号系统作为稳定结构的结构概念。

在结构主义语言学的话语里，解构主义发现了一种基本的哲学概念。这种哲学总是以假定某种偶然的、表面的语言外在性来表达思想。符号规定着哲学的秩序：所指（思想）从自身内部自发地产生出来，文本是思想和意识的一个窗口，意义是稳定的，可以直接了解并固定于文本之中。

德里达早期的著作主要是重读哲学和写作，考察哲学和语言学之间的关系。他的“补充”和“延异”的概念借用索绪尔的差异论，颠覆刻写于符号之中的形而上学的存在概念。他把“不在”阐述为“不在之存在的痕迹”。于是能指便成了不在场的指称物的补充，但它并不呈现不在场的指称物，而是占据它虚空的位置。表意活动总是包含沉默的延迟作用；表征不可能呈现，而只能推延所指的出现。索绪尔的能指和所指这种二元对立的表意作用，变成了无休止的延异活动，永不固定，永无止境。

德里达对符号的批判打开了一种新的文本批评模式。这种模式不是内容的转变，而是对语言本身的剖析。它重新审视整个人文学科中语言与真理、谬误、知识、权力、理性、欲望和说话主体之间的关系。因此毫不奇怪，解构主义对文学批评产生了重大而深刻的影响。它改变了整个文学批评领域，模糊了小说和理论、文学和哲学、阅读和写作、批评家和作家的区分。在解构主义和拉康的精神分析理论影响下，产生出一种新的写作范畴：在复杂的互为文本的链条中（即所谓的互文性），将自身置于另一时刻的阅读，例如关于拉康对弗洛伊德的阅读、关于德里达对柏拉图和卢梭的阅读、关于巴特对巴尔扎克的阅读等等。

在社会思想和科学的哲学领域，福柯提出了系谱学方法，其后果与解构主义相似。作为一种对话语王国及其形成的探讨，系谱学不仅是恢复现代主体所写的历史，而是置换这种历史。在《精神病史》一书里，他重写理性的历史，把它作为在语言中压制非理性声音的一种历史。在后来的著作里，福柯发展了从考古学到系谱学的方法论，从各种不同领域里找出知识主体的含义，涉及到科学和认识论、戒律和惩罚、医药、伦理、

性行为以及自我表现的技巧。这些历史考察话语及其客体(身体、疾病、性事、秩序、真理、知识)之间复杂的关系,以便写出一部现代主体的系谱学。最终,这些探索发现,话语既有统治的功能又有客体的功能。作为统治,它隐含于权力关系之中,对其客体进行控制;而作为客体,它屈从于自身话语作用的统治。在某些文章里,例如在《什么是启蒙?》和《尼采,系谱学,历史》里,福柯还探讨了系谱学对探索本身的话语的影响。他考察权力、知识和真理的交叉关系,但不是把它们作为外在于话语的客体,也不是作为话语构成的抽象的概念,而是作为话语的运作,作为话语中的事件和话语的后果。

巴特的著作追溯从结构主义到后结构主义各个领域中的理论转向,将探索的客体从作品转向文本,从陈述转向阐释行为,从故事转向话语,从结构转向一套发生作用的话语活动。巴特认为,如果作品是一个稳定的、封闭的结构,与它自己一致,并按照对多种文本都是超验的一种叙述逻辑加以组织,那么这部作品的文本就是一个生产和传播的所在,一个碰撞的领域,其中作者本人也只是一个访问者或者一种写作的功能,没有任何了解意义的特殊方式。一切都不断地进行多重能指,但不会构成一个最后的大聚合或一种最终的结构。

类似的转换是从陈述到阐释。文本极力创造那种纯内容或纯故事(历史)的幻觉,因而被怀疑是一个运作活动的领域。于是后结构主义抛弃对隐藏在文本之内的意义的分析,转而研究语言如何规定其话语构成秩序的运作活动。例如电影理论怀疑电影文本是意识形态和电影机制的作用,这种机制预想、计划和定位观众,把观众纳入它的无缝的文本。这样,与经验的主体混在一起的观众,便被重新阐述为一种电影的构成:在文本中的一个位置,在阅读中的一种作用,在意义中的一种效果。

弗洛伊德的"无意识"学说对后结构主义产生了重大影响。他的策略是通过在话语秩序中重新嵌入被压制和被排除的声音动摇话语机制。在各种不同学科中,这种策略为不同的后结构主义者共有。例如,福柯的《事物的秩序》揭示了关于知识的肯定的无意识,而《精神病史》揭示了被压制的非理性的声音。这就打破了科学和理性话语的"主人"地位。但这里也有一些问题:被压制的声音不仅可能在其他地方存在,更主要的是它无法在写作中再现。德里达认为,根本的改变永远不可能"在人身上"出现,而只能通过代表或代理说出来。

拉康的三部分理论机制(想像,象征,真实)说明了这种不可能性:真实就是那个无论理论还是主体都无法接触的不存在的客体(指称物)。

主体身份的代价或在语言中存在的代价就是消失，即它永远是一种经过调解的（即“延异”）与真实的关系。

这种困难在女权主义理论中最为明显，因为它要从哲学、批评和叙事等统治性的话语中恢复被排斥的女性。在精神分析和解构主义的影响之下，后结构主义的女权主义渴求这种在科学、哲学、文学艺术和女权主义本身的著作中被排斥的声音。这种渴求包含着批评和再现的双重任务。女权主义批评把女性的再现解读为双重反映的镜子：当这些话语反映妇女遭受“失语”的痛苦时，这种否定的形象也产生镜子的功能，反映出男性主体承认自己是个整体。就这种批评不能为女性提供肯定的身份而言，它表明了女权主义理论找出一种系统表达自己的话语立场时的困难。

在解构主义、系谱学、精神分析和女权主义当中，后结构主义理论均采取了“语言学转向”的立场：否认它在语言中对其客体有任何特权地位。当理论承认不存在一种能够以语言描述另一种客体的元语言时，它也就否定了对原因、作者、科学的客观性或构成文本内容基础的那种要求。文本不再是一种可以想像的原初的存在，也不是一种统一的存在方式。一切都开始于或者已经是一种再现或再生产：意义永远是一种在不断推延和差异中的重构。

这里所选的三篇文章均为后结构主义的代表作。德里达是法国著名的哲学家，这篇文章被称为解构主义（后结构主义的一个重要学派）的宣言。巴特被称为法国文学理论大师，他的文章“作者之死”扭转了文学批评的方向。德曼是美国后结构主义在文学方面的代表人物，他以修辞解构的方式体现了德里达等人的理论，并提出了修辞解构主义。三篇文章从不同侧面表明了后结构主义的基础观点。

雅克·德里达:人文科学话语中的结构、符号和游戏

Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences[1]

Jacques Derrida

We need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things.
(Montaigne)

Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an "event", if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the function of structural—or structuralist—thought to reduce or to suspect. Let us speak of an "event" nevertheless, and let us use quotation marks to serve as a precaution. What would this event be then? Its exterior form would be that of a *rupture* and a redoubling.

It would be easy enough to show that the concept of structure and even the word "structure" itself are as old as the *epistēmē*—that is to say, as old as Western science and Western philosophy—and that their roots thrust deep into the soil of ordinary language, into whose deepest recesses the *epistēme* plunges in order to gather them up and to make them part of itself in a metaphorical displacement. Nevertheless, up to the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure—or rather the structurality of structure—although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure—one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure—but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the *play* of the structure. By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the centre of a structure

permits the play of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself.

Nevertheless, the center also closes off the play which it opens up and makes possible. As center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer possible. At the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements (which may of course be structures enclosed within a structure) is forbidden. At least this permutation has always remained *interdicted* (and I am using this word deliberately). Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality. This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, *within* the structure and *outside* it. The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality *has its center elsewhere*. The center is not the center. The concept of centered structure—although it represents coherence itself, the condition of the *epistēmē* as philosophy or science—is contradictorily coherent. And as always, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire.[2] The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play. And on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were at stake in the game from the outset, And again on the basis of what we call the center (and which, because it can be either inside or outside, can also indifferently be called the origin or end, *archē* or *telos*), repetitions, substitutions, transformations, and permutations are always *taken* from a history of meaning [*sens*]—that is, in a word, a history—whose origin may always be reawakened or whose end may always be anticipated in the form of presence. This is why one perhaps could say that the movement of any archaeology, like that of any eschatology, is an

accomplice of this reduction of the structurality of structure and always attempts to conceive of structure on the basis of a full presence which is beyond play.

If this is so, the entire history of the concept of structure, before the rupture of which we are speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center. Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix—if you will pardon me for demonstrating so little and for being so elliptical in order to come more quickly to my principal theme—is the determination of Being as *presence* in all senses of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence—*eidos*, *archē*, *telos*, *energeia*, *ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject) *alētheia*, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.

The event I called a rupture, the disruption I alluded to at the beginning of this paper, presumably would have come about when the structurality of structure had to begin to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is why I said that this disruption was repetition in every sense of the word. Henceforth, it became necessary to think both the law which somehow governed the desire for a center in the constitution of structure, and the process of signification which orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence—but a central presence which has never been itself, has always already been exiled from itself into its own substitute. The substitute does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it. Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse—provided we can agree on this

word—that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the *domain* and the *play of signification* infinitely.

Where and how does this decentering, this thinking the structurality of structure, occur? It would he somewhat naïve to refer to an event, a doctrine, or an author in order to designate this occurrence. It is no doubt part of the totality of an era, our own, but still it has always already begun to proclaim itself and begun to *work*. Nevertheless, if we wished to choose several "names", as indications only, and to recall those authors in whose discourse this occurrence has kept most closely to its most radical formulation, we doubtless would have to cite the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of Being and truth, for which were substituted the concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without present truth); the Freudian critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession; and, more radically, the Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the determination of Being as presence. But all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. To take one example from many: the metaphysics of presence is shaken with the help of the concept of *sign*. But, as I suggest a moment ago, as soon as one seeks to demonstrate in this way that there is no transcendental or privileged signified and that the domain or play of signification henceforth has no limit, one must reject even the concept and word "sign" itself which is precisely what cannot be done. For the signification "sign" has always been understood and determined, in

its meaning, as sign-of, a signifier referring to a signified, a signifier different from its signified. If one erases the radical difference between signifier and signified, it is the word "signifier" itself which must be abandoned as a metaphysical concept. When Lévi-Strauss says in the preface to *The Raw and the Cooked* that he has "sought to transcend the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible by operating from the outset at the level of signs",[3] the necessity, force, and legitimacy of his act cannot make us forget that the concept of the sign cannot in itself surpass this opposition between the sensible and the intelligible. The concept of the sign, in each of its aspects, has been determined by this opposition throughout the totality of its history. It has lived only on this opposition and its system. But we cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity, or without the risk of erasing difference in the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier into itself or, amounting to the same thing, simply expelling its signifier outside itself. For there are two heterogenous ways of erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier, that is to sya, ultimately in *submitting* the sign to thought; the other, the one we are using here against the first one, consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding reduction functioned: first and foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible. For the *paradox* is that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing. The opposition is systematic with the reduction. And what we are saying here about the sign can be extended to all the concepts and all the sentences of metaphysics, in particular to the discourse on "structure". But there are several ways of being caught in this circle. They are all more or less naïve, more or less empirical, more or less systematic, more or less close to the formulation—that is, to the formalization of this circle. It is these differences which explain the multiplicity of destructive discourses and the disagreement between those who elaborate them. Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger, for example, worked within the inherited

concepts of metaphysics. Since these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since they are taken from a syntax and a system, every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics. This is what allows these destroyers to destroy each other reciprocally—for example, Heidegger regarding Nietzsche, with as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith and misconstruction, as the last metaphysician, the last "Platonist". One could do the same for Heidegger himself, for Freud, or for a number of others. And today no exercise is more widespread.

What is the relevance of this formal schema when we turn to what are called the "human sciences"? One of them perhaps occupies a privileged place—ethnology. In fact one can assume that ethnology could have been born as a science only at the moment when a decentering had come about: at the moment when European culture—and, in consequence, the history of metaphysics and of its concepts—has been *dislocated*, driven from its locus, and forced to stop considering itself as the culture of reference. This moment is not first and foremost a moment of philosophical or scientific discourse. It is also a moment which is political, economic, technical, and so forth. One can say with total security that there is nothing fortuitous about the fact that the critique of ethnocentrism—the very condition for ethnology—should be systematically and historically contemporaneous with the destruction of the history of metaphysics. Both belong to one and the same era. Now, ethnology—like any science—comes about within the element of discourse. And it is primarily a European science employing traditional concepts, however much it may struggle against them. Consequently, whether he wants to or not—and this does not depend on a decision on his part—the ethnologist accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment when he denounces them. This necessity is irreducible; it is not a historical contingency. We ought to consider all its implications very carefully. Bur if no one can escape this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsible for giving into it, however little he may do so, this does not mean that all the ways of giving in to it are of equal pertinence. The quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relation to the history of

metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought. Here is a question both of a critical relation to the language of the social sciences and a critical responsibility of the discourse itself. It is a question of explicitly and systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself. A problem of *economy* and *strategy*.

If we consider, as an example, the texts of Claude Lévi-Strauss, it is not only because of the privilege accorded to ethnology among the social sciences, nor even because the thought of Lévi-Strauss weighs heavily on the contemporary theoretical situation. It is above all because a certain choice has been declared in the work of Lévi-Strauss and because a certain doctrine has been elaborated there, and precisely, in a *more or less explicit manner*, as concerns both this critique of language and this critical language in the social sciences.

In order to follow this movement in the text of Lévi-Strauss, let us choose as one guiding thread among others the opposition between nature and culture. Despite all its rejuvenations and disguises, this opposition is congenital to philosophy. It is even older than Plato. It is at least as old as the Sophists. Since the statement of the opposition *physis/nomos*, *physis/technē*, it has been relayed to us by means of a whole historical chain which opposes "nature" to law, to education, to art, to technics—but also to liberty, to the arbitrary, to history, to society, to the mind, and so on. Now, from the outset of his researches, and from his first book (*The Elementary Structures of Kinship*) on, Lévi-Strauss simultaneously has experienced the necessity of utilizing this opposition and the impossibility of accepting it. In the *Elementary Structures*, he begins from this axiom or definition: that which is *universal* and spontaneous, and not dependent on any particular culture or on any determinate norm, belongs to nature. Inversely, that which depends upon a system of *norms* regulating society and therefore is capable of *varying* from one social structure to another, belongs to culture. These two definitions are of the traditional type. But in the very first pages of *the Elementary Structures of Kinship* by Lévi-Strauss, who has begun by giving credence to these concepts, encounters what he

calls a *scandal*, that is to say, something which no longer tolerates the nature/culture opposition he has accepted, something which *simultaneously* seems to require the predicates of nature and of culture. This scandal is the *incest prohibition*. The incest prohibition is universal; in this sense one could call it natural. But it is also a prohibition, a system of norms and interdicts; in this sense one could call it cultural:

> Let us suppose then that everything universal in man relates to the natural order, and is characterized by spontaneity, and that everything subject to a norm is cultural and is both relative and particular. We are then confronted with a fact, or rather, a group of facts, which, in the light of previous definitions, are not far removed from a scandal: we refer to that complex group of beliefs, customs, conditions and institutions described succinctly as the prohibition of incest, which presents, without the slightest ambiguity, and inseparably combines, the two characteristics in which we recognize the conflicting features of two mutually exclusive orders, It constitutes a rule, but a rule which, alone among all the social rules, possesses at the same time a universal character. [1]

Obviously there is no scandal except within a system of concepts which accredits the difference between nature and culture. By commencing his work with the *factum* of the incest prohibition, Lévi-Strauss thus places himself at the point at which this difference, which has always been assumed to be self-evident, finds itself erased or questioned. For from the moment when the incest prohibition can no longer be conceived within the nature/culture opposition, it can no longer be said to be a scandalous fact, a nucleus of opacity within a network of transparent significations. The incest prohibition is no longer a scandal one meets with or comes up against in the domain of traditional concepts; it is something which escapes these concepts and certainly precedes them probably as the condition of their possibility. It could perhaps be said that the whole of philosophical conceptualization, which is systematic with the nature/culture opposition, is designed to leave in

the domain of the unthinkable the very thing that makes this conceptualization possible: the origin of the prohibition of incest.

This example, too cursorily examined, is only one among many others, but nevertheless it already shows that language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique. Now this critique may be undertaken along two paths, in two "manners". Once the limit of the nature/culture opposition makes itself felt, one might want to question systematically and rigorously the history of these concepts. This is a first action. Such a systematic and historic questioning would be neither a philological nor a philosophical action in the classic sense of these words. To concern oneself with the founding concepts of the entire history of philosophy, to deconstitute them, is not to undertake the work of the philologist or of the classic historian of philosophy. Despite appearances, it is probably the most daring way of making the beginnings of a step outside of philosophy. The step "outside philosophy" is much more difficult to conceive than is generally imagined by those who think they made it long ago with cavalier ease, and who in general are swallowed up in metaphysics by the entire body of discourse which they claim to have disengaged from it.

The other choice (which I believe corresponds more closely to Lévi-Strauss's manner), in order to avoid the possibly sterilizing effects of the first one, consists in conserving all these old concepts within the domain of empirical discovery while here and there denouncing their limits, treating them as tools which can still be used. No longer is any truth value attributed to them; there is a readiness to abandon them, if necessary, should other instruments appear more useful. In the meantime, their relative efficacy is exploited, and they are employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they themselves are pieces. This is how the language of the social sciences criticizes *itself*. Lévi-Strauss thinks that in this way he can separate *method* from *truth*, the instruments of the method and the objective significations envisaged by it. One could almost say that this is the primary affirmation of Lévi-Strauss; in any event, the first words of the *Elementary Structures* are: "Above all, it is beginning to emerge that

this distinction between nature and society ('nature' and 'culture' seem preferable to us today), while of no acceptable historical significance, does contain a logic, fully justifying its use by modern sociology as a methodological tool."

Lévi-Strauss will always remain faithful to this double intention: to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value he criticizes.

On the one hand, he will continue, in effect, to contest the value of the nature/culture opposition. More than thirteen years after *Elementary Structures*, *The Savage Mind* faithfully echoes the text I have quoted: "The opposition between nature and culture to which I attached much importance at one time... now seems to be of primarily methodological importance." And this methodological value is not affected by its "ontological" nonvalue (as might be said, if this notion were not suspect here): "However, it would not be enough to reabsorb particular humanities into a general one. This first enterprise opens the way for others which... are incumbent on the exact natural sciences: the reintegration of culture in nature and finally of life within the whole of its physio-chemical conditions."[5]

On the other hand, still in *The Savage Mind*, he presents as what he calls *bricolage* what might be called the discourse of this method. The *bricoleur*, says Lévi-Strauss, is someone who uses "the means at hand", that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogenous—and so forth. There is therefore a critique of language in the form of *bricolage*, and it has even been said that *bricolage* is critical language itself. I am thinking in particular of the article of G. Genette, "Structuralisme et Critique Littéraire", published in homage to Lévi-Strauss in a special issue (1965), where it is stated that the analysis of *bricolage* could "be applied almost word for word" to criticism, and especially to "literary criticism".

If one calls *bricolage* the necessity of borrowing one's concepts from the text of a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is *bricoleur*. The engineer, whom Lévi-Strauss opposes to the *bricoleur*, should be the one to construct the totality of his language, syntax, and lexicon. In this sense the engineer is a myth. A subject who supposedly would be the absolute origin of his own discourse and supposedly would construct it "out of nothing", "out of whole cloth", would be the creator of the verb, the verb itself. The notion of the engineer who supposedly breaks with all forms of *bricolage* is therefore a theological idea; and since Lévi-Strauss tells us elsewhere that *bricolage* is mythopoetic, the odds are that the engineer is a myth produced by the *bricoleur*. As soon as we cease to believe in such an engineer and in a discourse which breaks with the received historical discourse, and as soon as we admit that every finite discourse is bound by a certain *bricolage* and that the engineer and the scientist are also species of *bricoleurs*, then the very idea of *bricolage* is menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning breaks down.

This brings us to the second thread which might guide us in what is being contrived here.

Lévi-Strauss describes *bricolage* not only as an intellectual activity but also as a mythopoetical activity. One reads in *The Savage Mind*, "Like *bricolage* on the technical plane, mythical reflection can reach brilliant unforeseen results on the intellectual plane. Conversely, attention has often been drawn to the mythopoetical nature of *bricolage*."

But Lévi-Strauss's remarkable endeaveor does not simply consist in proposing, notably in his most recent investigations, a structural science of myths and of mythological activity. His endeavour also appears- I would say almost from the outset—to have the status which he accords to his own discourse on myths, to what he calls his "mythologicals". It is here that his discourse on the myth reflects on itself and criticises itself. And this moment, this critical period, is evidently of concern to all the languages which share the field of the human sciences. What does Lévi-Strauss say of his "mythologicals"? It is here

that we rediscover the mythopoetical virtue of *bricolage*. In effect, what appears most fascinating in this critical search for a new status of discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a *center*, to a *subject*, to a privileged *reference*, to an origin, or to an absolute *archia*. The theme of this decentering could be followed throughout the "Overture" to his last book, *The Raw and the Cooked*. I shall simply remark on a few key points.

1. From the very start, Lévi-Strauss recognizes that the Bororo myth which he employs in the book as the "reference myth" does not merit this name and this treatment. The name is specious and the use of the myth improper. This myth deserves no more than any other its referential privilege: "In fact, the Bororo myth, which I shall refer to from now as the key myth, is, as I shall try to show, simply a transformation, to a greater or lesser extent, of other myths originating either in the same society or in neighboring or remote societies. I could, therefore, have legitimately taken as my starting point any one representative myth of the group. From this point of view, the key myth is interesting not because typical, but rather because of its irregular position within the group."[6]

2. There is no unity or absolute source of the myth. The focus or the source of the myth are always shadows and virtualities which are elusive, unactualizable, and nonexistent in the first place. Everything begins with structure, configuration, or relationship. The discourse on the acentric structure that myth itself is, cannot itself have an absolute subject or an absolute center. It must avoid the violence that consists in centering a language which describes an acentric structure if it is not to shortchange the form and movement of myth. Therefore it is necessary to forego scientific or philosophical discourse, to renounce the episteme whicb absolutely requires, which is the absolute requirement that we go back to the source, to the center, to the founding basis, to the principle, and so on. In opposition to *epistemic* discourse, structural discourse on myths *mythological* discourse—must itself be *mythomorphic*. It must have the form of that of which it speaks. This is what Lévi-Strauss says in *The Raw and the Crooked*, from which I would

now like to quote a long and remarkable passage:

> The study of myths raises a methodological problem, in that it cannot be carried out according to the Cartesian principle of breaking down the difficulty into as many parts as may be necessary for finding the solution. There is no real end to methodological analysis, no hidden unity to be grasped once the breaking-down process has been completed. Themes can be split up *ad infinitum*. Just when you think you have disentangled and separated them, you realize that they are knitting together again in response to the operation of unexpected affinities. Consequently the unity of the myth is never more than tendential and projective and cannot reflect a state or a particular moment of myth. It is a phenomenon of the imagination, resulting from the attempt at interpretation; and its function is to endow the myth with synthetic form and to prevent its disintegration into a confusion of opposites. The science of myths might therefore be termed "anaclastic", if we take this old term in the broader etymological sense which includes the study of both reflected rays and broken rays. But unlike philosophical reflection, which aims to go back to its own source, the reflections we are dealing with here concern rays whose only source is hypothetical...And in seeking to imitate the spontaneous movement of mythological thought, this essay, which is also both too brief and too long, has had to conform to the requirements of that thought and to respect its rhythm. It follows that this book on myths is itself a kind of myth.

This statement is repeated a little further on: "As the myths themselves are based on secondary codes (the primary codes being those that provide the substance of language), the present work is put forward as a tentative draft of a tertiary code, which is intended to ensure the reciprocal translatability of several myths. This is why it would not be wrong to consider this book itself as a myth: it is, as it were, the myth of mythology." The absence of a centre is here the absence of a subject

and the absence of an author. "Thus the myth and the musical work are like conductors of an orchestra, whose audience becomes the silent performers. If it is now asked where the real center of the work is to be found, the answer is that this is impossible to determine. Music and mythology bring man face to face with potential objects of which only the shadows are actualized...Myths are anonymous." The musical model chosen by Lévi-Strauss for the composition of his book is apparently justified by this absence of any real and fixed center of the mythical or mythological discourse.

Thus it is at this point that ethnographic *bricolage* deliberately assumes its mythopoetic function. But by the same token, this function makes the philosopbical or epistemological requirement of a center appear as mythological, that is to say, as a historical illusion.

Nevertheless, even if one yields to the necessity of what Lévi-Strauss has done, one cannot ignore its risks. If the mythological is mythomorphic, are all discourses on myths equivalent? Shall we have to abandon any epistemological requirement which permits us to distinguish between several qualities of discourse on tbe myth? A classic, but inevitable question. It cannot be answered- and I believe that Lévi-Strauss does not answer it- for as long as the problem of the relations between the philosopheme or the theorem, on the one hand, and the mytheme or the mythopoem, on the other, has not been posed explicitly, which is no small problem. For lack of explicitly posing this problem, we condemn ourselves to transforming the alleged transgression of philosophy into an unnoticed fault within the philosophical realm. Empiricism would be the genus of which these faults would always be the species. Transphilosophical concepts would be transformed into philosophical naïvetés. Many examples could be given to demonstrate this risk: the concepts of sign, bistory, truth, and so forth. What I want to emphasize is simply that the passage beyond philosophy does not consist in turning the page of philosophy (which usually amounts to philosophizing badly), but in continuing to read philosophers *in a certain way*. The risk I am speaking of is always assumed by Lévi-Strauss, and it is the very price of this endeavor. I have said that empiricism is the

matrix of all faults menacing a discourse which continues, as with Lévi-Strauss in particular, to consider itself scientific. If we wanted to pose the problem of empiricism and *bricolage* in depth, we would probably end up very quickly with a number of absolutely contradictory propositions concerning the status of discourse in structural ethnology. On the one hand, structuralism justifiably claims to be the critique of empiricism. But at the same time there is not a single book or study by Lévi-Strauss which is not proposed as an empirical essay which can always be completed or invalidated by new information. The structural schemata are always proposed as hypotheses resulting from a finite quantity of information and which are subjected to the proof of experience. Numerous texts could be used to demonstrate this double postulation. Let us turn once again to the "Overture" of *The Raw and the Cooked*, where it seems clear that if this postulation is double, it is because it is a question here of a language on language:

> If critics reproach me with not having carried out an exhaustive inventory of South American myths before analysing them, they are making a grave mistake about the nature and function of these documents. The total body of myth belonging to a given community is comparable to its speech. Unless the population dies out physically or morally, this totality is never complete. You might as well criticise a linguist for compiling the grammar of a language without having complete records of the words pronounced since the language came into being, and without knowing what will be said in it during the future part of its existence. Experience proves that a linguist can work out the grammar of a given language from a remarkably small number of sentences...And even a partial grammar or an outline grammar is a precious acquisition when we are dealing with unknown languages. Syntax does not become evident only after a (theoretically limitless) series of events has been recorded and examined, because it is itself the body of rules governing their production. What I have tried to give is an outline of the syntax of South American mythology. Should fresh data come to hand, they

> will be used to check or modify the formulation of certain grammatical laws, so that some are abandoned and replaced by new ones. But in no instance would I feel constrained to accept the arbitrary demand for a total mythological pattern, since, as has been shown, such a requirement has no meaning.

Totalization, therefore, is sometimes defined as *useless*, and sometimes as *impossible*. This is no doubt due to the fact that there are two ways of conceiving the limit of totalization. And I assert once more that these two determinations coexist implicitly in Lévi-Strauss's discourse. Totalization can be judged impossible in the classical style: one then refers to the empirical endeavor of either a subject or a finite richness which it can never master. There is too much, more than one can say. But nontotalization can also be determined in another way: no longer from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the empirical, but from the standpoint of the concept of *play*. If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field—that is, language and a finite language—excludes totalization. This field is in effect that of *play*, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. One could say—rigorously using that word whose scandalous signification is always obliterated in French—that this movement of play, permitted by the lack or absence of a center or origin, is the movement of *supplementarity*. One cannot determine the center and exhaust totalization because the sign which replaces the center, which supplements it, taking the center's place in its absence—this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a *supplement*.[7] The movement of signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is always more, but this addition is a floating one because it comes to perform a vicarious function, to supplement a lack on the part of the signified. Although Lévi-Strauss in his use of the word

"supplementary" never emphasizes, as I do here, the two directions of meaning which are so strangely compounded within it, it is not by chance that he uses this word twice in his "Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss", at one point where he is speaking of the "overabundance of signifier, in relation to the signifieds to which this overabundance can refer":

> In this endeavor to understand the world, man therefore always has at his disposal a surplus of signification (which he shares out amongst things according to the laws of symbolic thought—which is the task of ethnologists and linguists to study). This distribution of a *supplementary* allowance [*ration supplémentaire*]—if it is permissible to put it that way—is absolutely necessary in order that on the whole the available signifier and the signified it aims at may remain in the relationship of complementarity which is the very condition of the use of symbolic thought.

(It could no doubt be demonstrated that this *ration supplémentaire* of signification is the origin of the *ratio* itself.) The word reappears a little further on, after Lévi-Strauss has mentioned "this floating signifier, which is the servitude of all finite thought":

> In other words · and taking as our guide Mauss's precept that all social phenomena can be assimilated to language—we see in *mana*, *Wakau*, *oranda* and other notions of the same type, the conscious expression of a semantic function, whose role it is to permit symbolic thought to operate in spite of the contradiction which is proper to it. In this way are explained the apparently insoluble antinomies attached to this notion... At one and the same time force and action, quality and state, noun and verb; abstract and concrete, omnipresent and localized—*mana* is in effect all these things. But is it not precisely because it is none of these things that *mana* is a simple form, or more exactly, a symbol in the pure state, and therefore capable of becoming charged with any sort of symbolic

> content whatever? In the system of symbols constituted by all cosmologies, *mana* would simply be a zero symbolic value, that is to say, a sign marking the necessity of a symbolic content *supplementary* [my italics] to that with which the signified is already loaded, but which can take on any value required, provided only that this value still remains part of the available reserve and is not, as phonologists put it, a group-term.

Lévi-Strauss adds the note:

> Linguists have already been led to formulate hypotheses of this type. For example: "A zero phoneme is opposed to all other phonemes in French in that it entails no differential characters and no constant phonetic value. On the contrary, the proper function of the zero phoneme is to be opposed to phoneme absence." (R. Jakobson and J. Lutz, "Notes on the French Phonemic Pattern".) Similarly, if we schematise the conception I am proposing here, it could almost be said that the function of notions like *mana* is to be opposed to the absence of signfication, without entailing by itself any particular signification.

The *overabundance* of the signifier, its *supplementary* character, is thus the result of a finitude, that is to say, the result of a lack which must be *supplemented*.

It can now be understood why the concept of play is important in Lévi-Strauss. His references to all sorts of games, notably to roulette, are very frequent, especially in his *Conversations*, in *Race and History*, and in *The Savage Mind*. Further, the reference to play is always caught up in tension.

Tension with history, first of all. This is a classical problem, objections to which are now well worn. I shall simply indicate what seems to me the formality of the problem: by reducing history, Lévi-Strauss has treated as it deserves a concept which has always been in complicity with a teleological and eschatological metaphysics, in other words,

paradoxically, in complicity with that philosophy of presence to which it was believed history could be opposed. The thematic of historicity, although it seems to be a somewhat late arrival in philosophy, has always been required by the determination of Being as presence. With or without etymology, and despite the classic antagonism which opposes these significations throughout all of classical thought, it could be shown that the concept of *epistēmē* has always called forth that of *historia*, if history is always the unity of a becoming, as the tradition of truth or the development of science of knowledge oriented toward the appropriation of truth in presence and self-presence, toward knowledge in consciousness of self. History has always been conceived as the movement of a resumption of history, as a detour between two presences. But if it is legitimate to suspect this concept of history, there is a risk, if it is reduced without an explicit statement of the problem I am indicating here, of falling back into an ahistoricism of a classical type, that is to say, into a determined moment of the history of metaphysics. Such is the algebraic formality of the problem as I see it. More concretely, in the work of Lévi-Strauss it must be recognized that the respect for structurality, for the internal originality of the structure, compels a neutralisation of time and history. For example, the appearance of a new structure, of an original system, always comes about - and this is the very condition of its structural specificity by a rupture with its past, its origin, and its cause. Therefore one can describe what is peculiar of the structural organization only by not taking into account, in the very moment of this description, its past conditions; by omitting to posit the problem of the transition from one structure to another, by putting history between brackets. In this "structuralist" moment, the concepts of chance and discontinuity are indispensable. And Lévi-Strauss does in fact often appeal to them, for example, as concerns that structure of structures, language, of which he says in the "Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss" that is "could only have been born in one fell swoop":

Whatever may have been the moment and the circumstances of its

> appearance on the scale of animal life. language could only have been born in one fell swoop. Things could not have set about acquiring signification progressively. Following a transformation the study of which is not the concern of the social sciences, but rather of biology and psychology, a transition came about from a stage where nothing had a meaning to another where everything possessed it.

This standpoint does not prevent Lévi-Strauss from recognizing the slowness, the process of maturing, the continuous toil of factual transformations. history (for example, in *Race and History*). But, in accordance with a gesture which was also Rousseau's and Husserl's, he must "set aside all the facts" at the moment when he wishes to recapture the specificity of a structure. Like Rousseau, he must always conceive of the origin of a new structure on the model of catastrophe—an overturning of nature in nature, a natural interruption of the natural sequence, a setting aside *of* nature.

Besides the tension between play and history, there is also the tension between play and presence. Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is always play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence. Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around. If Lévi-Strauss, better than any other, has brought to light the play of repetition and the repetition of play, one no less perceives in his work a sort of ethic of presence, an ethic of nostalgia for origins, an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a purity of presence and self-presence in speech—an ethic, nostalgia, and even remorse, which he often presents as the motivation of the ethnological project when he moves toward the archaic societies which are exemplary societies in his eyes. These texts are well-known.[8]

Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent

origin, this structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, *negative*, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play whose other side would be the Nietzschean *affirmation*, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. *This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the center.* And it plays without security. For there is a sure play: that which is limited to the *substitution* of *given* and *existing*, *present*, pieces. In absolute chance, affirmation also surrenders itself to *genetic* indetermination, to the *seminal* adventure of the trace.

There are thus two interpretations of interpretation; of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology—in other words, throughout his entire history—has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play. The second interpretation of interpretation, to which Nietzsche pointed the way, does not seek in ethnography, as Lévi-Strauss does, the "inspiration of a new humanism" (again citing the "Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss").

There are more than enough indications today to suggest we might perceive that these two interpretations of interpretation—which are absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simultaneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy—together share the field which we call, in such a problematic fashion, the social sciences.

For my part, although these two interpretations must acknowledge and accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, I do not believe that today there is any question of *choosing*—in the first place because here we are in a region (let us say, provisionally, a region of historicity) where the category of choice seems particularly trivial; and

in the second, because we must first try to conceive of the common ground, and the *différance* of this irreducible difference. Here there is a kind of question, let us still call it historical, whose *conception*, *formation*, *gestation*, and *labor* we are only catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the operations of childbearing—but also with a glance toward those who, in a society from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.

注释:

1 德里达(Jacques Derrida,1930—):法国著名哲学家,理论家,解构主义创始人。本篇文章是他 1966 年在美国约翰斯·霍普金斯大学结构主义研讨会上的演讲,在美国知识界产生了广泛影响,被认为是解构主义的宣言。文中提出了"逻各斯中心主义"(写作是文化的中心)和"写作的非中心化"等问题,对结构主义进行了解构的批判。

2 从严格意义上说,这里指的是弗洛伊德的精神病和析梦的理论,其中一个特定的象征被矛盾地理解为既是实现一种冲动的欲望又是压制这种冲动的欲望。在一般意义上说,它指的是德里达的论点,即逻辑和连贯性本身只能矛盾地来理解,因为它们预设了对"差延"的压制,或者对整个系统意义上的写作的压制。在《撒播》(*La Dissemination*)收录的"柏拉图的药"("La Pharmacie de Plato")一文中,德里达运用弗洛伊德的析梦模式来澄清哲学连续性中的矛盾。

3 引自《生的与熟的》(*The Raw and the Cooked*, 1969)。列维一斯特劳斯(Claude Levi-Strauss, 1908-):法国著名文化人类学家,他通过把结构语言学运用于人类学,促进了结构主义的迅速发展。他所坚持的主要原则是:(1)必须研究语言现象的无意识的结构基础,而不是有意识的基础;(2)词语不是独立存在的实体,必须研究它们的关系;(3)必须确立系统的概念,阐明系统的结构;(4)必须找出结构的普遍规则。

4 引自《亲属关系的基本结构》(*The Elementary Structure of Kinship*, 1969)。列维一斯特劳斯在这篇文章里认为,亲属关系的名称像语言学里的音素一样,是意义的基本因素,但这种意义内在于名称之间的关系结构,而不在于名称本身。例如,叔叔只能在一个更大的关系系统中来理解,包括父亲、母亲、姊妹、兄弟以及对乱伦的禁忌。要想理解叔伯关系,必须把它理解为一个整体系统中的一种关系。

5 引自《原始思维》(*The Savage Mind*, 1966)。在这部作品里,列维一斯特劳斯讨

论了神话思想的性质，根据自然物体的不同特征，通过对它们的观察和分类，积聚了大量的形象。这些形象具有符号系统中能指的功能。原始思惟思考现存的一系列形象，通过一系列的转变将它们重组为新的意义系统。

6 引自《生的与熟的》。这是四卷本的《神话学》的第一卷。在这部作品里，列维一斯特劳斯分析了 187 个神话，通过不断重新安排一系列的形象，表明了单一主题的转变以及从自然到文化的过渡。

7 在《文字学》里，德里达对传统语言学的解构的核心就是这种双重意义的补充——提供某种失去的东西，增加某种新的东西。在《文字学》里，德里达扩展了这篇文章中对列维一斯特劳斯的分析，澄清了传统逻辑中的矛盾如何影响着最现代的语言学和社会科学的观念机制。

8 这里所谓熟悉的文本指的是《忧郁的热带》(*Tristes Tropiques*, 1966)。

罗兰·巴特：作者之死

The Death of the Author

Roland Barthes

In his story *Sarrasine* Balzac, describing a castrato disguised as a woman writes the following sentence: "*This was woman, herself, with her sudden fears, her irrational whims, her instinctive worries, her impetuous boldness, her fussings, and her delicious sensibility.*" Who is speaking thus? Is it the hero of the story bent on remaining ignorant of the castrato hidden beneath the woman? Is it Balzac the individual, furnished by his personal experience with a philosophy of woman? Is it Balzac the author professing "literary" ideas on femininity? Is it universal wisdom? Romantic psychology? We shall never know, for the good reason that writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.

No doubt it has always been that way. As soon as a fact is *narrated* no longer with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses

its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins. The sense of this phenomenon, however, has varied; in ethnographic societies the responsibility for a narrative is never assumed by a person but by a mediator, shaman or relator whose "performance" — the mastery of the narrative code — may possibly be admired but never his "genius". The author is a modern figure, a product of our society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages and English empiricism, French rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the individual, of, as it is more nobly put, the "human person". It is thus logical that in literature it should be this positivism, the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology, which has attached the greatest importance to the "person" of the author. The *author* still reigns in histories of literature, biographies of writers, interviews, magazines, as in the very consciousness of men of letters anxious to unite their person and their work through diaries and memoirs. The image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh's[1] his madness, Tchaikovsky's[2] his vice. The *explanation* of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the *author* "confiding" in us.

Though the sway of the Author remains powerful (the new criticism has often done no more than consolidate it), it goes without saying that certain writers have long since attempted to loosen it. In France, Mallarmé was doubtless the first to see and to foresee in its full extent the necessity to substitute language itself for the person who until then has been supposed to be its owner. For him, for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author; to write, is, through a prerequisite impersonality (not at all to be confused with the castrating objectivity of the realist novelist), to reach that point, where only language acts, "performs" and not "me". Mallarmé's entire poetics consists in suppressing the author in the interests of writing (which is, as

will be seen, to restore the place of the reader). Valéry, encumbered by a psychology of the Ego, considerably diluted Mallarmé's theory but, his taste for classicism leading him to turn to the lessons of rhetoric, he never stopped calling into question and deriding the Author; he stressed the linguistic and, as it were, "hazardous" nature of his activity, and throughout his prose works he militated in favour of the essentially verbal condition of literature, in the face of which all recourse to the writer's inferiority seemed to him pure superstition. Proust himself, despite the apparently psychological character of what are called his *analyses*, was visibly concerned with the task of inexorably blurring, by an extreme subtilisation, the relation between the writer and his characters; by making of the narrator not he who has seen and felt nor even he who is writing, but he who *is going to write* (the young man in the novel—but, in fact, how old is he and who is he?—wants to write but cannot; the novel ends when writing at last becomes possible), Proust gave modern writing its epic. By a radical reversal, instead of putting his life into his novel, as is so often maintained, he made of his very life a work for which his own book was the model; so that it is clear to us that Charlus does not imitate Montesquiou but that Montesquiou—in his anecdotal, historical reality—is no more than a secondary fragment, derived from Charlus. Lastly, to go no further than this prehistory of modernity, Surrealism, though unable to accord language a supreme place (language heing system and the aim of the movement being, romantically, a direct subversion of codes—itself moreover illusory: a code cannot be destroyed, only "played off"), contrihuted to the desacrilization of the image of the Author by ceaselessly recommending the abrupt disappointment of expectations of meaning (the famous surrealist "jolt"), by entrusting the hand with the task of writing as quickly as possible what the head itself is unaware of (automatic writing), by accepting the principle and the experience of several people writing together. Leaving aside literature itself (such distinctions really becoming invalid), linguistics has recently provided the destruction of the Author with a valuable analytical tool by showing that the whole of the enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly

without there being any need for it to be filled with the person of the interlocutors. Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as *I* is nothing other than the instance saying *I*; language knows a "subject", not a "person", and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language "hold together", suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it.

The removal of the Author (one could talk here with Brecht of a veritable "distancing", the Author diminishing like a figurine at the far end of the literary stage) is not merely an historical fact or an act of writing; it utterly transforms the modern text (or—which is the same thing—the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all its levels the author is absent). The temporality is different. The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a *before* and an *after*. The Author is thought to *nourish* the book, which is to say that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child. In complete contrast, the modern scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written *here and now*. The fact is (or, it follows) that *writing* can no longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, "depiction" (as the Classics would say); rather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative, a rare verbal form (exclusively given in the first person and in the present tense) in which the enunciation has no other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is uttered—something like the *I declare* of kings or the *I sing* of very ancient poets. Having buried the Author, the modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according to the pathetic view of his predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his thought or passion and that consequently, making a law of necessity, he must emphasize this delay and indefinitely "polish" his form. For him, on the contrary, the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a

pure gesture of inscription (and not of expression), traces a field without origin—or which, at least, has no other origin than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins.

We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single "theological" meaning (the"message" of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innu merable centres of culture. Similar to Bouvard and Pécuchet, those eternal copyists, at once sublime and comic and whose profound ridiculousness indicates precisely the truth of writing, the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them. Did he wish to *express himself*, he ought at least to know that the inner "thing" he thinks to "translate" is itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so on indefinitely; something experienced in exemplary fashion by the young Thomas de Quincey, he who was so good at Greek that in order to translate absolutely modern ideas and images into that dead language, he had, so Baudelaire tells us (in *Paradis Artificiels*), "created for himself an unfailing dictionary, vastly more extensive and complex than those resulting from the ordinary patience of purely literary themes". Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt; life never does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred.

Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well, the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the Author (or its hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty) beneath the work; when the Author has been found, the text is "explained"—victory to the critic. Hence there is no surprise

in the fact that, historically, the reign of the Author has also been that of the Critic, nor again in the fact that criticism (be it new) is today undermined along with the Author. In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be *disentangled*, nothing *deciphered*; the structure can be followed, "run" (like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing beneath: the space on writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic exemption of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would be better from now on to say *writing*), by refusing to assign a "secret", an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases—reason, science, law.

Let us come back to the Balzac sentence. No one, no "person", says it: its source, its voice, is not the true place of the writing, which is reading. Another—very precise—example will help to make this clear: recent research (J. P. Vernant) has demonstrated the constitutively ambiguous nature of Greek tragedy, its texts being woven from words with double meanings that each character understands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is exactly the "tragic"); there is, however, someone who understands each word in its duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters speaking in front of him—this someone being precisely the reader (or here, the listener). Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is

constituted. Which is why it is derisory to condemn the new writing in the name of a humanism hypocritically turned champion of the reader's rights. Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only person in literature. We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.

注释:

1 凡高(Vincent Van Gogh, 1853—1890):荷兰后印象主义画家。

2 柴可夫斯基(Peter Ilitch Tchaikovsky, 1840—1893):俄罗斯著名作曲家。

保罗・德曼:符号学与修辞

Semiology and Rhetoric

Paul de Man

To judge from various recent publications, the spirit of the times is not blowing in the direction of formalist and intrinsic criticism. We may no longer be hearing too much about relevance but we keep hearing a great deal about reference, about the nonverbal "outside" to which language refers, by which it is conditioned and upon which it acts. The stress falls not so much on the fictional status of literature—a property now perhaps somewhat too easily taken for granted—but on the interplay between these fictions and categories that are said to partake of reality, such as the self, man, society, "the artist, his culture and the human community", as one critic puts it. Hence the emphasis on hybrid texts considered to be partly literary and partly referential, on popular fictions deliberately aimed towards social and psychological gratification, on literary autobiography as a key to the understanding of the self, and so on. We speak as if with the problems of literary form

resolved once and forever, and with the techniques of structural analysis refined to near-perfection, we could now move "beyond formalism" towards the questions that really interest us and reap, at last, the fruits of the ascetic concentration on techniques that prepared us for this decisive step. With the internal law and order of literature well policed, we can now confidently devote ourselves to the foreign affairs, the external politics of literature. Not only do we feel able to do so , but we owe it to ourselves to take this step: our moral conscience would not allow us to do otherwise. Behind the assurance that valid interpretation is possible, behind the recent interest in writing and reading as potentially effective public speech acts, stands a highly respectable moral imperative that strives to reconcile the internal, formal, private structures of literary language with their external, referential, and public effects.

I want, for the moment, to consider briefly this tendency in itself, as an undeniable and recurrent historical fact, without regard for its truth or falseness or for its value as desirable or pernicious. It is a fact that this sort of thing happens, again and again, in literary studies. On the one hand, literature cannot merely be received as a definite unit of referential meaning that can be decoded without leaving a residue. The code is unusually conspicuous, complex, and enigmatic: it attracts an inordinate amount of attention to itself, and this attention has to acquire the rigor of a method. The structural moment of concentration on the code for its own sake cannot be avoided, and literature necessarily breeds its own formalism. Technical innovations in the methodical study of literature only occur when this kind of attention predominates. It can legitimately be said, for example, that, from a technical point of view, very little has happened in American criticism since the innovative works of New Criticism. There certainly have been numerous excellent books of criticism since, but in none of them have the techniques of description and interpretation evolved beyond the techniques of close reading established in the thirties and the forties. Formalism, it seems, is an all-absorbing and tyrannical muse; the hope that one can be at the same time technically original and discursively eloquent is not borne out by the history of literary criticism.

On the other hand—and this is the real mystery—no literary formalism, no matter how accurate and enriching in its analytic powers, is ever allowed to come into being without seeming reductive. When form is considered to be the external trappings of literary meaning or content, it seems superficial and expendable. The development of intrinsic, formalist criticism in the twentieth century has changed this model: form is now a solipsistic category of selfreflection, and the referential meaning is said to be extrinsic. The polarities of inside and outside have been reversed, but they are still the same polarities that are at play: internal meaning has become outside reference, and the outer form has become the intrinsic structure. A new version of reductiveness at once follows this reversal: formalism nowadays is mostly described in an imagery of imprisonment and claustrophobia: the "prison house of language", "the impasse of formalist criticism", etc. Like the grandmother in Proust's[1] novel ceaselessly driving the young Marcel out into the garden, away from the unhealthy inwardness of his closeted reading, critics cry out for the fresh air of referential meaning. Thus, with the structure of the code so opaque, but the meaning so anxious to blot out the obstacle of form, no wonder that the reconciliation of form and meaning would be so attractive. The attraction of reconciliation is the elective breeding-ground of false models and metaphors; it accounts for the metaphorical model of literature as a kind of box that separates an inside from an outside, and the reader or critic as the person who opens the lid in order to release in the open what was secreted but inaccessible inside. It matters little whether we call the inside of the box the content or the form, the outside the meaning or the appearance. The recurrent debate opposing intrinsic to extrinsic criticism stands under the aegis of an inside/outside metaphor that is never being seriously questioned.

Metaphors are much more tenacious than facts, and I certainly don't expect to dislodge this age-old model in one short try. I merely wish to speculate on a different set of terms, perhaps less simple in their differential relationships than the strictly polar, binary opposition between inside and outside and therefore less likely to enter into the

easy play of chiasmic reversals. I derive these terms (which are as old as the hills) pragmatically from the observation of developments and debates in recent critical methodology.

One of the most controversial among these developments coincides with a new approach to poetics or, as it is called in Germany, poetology, as a branch of general semiotics. In France, a semiology of literature comes about as the outcome of the long-deferred but all the more explosive encounter of the nimble French literary mind with the category of form. Semiology, as opposed to semantics, is the science or study of signs as signifiers; it does not ask what words mean but how they mean. Unlike American New Criticism, which derived the internalization of form from the practice of highly self-conscious modern writers, French semiology turned to linguistics for its model and adopted Saussure and Jakobson[2] rather than Valéry or Proust for its masters. By an awareness of the arbitrariness of the sign (Saussure) and of literature as an autotelic statement "focused on the way it is expressed" (Jakobson) the entire question of meaning can be bracketed, thus freeing the critical discourse from the debilitating burden of paraphrase. The demystifying power of semiology, within the context of French historical and thematic criticism, has been considerable. It demonstrated that the perception of the literary dimensions of language is largely obscured if one submits uncritically to the authority of reference. It also revealed how tenaciously this authority continues to assert itself in a variety of disguises, ranging from the crudest ideology to the most refined forms of aesthetic and ethical judgment. It especially explodes the myth of semantic correspondence between sign and referent, the wishful hope of having it both ways, of being, to paraphrase Marx in the German Ideology, a formalist critic in the morning and a communal moralist in the afternoon, of serving both the technique of form and the substance of meaning. The results, in the practice of French criticism, have been as fruitful as they are irreversible. Perhaps for the first time since the late eighteenth century, French critics can come at least somewhat closer to the kind of linguistic awareness that never ceased to be operative in its poets and novelists and that forced all of them, including Sainte Beuve,

to write their main works "contre Sainte Beuve[3]". The distance was never so considerable in England and the United States, which does not mean, however, that we may be able, in this country, to dispense altogether with some preventative semiological hygiene.

One of the most striking characteristics of literary semiology as it is practiced today, in France and elsewhere, is the use of grammatical (especially syntactical) structures conjointly with rhetorical structures, without apparent awareness of a possible discrepancy between them. In their literary analyses, Barthes, Genette[4], Todorov,[5] Greimas,[6] and their disciples all simplify and regress from Jakobson in letting grammar and rhetoric function in perfect continuity, and in passing from grammatical to rhetorical structures without difficulty or interruption. Indeed, as the study of grammatical structures is refined in contemporary theories of generative, transformational, and distributive grammar, the study of tropes and of figures (which is how the term *rhetoric* is used here, and not in the derived sense of comment or of eloquence or persuasion) becomes a mere extension of grammatical models, a particular subset of syntactical relations. In the recent *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique des Sciences du Langage*, Ducrot[7] and Todorov write that rhetoric has always been satisfied with a paradigmatic view over words (words substituting for each other), without questioning their syntagmatic relationship (the contiguity of words to each other). There ought to be another perspective, complementary to the first, in which metaphor, for example, would not be defined as a substitution but as a particular type of combination. Research inspired by linguistics or, more narrowly, by syntactical studies, has begun to reveal this possibility—but it remains to be explored. Todorov, who calls one of his books *Grammar of the Decameron*, rightly thinks of his own work and that of his associates as first explorations in the elaboration of a systematic grammar of literary modes, genres, and also of literary figures. Perhaps the most perceptive work to come out of this school, Genette's studies of figural modes, can be shown to be assimilations of rhetorical transformations or combinations to syntactical, grammatical patterns. Thus a recent study, now printed in *Figures III* and entitled *Metaphor and Metonymy*

in Proust, shows the combined presence, in a wide and astute selection of passages, of paradigmatic, metaphorical figures with syntagmatic, metonymic structures. The combination of both is treated descriptively and nondialectically without considering the possibility of logical tensions.

One can ask whether this reduction of figure to grammar is legitimate. The existence of grammatical structures, within and beyond the unit of the sentence, in literary texts is undeniable, and their description and classification are indispensable. The question remains if and how figures of rhetoric can be included in such a taxonomy. This question is at the core of the debate going on, in a wide variety of apparently unrelated forms, in contemporary poetics. But the historical picture of contemporary criticism is too confused to make the mapping out of such a topography a useful exercise. Not only are these questions mixed in and mixed up within particular groups or local trends, but they are often co-present, without apparent contradiction, within the work of a single author.

Neither is the theory of the question suitable for quick expository treatment. To distinguish the epistemology of grammar from the epistemology of rhetoric is a redoubtable task. On an entirely naïve level, we tend to conceive of grammatical systems as tending towards universality and as simply generative, i. e., as capable of deriving, an infinity of versions from a single model (that may govern transformations as well as derivations) without the intervention of another model that would upset the first. We therefore think of the relationship between grammar and logic, the passage from grammar to propositions, as being relatively unproblematic; no true propositions are conceivable in the absence of grammatical consistency or of controlled deviation from a system of consistency no matter how complex. Grammar and logic stand to each other in a dyadic relationship of unsubverted support. In a logic of acts rather than of statements, as in Austin's[8] theory of speech acts, that has had such a strong influence on recent American work in literary semiology, it is also possible to move between speech acts and grammar without difficulty. The performance of what is called

illocutionary acts such as ordering, questioning, denying, assuming, etc., within the language is congruent with the grammatical structures of syntax in the corresponding imperative, interrogative, negative, optative sentences. "The rules for illocutionary acts," writes Richard Ohman in a recent paper, "determine whether performance of a given act is well-executed, in just the same way as *grammatical* rules determine whether the product of a locutionary act—a sentence is well formed...But whereas the rules of grammar concern the relationships among sound, syntax, and meaning, the rules of illocutionary acts concern relationships among people." And since rhetoric is then conceived exclusively as persuasion, as actual action upon others (and not as an intralinguistic figure or trope), the continuity between the illocutionary realm of grammar and the perlocutionary realm of rhetoric is self-evident. It becomes the basis for a new rhetoric that, exactly as is the case for Todorov and Genette, would also be a new grammar.

Without engaging the substance of the question, it can be pointed out, without having to go beyond recent and American examples, and without calling upon the strength of an age-old tradition, that the continuity here assumed between grammar and rhetoric is not borne out by theoretical and philosophical speculation. Kenneth Burke mentions *deflection* (which he compares structurally to Freudian displacement), defined as "any slight bias or even unintended error", as the rhetorical basis of language, and deflection is then conceived as a dialectical subversion of the consistent link between sign and meaning that operates within grammatical patterns; hence Burke's well-known insistence on the distinction between grammar and rhetoric. Charles Sanders Peirce,[9] who, with Nietzsche and Saussure, laid the philosophical foundation for modern semiology, stressed the distinction between grammar and rhetoric in his celebrated and so suggestively unfathomable definition of the sign. He insists, as is well-known, on the necessary presence of a third element, called the interpretant, within any relationship that the sign entertains with its object. The sign is to be interpreted if we are to understand the idea it is to convey, and this is so because the sign is not the thing but a meaning derived from the thing by a process here called

representation that is not simply generative, i. e., dependent on a univocal origin. The interpretation of the sign is not, for Peirce, a meaning but another sign; it is a reading, not a decodage, and this reading has, in its turn, to be interpreted into another sign, and so on *ad infinitum*. Peirce calls this process by means of which "one sign gives birth to another" pure rhetoric, as distinguished from pure grammar, which postulates the possibility of unproblematic, dyadic meaning, and pure logic, which postulates the possibility of the universal truth of meanings. Only if the sign engendered meaning in the same way that the object engenders the sign, that is, by representation, would there be no need to distinguish between grammar and rhetoric.

These remarks should indicate at least the existence and the difficulty of the question, a difficulty which puts its concise theoretical exposition beyond my powers. I must retreat therefore into a pragmatic discourse and try to illustrate the tension between grammar and rhetoric in a few specific textual examples. Let me begin by considering what is perhaps the most commonly known instance of an apparent symbiosis between a grammatical and a rhetorical structure, the so-called rhetorical question, in which the figure is conveyed directly by means of a syntactical device. I take the first example from the sub-literature of the mass media: asked by his wife whether he wants to have his bowling shoes laced over or laced under, Archie Bunker answers with a question: "What's the difference?" Being a reader of sublime simplicity, his wife replies by patiently explaining the difference between lacing over and lacing under, whatever this may be, but provokes only ire. "What's the difference" did not ask for difference but means instead "I don't give a damn what the difference is". The same grammatical pattern engenders two meanings that are mutually exclusive: the literal meaning asks for the concept (difference) whose existence is denied by the figurative meaning. As long as we are talking about bowling shoes, the consequences are relatively trivial; Archie Bunker, who is a great believer in the authority of origins (as long, of course, as they are the right origins) muddles along in a world where literal and figurative meanings get in each other's way, though not without discomforts. But

suppose that it is a debunker rather than a "Bunker", and a debunker of the arche (or origin), an archie De-bunker such as Nietzsche or Jacques Derrida for instance, who asks the question "What is the difference" — and we cannot even tell from his grammar whether he "really" wants to know "what" difference is or is just telling us that we shouldn't even try to find out. Confronted with the question of the difference between grammar and rhetoric, grammar allows us to ask the question, but the sentence by means of which we ask it may deny the very possibility of asking. For what is the use of asking, I ask, when we cannot even authoritatively decide whether a question asks or doesn't ask?

The point is as follows. A perfectly clear syntactical paradigm (the question) engenders a sentence that has at least two meanings, of which the one asserts and the other denies its own illocutionary mode. It is not so that there are simply two meanings, one literal and the other figural, and that we have to decide which one of these meanings is the right one in this particular situation. The confusion can only be cleared up by the intervention of an extratextual intention, such as Archie Bunker putting his wife straight; but the very anger he displays is indicative of more than impatience; it reveals his despair when confronted with a structure of linguistic meaning that he cannot control and that holds the discouraging prospect of an infinity of similar future confusions, all of them potentially catastrophic in their consequences. Nor is this intervention really a part of the mini text constituted by the figure which holds our attention only as long as it remains suspended and unresolved. I follow the usage of common speech in calling this semiological enigma "rhetorical". The grammatical model of the question becomes rhetorical not when we have, on the one hand, a literal meaning and on the other hand a figural meaning, but when it is impossible to decide by grammatical or other linguistic devices which of the two meanings (that can be entirely incompatible) prevails. Rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration. And although it would perhaps be somewhat more remote from common usage, I would not hesitate to equate the rhetorical, figural potentiality of language with literature itself. I could point to a greater

number of antecedents to this equation of literature with figure; the most recent reference would be to Monroe Beardsley's insistence in his contribution to the *Essays* to honor William Wimsatt, that literary language is characterized by being "distinctly above the norm in ratio of implicit [or, I would say rhetorical] to explicit meaning".

Let me pursue the matter of the rhetorical question through one more example. Yeats's poem "Among School Children" ends with the famous line: "How can we know the dancer from the dance?" Although there are some revealing inconsistencies within the commentaries, the line is usually interpreted as stating, with the increased emphasis of a rhetorical device, the potential unity between form and experience, between creator and creation. It could be said that it denies the discrepancy between the sign and the referent from which we started out. Many elements in the imagery and the dramatic development of the poem strengthen this traditional reading; without having to look any further than the immediately preceding lines, one finds powerful and consecrated images of the continuity from part to whole that makes synecdoche into the most seductive of metaphors: the organic beauty of the tree, stated in the parallel syntax of a similar rhetorical question, or the convergence, in the dance, of erotic desire with musical form:

> O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer, Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
> O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
> How can we know the dancer from the dance?

A more extended reading, always assuming that the final line is to be read as a rhetorical question, reveals that the thematic and rhetorical grammar of the poem yields a consistent reading that extends from the first line to the last and that can account for all the details in the text. It is equally possible, however, to read the last line literally rather than figuratively, as asking with some urgency the question we asked earlier within the context of contemporary criticism: *not* that sign and referent are so exquisitely fitted to each other that all difference between them is

at times blotted out but, rather, since the two essentially different elements, sign and meaning, are so intricately intertwined in the imagined "presence" that the poem addresses, how can we possibly make the distinctions that would shelter us from the error of identifying what cannot be identified? The clumsiness of the paraphrase reveals that it is not necessarily the literal reading which is simpler than the figurative one, as was the case in our first example; here, the figural reading, which assumes the question to be rhetorical, is perhaps naïve, whereas the literal reading leads to greater complication of theme and statement. For it turns out that the entire scheme set up by the first reading can be undermined, or deconstructed, in the terms of the second, in which the final line is read literally as meaning that, since the dancer and the dance are not the same, it might be useful, perhaps even desperately necessary—for the question can be given a ring of urgency, "Please tell me, how *can* I know the dancer from the dance" —to tell them apart. But this will replace the reading of each symbolic detail by a divergent interpretation. The oneness of trunk, leaf, and blossom, for example, that would have appealed to Goethe, would find itself replaced by the much less reassuring Tree of Life from the Mabinogion that appears in the poem "Vacillation", in which the fiery blossom and the earthly leaf are held together, as well as apart, by the crucified and castrated God Attis, of whose body it can hardly be said that it is "not bruised to pleasure soul". This hint should suffice to suggest that two entirely coherent but entirely incompatible readings can be made to hinge on one line, whose grammatical structure is devoid of ambiguity, but whose rhetorical mode turns the mood as well as the mode of the entire poem upside down. Neither can we say, as was already the case in the first example, that the poem simply has two meanings that exist side by side. The two readings have to engage each other in direct confrontation, for the one reading is precisely the error denounced by the other and has to be undone hy it. Nor can we in any way make a valid decision as to which of the readings can be given priority over the other; none can exist in the other's absence. There can be no dance without a dancer, no sign without a referent. On the other hand, the authority of

the meaning engendered by the grammatical structure is fully obscured by the duplicity of a figure that cries out for the differentiation that it conceals.

Yeats's poem is not explicitly "about" rhetorical questions but about images or metaphors, and about the possibility of convergence between experiences of consciousness such as memory or emotions—what the poem calls passion, piety, and affection—and entities accessible to the senses such as bodies, persons, or icons. We return to the inside/outside model from which we started out and which the poem puts into question by means of a syntactical device (the question) made to operate on a grammatical as well as on a rhetorical level. The couple grammar/rhetoric, certainly not a binary opposition since they in no way exclude each other, disrupts and confuses the neat antithesis of the inside/outside pattern. We can transfer this scheme to the act of reading and interpretation. By reading we get, as we say, *inside* a text that was first something alien to us and which we now make our own by an act of understanding. But this understanding becomes at once the representation of an extra-textual meaning; in Austin's terms, the illocutionary speech act becomes a perlocutionary actual act—in Frege's terms, *Bedeutung* becomes *Sinn*. Our recurrent question is whether this transformation is semantically controlled along grammatical or along rhetorical lines. Does the metaphor of reading really unite outer meaning with inner understanding, action with reflection, into one single totality? The assertion is powerfully and suggestively made in a passage from Proust that describes the experience of reading as such a union. It describes the young Marcel, near the beginning of Combray, hiding in the closed space of his room in order to read. The example differs from the earlier ones in that we are not dealing with a grammatical structure that also functions rhetorically but have instead the representation, the dramatization, in terms of the experience of a subject, of a rhetorical structure—just as, in many other passages, Proust dramatizes tropes by means of landscapes or descriptions of objects. The figure here dramatized is that of metaphor, an inside/outside correspondence as represented by the act of reading. The reading scene is the

culmination of a series of actions taking place in enclosed spaces and leading up to the "dark coolness" of Marcel's room.

> I had stretched out on my bed, with a book, in my room which sheltered, tremblingly, its transparent and fragile coolness from the afternoon sun, behind the almost closed blinds through which a glimmer of daylight had nevertheless managed to push its yellow wings, remaining motionless between the wood and the glass, in a corner, poised like a butterfly. It was hardly light enough to read, and the sensation of the light's splendor was given me only by the noise of Camus. . .hammering dusty crates; resounding in the sonorous atmosphere that is peculiar to hot weather, they seemed to spark off scarlet stars; and also by the flies executing their little concert, the chamber music of summer: evocative not in the manner of a human tune that, heard perchance during the summer, afterwards reminds you of it but connected to summer by a more necessary link: born from beautiful days, resurrecting only when they return, containing some of their essence, it does not only awaken their image in our memory; it guarantees their return, their actual, persistent, unmediated presence.
>
> The dark coolness of my room related to the full sunlight of the street as the shadow relates to the ray of light, that is to say it was just as luminous and it gave my imagination the total spectacle of the summer, whereas my senses, if I had been on a walk, could only have enjoyed it by fragments; it matched my repose which (thanks to the adventures told by my book and stirring my tranquility) supported, like the quiet of a motionless hand in the middle of a running brook the shock and the motion of a torrent of activity.

For our present purpose, the most striking aspect of this passage is the juxtaposition of figural and metafigural language. It contains seductive metaphors that bring into play a variety of irresistible objects: chamber music, butterflies, stars, books, running brooks, etc., and it

inscribes these objects within dazzling fire—and waterworks of figuration. But the passage also comments normatively on the best way to achieve such effects; in this sense, it is metafigural: it writes figuratively about figures. It contrasts two ways of evoking the natural experience of summer and unambiguously states its preference for one of these ways over the other: the "necessary link" that unites the buzzing of the flies to the summer makes it a much more effective symbol than the tune heard "perchance" during the summer. The preference is expressed by means of a distinction that corresponds to the difference between metaphor and metonymy, necessity and chance being a legitimate way to distinguish between analogy and contingency. The inference of identity and totality that is constitutive of metaphor is lacking in the purely relational metonymic contact: an element of truth is involved in taking Achilles for a lion but none in taking Mr. Ford for a motor car. The passage is *about* the aesthetic superiority of metaphor over metonymy, but this aesthetic claim is made by means of categories that are the ontological ground of the metaphysical system that allows for the aesthetic to come into being as a category. The metaphor for summer (in this case, the synesthesia set off by the "chamber music" of the flies) guarantees a presence which, far from being contingent, is said to be essential, permanently recurrent and unmediated by linguistic representations or figurations. Finally, in the second part of the passage, the metaphor of presence not only appears as the ground of cognition but as the performance of an action, thus promising the reconciliation of the most disruptive of contradictions. By then, the investment in the power of metaphor is such that it may seem sacrilegious to put it in question.

Yet, it takes little perspicacity to show that the text does not practice what it preaches. A rhetorical reading of the passage reveals that the figural praxis and the metafigural theory do not converge and that the assertion of the mastery of metaphor over metonymy owes its persuasive power to the use of metonymic structures. I have carried out such an analysis in a somewhat more extended context...; *at this point*, we are more concerned with the results than with the procedure. For the metaphysical categories of presence, essence, action, truth, and

beauty do not remain unaffected by such a reading. This would become clear from an inclusive reading of Proust's novel or would become even more explicit in a language-conscious philosopher such as Nietzsche who, as a philosopher, has to be concerned with the epistemological consequences of the kind of rhetorical seductions exemplified by the Proust passage. It can be shown that the systematic critique of the main categories of metaphysics undertaken by Nietzsche in his late work, the critique of the concepts of causality, of the subject, of identity, of referential and revealed truth, etc., occurs along the same pattern of deconstruction that was operative in Proust's text; and it can also be shown that this pattern exactly corresponds to Nietzsche's description, in texts that precede *The Will to Power* by more than fifteen years, of the structure of the main rhetorical tropes. The key to this critique of metaphysics, which is itself a recurrent gesture throughout the history of thought, is the rhetorical model of the trope or, if one prefers to call it that, literature. It turns out that in these innocent looking didactic exercises we are in fact playing for very sizeable stakes.

It is therefore all the more necessary to know what is linguistically involved in a rhetorically conscious reading of the type here undertaken on a brief fragment from a novel and extended by Nietzsche to the entire text of post-Hellenic thought. Our first examples dealing with the rhetorical questions were rhetorizations of grammar, figures generated by syntactical paradigms, whereas the Proust example could be better described as a grammatization of rhetoric. By passing from a paradigmatic structure based on substitution, such as metaphor, to a syntagmatic structure based on contingent association such as metonymy, the mechanical, repetitive aspect of grammatical forms is shown to be operative in a passage that seemed at first sight to celebrate the self-willed and autonomous inventiveness of a subject. Figures are assumed to be inventions, the products of a highly particularized individual talent, whereas no one can claim credit for the programmed pattern of grammar. Yet, our reading of the Proust passage shows that precisely when the highest claims are being made for the unifying power of metaphor, these very images rely in fact on the deceptive use of semi-automatic

grammatical patterns. The deconstruction of metaphor and of all rhetorical patterns such as mimesis, paranomasis, or personification that use resemblance as a way to disguise differences, takes us back to the impersonal precision of grammar and of a semiology derived from grammatical patterns. Such a reading puts into question a whole series of concepts that underlie the value judgments of our critical discourse: the metaphors of primacy, of genetic history, and, most notably, of the autonomous power to will of the self.

There seems to be a difference, then, between what I called the rhetorization of grammar (as in the rhetorical question) and the grammatization of rhetoric, as in the readings of the type sketched out in the passage from Proust. The former end up in indetermination, in a suspended uncertainty that was unable to choose between two modes of reading, whereas the latter seems to reach a truth, albeit by the negative road of exposing an error, a false pretense. After the rhetorical reading of the Proust passage, we can no longer believe the assertion made in this passage about the intrinsic, metaphysical superiority of metaphor over metonymy. We seem to end up in a mood of negative assurance that is highly productive of critical discourse. The further text of Proust's novel, for example, responds perfectly to an extended application of this pattern: not only can similar gestures be repeated throughout the novel, at all the crucial articulations or all passages where large aesthetic and metaphysical claims are being made—the scenes of involuntary memory, the workshop of Elstir, the septette of Vinteuil, the convergence of author and narrator at the end of the novel but a vast thematic and semiotic network is revealed that structures the entire narrative and that remained invisible to a reader caught in naive metaphorical mystification. The whole of literature would respond in similar fashion, although the techniques and the patterns would have to vary considerably, of course, from author to author. But there is absolutely no reason why analyses of the kind here suggested for Proust would not be applicable, with proper modifications of technique, to Milton or to Dante or to Hölderlin. This will in fact be the task of literary criticism in the coming years.

It would seem that we are saying that criticism is the deconstruction of literature, the reduction to the rigors of grammar of rhetorical mystifications. And if we hold up Nietzsche as the philosopher of such a critical deconstruction, then the literary critic would become the philosopher's ally in his struggle with the poets. Criticism and literature would separate around the epistemological axis that distinguishes grammar from rhetoric. It is easy enough to see that this apparent glorification of the critic-philosopher in the name of truth is in fact a glorification of the poet as the primary source of this truth; if truth is the recognition of the systematic character of a certain kind of error, then it would be fully dependent on the prior existence of this error. Philosophers of science like Bachelard or Wittgenstein are notoriously dependent on the aberrations of the poets. We are back at our unanswered question: does the grammatization of rhetoric end up in negative certainty or does it, like the rhetorization of grammar, remain suspended in the ignorance of its own truth or falsehood?

Two concluding remarks should suffice to answer the question. First of all, it is not true that Proust's text can simply be reduced to the mystified assertion (the superiority of metaphor over metonymy) that our reading deconstructs. The reading is not "our" reading; since it uses only the linguistic elements provided by the text itself; the distinction between author and reader is one of the false distinctions that the reading makes evident. The deconstruction is not something we have added to the text but it constituted the text in the first place. A literary text simultaneously asserts and denies the authority of its own rhetorical mode, and by reading the text as we did we were only trying to come closer to being as rigorous a reader as the author had to be in order to write the sentence in the first place. Poetic writing is the most advanced and refined mode of deconstruction; it may differ from critical or discursive writing in the economy of its articulation, but not in kind.

But if we recognize the existence of such a moment as constitutive of all literary language, we have surreptitiously reintroduced the categories that this deconstruction was supposed to eliminate and that have merely been displaced. We have, for example, displaced the

question of the self from the referent into the figure of the narrator, who then becomes the *signifié* of the passage. It becomes again possible to ask such naïve questions as what Proust's, or Marcel's, motives may have been in thus manipulating language: was he fooling himself, or was he represented as fooling himself and fooling us into believing that fiction and action are as easy to unite, by reading, as the passage asserts? The pathos of the entire section, which would have been more noticeable if the quotation had been a little more extended, the constant vacillation of the narrator between guilt and well being, invites such questions. They are absurd questions, of course, since the reconciliation of fact and fiction occurs itself as a mere assertion made in a text, and is thus productive of more text at the moment when it asserts its decision to escape from textual confinement. But even if we free our selves of all false questions of intent and rightfully reduce the narrator to the status of a mere grammatical pronoun, without which the narrative could not come into being, this subject remains endowed with a function that is not grammatical but rhetorical, in that it gives voice, so to speak, to a grammatical syntagm. The term *voice*, even when used in a grammatical terminology as when we speak of the passive or interrogative voice, is, of course, a metaphor inferring by analogy the intent of the subject from the structure of the predicate. In the case of the deconstructive discourse that we call literary, or rhetorical, or poetic, this creates a distinctive complication illustrated by the Proust passage. The reading revealed a first paradox: the passage valorizes metaphor as being the "right" literary figure, but then proceeds to constitute itself by means of the epistemologically incompatible figure of metonymy. The critical discourse reveals the presence of this delusion and affirms it as the irreversible mode of its truth. It cannot pause there however. For if we then ask the obvious and simple next question, whether the rhetorical mode of the text in question is that of metaphor or metonymy, it is impossible to give an answer. Individual metaphors, such as the chiaroscuro effect or the butterfly, are shown to be subordinate figures in a general clause whose syntax is metonymic; from this point of view, it seems that the rhetoric is superseded by a grammar that

deconstructs it. But this metonymic clause has as its subject a voice whose relationship to this clause is again metaphorical. The narrator who tells us about the impossibility of metaphor is himself, or itself, a metaphor, the metaphor of a grammatical syntagm whose meaning is the denial of metaphor stated, by antiphrasis, as its priority. And this subject-metaphor is, in its turn, open to the kind of deconstruction to the second degree, the rhetorical deconstruction of psycholinguistics, in which the more advanced investigations of literature are presently engaged, against considerable resistance.

We end up, therefore, in the case of the rhetorical grammatization of semiology, just as in the grammatical rhetorization of illocutionary phrases, in the same state of suspended ignorance. Any question about the rhetorical mode of a literary text is always a rhetorical question which does not even know whether it is really questioning. The resulting pathos is an anxiety (or bliss, depending on one's momentary mood or individual temperament) of ignorance, not an anxiety of reference -as becomes thematically clear in Proust's novel when reading is dramatized, in the relationship between Marcel and Albertine, not as an emotive reaction to what language does, but as an emotive reaction to the impossibility of knowing what it might be up to. Literature as well as criticism—the difference between them being delusive—is condemned (or privileged) to be forever the most rigorous and, consequently, the most unreliable language in terms of which man names and transforms himself.

注释：

1 普鲁斯特（Marcel Proust, 1871—1922）：法国现代主义作家，最著名的小说是《追忆似水年华》。

2 雅可布森（Roman Osipovich Jakobson, 1890—1982）：著名语言学家、符号学家和文学批评家，生于俄国，1941 年移居美国。他在语言学方面最突出的成就与他毕生从事的文学研究紧密相关。他认为这两者应该联系起来研究。他特别强调隐喻和转喻。根据索绪尔的纵聚合和横聚合语言理论，他认为词语的选择和组合的作用应该从隐喻和转喻的修辞范畴来理解。因此，隐喻和转喻内在于语言运作的每一个层面。

3 圣伯夫（Charles Augustin Sainte Beuve, 1804—1869）：法国著名批评家，他第一

个打破了古典学派的教条。

4 热耐特（Gerard Genette，1930 — ）：法国文学理论家和结构主义批评家，其突出贡献是结构主义叙述学。

5 托多洛夫（Tzvetan Todorov，1939 — ）：法国结构主义文学批评家和符号学家，深受俄国形式主义和德国结构形态学派的文本分析的影响。他对科学诗学和其他类型批评的区分，以及他对以语言为导向的诗学和阅读的区分，在批评界曾产生重大影响。

6 格雷玛斯（Algirdas Julien Greimas，1948 — ）：法国符号学家，他的重要论著《结构语义学》（*Semantique Structurale*，1966）对叙事学产生了重大影响。

7 迪克罗（Oswald Ducrot，1930 — ）：法国语言学家和哲学家。他的主要著作集中研究语言学的历史，尤其是结构主义的历史。通过考察语言生产的特殊条件，他构成语言和逻辑间的对立，他认为语言的内在逻辑不可能封闭在形式哲学体系的三段论逻辑之内。

8 奥斯丁（John Langshaw Austin，1911—1960）：英国哲学家，言语行为理论创始人之一。但生前他的理论并未受到重视，只是死后人们才发现他的《论言有所为》（*How to Do Things with Words*）的价值。他提出的能动性言语构成了言语行为理论。言语行为理论的主要前提是：一切语言交流都包含语言行为；语言交流单位不是象征、词语或句子，而是通过言语行为的能动作用产生象征、词语和句子；语言理论是行为理论的组成部分，因为言语行为不仅是句子，而是语言行为的方式；语言以使用为导向并依赖于语境；它强调的是说话者的意思，而不是所说的话的意思。

9 皮尔士（Charles Sanders Peirce，1839—1914）：美国哲学家、逻辑学家、科学家和数学家，现代符号学理论奠基人。生前并未受到足够重视。但在20世纪后半期，他的符号学理论得到认识和发展，对文学批评理论产生了重大影响。

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第八章 西方马克思主义的文学理论

马克思主义文学理论是20世纪最具有活力和广阔视野的“理论流派”。作为一门以历史和社会为主要关注对象的理论，马克思主义政治批判的立场不同程度地渗入一切带有激进文化政治色彩的理论和批评实践当中。在近一二十年崛起的新理论，如后殖民主义、新历史文化和文化研究中，依然可以捕捉到它的身影。纵观整个20世纪的理论图景可以发现，马克思主义批评往往是以其他理论的对话者身份出现的，它往往能够弥补某些过于偏狭的理论主张的缺漏。有一位批评家总结过，当读者反应批评设定一个普遍的读者时，马克思主义却从阶级入手描述读者的差异性；当形式主义一门心思探讨文学本身的风格时，马克思主义批评却质问起不同形式策略背后的意识形态内涵；当精神分析批评要找出作品的个人心理意义时，马克思主义批评则考察社会力量与整体深层心理结构的关系；当解构批评家关心破坏中心主题或意义的修辞运作时，马克思主义则利用此种策略指出作品中潜伏着某种特殊的支配性意识形态或思考方式，并认为此作品是在鼓励此种意识形态与思考方式。马克思主义理论的介入，无疑会为文学批评添加历史与社会的厚重感。在对话的过程中，当代马克思主义文学批评也从其他理论那里汲取养分，丰富自身，从而变得更加精致和完备。从现象学、阐释学到符号学和结构主义精神分析，无不为其所用。当代马克思主义文学批评已经超出传统的界限，俨然成为各种批评方法的综合体。

马克思主义文学批评出现在19世纪后期，是从马克思和恩格斯的政治、经济学著作中衍生出来的。马克思和恩格斯本人并未提出系统的文学或美学理论，他们对文学和艺术的评论往往是零星片断的。马克思对古希腊艺术永久魅力的论述以及恩格斯论文学的信件是后来的马克思主义批评家经常引证的文献。他们对经济基础和上层建筑之间的关系以及意识形态的论述成为马克思主义文学批评中亘古常新的话题。早期马克思主义文学批评拘泥于经济基础决定上层建筑这个公式，文学

作品被视为现实的反映，是由社会经济力量直接决定的，这类批评往往被视为庸俗的马克思主义经济决定论。从1870年到第一次世界大战时期，大多数马克思主义者持经济决定论观点，这与当时工人阶级的经济斗争有关，20世纪的西方马克思主义者更加注重上层建筑对经济基础的改变作用。二三十年代是庸俗马克思主义文学批评较为盛行的时期，在前苏联，符拉基米尔·马克西莫维奇·弗里契的庸俗社会学批评认为艺术与社会经济之间有着直接的对应关系，艺术的任务在于用形象的语言来反映社会生活，艺术的发展和衰落与社会经济的繁盛和衰败遥相呼应；在英国，当时以考德威尔为代表的马克思主义批评家从经济角度探讨文学的起源，他本人曾说过："诗的本质应被理解为经济的。我们期待文化的因而是诗的发展与它的基础劳动分工的复杂性同步进行。"在《幻像与现实》中，考德威尔根据15世纪以来英国社会的资本主义性质而把这一时期以来的诗歌统一定性为"资本主义诗歌"。在另一部颇具代表性的论著《一种垂死文化研究》中，考德威尔把工业革命以来的英国文化说成是"资产阶级"的，将当代英国文化描述为"濒临死亡"的文化。这都是以牺牲现实来成全经济基础决定上层建筑、特定社会制度决定特定文学这个公式。

这个局面为20世纪西方马克思主义批评所打破。西方马克思主义先驱乔治·卢卡奇在《历史小说》(1937)、《欧洲现实主义研究》(1950)中虽然认为文学是对社会经济现实的反映，但是他否认二者之间存在着简单的决定关系。他认为伟大的文学作品不仅复现了当时的主导意识形态，而且包含了对主导意识形态的批判。以巴尔扎克和斯汤达为代表的19世纪现实主义小说是卢卡奇心目中的文学典范。在他看来，这些小说不仅仅模拟社会现实，而且认识到资本主义社会内部矛盾。在大力推崇现实主义的同时，卢卡奇极力贬低现代主义的成就和潜力。他认为现代主义作家对蒙太奇、内心独白、意识流等技巧的偏好是一味偏注主观印象的结果，因此在现代主义作品中出现的不是对社会现实的客观反映，而是对现代世界的焦虑之情。

卢卡奇对现代主义的偏见招致了同时代批评家布莱希特、阿多诺以及本雅明等人的尖锐批评。布莱希特在他的戏剧中大胆引入和使用了蒙太奇、报道手法和间离效果等现代主义实验技巧，他认为卢卡奇独尊某一具体文学形式(如巴尔扎克和托尔斯泰的小说)，并把它当作惟一真正的现实主义模式，难免有落入形式主义的危险。他反倒主张作家应当采取一切可资利用的形式技巧来描写现实。在他看来，不存在永恒的美

学法则，没有哪一种形式、模式能有永久的生命力。即便是他本人大胆创新的间离效果，一旦过多地因袭使用，也会失去其震撼人心的效果，变得了无新意，乏善可陈。布莱希特的戏剧理论与传统的亚里士多德悲剧理论背道而驰。亚里士多德强调悲剧情节的普遍性和统一性，观众移情认同于剧中角色，以达到情感净化。布莱希特则提出打破情节连贯、平铺直叙的做法，要求戏剧家避免让观众把自己等同于剧中人物而陷入被动接受状态。他提倡的间离效果就是使演员在观众面前变得既似曾相识又很陌生，从而引发观众对剧中表现的社会现实进行批判性思考。

在整个西方马克思主义批评发展历程中，法兰克福学派的美学思想占有举足轻重的地位，主要代表人物有马克斯·霍克海默、西奥多·阿多诺和赫伯特·马尔库塞等。他们批判大众文化侵蚀和麻醉人们的心灵，诱使人们默认不合理的社会现实，在全社会营造一种肯定性(affirmative)的文化氛围，自动放弃了改造社会的斗志。为了改变这一状况，他们大力宣扬现代主义高雅文化，抵御大众文化的侵蚀，以达到批判现实的目的。阿多诺建立了一套否定认识模式。他批评卢卡奇对现实的看法有教条主义倾向。他认为，艺术与现实并没有直接的联系，艺术和现实之间有一段距离，正是这一段距离给予艺术品一个有利的位置，增添了它们批判现实的力量。大众文化与支撑和塑造它们的经济制度沆瀣一气。相反，置身于商业氛围之外，有自律性的现代主义作品却能够否定相关的现实。用他的话说，"艺术否定性地认识现实世界"。所谓否定的认识，是指对物化了的现实社会状况加以破坏并否定的认识。普鲁斯特和乔伊斯作品中的内心独白中就有这种否定功能。按照霍克海默的说法，大众之所以拒绝先锋派作品是因为它们扰乱了大众对社会制度操纵的默认状态。为了防止文化工业否定用清晰明了的语言写就的对现存社会秩序的批评，阿多诺鼓励"难懂的"文学实验，从而保持作品与现实的距离，以防备大众文化工业的吸收与同化。

与布莱希特同时代的德国马克思主义批评家瓦尔特·本雅明受到马克思有关生产力与生产关系理论的启示，致力于探讨文学的社会生产状况。他和布莱希特一样，把艺术首先视为一种社会实践形式，与其他形式的社会、经济生产共同存在。在他看来，作家主要是一位生产者，是植根于某一历史时期对现有材料进行加工整理的生产者，而不是受神启或凭个人天分从事写作的创造者。在"作为生产者的作者"一文中，他积极倡导利用方兴未艾的流行文化形式，如电影、收音机、摄影和唱片等，改造旧有的艺术生产方式，确立作家、读者和观众之间的合作关系，充分

发挥新的艺术力量的革命潜能。与同时代的大多数诋毁大众文化的西方马克思主义批评家不同，本雅明从这些新出现的艺术形式中发现了革命性变化的潜能。在其主要著作《机械复制时代的艺术作品》中，他认为现代文化生产技术的新发明（如电影、无线电）大大改变了艺术品的地位。过去，艺术作品因其独一性而被赋有一种准宗教式的"辉光"(aura)，而机械复制技术的出现驱散了这层"辉光"，拉近了人们与艺术品之间的距离。

60 年代是战后马克思主义理论的一个繁盛时期。与此同时，欧洲思想在很大程度上受到结构主义思想的支配。在这种思想交汇情势之下，出现了以路易·阿尔都塞、吕西安·戈德曼和皮埃尔·马谢雷为主要阵容的结构马克思主义。粗略说来，结构主义和马克思主义有着大致相同的思想取向，都认为对个体的认识不能脱离其社会存在，而必须置于复杂的社会关系之中。

戈德曼发展了一种发生学结构主义批评方法，以探求作家所属社会集团的集体精神结构的历史渊源。这是一种文学社会学，它研究的是集体精神结构（用戈德曼的话说，是世界观）与它得以产生的社会历史状况之间的关系。戈德曼认为，某社会集团的世界观是这个社会集团的精神结构，属于集体意识现象。文学作品的结构与作家所属社会集团的精神结构是同构的，因为作者的立场有意或无意地受制于他所在的社会集团的世界观，社会集团的世界观将他的立场内在化，使他的作品表现出与这个社会集团的世界观相一致的精神物质。在这个意义上，文学作品是社会集团世界观的产物，文学的成就和生命力取决于它在与社会集团的世界观保持一致的程度。作品越是能表现这个社会阶级完整一致的"世界观"，就越有生命力。戈德曼的代表作《隐蔽的上帝》分析了拉辛的悲剧观与 17 世纪法国穿袍贵族和詹森主义宗教运动的世界观之间的同构关系。正如后来许多批评家所指出的那样，戈德曼的批评有很大的缺陷，伟大作品中体现的世界观很难说是某一社会集团成员的真正意识。

阿尔都塞是 60 年代最走红的马克思主义哲学家，他的意识理论对法国和英国的马克思主义文学批评和文化研究留下了深刻的影响痕迹。在《列宁与哲学及其他论文》一书中，他提出了一种迥异于前人的意识形态观念。在他看来，意识形态并不是有意识的信仰、价值观和态度取向这类东西，也不是一种虚假的意识，阻碍人们正确地审视真实的社会状况，掩盖统治阶级与工人阶级之间的现实冲突——意识形态是"与个体与其真实存在状况的想像关系的再现"。在阿尔都塞看来，我们都是身

处意识形态氛围之内的"主体",无法逃避意识形态的影响和渗透。意识形态借助宗教、教育以及法律等国家机器来"质询"主体,让我们在社会结构中安然接受自己的社会位置。一方面,意识形态有助于我们理解世界,但同时也掩盖了我们与现实世界的真实关系,从而造就了被统治阶级把统治阶级的意识形态体系视为理所当然的局面,事实上维护了统治阶级的利益。在文学与意识形态之间的关系上,他并没有像庸俗马克思主义批评家那样,认为文学完全是统治阶级意识的表现,而是认为艺术处于意识形态与科学的认识之间。

阿尔都塞的学生马谢雷继承并进一步发展了阿尔都塞的意识形态理论。马谢雷在他最重要的著作《文学生产理论》之中指出,文学写作不是一种创作而是一个生产过程,正如生产劳动一样,作者的任务在于把预先存在的原材料如文学体裁、惯例、语言和意识形态中加工成成品。在文本写作过程中,进入文本的任何东西都容易发生改变,就好像某种工业制品的原材料经过一番工艺处理后外形会发生改变一样,意识形态进入文本之后也会面临类似情况。作家在写作的时候会不自觉地受到意识形态话语不一致的限制,写出有意义分歧和矛盾的作品。在马谢雷看来,批评家的任务就是要挖空心思去分析和解释这些分歧和矛盾产生的根由。在《文学生产理论》的最后一部分,他应用这一理论方法分析了凡尔纳和巴尔扎克的小说,指出作者的本意和实际结果并不相符之处。

当代英国马克思主义批评家特里·伊格尔顿深受阿尔都塞和马谢雷的影响,非常关注意识形态与文化之间的关系。他的重要著作《批评与意识形态》大体上遵循了阿尔都塞和马谢雷的马克思主义思想路数。这本书在前半部分对英国文学批评传统进行了尖锐的批判,并从意识形态入手分析了几部重要的英国小说。他认为,文学作品并不反映历史现实,而是作用于意识形态,从而产生某种貌似真实的效果。他所理解的意识形态指的是包括美学、宗教和司法等在内的再现系统。人们对于现实生活的理解和认识,正是借助于这些再现系统对现实的描述。按照他的理解,意识形态是对现实生活的加工,而文学作品产生的意义和见解又是对这种意识形态加工的再加工。因此,他反对阿尔都塞所坚持的文学能够与意识形态保持距离的观点。他强调,文学并不纯粹是意识形态的反映,而是一种特定的意识形态;文学批评的主要任务就是要考察"文学作为一种意识形态的话语的规律"。他在该书中探讨了文学形式与意识形态之间的复杂关系。伊格尔顿的文学批评思想纵横捭阖,兼容并蓄,能够与时俱进。70 年代末、80 年代初以来,他有意识地摆脱阿尔都

塞的某些影响，转向布莱希特和本雅明的革命思想。对于新出现的解构理论，他一方面认为这些理论有助于瓦解所有被视为理所当然的认识形式，同时又批判它们否定客观性和物质利益尤其是阶级利益的虚无主义倾向。他提出：马克思主义文学批评要从政治出发，而不是作空洞的哲理探讨；批评家的任务必须破除现有的文学观念，揭示它们在塑造读者主体性方面的意识形态作用。

弗里德里克·詹姆逊是当代美国首屈一指的马克思主义批评家，《马克思主义与形式》(1971)和《语言的牢笼》(1972)奠定了他在批评界的地位。在《马克思主义与形式》一书中，他依次探讨了阿多诺、本雅明、马尔库塞、布洛赫、卢卡奇和萨特等人的美学思想后，提出辨证批评的思想。按照较为通行的解释，辨证批评属于黑格尔式的马克思主义传统，它关注的是黑格尔哲学中的一些大命题，例如整体与部分之间的关系、具体和抽象的对立、总体性的概念、现象与本质之间的辨证关系、主体和客体之间的互动关系等。根据辨证法思想，客体不是恒定不变的，它与较大的整体相关联，同时又与作为历史环境组成部分的思惟主体密切相关。这种批评决不孤立地分析文学作品，而是把它看作一种大的结构（一种文学的传流或运动）或历史环境的一部分；辨证批评家在分析作品的时候，会认识到他所凭借的分析范畴（风格、人物、形象等）最终被认为是批评家本人所处历史环境的一部分，受到历史环境的塑造。辨证批评的一个主要任务是，透过文学文本的表面揭示出作品的内在形式与社会现实之间错综复杂的关系。在秉承黑格尔传统的同时，詹姆逊又吸收和综合了结构主义、后结构主义、精神分析和阿尔都塞的意识形态理论。在代表性论著《政治无意识》之中，詹姆逊提出，文学作品应当被理解成象征性的行为，它们为无法解决的社会政治矛盾提供了想像和意识形态的解决方案。一切意识形态都有压制反抗的功能，而这种压制往往渗透在深层次的无意识之中，所以它是一种政治无意识。

路易·阿尔都塞:意识形态和意识形态国家机器

Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses

Louis Althusser

On Ideology

When I put forward the concept of an Ideological State Apparatus, when I said that the ISAs "function by ideology", I invoked a reality which needs a little discussion: ideology.

It is well-known that the expression "ideology" was invented by Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy and their friends[1], who assigned to it as an object the (genetic) theory of ideas. When Marx took up the term fifty years later, he gave it a quite different meaning, even in his early works. Here, ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group. The ideologico-political struggle conducted by Marx as early as his articles in the *Rheinische Zeitung*[2] inevitably and quickly brought him face to face with this reality and forced him to take his earliest intuitions further.

However, here we come upon a rather astonishing paradox. Everything seems to lead Marx to formulate a theory of ideology. In fact, *The German Ideology* does offer us, after the *1844 Manuscripts*,[3] an explicit theory of ideology, but . . . it is not Marxist (we shall see why in a moment).[1] As for *Capital*, although it does contain many hints towards a theory of ideologies (most visibly, the ideology of the vulgar economists), it does not contain the theory itself, which depends for the most part on a theory of ideology in general.

I should like to venture a first and very schematic outline of such a theory. The theses I am about to put forward are certainly not off the cuff, but they cannot be sustained and tested, i. e. confirmed or

rejected, except by much thorough study and analysis.

Ideology has no history

One word first of all to expound the reason in principle which seems to me to found, or at least to justify, the project of a theory of ideology *in general*, and not a theory of particular ideologies, which, whatever their form (religious, ethical, legal, political), always express *class positions*.

It is quite obvious that it is necessary to proceed towards a theory of ideologies in the two respects I have just suggested.[5] It will then be clear that a theory of ideologies depends in the last resort on the history of social formations, and thus of the modes of production combined in social formations, and of the class struggles which develop in them. In this sense it is clear that there can be no question of a theory of ideologies in general, since ideologies (defined in the double respect suggested above: regional and class) have a history, whose determination in the last instance is clearly situated outside ideologies alone, although it involves them.

On the contrary, if I am able to put forward the project of a theory of ideology *in general*, and if this theory really is one of the elements on which theories of ideologies depend, that entails an apparently paradoxical proposition which I shall express in the following terms: *ideology has no history*.

As we know, this formulation appears in so many words in a passage from *The German Ideology*. Marx utters it with respect to metaphysics, which, he says, has no more history than ethics (meaning also the other forms of ideology).[6]

In *The German Ideology*, this formulation appears in a plainly positivist context. Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i. e. as nothingness. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud. For these writers, the dream was the purely imaginary, i. e. null, result of "day's residues", presented in an arbitrary arrangement and order.

sometimes even "inverted", in other words, in "disorder". For them, the dream was the imaginary, it was empty, null and arbitrarily "stuck together" (*bricolé*), once the eyes had closed, from the residues of the only full and positive reality, the reality of the day. This is exactly the status of philosophy and ideology (since in the book philosophy is ideology *par excellence*) in *The German Ideology*.

Ideology, is that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence. It is on this basis that ideology has no history in *The German Ideology*, since its history is outside it, where the only existing history is, the history of concrete individuals, etc. In *The German Ideology*, the thesis that ideology has no history is therefore a purely negative thesis, since it means both:

1. ideology is nothing insofar as it is a pure dream (manufactured by who knows what power: if not by the alienation of the division of labour, but that, too, is a *negative* determination);

2. ideology has no history, which emphatically does not mean that there is no history in it (on the contrary, for it is merely the pale, empty and inverted reflection of real history) but that it has no history *of its own*.

Now, while the thesis I wish to defend formally speaking adopts the terms of *The German Ideology* ("ideology has no history"), it is radically different from the positivist and historicist thesis of *The German Ideology*.

For on the one hand, I think it is possible to hold that ideologies have a history of their own (although it is determined in the last instance by the class struggle); and on the other, I think it is possible to hold that ideology *in general has no history*, not in a negative sense (its history is external to it), but in an absolutely positive sense.

...

To give a theoretical reference-point here, I might say that, to return to our example of the dream, in its Freudian conception this time, our proposition: ideology has no history, can and must (and in a way which has absolutely nothing arbitrary about it, but, quite the reverse, is theoretically necessary, for there is an organic link between the two

propositions) be related directly to Freud's proposition that the *unconscious is eternal*, i. e. that it has no history.

If eternal means, not transcendent to all (temporal) history, but omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of history, I shall adopt Freud's expression word for word, and write *ideology is eternal*, exactly like the unconscious. And I add that I find this comparison theoretically justified by the fact that the eternity of the unconscious is not unrelated to the eternity of ideology in general.

That is why I believe I am justified, hypothetically at least, in proposing a theory of ideology *in general*, in the sense that Freud presented a theory of the unconscious *in general*.

To simplify the phrase, it is convenient, taking into account what has been said about ideologies, to use the plain term ideology to designate ideology in general, which I have just said has no history, or, what comes to the same thing, is eternal, i. e. omnipresent in its immutable form throughout history (the history of social formations containing social classes). For the moment I shall restrict myself to "class societies" and their history.

Ideology is a "representation" of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence

In order to approach my central thesis on the structure and functioning of ideology, I shall first present two theses, one negative, the other positive. The first concerns the object which is "represented" in the imaginary form of ideology, the second concerns the materiality of ideology.

THESIS I: Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.

We commonly call religious ideology, ethical ideology, legal ideology, political ideology, etc., so many "world outlooks". Of course, assuming that we do not live one of these ideologies as the truth (e. g. "believe" in God, Duty, Justice, etc. . . .), we admit that the ideology we are discussing from a critical point of view, examining it as the

ethnologist examines the myths of a "primitive society", that these "world outlooks" are largely imaginary, i.e. do not "correspond to reality".

However, while admitting that they do not correspond to reality, i.e. that they constitute an illusion, we admit that they do make allusion to reality, and that they need only be "interpreted" to discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary representation of that world (ideology=*illusion/allusion*).

There are different types of interpretation, the most famous of which are the *mechanistic* type, current in the eighteenth century (God is the imaginary representation of the real King), and the "*hermeneutic*" interpretation, inaugurated by the earliest Church Fathers, and revived by Feuerbach[7] and the theologico-philosophical school which descends from him, e.g. the theologian Barth[8] (to Feuerbach, for example, God is the essence of real Man). The essential point is that on condition that we interpret the imaginary transposition (and inversion) of ideology we arrive at the conclusion that in ideology "men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form".

Unfortunately, this interpretation leaves one small problem unsettled: why do men "need" this imaginary transposition of their real conditions of existence in order to "represent to themselves" their real conditions of existence?

The first answer (that of the eighteenth century) proposes a simple solution: Priests or Despots are responsible. They "forged" the Beautiful Lies so that, in the belief that they were obeying God, men would in fact obey the Priests and Despots, who are usually in alliance in their imposture, the Priests acting in the interests of the Despots or *vice versa*, according to the political positions of the "theoreticians" concerned. There is therefore a cause for the imaginary transposition of the real conditions of existence: that cause is the existence of a small number of cynical men who base their domination and exploitation of the "people" on a falsified representation of the world which they have imagined in order to enslave other minds by dominating their imaginations.

The second answer (that of Feuerbach, taken over word for word by Marx in his early works) is more "profound", i. e. just as false. It, too, seeks and finds a cause for the imaginary transposition and distortion of men's real conditions of existence, in short, for the alienation in the imaginary of the representation of men's conditions of existence. This cause is no longer Priests or Despots, nor their active imagination and the passive imagination of their victims. This cause is the material alienation which reigns in the conditions of existence of men themselves. This is how, in *The Jewish Question* and elsewhere, Marx defends the Feuerbachian idea that men make themselves an alienated (= imaginary) representation of their conditions of existence because these conditions of existence are themselves *alienating* (in the *1844 Manuscripts*: because these conditions are dominated by the essence of alienated society- "*alienated labour*").

All these interpretations thus take literally the thesis which they presuppose, and on which they depend, i. e. that what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology is the conditions of existence of men, i. e. their real world.

Now I can return to a thesis which I have already advanced: it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that "men" "represent to themselves" in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. It is this relation which is at the centre of every ideological, i. e. imaginary, representation of the real world. It is this relation that contains the "cause" which has to explain the imaginary distortion of the ideological representation of the real world. Or rather, to leave aside the language of causality it is necessary to advance the thesis that it is the *imaginary nature of this relation* which underlies all the imaginary distortion that we can observe (if we do not live in its truth) in all ideology.

To speak in a Marxist language, if it is true that the representation of the real conditions of existence of the individuals occupying the posts of agents of production, exploitation, repression, ideologization and scientific practice, does in the last analysis arise from the relations of production, and from relations deriving from the relations of

production, we can say the following: all ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of production (and the other relations that derive from them), but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live.

If this is the case, the question of the "cause" of the imaginary distortion of the real relations in ideology disappears and must be replaced by a different question: why is the representation given to individuals of their (individual) relation to the social relations which govern their conditions of existence and their collective and individual life necessarily an imaginary relation?' And what is the nature of this imaginariness? Posed in this way, the question explodes the solution by a "clique"[16] by a group of individuals (Priests or Despots) who are the authors of the great ideological mystification, just as it explodes the solution by the alienated character of the real world. We shall see why later in my exposition. For the moment I shall go no further.

THESIS II: Ideology has a material existence.

...

While discussing the ideological State apparatuses and their practices, I said that each of them was the realization of an ideology (the unity of these different regional ideologies religious, ethical, legal, political, aesthetic, etc.—being assured by their subjection to the ruling ideology).[11] I now return to this thesis: an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material.

Of course, the material existence of the ideology in an apparatus and its practices does not have the same modality as the material existence of a paving-stone or a rifle. But, at the risk of being taken for a Neo-Aristotelian (NB: Marx had a very high regard for Aristotle), I shall say that "matter is discussed in many senses", or rather that it exists in different modalities, all rooted in the last instance in "physical" matter.

Having said this, let me move straight on and see what happens to the "individuals" who live in ideology, i. e. in a determinate (religious, ethical, etc.) representation of the world whose imaginary distortion depends on their imaginary *relation to their conditions of existence*, in other words, in the last instance, to the relations of production and to class relations (ideology = an imaginary relation to real relations). I shall say that this imaginary relation is itself endowed with a material existence.

Now I observe the following.

An individual believes in God, or Duty, or Justice, etc. This belief derives (for everyone, i. e. for all those who live in an ideological representation of ideology, which reduces ideology to ideas endowed by definition with a spiritual existence) from the ideas of the individual concerned, i. e. from him as a subject with a consciousness which contains the ideas of his belief. In this way, i. e. by means of the absolutely ideological "conceptual" device (*dispositif*) thus set up (a subject endowed with a consciousness in which he freely forms or freely recognizes ideas in which he believes), the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally follows.

The individual in question behaves in such and such a way, adopts such and such a practical attitude, and, what is more, participates in certain regular practices which are those of the ideological apparatus on which "depend" the ideas which he has in all consciousness freely chosen as a subject. If he believes in God, he goes to Church to attend Mass, kneels, prays, confesses, does penance (once it was material in the ordinary sense of the term) and naturally repents and so on. If he believes in Duty, he will have the corresponding attitudes, inscribed in ritual practices "according to the correct principles". If he believes in Justice, he will submit unconditionally to the rules of the Law, and may even protest when they are violated, sign petitions[12], take part in a demonstration, etc.

Throughout this schema we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself forced to recognize that every "subject" endowed with a "consciousness" and believing in the "ideas" that his

"consciousness" inspires in him and freely accepts, must "*act* according to his ideas", must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice. If he does not do so, "that is wicked".

. . .

In every case, the ideology of ideology thus recognizes, despite its imaginary distortion, that the "ideas" of a human subject exist in his actions, or ought to exist in his actions, and if that is not the case, it lends him other ideas corresponding to the actions (however perverse) that he does perform. This ideology talks of actions: I shall talk of actions inserted into *practices*. *And* I shall point out that these practices are governed by the *rituals* in which these practices are inscribed, within the *material existence of an ideological apparatus*, be it only a small part of that apparatus: a small mass in a small church, a funeral, a minor match at a sports' club, a school day, a political party meeting, etc.

. . .

I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that *his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject*. Naturally, the four inscriptions of the adjective "material" in my proposition must be affected by different modalities: the materialities of a displacement for going to Mass, of kneeling down, of the gesture of the sign of the cross, or of the *mea culpa*[13], of a sentence, of a prayer, of an act of contrition, of a penitence, of a gaze, of a hand-shake, of an external verbal discourse or an "internal" verbal discourse (consciousness), are not one and the same materiality. I shall leave on one side the problem of a theory of the differences between the modalities of materiality.

It remains that in this inverted presentation of things, we are not dealing with an "inversion" at all, since it is clear that certain notions have purely and simply disappeared from our presentation, whereas

others on the contrary survive, and new terms appear.

Disappeared: the term *ideas*.
Survive: the terms *subject*, *consciousness*, *belief*, *actions*.
Appear: the terms *practices*, *rituals*, *ideological apparatus*.

It is therefore not an inversion or overturning (except in the sense in which one might say a government or a glass is overturned), but a reshuffle (of a non-ministerial type), a rather strange reshuffle, since we obtain the following result.

Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has emerged that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus. It therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief.

But this very presentation reveals that we have retained the following notions: subject, consciousness, belief, actions. From this series I shall immediately extract the decisive central term on which everything else depends: tbe notion of the *subject*.

And I shall immediately set down these two conjoint theses:

1. there is no practice except by and in an ideology;
2. there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects.

I can now come to my central thesis.

Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects[11]

This thesis is simply a matter of making my last proposition explicit: there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. Meaning, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: meaning, *by the category of the subject* and its functioning.

By this I mean that, even if it only appears under this name (the subject) with the rise of bourgeois ideology, above all with the rise of legal ideology,[15] the category of the subject (which may function under other names: e.g. , as the soul in Plato, as God, etc.) is the constitutive category of all ideology, whatever its determination (regional or class) and whatever its historical date—since ideology has no history.

I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that *the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it)* of "constituting" concrete individuals as subjects. In the interaction of this double constitution exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing but its functioning in the material forms of existence of that functioning.

In order to grasp what follows, it is essential to realize that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who reads them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (a tautological proposition), i. e. that the author and the reader of these lines both live "spontaneously" or "naturally" in ideology in the sense in which I have said that "man is an ideological animal by nature".

...

To take a highly "concrete" example, we all have friends who, when they knock on our door and we ask, through the door, the question "Who's there?" , answer (since "it's obvious") "It's me" . And we recognize that "it is him" , or "her" . We open the door, and "it's true, it really was she who was there" . To take another example, when we recognize somebody of our (previous) acquaintance ((*re-*)*connaissance*) in the street, we show him that we have recognized him (and have recognized that he has recognized us) by saying to him "Hello, my friend" , and shaking his hand (a material ritual practice of ideological recognition in everyday life—in France, at least; elsewhere, there are other rituals).

In this preliminary remark and these concrete illustrations, I only wish to point out that you and I are *always already* subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which

guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects. The writing I am currently executing and the reading you are currently[16] performing are also in this respect rituals of ideological recognition, including the "obviousness" with which the "truth" or "error" of my reflections may impose itself on you.

But to recognize that we are subjects and that we function in the practical rituals of the most elementary everyday life (the hand-shake, the fact of calling you by your name, the fact of knowing, even if I do not know what it is, that you "have" a name of your own, which means that you are recognized as a unique subject, etc.)—this recognition only gives us the "consciousness" of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological recognition—its consciousness, i. e. its *recognition*—but in no sense does it give us the (scientific) *knowledge* of the mechanism of this recognition. Now it is this knowledge that we have to reach, if you will, while speaking in ideology, and from within ideology we have to outline a discourse which tries to break with ideology, in order to dare to be the beginning of a scientific (i. e. subjectless) discourse on ideology.

Thus in order to represent why the category of the "subject" is constitutive of ideology, which only exists by constituting concrete subjects as subjects, I shall employ a special mode of exposition: "concrete" enough to be recognized, but abstract enough to be thinkable and thought, giving rise to knowledge.

As a first formulation I shall say: *all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects*, by the functioning of the category of the subject.

This is a proposition which entails that we distinguish for the moment between concrete individuals on the one hand and concrete subjects on the other, although at this level concrete subjects only exist insofar as they are supported by a concrete individual.

I shall then suggest that ideology "acts" or "functions" in such a way that it "recruits" subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or "transforms" the individuals into subjects (it transforms them

all) by that very precise operation which I have called *interpellation* or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: "Hey, you there!"

Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a *subject*. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was "really" addressed to him, and that "it was *really him* who was hailed" (and not someone else). Experience shows that the practical telecommunication of hailings is such that they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed always recognizes that it is really him who is being hailed. And yet it is a strange phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely by "guilt feelings", despite the large numbers who "have something on their consciences".

Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoretical theatre I have had to present things in the form of a sequence, with a before and an after, and thus in the form of a temporal succession. There are individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out: "Hey, you there!" One individual (nine times out of ten it is the right one) turns round, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is for him, i. e. recognizing that "it really is he" who is meant by the hailing. But in reality these things happen without any succession. The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as suhjects are one and the same thing.

I might add: what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical *denegation* of ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, "I am ideological." It is necessary to be outside ideology, i. e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: I am in ideology (a quite exceptional case) or (the general case): I was in ideology. As is well-known, the accusation of being in ideology only applies to others, never to oneself

(unless one is really a Spinozist or a Marxist, which, in this matter, is to be exactly the same thing). Which amounts to saying that ideology *has no outside* (for itself), but at the same time *that it is nothing but outside* (for science and reality).

...

Thus ideology hails or interpellates individuals as subjects. As ideology is eternal, I must now suppress the temporal form in which I have presented the functioning of ideology, and say: ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: *individuals are always-already subjects*. Hence individuals are "abstract" with respect to the subjects which they always-already are. This proposition might seem paradoxical.

That an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is born, is nevertheless the plain reality, accessible to everyone and not a paradox at all. Freud shows that individuals are always "abstract" with respect to the subjects they always-already are, simply by noting the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a "birth", that "happy event". Everyone knows how much and in what way an unborn child is expected. Which amounts to saying, very prosaically, if we agree to drop the "sentiments", i. e. the forms of family ideology (paternal/maternal/conjugal/fraternal) in which the unborn child is expected: it is certain in advance that it will bear its Father's Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is "expected" once it has been conceived. I hardly need add that this familial ideological configuration is, in its uniqueness, highly structured, and that it is in this implacable and more or less "pathological" (presupposing that any meaning can be assigned to that term) structure that the former subject-to-be will have to "find" "its" place, i. e. "become" the sexual subject (boy or girl) which it already is in advance. It is clear that this ideological constraint and pre-appointment, and all the rituals of rearing

and then education in the family, have some relationship with what Freud studied in the forms of the pre-genital and genital "stages" of sexuality, i. e. in the "grip" of what Freud registered by its effects as being the unconscious. But let us leave this point, too, on one side.

Let me go one step further. What I shall now turn my attention to is the way the "actors" in this *mise en scene* of interpellation, and their respective roles, are reflected in the very structure of all ideology.

An example: the Christian religious ideology

As the formal structure of all ideology is always the same, I shall restrict my analysis to a single example, one accessible to everyone, that of religious ideology, with the proviso that the same demonstration can be produced for ethical, legal, political, aesthetic ideology, etc.

Let us therefore consider the Christian religious ideology. I shall use a rhetorical figure and "make it speak", i. e. collect into a fictional discourse what it "says" not only in its two Testaments, its Theologians, Sermons, but also in its practices, its rituals, its ceremonies and its sacraments. The Christian religious ideology says something like this:

It says: I address myself to you, a human individual called Peter (every individual is called by his name, in the passive sense, it is never he who provides his own name), in order to tell you that God exists and that you are answerable to Him. It adds: God addresses himself to you through my voice (Scripture having collected the Word of God, Tradition having transmitted it, Papal Infallibility fixing it for ever on "nice" points). It says: this is who you are: you are Peter! This is your origin, you were created by God for all eternity, although you were born in the 1920th year of Our Lord! This is your place in the world! This is what you must do! By these means, if you observe the "law of love" you will be saved, you, Peter, and will become part of the Glorious Body of Christ! etc. . . .

Now this is quite a familiar and banal discourse, but at the same time quite a surprising one.

Surprising because if we consider that religious ideology is indeed

addressed to individuals,[17] in order to "transform them into subjects", by interpellating the individual, Peter, in order to make him a subject, free to obey or disobey the appeal, i. e. God's commandments; if it calls these individuals by their names, thus recognizing that they are always-already interpellated as subjects with a personal identity (to the extent that Pascal's Christ says: "It is for you that I have shed this drop of my blood!"); if it interpellates them in such a way that the subject responds: *"Yes, it really is me!"* if it obtains from them the *recognition* that they really do occupy the place it designates for them as theirs in the world, a fixed residence: "It really is me, I am here, a worker, a boss or a soldier!" in this vale of tears; if it obtains from them the recognition of a destination (eternal life or damnation) according to the respect or contempt they show to "God's Commandments". Law become Love; —if everything does happen in this way (in the practices of the well-known rituals of baptism, confirmation[18], communion, confession and extreme unction[19], etc. ...), we should note that all this "procedure" to set up Christian religious subjects is dominated by a strange phenomenon: the fact that there can only be such a multitude of possible religious subjects on the absolute condition that there is a Unique, Absolute, *Other Subject*, i. e. God.

It is convenient to designate this new and remarkable Subject by writing Subject with a capital S to distinguish it from ordinary subjects, with a small s.

It then emerges that the interpellation of individuals as subjects presupposes the "existence" of a Unique and Central Other Subject, in whose name the religious ideology interpellates all individuals as subjects.[20] All this is clearly written in what is rightly called the Scriptures. "And it came to pass at that time that God the Lord (Yahweh) spoke to Moses in the cloud. And the Lord cried to Moses, 'Moses!' And Moses replied, 'It is (really) I! I am Moses thy servant, speak and I shall listen!' And the Lord spoke to Moses and said to him, '*I am that I am*.'"[21]

God thus defines himself as the Subject *par excellence*, he who is through himself and for himself ("I am that I am"), and he who

interpellates his subject, the individual subjected to him by his very interpellation, i. e. the individual named Moses. And Moses, interpellated-called by his Name, having recognized that it "really" was he who was called by God, recognizes that he is a subject, a subject *of* God, a subject subjected to God, *a subject through the Subject and subjected to the Subject*. The proof: he obeys him, and makes his people obey God's Commandments.

...

Let us decipher into theoretical language this wonderful necessity for the duplication of *the Subject into subjects* and of *the Subject itself into a subject-Subject*.

We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is *speculary*, i. e. a mirror-structure, and *doubly* speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its functioning. Which means that all ideology is *centred*, that the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connexion such that it *subjects* the subjects to the Subject, while giving them in the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and future) the *guarantee* that this really concerns them and Him, and that since everything takes place in the Family (the Holy Family: the Family is in essence Holy), "God will *recognize* his own in it", i. e. those who have recognized God, and have recognized themselves in Him, will be saved.

Let me summarize what we have discovered about ideology in general.

The duplicate mirror-structure of ideology ensures simultaneously:

1. the interpellation of "individuals" as subjects;

2. their subjection to the Subject;

3. the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects' recognition of each other, and finally the subject's recognition of himself;

4. the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on

condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right; Amen— "*So be it*".

Result: caught in this quadruple system of interpellation as subjects, of subjection to the Subject, of universal recognition and of absolute guarantee, the subjects "work", they "work by themselves" in the vast majority of cases, with the exception of the "bad subjects" who on occasion provoke the intervention of one of the detachments of the (repressive) State apparatus. But the vast majority of (good) subjects work all right "all by themselves", i. e. by ideology (whose concrete forms are realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses). They are inserted into practices governed by the rituals of the ISAs. They "recognize" the existing state of affairs (*das Bestehende*), that "it really is true that it is so and not otherwise", and that they must be obedient to God, to their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle[22], to the boss, to the engineer, that thou shalt "love thy neighbour as thyself", etc. Their concrete, material behaviour is simply the inscription in life of the admirable words of the prayer: *"Amen—So be it"*.

Yes, the subjects "work by themselves". The whole mystery of this effect lies in the first two moments of the quadruple system I have just discussed, or, if you prefer, in the ambiguity of the term *subject*. In the ordinary use of the term, subject in fact means: (1) a free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission. This last note gives us the meaning of this ambiguity, which is merely a reflection of the effect which produces it: the individual *is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i. e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection*, i. e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection "all by himself". *There are no subjects except by and for their subjection*. That is why they "work all by themselves".

...

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P. S.[24] If these few schematic theses allow me to illuminate certain aspects of the functioning of the Superstructure and its mode of intervention in the Infrastructure, they are obviously *abstract* and necessarily leave several important problems unanswered, which should be mentioned:

1. The problem of the *total process* of the realization of the reproduction of the relations of production.

As an element of this process, the ISAs *contribute* to this reproduction. But the point of view of their contribution alone is still an abstract one.

It is only within the processes of production and circulation that this reproduction is *realized*. It is realized by the mechanisms of those processes, in which the training of the workers is "completed", their posts assigned them, etc. It is in the internal mechanisms of these processes that the effect of the different ideologies is felt (above all the effect of legal-ethical ideology).

But this point of view is still an abstract one. For in a class society the relations of production are relations of exploitation, and therefore relations between antagonistic classes. The reproduction of the relations of production, the ultimate aim of the ruling class, cannot therefore be a merely technical operation training and distributing individuals for the different posts in the "technical division" of labour except in the ideology of the ruling class: every "technical" division, every "technical" organization of labour is the form and mask of a *social* (=class) division and organization of labour. The reproduction of the relations of production can therefore only be a class undertaking. It is realized through a class struggle which counterposes the ruling class and the exploited class.

The *total process* of the realization of the reproduction of the relations of production is therefore still abstract, insofar as it has not adopted the point of view of this class struggle. To adopt the point of view of reproduction is therefore, in the last instance, to adopt the point of view of the class struggle.

2. The problem of the class nature of the ideologies existing in a

social formation.

The "mechanism" of ideology *in general* is one thing. We have seen that it can be reduced to a few principles expressed in a few words (as "poor" as those which, according to Marx, define production *in general*, or in Freud, define *the* unconscious *in general*). If there is any truth in it, this mechanism must be *abstract* with respect to every real ideological formation.

I have suggested that the ideologies were *realized* in institutions, in their rituals and their practices, in the ISAs. We have seen that on this basis they contribute to that form of class struggle, vital for the ruling class, the reproduction of the relations of production. But the point of view itself, however real, is still an abstract one.

In fact, the State and its Apparatuses only have meaning from the point of view of the class struggle, as an apparatus of class struggle ensuring class oppression and guaranteeing the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction. But there is no class struggle without antagonistic classes. Whoever says class struggle of the ruling class says resistance, revolt and class struggle of the ruled class.

That is why the ISAs are not the realization of ideology *in general*, nor even of the conflict-free realization of the ideology of the ruling class. The ideology of the ruling class does not become the ruling ideology by the grace of God, nor even by virtue of the seizure of State power alone. It is by the installation of the ISAs in which this ideology is realized and realizes itself that it becomes the ruling ideology. But this installation is not achieved all by itself; on the contrary, it is the stake in a very bitter and continuous class struggle: first against the former ruling classes and their positions in the old and new ISAs, then against the exploited class.

But this point of view of the class struggle in the ISAs is still an abstract one. In fact, the class struggle in the ISAs is indeed an aspect of the class struggle, sometimes an important and symptomatic one: e. g. the anti-religious struggle in the eighteenth century, or the "crisis" of the educational ISA in every capitalist country today. But the class struggles in the ISAs is only one aspect of a class struggle which

goes beyond the ISAs. The ideology that a class in power makes the ruling ideology in its ISAs is indeed "realized" in those ISAs, but it goes beyond them, for it comes from elsewhere. Similarly, the ideology that a ruled class manages to defend in and against such ISAs goes beyond them, for it comes from elsewhere.

It is only from the point of view of the classes, i. e. of the class struggle, that it is possible to explain the ideologies existing in a social formation. Not only is it from this starting-point that it is possible to explain the realization of the ruling ideology in the ISAs and of the forms of class struggle for which the ISAs are the seat and the stake. But it is also and above all from this starting-point that it is possible to understand the provenance of the ideologies which are realized in the ISAs and confront one another there. For if it is true that the ISAs represent the *form* in which the ideology of the ruling class must *necessarily* be realized, and the form in which the ideology of the ruled class must *necessarily* be measured and confronted, ideologies are not "born" in the ISAs but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc.

April 1970

注释:

1 卡巴尼斯(P. J. G. Cabanis,1757—1808):法国哲学家兼生理学家。他认为思想是头脑的一种"分泌物",同胆汁是肝脏分泌出来的一个道理。著有《人的肉体和精神的关系》等。

特拉西(Destutt de Tracy,1754—1836):法国哲学家,观念学派创始人。其观念学认为各种观念可分析为感觉的要素,有些观念能够在自己的感觉经验中发现,有些则不能。"观念学"一词逐渐具有"意识形态"的含义,成为马克思运用的"意识形态"一词的来源。

2 *Rheinische Zeitung*:《莱茵报》。

3 *1844 Manuscripts*:《1844年经济学哲学手稿》。

4 阿尔都塞等许多西方马克思主义者认为,马克思本人的思想发展以《德意志意识形态》(1845)为界分为两个阶段,早期体现了人道主义和历史主义的思想,后期则逐渐脱离了黑格尔和费尔巴哈的理论束缚,创立了科学马克思主义思想。

5 阿尔都塞把下列机构视为意识形态国家机器:宗教意识形态国家机器(各种教会

系统）；教育意识形态国家机器（各种公立和私立学校系统）；政治意识形态国家机器（包括各个党派在内的政治系统）；工会意识形态国家机器；传播媒介意识形态国家机器（出版、广播、电视等）；文化意识形态国家机器（文学、艺术、体育比赛等）。

6 见《德意志意识形态》，人民出版社，1962年版，第20页。

7 费尔巴哈（Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach，1804—1872）：法国唯物主义哲学家。

8 巴特（Karl Barth，1886—1968）：瑞士神学家，新正统神学奠基人。他强调上帝不同于人间任何事物，著有《上帝的话与神学》（1928）、《教会教义学》（1932—1935）。

9 大意如下：关系制约着个体的生存状况以及他们的集体生活和个人生活，为什么说对个体与这种社会关系之间关系的再现是一种想像关系？

10 作者在原注中说明，他在此使用"宗派"这个词是经过周密考虑的。在共产党内部，"宗派"行为经常用来指左倾激进主义或右倾机会主义偏离正确的政治路线。

11 阿尔都塞认为，意识形态国家机器主要是利用意识形态的方式来实现统治阶级的意志的，其次才使用强制手段，但这些强制手段是隐蔽的和象征性的，例如学校和教会使用处罚、免职和开除等措施惩戒学生和老师以及文化领域内的官方审查等。

12 sign petition：签名请愿。

13 *mea culpa*：口头认错。

14 所谓"意识形态质询作为主体的个人"，指的是意识形态建构了作为主体的个人。在这篇文章中，subject有两层含义：既表示主体，又表示屈从于主导意识形态的臣属。

15 作者在原注中解释说，"主体"这一名称借自"法定主体"（subject in law）这一法律范畴，以表达这样一种意识形态观念：人生来就是一个主体。

16 作者在原注中解释说，他在这句话中之所以两次使用"现在"这个词，是想证明意识形态具有永恒性，因为作者在写这几句话时的"现在"与读者阅读时的"现在"有时间间隔。

17 作者在原注中说，尽管我们知道个体一直就是主体，但还是坚持使用"个体"这个词，为的就是产生一种对比的效果。

18 confirmation：坚信礼（主教按手于教徒头顶，使其坚定信仰）。

19 extreme unction：临终涂油礼。

20 作者在原注中解释说，这段文字中的引用不是逐句逐字的，而是观其大略，取其精神主旨。

21 参见《旧约》"出埃及记"第三章。

22 作者写此文时，戴高乐任法国总统。

23 P. S.：postscript的缩略形式，附录。

吕西安·戈德曼:《小说社会学》导论

Introduction to *Towards a Sociology of the Novel*

Lucien Goldmann

Two years ago, in January 1961, the Institute of Sociology in the Free University of Brussels asked me to lead a research group into the sociology of literature, beginning with the novels of André Malraux[1]. With a good deal of apprehension, I accepted. My work on seventeenth-century philosophy and tragedy in no way prejudiced me against the possibility of a similar study of the novel, even of a body of fiction so nearly contemporary as Malraux's. In fact, we spent the first year on a preliminary study of the problems of the novel as a literary form, taking as our starting-point Georg Lukács's already almost classic work—though still little known in France *The Theory of the Novel* and René Girard's recently published *Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque*, in which Girard—unknown to himself, as he later told me—discovered the Lukácsian analyses, while modifying them on several particular points.

Our study of *The Theory of the Novel* and Girard's book led me to formulate a number of sociological hypotheses that seem to me to be particularly interesting, and on the basis of which my later work on Malraux's novels was developed.

These hypotheses concern, on the one hand, the homology between the structure of the classical novel and the structure of exchange in the liberal economy and, on the other hand, certain parallels in their later evolutions.

Let us begin by tracing the outlines of the structure described by Lukács. This structure may not, as he believed, characterize the novel form in general, but it does characterize at least its most important aspects (and probably, from the genetic point of view, its primordial

aspect). The novel form studied by Lukács is that characterized by a hero that he very felicitously calls the *problematic hero*.[2]

The novel is the story of a *degraded* (what Lukács calls "demoniacal") search, a search for authentic values in a world itself degraded, but at an otherwise advanced level according to a different mode.

By authentic values, I mean, of course, not the values that the critic or the reader regards as authentic, but those which, without being manifestly present in the novel, organize in accordance with an *implicit* mode its world as a whole. It goes without saying that these values are specific to each novel and different from one novel to another.

Since the novel is an epic genre characterized, unlike the folk tale or the epic poem itself, by the insurmountable rupture between the hero and the world, there is in Lukács an analysis of the nature of two degradations (that of the hero and that of the world) that must engender both a *constitutive opposition*, the foundation of this insurmountable rupture, and an *adequate community* to make possible the existence of an epic form.

The radical rupture alone would, in effect, have led to tragedy or to lyric poetry; the absence of rupture or the existence of a merely accidental rupture would have led to the epic poem or the folk tale.

Situated between the two, the novel has a dialectical nature in so far as it derives specifically, on the one hand, from the fundamental community of the hero and of the world presupposed by all epic forms and, on the other hand, from their insurmountable rupture; the community of the hero and of the world resulting from the fact that they are both degraded in relation to authentic values, the opposition resulting from the difference of nature between each of these two degradations.

The *demoniacal* hero of the novel is a madman or a criminal, in any case, as I have said, a *problematic* character whose degraded, and therefore inauthentic, search for authentic values in a world of conformity and convention constitute the content of this new literary genre known as the "novel" that writers created in an individualistic society.

On the basis of this analysis, Lukács develops a typology of the novel. Setting out from the relation between the hero and the world, he

distinguishes three schematic types of the Western novel in the nineteenth century, to which is added a fourth that already constitutes a transformation from the novel form towards new modalities that would require a different type of analysis. In 1920, this fourth possibility seemed to him to be expressed pre-eminently in the novels of Tolstoy, which strive towards the epic. The three types of novel on which his analysis bears are as follows:

1. the novel of "abstract idealism": characterized by the activity of the hero and by his over-narrow consciousness in relation to the complexity of the world (*Don Quixote*, *Le Rouge et le Noir*);[3]

2. the psychological novel; concerned above all with the analysis of the inner life, and characterized by the passivity of the hero and a consciousness too broad to be satisfied by what the world of convention can offer him (*Oblomov* and *L'Éducation Sentimentale*[4]);

3. the *Bildungsroman*, which ends with a *self-imposed limitation*; although the hero gives up the problematic search, he does not accept the world of convention or abandon the implicit scale of values—a self-imposed limitation that must be characterized by the term "virile maturity" (Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*[5] or Gottfried Keller's *Der grüne Heinrich*[6]).

...

The problem of the novel, therefore, is to make what in the novelist's consciousness is *abstract* and *ethical* the essential element of a work in which reality can exist only in the mode of a non-thematized (Girard would say mediatized) absence or , which is equivalent, a degraded presence. As Lukács says, the novel is the only literary genre in which *the novelist's ethic becomes an aesthetic problem of the work.*

The problem of a sociology of the novel has always preoccupied sociologists of literature, though, as yet, no decisive step towards its elucidation has so far been attempted. Basically, the novel, for the first part of its history, was a biography and a social chronicle and so it has always been possible to show that the social chronicle reflected to a greater or lesser degree the society of the period—and one does not have to be a sociologist to see that.

On the other hand, a connection has also been made between the transformation of the novel since Kafka and the Marxist analyses of reification. Here, too, it has to be said that serious sociologists should have seen this as a problem rather than as an explanation. Although it is obvious that the absurd worlds of Kafka or Camus's *L'Étranger*, or Robbe-Grillet's[7] world composed of relatively autonomous objects, correspond to the analysis of reification as developed by Marx and later Marxists, the problem arises as to why, when this analysis was elaborated in the second half of the nineteenth century and concerned a phenomenon that appeared in a still earlier period, this same phenomenon was expressed in the novel only at the end of World War I.

In short, all these analyses concern the relation between certain elements of the *content* of fictional literature and the existence of a social reality that they reflect almost without transposition or by means of a more or less transparent transposition.

But the first problem that a sociology of the novel should have confronted is that of the relation between the *novel form* itself and the *structure* of the social environment in which it developed, that is to say, between the novel as a literary genre and individualistic modern society.

It seems to me today that a combination of the analyses of Lukács and Girard, even though they were both developed without specifically sociological preoccupations, makes it possible, if not to elucidate this problem entirely, at least to make a decisive step towards its elucidation.

I have just said that the novel can be characterized as the story of a search for authentic values in a degraded mode, in a degraded society, and that this degradation, in so far as it concerns the hero, is expressed principally through the mediatization, the reduction of authentic values to the implicit level and their disappearance as manifest realities. This is obviously a particularly complex structure and it would be difficult to imagine that it could one day emerge simply from individual invention without any basis in the social life of the group.

What, however, would be quite inconceivable, is that a literary

form of such dialectical complexity should be rediscovered, over a period of centuries, among the most different writers in the most varied countries, that it should have become the form *par excellence* in which was expressed, on the literary plane, the content of a whole period, without there being either a homology or a significant relation between this form and the most important aspects of social life.

This hypothesis seems to me particularly simple and above all productive and credible, though it has taken me years to find it.

The novel form seems to me, in effect, to be *the transposition on the literary plane of everyday life in the individualistic society created by market production*. There is a *rigorous homology* between the literary form of the novel, as I have defined it with the help of Lukács and Girard, and the everyday relation between man and commodities in general, and by extension between men and other men, in a market society.

The natural, healthy relation between men and commodities is that in which production is consciously governed by future consumption, by the concrete qualities of objects, by their *use-value*.

Now what characterizes market production is, on the contrary, the elimination of this relation with men's consciousness, its reduction to the implicit through the mediation of the new economic reality created by this form of production: *exchange-value*.

In other forms of society, when a man needed an article of clothing or a house, he had to produce them himself or obtain them from someone capable of producing them and who was under an obligation to provide him with them, either in accordance with certain traditional rules, or for reasons of authority, friendship, etc., or as part of some reciprocal arrangement.[8]

If one wishes to obtain an article of clothing or a house today, one has to find the money needed to buy them. The producer of clothes or houses is indifferent to the use-values of the objects he produces. For him, these objects are no more than a necessary evil to obtain what alone interests him, an exchange-value sufficient to ensure the viability of his enterprise. In the economic life, which constitutes the most

important part of modern social life, every authentic relation with the qualitative aspect of objects and persons tends to disappear — inter-human relations as well as those between men and things — and be replaced by a mediatized and degraded relation: the relation with purely quantitative exchange-values.

Of course, use-values continue to exist and even to govern, in the last resort, the whole of the economic life; but their action assumes an *implicit character, exactly like that of authentic values in the fictional world.*

On the conscious, manifest plane, *the economic life* is composed of people orientated exclusively towards exchange-values, degraded values, to which are added in production a number of individuals — the creators in every sphere — who remain essentially orientated towards use-values and who by virtue of that fact are situated on the fringes of society and become *problematic individuals*; and, of course, even these individuals unless they accept the romantic illusion (Girard would say lie) of the *total* rupture between essence and appearance, between the inner life and the social life, cannot be deluded as to the degradations that their creative activity undergoes in a market society, when this activity is manifested externally, when it becomes a book, a painting, teaching, a musical composition, etc., enjoying a certain prestige, and having therefore a certain price. It should be added that as the ultimate consumer, opposed in the very act of exchange to the producers, any individual in a market society finds himself at certain moments of the day aiming at qualitative use-values that he can obtain only through the mediation of exchange-values.

In view of this, there is nothing surprising about the creation of the novel as a literary genre. Its apparently extremely complex form is the one in which men live every day, when they are obliged to seek all quality, all use-value in a mode degraded by the mediation of quantity, of exchange-value — and this in a society in which any effort to orientate oneself *directly* towards use-value can only produce individuals who are themselves degraded, but in a different mode, that of *the problematic individual.*

Thus the two structures, that of an important fictional genre and that of exchange, proved to be strictly homologous, to the point at which one might speak of one and the same structure manifesting itself on two different planes. Furthermore, as we shall see later, the *evolution* of the fictional form that corresponds to the world of reification can be understood only in so far as it is related to a *homologous history* of the structure of reification.

However, before making a few remarks about this homology between the two evolutions we must examine the problem, particularly important for the sociologist, of the process by which the literary form was able to emerge out of the economic reality, and of the modifications that the study of this process forces us to introduce into the traditional representation of the sociological conditioning of literary creation.

One fact is striking at the outset; the traditional scheme of literary sociology, whether Marxist or not, cannot be applied in the case of the structural homology just referred to. Most work in the sociology of literature established a relation between the most important literary works and the collective *consciousness* of the particular social group from which they emerged. On this point, the traditional Marxist position does not differ essentially from non-Marxist sociological work as a whole, in relation to which it introduces only four new ideas, namely:

1. The literary work is not the mere reflection of a real, given collective consciousness, but the culmination at a very advanced level of coherence of tendencies peculiar to the consciousness of a particular group, a consciousness that must be conceived as a dynamic reality, orientatd towards a certain state of equilibrium. What really separates, in this as in all other spheres, Marxist sociology from positivistic, relativist or eclectic sociological tendencies is the fact that it sees the key concept not in the *real* collective consciousness, but in the constructed concept (*zugerechnet*) of *possible consciousness*[9] which, alone, makes an understanding of the first possible.

2. The relation between collective ideology and great individual literary, philosophical, theological, etc. creations resides not in an identity of content, but in a more advanced coherence and in a homology

of structures, which can be expressed in imaginary contents very different from the real content of the collective consciousness.

3. The work corresponding to the mental structure of the particular social group may be elaborated in certain exceptional cases by an individual with very few relations with this group. The *social* character of the work resides above all in the fact that an individual can never establish by himself a coherent mental structure corresponding to what is called a "world view". Such a structure can be elaborated only by a group, the individual being capable only of carrying it to a very high degree of coherence and transposing it on the level of imaginary creation, conceptual thought, etc.

4. The collective consciousness is neither a primary reality, nor an autonomous reality; it is elaborated implicitly in the overall behaviour of individuals participating in the economic, social, political life, etc.

These are evidently extremely important theses, sufficient to establish a very great difference between Marxist thinking and other conceptions of the sociology of literature. Nevertheless, despite these differences, Marxist theoreticians, like positivistic or relativistic sociologists of literature, have always thought that the social life can be expressed on the literary, artistic or philosophical plane only through the intermediary link of the collective consciousness.

In the case we have just studied, however, what strikes one first is the fact that although we find a strict homology between the structures of economic life and a certain particularly important manifestation[10], one can detect no analogous structure at the level of the *collective consciousness* that seemed hitherto to be the indispensable intermediary link to realize either the homology or an intelligible, significant relation between the different aspects of social existence.

The novel analysed by Lukács and Girard no longer seems to be the imaginary transposition of the *conscious structures* of a particular group, but seems to express on the contrary (and this may be the case of a very large part of modern art in general) a search for values that no social group defends effectively and that the economic life tends to make implicit in all members of the society.

...

This analysis, which Marx regarded as one of his most important discoveries, affirms in effect that in market societies (that is to say, in types of society in which economic activity predominates), the collective consciousness gradually loses all active reality and tends to become a mere reflection[12] of the economic life and, ultimately, to disappear.

There was obviously, therefore, between this particular analysis of Marx and the general theory of literary and philosophical creation of later Marxists, who presupposed an active role of the collective consciousness, not a contradiction but an incoherence. The latter theory never envisaged the consequences for the sociology of literature of Marx's belief that there survives in market societies a radical modification of the status of the individual and collective consciousness and, implicitly, relations between the infrastructure and the superstructure. The analysis of reification elaborated first by Marx on the level of everyday life, then developed by Lukács in the field of philosophical, scientific and political thought, finally taken up by a number of theoreticians in various specific domains, and about which I have myself published a study, would appear therefore, for the moment at least, to be confirmed by the facts in the sociological analysis of a certain fictional form.

Having said this, the question arises as to how the link between the economic structures and literary manifestations is made in a society in which this link occurs *outside the collective consciousness*.

With regard to this I have formulated the hypothesis of the convergent action of four different factors, namely:

1. The birth in the thinking of members of bourgeois society, on the basis of economic behaviour and the existence of exchange-value, of the *category of mediation* as a fundamental and increasingly developed form of thought, with an implicit tendency to replace this thought by a total false consciousness in which the mediating value becomes an absolute value and in which the mediated value disappears entirely or, to put it more clearly, with the tendency to conceive of the access to all values

from the point of view of mediation, together with a propensity to make of money and social prestige absolute values and not merely mediations that provide access to other values of a qualitative character.

2. The survival in this society of a number of individuals who are essentially *problematic* in so far as their thinking and behaviour remain dominated by qualitative values, even though they are unable to extract themselves entirely from the existence of the degrading mediation whose action permeates the whole of the social structure. These individuals include, above all, the creators, writers, artists, philosophers, theologians, men of action, etc., whose thought and behaviour are governed above all by the quality of their work even though they cannot escape entirely from the action of the market and from the welcome extended them by the reified society.

3. Since no important work can be the expression of a purely individual experience, it is likely that the novel genre could emerge and be developed only in so far as a *non-conceptualized*, affective discontent, an affective aspiration towards qualitative values, was developed either in society as a whole, or perhaps solely among the middle strata from which most novelists have come.[13]

4. Lastly, in the liberal market societies, there was a set of values, which, though not trans-individual, nevertheless, had a universal aim and, within these societies, a general validity. These were the values of liberal individualism that were bound up with the very existence of the competitive market (in France, liberty, equality and property, in Germany, *Bildungsideal*[14], with their derivatives, tolerance, the rights of man, development of the personality, etc.). On the basis of these values, there developed the category of *individual* biography that became the constitutive element of the novel. Here, however, it assumed the form of the *problematic* individual, on the basis of the following: (1) the personal experience of the problematic indivduals mentioned above in the second point; (2) the internal contradiction between individualism as a universal value produced by bourgeois society and the important and painful limitations that this society itself brought to the possibilities of the development of the individual.

This hypothetical schema seems to me to be confirmed among other things by the fact that, when one of these four elements, individualism, has gradually been eliminated by the transformation of the economic life and the replacement of the economy of free competition by an economy of cartels and monopolies (a transformation that began at the end of the nineteenth century, but whose qualitative turning-point most economists would place between 1900 and 1910), we witness a parallel transformation of the novel form that culminates in the gradual dissolution and disappearance of the individual character, of the hero; a transformation that seems to me to be characterized in an extremely schematic way by the existence of two periods:

1. The first, transitional period, during which the disappearance of the importance of the individual brings with it attempts to replace biography as the content of the work of fiction with values produced by different ideologies. For although, in Western societies, these values have proved to be too weak to produce their own literary forms, they might well give a new lease of life to an already existing form that was losing its former content. First and foremost, on this level, are the ideas of community and collective reality (institutions, family, social group, revolution, etc.) that had been introduced and developed in Western thinking by the socialist ideology.

2. The second period, which begins more or less with Kafka and continues to the contemporary *nouveau roman*[17], and which has not yet come to an end, is characterized by an abandonment of any attempt to replace the problematic hero and individual biography by another reality and by the effort to write the novel of the absence of the subject, of the non-existence of any ongoing search.

It goes without saying that this attempt to safeguard the novel form by giving it a content, related no doubt to the content of the traditional novel (it had always been the literary form of the problematic search and the absence of positive values), but nevertheless essentially different (it now involves the elimination of two essential elements of the specific content of the novel: the psychology of the problematic hero and the story of his demoniacal search), was to produce at the same

time parallel orientations towards different forms of expression. There may be here elements for a sociology of the theatre of absence (Beckett[16], Ionesco[17], Adamov[18] during a certain period) and also of certain aspects of non-figurative painting.

Lastly, we should mention a problem that might and ought to be the subject of later research. The novel form that we have just studied is essentially critical and oppositional. It is a form of resistance to developing bourgeois society. An individual resistance that can fall back, within a group, only on *affective* and *non-conceptualized* psychical processes precisely because conscious resistances that might have elaborated literary forms implying the possibility of a positive hero (in the first place, a proletarian oppositional consciousness such as Marx had hoped for and predicted) had not become sufficiently developed in Western societies. The novel with a problematic hero thus proves, contrary to traditional opinion, to be a literary form bound up certainly with history and the development of the bourgeoisie, but not the expression of the real or possible consciousness of that class.

But the problem remains as to whether, parallel with this literary form, there did not develop other forms that might correspond to the conscious values and effective aspirations of the bourgeoisie; and, on this point, I should like to mention, merely as a general and hypothetical suggestion, the possibility that the work of Balzac — whose structure ought, indeed, to be analysed from this point of view — might constitute the only great literary expression of the world as structured by the conscious values of the bourgeoisie: individualism, the thirst for power, money and eroticism, which triumph over the ancient feudal values of altruism, charity and love.

Sociologically, this hypothesis, if it proves to be correct, might be related to the fact that the work of Balzac is situated precisely at a period in which individualism, ahistorical in itself, structured the consciousness of a bourgeoisie that was in the process of constructing a new society and found itself at the highest and most intense level of its real historical efficacity.

We should also ask ourselves why, with the exception of this

single case, this form of fictional literature had only a secondary importance in the history of Western culture, why the real consciousness and aspirations of the bourgeoisie never succeeded again, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in creating a literary form of its own that might be situated on the same level as the other forms that constitute the Western literary tradition.

On this point, I would like to make a few general hypotheses. The analysis that I have just developed extends to one of the most important novel forms a statement that now seems to me to be valid for almost all forms of *authentic cultural creation*. In relation to this statement the only expression that I could see for the moment was constituted precisely by the work of Balzac, who was able to create a great literary universe structured by purely individualistic values, at a historical moment when, concurrently, men animated by ahistorical values were accomplishing a considerable historical upheaval (an upheaval that was not really completed in France until the end of the bourgeois revolution in 1848). With this single exception (but perhaps one should add a few other possible exceptions that may have escaped my attention), it seems to me that there is valid literary and artistic creation only when there is an aspiration to transcendence on the part of the individual and a search for qualitative trans-individual values. "Man passes beyond man," I have written, slightly altering Pascal[17]. This means that man can be authentic only in so far as he conceives himself or feels himself as part of a developing whole and situates himself in a historical or transcendent trans-individual dimension. But bourgeois ideology, bound up like bourgeois society itself with the existence of economic activity, is precisely the first ideology in history that is both radically profane and ahistorical; the first ideology whose tendency is to deny anything sacred, whether the otherworldly sacredness of the transcendent religions or the immanent sacredness of the historical future. It is, it seems to me, the fundamental reason why bourgeois society created the first radically non-aesthetic form of consciousness. The essential character of bourgeois ideology, rationalism, ignores in its extreme expressions the very existence of art. There is no Cartesian or Spinozian aesthetics, or

even an aesthetics for Baumgarten[20] — art is merely an inferior form of knowledge.

It is no accident therefore if, with the exception of a few particular situations, we do not find any great literary manifestations of the bourgeois consciousness itself. In a society bound up with the market, the artist is, as I have already said, a problematic individual, and this means a critical individual, opposed to society.

Nevertheless reified bourgeois ideology had its thematic values, values that were sometimes authentic, such as those of individualism, sometimes purely conventional, which Lukács called false consciousness and, in their extreme forms, bad faith, and Heidegger's "chatter". These stereotypes, whether authentic or conventional, thematized in the collective consciousness, were later able to produce, side by side with the authentic novel form, a parallel literature that also recounted an individual history and, naturally enough, since conceptualized values were involved, could depict a positive hero.

It would be interesting to follow the meanderings of the secondary novel forms that might be based, quite naturally, on the collective consciousness. One would end up perhaps — I have not yet made such a study — with a very varied spectrum, from the lowest forms of the Delly type to the highest forms to be found perhaps in such writers as Alexandre Dumas or Eugéne Sue[21]. It is also perhaps on this plane that we should situate, parallel with the *nouveau roman*, certain best-sellers that are bound up with the new forms of collective consciousness.

However, the extremely schematic sketch that I have just traced seems to me to provide a framework for a sociological study of the novel form. Such a study would be all the more important in that, apart from its own object, it would constitute a not inconsiderable contribution to the study of the psychical structures of certain social groups, the middle strata in particular.

注释：

1 马尔罗(André Malraux,1901—1976)：法国作家，政治活动家，曾经参与国际反法西斯斗争和国内抵抗运动，著有长篇小说《征服者》、《人类的命运》、《希望》等。戈

德曼的《小说社会学》一书收录了论文"马尔罗小说结构研究导言"。

2 作者在原注中说明，卢卡奇的这一假设所适用的范围很有限。它适用于塞万提斯的《堂吉诃德》、斯汤达的《红与黑》、福楼拜的《包法利夫人》和《情感教育》，部分适用于斯汤达的《巴黎修道院》，完全不适用于巴尔扎克的所有小说。尽管如此，卢卡奇的分析还是有助于对小说形式进行严肃的社会学研究。

3 *Le Rouge et le Noir*：《红与黑》，法国现实主义文学先驱斯汤达的代表作。

4 *Oblomov*：《奥勃洛莫夫》，伊·冈察洛夫(1812—1891)所著长篇小说，是19世纪批判现实主义文学的代表作。奥勃洛莫夫是贵族地主的典型代表。*L'Éducation Sentimentale*：《情感教育》，福楼拜的长篇小说。

5 *Wilhelm Meister*：歌德的"威廉·麦斯特"系列小说，包括《威廉·麦斯特的学徒时代》及其续篇《威廉·麦斯特的漫游时代》，是德国文学中成长小说(bildungsroman)的先驱之作。

6 凯勒(Gottfried Keller，1819—1890)：瑞士德语作家，《绿衣亨利》(*Der Grüne Heinrich*)是他的成名之作。

7 加缪(Albert Camus，1913—1960)：法国小说家、戏剧家兼评论家，作品反映世界的荒谬与人的孤独和无能为力，代表作有小说《局外人》和《鼠疫》、剧本《卡利古拉》、哲学随笔《反抗的人》等，1957年获诺贝尔文学奖。罗伯—格里耶(Alan Robbe-Grillet，1922-)：20世纪50年代法国新小说派代表作家和主要理论家。他的小说中的故事按照时间顺序叙述，事事一一详加描述，人物的来去无一遗漏。著名作品有《橡皮》(1953)、《窥视者》(1953)等。

8 作者在原注中补充说明，只要交换是零星的，交换的只是生产和生活的剩余物品，或者在基本的自然经济里，使用价值的交换特征尚未由许多个体或社会集团产生，中介性的心理结构就不会出现，或者处于次要地位。物化发展过程中的根本变化是市场生产的到来造成的。

9 possible consciousness：可能性意识。在戈德曼的理论中，可能性意识经常指的是某一社会集团所持有的完整一致的世界观。戈德曼认为，一个社会集团的世界观是这个社会集团的集体精神结构。在文学作品中，作品想像世界的结构与作者所属社会集团的世界观是同构的。作者在写作之时，固然可以自由想像，但是他的立场有意或无意地受制于所处的社会集团的世界观。这个社会集团的世界观将他的立场和作品内在化，使他的作品表现出与这个社会集团一致的特质。

10 这里所说的"表现"(manifestation)，指的是文学表现。

11 the fetishization of merchandise：商品的拜物教。宗教意义上的拜物教产生于原始神灵观念之前。被崇拜对象被赋予超自然的特性，使人产生敬畏与恐惧感。商品拜物教喻指在以生产资料私有制为基础的社会中对商品盲目崇拜的现象。

reification：物化，卢卡奇所用的重要术语，指资本主义商品制度使人与人的关系转化为物与物的关系、物的世界统治人的世界的现象。

卢卡奇根据马克思在《资本论》中对商品拜物教的剖析，认为在资本主义商品制度

下,"人自己的活动,他自己的劳动,成为客观的、独立于它的某种东西",造成人的劳动产品反过来制约人自身的物化,其中最集中的表现就是商品拜物教。由于商品的生产和流通有着固定的规则,人可以认识和利用它,但却无法改变它,又由于大工业生产的高度机械化使工人的劳动变得支离破碎,主体的意识和行动在生产中被肢解,肉体和心理从属于物的世界,因此物化在客观上表现为形成了一个与人相对立的商品世界,在主观上表现为人的活动、能力变成了一种商品,劳动力被视为货物在市场上出售。卢卡奇在尘封多年的马克思《1844 年经济学哲学手稿》公开发表之前已经将物化当作批判资本主义的核心范畴,同马克思运用"异化"批判资本主义有相似之处。物化和异化后来成为法兰克福学派、存在主义与马克思主义批判资本主义的中心范畴。物化和异化之间的区别是:物化主要指人与人之间的关系非人化,物与人的关系相颠倒,把人的特性、关系和行动当作物的特性、关系和行动;异化则指主体所创造的客体反过来成为同主体相对立的异己力量,着重强调客体同主体的对立关系。

12 作者在原注中说明,在资本主义社会的现实中,意识对经济生活的影响越来越小。相反,社会生活中的经济领域对意识的内容和结构的影响却与日俱增。

13 作者在原注中说明,他最初以为,因物化分解不同的社会集团,把它们整合到总体社会之中,从而使它们在一定程度上失去特性,物化所具有的特征严重违背了个体的生物和心理现实,将会在所有的个体身上激起不同程度的反抗行为,对物化世界的普遍抵制构成了小说创作的背景。可是,作者后来发现,这种观点暗含一种无法确证的假设,即存在一种生物本性,其外在表现没有全部被社会现实扭曲。实际上,对物化的反抗局限于某些特定社会阶层,这需要实证性研究来确认。

14 *Bildungsideal*:德文,教育理想。

15 *nouveau roman*:新小说,是指 20 世纪五六十年代法国出现的一批小说,代表作家有萨洛特、罗伯-格里耶、布托等人。他们在人物、情节结构、叙述方式、语言等方面进行了创新,继承了意识流小说和超现实主义的某些观点和创作方法。在新小说中,人物没有典型的性格,也没有确切的生活经历,有时甚至没有名字,故事情节不连贯且缺乏逻辑性。这反映出新小说作家从自我意识中寻找"真实"的创作主张。

16 贝克特(Samuel Beckett,1906—1989):爱尔兰戏剧家和小说家,荒诞派戏剧的主要代表,1969 年诺贝尔文学奖得主,代表作为《等待戈多》,另有三部曲小说《马洛伊》、《马洛纳之死》和《无名的人》。

17 尤内斯库(Eugene Ionesco,1912—　):原籍罗马尼亚的法国戏剧家,荒诞派戏剧的创始人之一,崇尚超现实主义技巧,代表性剧作有《秃头歌女》、《椅子》等。

18 阿达莫夫(Adamov,1908—1970):原籍俄国的法国荒诞派剧作家。

19 帕斯卡(Blaise Pascal,1623—1662):法国哲学家、数学家和物理学家,著有哲学著作《致外省人书》、《思想录》等。戈德曼的《隐蔽的上帝》深入研究了帕斯卡的哲学思想。

20 鲍姆加通(Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,1714 1762):德国哲学家,首创"美学"一词,著有《美学史》。

21 欧仁·苏(Eugéne Sue,1804—1857):法国作家、倡导长篇连载小说,以描写城市生活的阴暗面著称,代表作有长篇小说《巴黎的秘密》、《流浪的犹太人》。

特里·伊格尔顿:意识形态与文学形式

Ideology and Literary Form

Terry Eagleton

Bourgeois ideology in nineteenth-century England confronted a severe problem. Nurtured in the sparse soil of Utilitarianism[1], it was unable to produce a set of potently affective mythologies which might permeate the texture of lived experience of English society. It needed, therefore, to have constant resort to the Romantic humanist heritage—to that nebulous compound of Burkean conservatism and German idealism, transmitted by the later Coleridge to Carlyle, Disraeli, Arnold and Ruskin, which has become known as the "Culture and Society" tradition.[2] It was a tradition which offered an idealist critique of bourgeois social relations, coupled with a consecration of the rights of capital. The peculiar complexity of English nineteenth-century ideology, founded on a complex conjuncture of bourgeois and aristocratic classes within the dominant bloc, lies in part in this contradictory unity between what Antonio Gramsci refers to as "organic" and "traditional" elements.[3] An impoverished empiricism, unable to rise to the level of an ideology proper, is driven to exploit the fertile symbolic resources of Romantic humanism, drawing on its metaphysical sanctions and quasi-feudalist social models to ratify bourgeois property relations. The "Culture and Society" tradition is the literary record of this ideological conjuncture; John Stuart Mill, mechanistically harnessing Coleridge to Bentham in the late eighteen-thirties, provides one of its more palpable instances.[4]

Gramsci, indeed, has commented directly on this ideological formation

in nineteenth-century England. "There is a very extensive category of organic intellectuals—those, that is, who come into existence on the same industrial terrain as the economic group—but in the higher sphere we find that the old land-owning class preserves its position of virtual monopoly. It loses its economic supremacy and is assimilated as 'traditional intellectuals' and as directive (*dirigente*) group by the new group in power. The old land-owning aristocracy is joined to the industrialists by a kind of suture which is precisely that which in other countries unites the traditional intellectuals with the new dominant classes."

One aspect of this assimilation can be seen in bourgeois ideology's growing dependence on "organicist" concepts of society.[5] As Victorian capitalism assumes increasingly corporate forms, it turns to the social and aesthetic organicism of the Romantic humanist tradition, discovering in art models of totality and affectivity relevant to its ideological requirements. During the second half of the century, the initially poetic notion of "organic form" becomes progressively extended to the dominant literary mode of the time, fiction. A serious aesthetics of fiction consequently develops, to discover its major ideologue at the end of the century in Henry James.[6] This essay will survey, in skeletal and schematicform, some relations between a sector of the major literature of the last century and the ideological formations in which it is set; it will do so by taking the concept of "organic form" as one crucial nexus between history and literary production.

I. Matthew Arnold

The assimilation of "traditional" to "organic" intellectuals of which Gramsci speaks is the key to the historic significance of that powerful Victorian poet, critic and ideologue, Matthew Arnold. Arnold, apostle of Culture and scourge of bourgeois philistinism, has always exercised a potent influence on modern liberals and even on socialists; did he not claim, after all, that Culture "seeks to do away with classes", that "the men of culture are the true apostles of equality"?[7] Yet Arnold's project is not, need one say, the revolutionary abolition of class-society. Quite

the reverse: it is to effect a radical realignment of class-forces within the ruling bloc of Victorian England, so as more effectively to incorporate the proletariat. The thrust of Arnold's social criticism is to convert a visionless, sectarian bourgeoisie, pragmatically sunk in its own material interests, into a truly *hegemonic* class—a class with cultural resources adequate to the predominance it has come to hold in history. For Arnold, the aristocracy is rapidly losing political hegemony, but its historical successor, the bourgeoisie, is disastrously unprepared to assume it.[6] He insists, accordingly, on the need for the middle class to attain to more corporate, cultivated forms, and to do so by enshrining itself in a civilising state educational system. What Antonio Gramsci demands for the modern proletariat that it should achieve "moral and intellectual leadership" as well as material power —Matthew Arnold seeks for the Victorian bourgeoisie. The proletariat, Gramsci argues in *The Modern Prince*, "alongside the problem of the conquest of political power and of economic power must, just as it has thought about organising itself for politics and for economics, think also about organising itself for culture". Arnold's own programme could hardly be more deftly formulated.

It is this ideological necessity which underlies Arnold's apparently altruistic efforts to "Hellenise" his stiff-necked fellow-bourgeois. State-established schools, by linking the middle class to "the best culture of their nation", will confer on them "a greatness and a noble spirit, which the tone of these classes is not of itself at present adequate to impart". Such an enterprise, Arnold claims, "would really augment their self-respect and moral force; it would truly fuse them with the class above, and tend to bring about for them the equality which they are entitled to desire." The bourgeoisie is bereft of that pervasive spiritual predominance which has ratified aristocratic rule: unless it can rapidly achieve such cultural supremacy, installing itself as a truly national class at the "intellectual centre" of society, it will fail in its historical mission of politically incorporating the class it exploits:

It is of itself a serious calamity for a nation that its tone of feeling

> and grandeur of spirit should be lowered or dulled. But the calamity appears far more serious still when we consider that the middle classes, remaining as they are now, with their narrow, harsh, unintelligent, and unattractive spirit and culture, will almost certainly fail to mould or assimilate the masses below them, whose sympathies are at the present moment actually wider and more liberal than theirs. They arrive, these masses, eager to enter into possession of the world, to gain a more vivid sense of their own life and activity. In this their irrepressible development, their natural educators and initiators are those immediately above them, the middle classes. If these classes cannot win their sympathy or give them their direction, society is in danger of falling into anarchy.

The bourgeoisie, then, must appropriate the civilised aesthetic heritage of a failing aristocracy in order to equip itself with an ideology (Culture) capable of penetrating the masses. In a "cultured, liberalised, ennobled, transformed middle class", the proletariat will have "a point towards which it may with joy direct its aspirations".

Arnold's notion of class hegemony, it should be noted at once, is theoretically invalid. It is, indeed, a classic illustration of that historicist error which grasps ideology as the "world view" of a "class-subject", a spiritual vision imposed by that class on society as a whole. Yet Arnold's argument as a whole marks a significant mutation in nineteenth-century liberalism. As Victorian capitalism is driven to transcend its earlier individualist phase and organise itself into more corporate forms, so the classical liberalism which finds a late, defeated expression in John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1859) suffers a parallel transformation. Arnold believes that "all tendencies of human nature are in themselves vital and profitable"; but it is now imperative to harmonise them within a cohesive, conflict-free order — within, in a word, Culture. Spiritual *laissez-faire* is historically obsolete; it must yield to a faith in "the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals".

A bourgeoisie sunk in individualist dogmatism must now consider whether state action, "which was once dangerous, may [not] become, not only without danger in itself, but the means of helping us against dangers from another quarter".

The corporate state[9], then, is the social locus of Culture—of that symmetrical totality of impulses which is the organic form of a civilisation. Yet if Arnold is in this sense in advance of his age, a "liberal of the future" bearing the new needs of the bourgeois state, he can be so precisely because he is in another sense reactionary. If his critique of bourgeois pragmatism stems from the sensed need for a more richly elaborated ideology, it springs also from a traditionalist coneeption of culture as "an inward condition of the mind and spirit... at variance with the mechanical and material civilisation in esteem with us".[10] The "progressive" Inspector of Schools, and the patrician Professor of Poetry, both stand in conflict with conventional bourgeois liberalism; they meet in the aestheticised sociology of *Culture and Anarchy*.

Arnold's concern for the aesthetic meanings of Culture is both productive and disabling for the ideological ends he serves. Productive, in that art offers a prototype of how human subjects are spontaneously, subconsciously *affected*, and thus is relevant to the problem of ideology in general. Disabling, in that the consequence of such an intuitive aesthetics is a politically catastrophic vagueness. Arnold correctly perceives that ideologies establish themselves chiefly through image and representation rather than through systems of doctrine: Culture, in contrast with "Jacobinism", is eternally dissatisfied with "the men of a system, of disciples, of a school; with men like Comte, or the late Mr. Buckle, or Mr. Mill". Indeed it is precisely divisive rationalist debate over "doctrines" which threatens to destroy those instinctual pieties and spiritual allegiances which ideology must nurture. Doctrine, then, must yield to poetry, literature must oust dogma:

> The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, where it is worthy of its highest destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not

> shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve... More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry... The day will come when we shall wonder at ourselves for having trusted to them, for having taken them seriously; and the more we perceive their hollowness, the more we shall prize "the breath and finer spirit of knowledge" offered to us by poetry.

"Poetry", that is to say, is the final resort of a society in dire ideological crisis, replacing criticism with consolation, the analytic with the affective, the subversive with the sustaining. As such, it comes to denote less a particular literary practice than the mode of operation of ideology in general. Yet Poetry, like Culture, is thereby emptied of content in direct proportion to its all-pervasiveness, as Frederic Harrison perceived in his devastating parody of *Culture and Anarchy*:

> There is harmony, but no system; instinct, but no logic; eternal growth, and no maturity; everlasting movement, and nothing acquiesced in; perpetual opening of all questions, and answering of none; infinite possibilities of everything; the becoming all things, the being nothing.

It is a theoretical nullity obvious enough in Arnold's "touchstones" concept of criticism, in which an entirely intuitive response to some ghostly resonance supposedly common to a handful of poetic images ripped from their aesthetic and historical contexts is solemnly elevated into an absolute measure of literary evaluation.

Culture and Anarchy opposed the claims of "Hellenism" to "Hebraism", liberal cultivation to moral commitment, in a drive to deepen the spiritual hegemony of the middle class. Yet in doing so it risked liberalising out of existence the very "absolute" moral values which in

practice sustained bourgeois hegemony. In the "theological" works which follow *Culture and Anarchy*, then, Arnold needs to counterbalance Hellenism with the Hebraistic virtues of duty, obedience and submission—virtues whereby a dangerously rationalistic working class may be ideologically integrated into political society. Many of the masses, Arnold complains in *God and the Bible*, have espoused a sort of revolutionary deism, based on the supposed "rights of man" and hostile to all traditional culture. The essential corrective is Christianity: man in Christ knows duties rather than rights, surrendering himself to the "sweet reasonableness" of a corporate order of divine law. Yet if the masses are to be reclaimed from "Jacobinism", much unacceptable religious doctrine will need to be poeticised away. The proletariat have turned from the Bible, Arnold remarks in *Literature and Dogma*, because of the spurious theological categories in which it is tricked out. A wholesale demythologisation is therefore crucial: the scriptures must be stripped to a suggestive poetic structure for shoring up a conservative social morality. A Hellenised religion must become the handmaiden of a Hebraistic ethics.

One of the more discreditable facts about Matthew Arnold was his refusal to support an authentic demythologiser of his own day, Bishop John William Colenso. Arnold criticised Colenso, as Lionel Trilling[1] has pointed out, because he believed that "the factory operatives whom Colenso had in mind could not possibly be edified—that is, their spirits could not be raised, their moral sense heightened nor their religious faith strengthened—by this work". Colenso's scriptural questionings are ideologically damaging: "The great mass of the human race have to be softened and humanised through their heart and imagination, before any soil can be found in them where knowledge may strike living roots...only when [ideas] reach them in this manner do they adjust themselves to their practice without convulsing it." Colenso, in short, is unpoetical and so politically dangerous: his rationalist critique of the Bible checks that dissolution of dogma to image which alone can infiltrate proletarian sensibilities, assuring rather than disrupting, soothing rather than subverting. If Culture is too elusive and élitist an

instrument for this pressing task, then religion—traditionally one of the most potent and pervasive modes of ideological control- -must be refurbished and transformed for this end. Arnold's anxieties over Colenso recall his fears, recorded in the Preface to his *Poems* of 1853, about the spiritually undermining effects of his own earlier poetry. He rejects *Empedocles on Etna*[12] from that volume because it seems calculated to depress rather than to elevate the reader; true poetry must dispense "disinterested objectivity" rather than gloom and neurosis, appealing to "those elementary feelings which subsist permanently in the race, and which are independent of time". "Moral grandeur" must combat "spiritual discomfort" : poetry must become the ideological resolution of real contradictions.

2. George Eliot

To turn from Matthew Arnold to George Eliot is to see in peculiarly complex form some of the ideological conflicts which Arnold's idea of Culture is intended to resolve. Eliot's literary career, from her translation of Strauss's *Das Leben Jesu* (1846) to *Daniel Deronda* (1876)[13], is almost exactly coterminous with the period of Victorian prosperity which follows the severe depression and fierce class-struggles of the eighteen-thirties and forties. During this period productive output increased spectacularly, Britain's volume of world trade grew rapidly, and money-wages probably rose by at least a third between 1850 and 1870. A familiar political consequence of this prosperity was a partial though marked incorporation of the working class. From the mid-century onwards, until the resurgence of proletarian militancy in the depressed eighties, corporatism becomes a prominent characteristic of wide areas of the working-class movement.[14] Having defeated the first wave of working-class militancy, the industrial bourgeoisie had begun by 1850 to consolidate its victory. Sections of the working class advanced economically, only to become at each stage politically incorporated. On the eve of the second Reform Bill, R. H. Hutton argued in *Essays in Reform* (1867) that the trade unions had taught the workers

the value of cooperation, sacrifice and solidarity, and that this principle might be usefully integrated into society as a whole. Through the unions, the working class had come to appreciate the value of true government and to distrust "mere scattered energies". This "class-patriotism" must at all costs be channelled to national account; the spirit of trade unionism must be grafted "into the richer growth of our national politics".[15]

The ideological matrix of George Eliot's fiction is set by the increasingly corporate character of Victorian capitalism and its political apparatus. Eliot's work attempts to resolve a structural conflict between two forms of mid-Victorian ideology: between a progressively muted Romantic individualism, concerned with the untrammelled evolution of the "free spirit", and certain "higher", corporate ideological modes. These higher modes (essentially, Feuerbachian humanism and scientific rationalism) seek to identify the immutable social laws to which Romantic individualism, if it is to avoid both ethical anarchy and social disruption, must conform. In principle, it is possible for Romantic individualism to do so without betraying its own values. For if it is true on the one hand that scientific rationalism, in judiciously curbing the disruptive tendencies of Benthamite egoism, also obstructs Romantic self-expression, it is also true that it reveals certain historically progressive laws with which the developing individual may imaginatively unite. Moreover, the Religion of Humanity imbues scientific law with Romantic humanist spirit, discovering that law inscribed in the very passions and pieties of men. Unlike the obsessively abstract, systemic symbology of Comtism, it can offer itself as a totalising doctrine without detriment to the "personal"—to a lived relation with immediate experience. The Religion of Humanity protects Romantic values against an aggressive rationalism; but by rooting those values in the human collective, it defends them equally against an unbridled individualism. By virtue of this ideological conjuncture, the Romantic individualist may submit to the social totality without sacrifice to personal self-fulfilment.

In principle, that is; in practice, a potentially tragic collision

between "corporate" and "individualist" ideologies is consistently defused and repressed by the forms of Eliot's fiction. As the daughter of a farm-agent, the social locus of corporate value for Eliot is rural society; it is here, most obviously in *Adam Bede* and *Silas Marner*[16], that the cluster of traditionalist practices and "organic" affiliations imputed to the English provincial countryside is "selected" by the national ideology as paradigmatic, at a point where that ideology demands precisely such images of social incorporation. Rural society in *Adam Bede*, as John Goode has commented, is chosen as a literary subject not for its cloistered idiosyncratic charm but as a simplifying model of the whole social formation—a formation whose determining laws may be focused there in purer, more diagrammatic form. The function of the framing, externalising forms of Eliot's rural novels—pastoral myth, moral fable—is to allow for such "transparency", but in doing so to recast the historical contradictions at the heart of Eliot's fiction into ideologically resolvable terms.

It is not, naturally, that the organicist modes of Eliot's novels are the "expression" of her authorial ideology. As a literary producer, George Eliot delineates a "space" constituted by the insertion of "pastoral", religious and Romantic ideological sub-ensembles into an ideological formation dominated by liberalism, scientific rationalism and empiricism. This conjuncture is overdetermined in her case by elements of sexual ideology, which both reinforce the drive to individual emancipation and ratify the "feminine" values (compassion, tolerance, passive resignation) called upon to forestall it. There is no question of reducing the metropolitan rationalist intellectual George Eliot to the "subject" of a provincial, petty-bourgeois "class-ideology". The phrase "George Eliot" signifies nothing more than the insertion of certain specific ideological determinations—Evangelical Christianity, rural organicism, incipient feminism, petty-bourgeois moralism—into a hegemonic ideological formation which is partly supported, partly embarrassed by their presence. This contradictory unity of ideological structures provides the productive matrix of her fiction; yet the ideology of her texts is not, of course, reducible to it. For Eliot's literary production must be situated,

not only at the level of "general" ideology, but also at the relatively autonomous level of the mutation of literary forms. For each of her texts displays a complex amalgam of fictional devices appropriate to distinct generic modes: "pastoral", historical, realism, fable, mythopoeic and didactic discourse, even (with *Daniel Deronda*) elements of utopian fantasy. None of these discourses can be placed in any simple expressive relation to ideological forms; on the contrary, it is the mutual articulation of these discourses within the text which *produces* those ideological forms as literary signification. Two examples of this process will have to suffice. The biographical mode of *The Mill on the Floss*[17] encompasses at least two distinct forms of literary discourse: a kind of descriptive "pastoral" (the Dodsons, Maggie's early life at the mill), and the complex psychological drama of Maggie's subjective development. It is the interplay of these mutually conflictual modes which produces the ideological contention between "tradition" and "progress" inscribed in the figures of Tom and Maggie Tulliver. But it is a contention which the novel's "pastoral" devices simultaneously resolve. For just as the text's synthetic closure simplifies Tom to a type of eternal childhood, so the image of the river -symbol of moral drifting and wayward desire—naturalises and thus deforms the values of liberal individualism, figuring them as a mindless yielding to natural appetite rather than as positive growth. An opposition between "natural" and "cultural" discourses is transformed into a polarity between two modes of "natural" signification: Nature as positive (pastoral), and Nature as negative (appetitive). Again, it is not difficult to see how in *Middlemarch*[18] the realist form itself determines a certain "ideology of the text". In the earlier "pastoral" novels, Eliot's realism is partly signified by her apologetic engagement with socially obscure destinies; yet that engagement does not necessarily extend to a fully "internal" mode of characterisation. Once it does so, however, the novel-form is instantly decentred; since every destiny is significant, each is consequently relativised. Realism, as Eliot conceives of it, involves the tactful unravelling of interlaced processes, the equable distribution of authorial sympathies, the holding of competing values in precarious equipoise.

The "general" ideological correlative of this textual ideology is, naturally, liberal reformism; no other ideological effect could conceivably be produced by such an assemblage of fictional devices.

That Eliot's fiction recasts historical contradictions into ideologically resolvable form is evident enough in the case of *Adam Bede*[19]. Adam himself, with his Carlylean gospel of work and stiff-necked moralism, is an "organic" type -a petty-bourgeois pragmatist who "had no theories about setting the world to rights", and who thus functions as a reliable agent of the ruling class. Yet these "organic" values are forbidden by the novel's form from entering into significant deadlock with any "authentic" liberal individualism. Such individualism figures in the text only in the debased and trivialised form of a hedonistic egoism (the anarchic sexual appetite of Arthur Donnithorne and Hetty Sorrel), which the stable structures of rural society can expel or absorb without notable self-disruption. Hetty has unwittingly ruptured the class-collaboration between squire and artisan, turning Adam against Arthur; but once she is, so to speak, deported from the novel, that organic allegiance can be gradually reaffirmed. Moreover, the morally intransigent Adam has been humanised by his trials to the point where he is now spiritually prepared to wed the "higher" working-class girl, Dinah Morris, whose Evangelical fervour for duteous self-sacrifice matches his own doggedly anti-intellectual conformism. Adam is thus allowed to advance into more richly individualised consciousness (he ends up owning a timber-yard) without damage to his mythological status as organic type, an admirable amalgam of naturalised culture and cultivated nature.

In choosing rural petty-bourgeois life as a "paradigmatic" region, Eliot betrays towards it an ambiguous attitude which reveals, in turn, her problematic relationship to her readership. She extends the conventions of literary realism to a sensitive treatment of socially obscure figures; but while she insists on the latent significance of the apparently peripheral lives she presents, she also apologises, with a blend of genial patronage and tentative irony, for choosing such an unenlightened enclave as the subject-matter of serious fiction. That hesitancy of tone

focuses an ideological conflict. It exposes the contradiction between a rationalist critique of rural philistinism (one coupled with a Romantic individualist striving beyond those stifling limits), and a deep-seated imperative to celebrate the value of such bigoted, inert traditionalism, as the humble yet nourishing soil which feeds the flower of higher individual achievement. *Adam Bede* tries for a partial solution of this dilemma by romantically idealising the common life in the figures of Adam and Dinah, fusing the intense with the ordinary. In *The Mill on the Floss*, however, such a synthesis calls for a considerably more obtrusive manipulation of literary devices.

The rural society of the *Mill*—one of struggling tenant farmers becoming enmortgaged and forced to ruin by the pressures of urban banking and agricultural industry—is less easily idealised than the society of *Adam Bede*. As urban capital penetrates into the countryside, those conflicts in rural society suggested yet suppressed in *Adam Bede* erupt to provide one of the *Mill's* central images—the financial collapse of Dorlcote Mill itself. Moreover, if Hetty Sorrel can be effectively externalised as a socially disruptive egoist, Maggie Tulliver of the *Mill* is a bearer of authentic liberal values who is by no means so easily dislodged. Whereas *Adam Bede* divided moral fervour and restless individualism between Dinah and Hetty, Maggie Tulliver combines both; and this forestalls the simple resolution available to the earlier novel. Allured by a liberal individualism which decisively breaks with the stagnant oppressiveness of the rural petty bourgeoisie, Maggie must none the less refuse that ethic in the name of a commitment to the traditionalist social milieu of her childhood. In this way, nostalgia for an idealised upbringing at the mill becomes translated into a defence of clannish, claustrophobic *mores* against the Romantic spontaneity of the self, treacherously entwined as it is with appetitive egoism. The claustrophobia, and the snare of self-sacrifice, are clearly registered by the novel; yet one reason why they cannot be decisively rejected is because the only alternative commitment which the book allows Maggie is Stephen Guest. Guest cannot represent a true fulfilment for her: his personal flaws are subtly related to his class position, as an overbred

product of the predatory capitalism which is ousting the old rural world of her father. In grasping this connection, the novel at once shows a complex historical sense beyond the range of *Adam Bede*, and conveniently renders Maggie's return to St. Oggs more palatable. In a parallel way, the career of Tom Tulliver strikingly renders the contradictions of rural society: Tom strives to help his ruined father by prospering within the very urban capitalism which has brought about the mill's collapse. Yet it is not this historically complex and self-divided Tom with whom Maggie finally unites. The novel's transparently engineered conclusion Maggie's self-sacrificial drowning with her brother—suppresses ideological conflict by the magical stratagem of a literary device. Maggie's death is at once guilty expiation and affirmative self-fulfilment; in uniting with her brother, object of romantic love and bigoted type of organic community, she achieves and abnegates herself in the same act, endorsing the imperatives of "organic" morality while attaining to a fulfilling individual transcendence of them.

That the nostalgic organicism of Eliot's historically backdated rural fiction is determined in the last instance by the exigencies of the present is evident enough in *Felix Holt. The Radical*[20], written about the first Reform Bill on the eve of the second. Felix is essentially an urban version of Adam Bede, a petty-bourgeois craftsman no more representative of the proletariat in whose name he speaks than his pre-industrial predecessor. His "radicalism", accordingly, consists in a reformist trust in moral education and a positivist suspicion of political change a combination heroically opposed by the text to an unsavoury alliance of opportunist Radical politics with the insensate irrationality of the masses. Felix's *Address to Working Men*, with its call for a conversion of class interests into class duties, its apologia for cultural privilege and fear of mass action, merely projects the novel's sustaining ideology of "organic" change into more crudely explicit terms. In this sense, *Felix Holt* highlights the ideological impotence of those "pastoral" images which persist within Eliot's realist fictional mode. It is a self-contradictory work because it insists (as its self-consciously assertive title would suggest) on "centring" such an image Felix himself—in an urban context

which can only enforce its effective displacement, transplanting a marooned, moralising Adam Bede to the town. The novel's "official" project is in conflict with what it reveals: Felix's "progressive" political critique is no more than the idealist protest of traditionalist values against the political itself. What the book wishes to assert of its protagonist that he is more radical than the Radicals—simply cannot be reconciled with what it shows of him, as a doughty defender of landed property. The solution to this contradiction lies in the "personalisation" of Felix himself, as a forcefully charismatic hero compensating in physical presence for what he politically lacks.

If Felix is in this sense a "false" centre, the novel has a real but displaced centre in Mrs Transome. Both characters are historically obsolete; Mrs Transome is presented as a pathetically outdated feudalist whose pieties are ridden over roughshod by her Radical son. Yet if the novel mourns in her the death of traditional society, that mourning must be refracted in the case of the equally obsolescent Holt to a "progressive" position. The Mrs Transome scenes are nothing less than the aesthetic betrayal of this ideological contradiction at the novel's heart the unabsorbed region of bleakness, nostalgia and frustration with which nothing can be politically done, which is thereby forced to the work's ideological margins, but which protests by its sheer artistry against such relegation. Mrs Transome is an implicit refutation of Felix and contemporary history, even as Felix himself is fundamentally a refusal of that world; there is thus a double displacement at work in the text. *Felix Holt* betrays in its formal structure—in the disjunction between its political region and its Mrs Transome episodes—a self-division which fails to achieve thematic articulation. The artistic power of the Mrs Transome scenes suggests the residual presence of an ineradicable "personal" disillusionment which refuses to be totalised and absorbed by the novel's official progressivist ideology. Liberalism, raised by the quasi-positivist Holt to more corporate and "scientific" forms, at the same time disengages itself from such potentially tyrannic totalities to defend the "personal" values they threaten. The structural dislocations of the text are produced by that ideological dissonance; but that

dissonance is equally the product of the interplay between the three distinct "texts" which struggle for dominance within the novel as a whole. For *Felix Holt* is a contradictory amalgam of organicist myth (Felix), psychological drama (Mrs Transome) and political fiction; its discourse is the product of a series of slippages or mutations from each of these traditional forms to the other. It is in the hiatuses produced by these partial, ineffective transformations of mode that the ideology of the text inheres.

Eliot's fiction, indeed, displays from the outset a conflict between ideological totalities which outstrip classical liberalism, and a fear of the disruptive effect of such totalities on the "personal" values bred by that liberal lineage. (It is a conflict revealed in her ambiguous fellow-travelling relations with the English Positivists, whom she supported but could not bring herself to join.) Fiction is organic totality, but *phenomenological* totality; its creation of seamless, symmetrical wholes must be achieved without damage to the integrity of immediate experience. That problem is thematically evident in *Romola*[21], where Savonarola's "passionate sense of the infinite", his seductively corporate vision, is entwined with a moral despotism which violates liberal sanctities. Yet those sanctities are in themselves insufficient: "tender fellow-feeling for the nearest has its danger too, and is apt to be timid and sceptical towards the larger aims without which life cannot rise to religion". In Arnold's terms, it is a conflict between a dangerously decentred Hellenism and an oppressively sectarian Hebraism.

Liberal-minded working men like Felix Holt seem to propose one answer to that problem, blending "culture" with moral discipline; yet after *Felix Holt* Eliot did not repeat the doomed experiment of centring such "pastoral" figures within urban landscapes. The Bede-Holt character in *Middlemarch* is Caleb Garth, stock type of rural organicism, but decidedly muted and marginal within the novel's structure. As such figures decline in ideological impact, value shifts to an alternative oppositional standpoint: in the case of *Middlemarch*, to the cosmopolitan artist Will Ladislaw. If the traditionalist craftsman forms a pocket of spiritual resistance within bourgeois society, the cosmopolitan artist

inhabits such a dissentient space outside it. He is, however, no complete compensation for the outmoded organicist type: if Ladislaw has the edge over Garth in liberal culture it is because he lacks his social rootedness. It is only with Daniel Deronda, who combines synoptic vision with settled allegiance, that this ideological dilemma can be finally dissolved.

This is not to say, however, that Garth's values do not finally triumph in *Middlemarch*. They do, but in the "higher" mode of a wide eyed liberal disillusion-ment which, with the collapse of more ambitious commitments, is compelled to find solace in the humble reformist tasks nearest to hand. The irony of *Middlemarch* is that it is a triumph of aesthetic totalisation deeply suspicious of ideological totalities. Each of the novel's four central characters represents such an historically typical totalisation: Casaubon idealism, Lydgate scientific rationalism, Bulstrode Evangelical Christianity, Dorothea Brooke Romantic self-achievement through a unifying principle of action. Each of these totalities crumbles, ensnared in the quotidian; and that ensnarement can be read in two ways. It is in part a salutary empiricist check to the tyranny of theoreticism; but it also signifies the bleak victory of an entrenched provincial consciousness over rationalist or Romantic drives to transcend it. That stalemate, the novel's title suggests, springs from a transitional phase of rural society at the time of the first Reform Bill; yet there is no doubt that the novel's judiciously muted disillusion, its "end-of-ideologies" ambience, belongs to its post-second Reform Bill present. The problem which *Middlemarch* objectively poses, and fails to resolve, is how ideology is to be conceptually elaborate yet emotionally affective—how it is to nurture "irrational" personal pieties while cohering them into a structure which surpasses mere empiricism and Romantic spontaneity. What is needed, according to Ladislaw, is "a soul in which knowledge passes instantaneously into feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of knowledge"—a question to which we have seen Matthew Arnold address himself. Confronted with the aggressive modes of working-class consciousness caricatured in *Felix Holt*, the cautious empiricism of the bourgeois liberal tradition must be

reaffirmed; yet that empiricism is in itself an ideologically inadequate response to the historical moment of post-Reform Bill England, with its demand for a more intensively incorporating ideology.

This dilemma is figured in *Middlemarch* in one of its key images: that of the *web* as image of the social formation. The web is a *derivative* organic image, a mid-point between the animal imagery of *Adam Bede* and some more developed theoretical concept of *structure*. The complexity of the web, its subtle interlacing of relatively autonomous strands, its predatory overtones, the possibilities of local complication it permits, accommodate forms of conflict excluded by the more thoroughgoing organicist imagery of *Adam Bede*. But at the same time the web's symmetry, its "spatial" dehistoricising of the social process, its exclusion of levels of contradiction, preserve the essential unity of the organic mode. The web's complex fragility impels a prudent political conservatism: the more delicately interlaced its strands, the more the disruptive consequences of action can multiply, and so the more circumspect one must be in launching ambitiously totalising projects. Yet conversely, if action at any point in the web will vibrate through its filaments to affect the whole formation, a semi-mystical relationship to the totality is nevertheless preserved. Here, as in the novel's closing trope of the river, which in diffusing its force to tributaries intensifies its total impact, natural imagery is exploited to signify how a fulfilling relation to the social totality can be achieved, not by ideological abstraction, but by pragmatic, apparently peripheral work. And if *Middlemarch's* natural metaphors perform this function, so does its aesthetic imagery. As Ladislaw remarks to Dorothea: "It is no use to try and take care of all the world; that is being taken care of when you feel delight—in art or in anything else." The problem of totality within the novel is effectively displaced to the question of aesthetic form itself, which gives structure to its materials without violating their empirical richness. The novel, in other words, formally answers the problem it thematically poses. Only the novelist can be the centred subject of her own decentred fiction, the privileged consciousness which at once supervenes on the whole as its source, and enters into empathetic relation

with each part.

Middlemarch, one might say, is an historical novel in form with little substantive historical content. The Reform Bill, the railways, cholera, machine-breaking: these "real" historical forces do no more than impinge on the novel's margins. The mediation between the text and the "real" history to which it alludes is notably dense; and the effect of this is to transplant the novel from the "historical" to the "ethical". *Middlemarch* works in terms of egoism and sympathy, "head" and "heart", self-fulfilment and self-surrender; and this predominance of the ethical at once points to an historical impasse and provides the means of ideologically overcoming it. History in the novel is officially in a state of transition; yet to read the text is to conclude that "suspension" is the more appropriate term. What is officially offered as an ambivalent, intermediate era leading eventually to the "growing" good of the world' is in fact more of a historical vacuum; the benighted, traditionalist-minded Middlemarch seems little more responsive to historical development than does the Hayslope of *Adam Bede*. There is, then, a discrepancy between what the novel claims and what it shows: in aesthetically "producing" the melioristic ideology intimated by its title, it betrays a considerably less sanguine view of historical progress. It reveals, in fact, an image of the early eighteen-thirties which belongs to the jaundiced viewpoint of where they actually led to--the early eighteen-seventies, where Will Ladislaw's pioneering reformist zeal "has been much checked". *Middlemarch* projects back onto the past its sense of contemporary stalemate: and since the upshot of this is a radical distrust of "real" history, that history is effectively displaced into ethical, and so "timeless", terms. Yet such displacement thereby provides Eliot with an ideological solution: for what cannot be resolved in "historical" terms can be accommodated by a moralising of the issues at stake. This, indeed, is a mystification inherent in the very forms of realist fiction, which by casting objective social relations into interpersonal terms, constantly hold open the possibility of reducing the one to the other. In *Middlemarch*, such an ethical reduction of history is achieved in the "solution" of self-sacrifice, to which, in their

various ways, Dorothea, Lydgate and (in a sense) Bulstrode struggle through. The suffering abnegation of the ego offers itself as the answer to the riddle of history.

Yet such a solution is ideologically insufficient, as Will Ladislaw's presence in the novel would suggest. For Ladislaw, while consenting to the course of social evolution, also retains an individualist verve which challenges such mature resignation. As a politically reforming artist, he suggests that empirical labour and Romantic self-affirmation need not be incompatible; in Mr Brooke's words, he is "a sort of Burke with a leaven of Shelley". The novel's difficulty in "realising" him springs from its incapacity to see how this desirable ideological conjuncture, yoking prudent gradualism to visionary Romanticism, can be achieved in the historical conditions it describes. At this point, therefore, a different kind of history becomes necessary. What cannot be effectively achieved in Ladislaw can be re-attempted on more propitious terms in that later amalgam of Romantic prophet and reformist politician, Daniel Deronda.

What is demanded, in fact, is a "totalising" vision which binds the individual to the laws of a social formation, preserves the "personal" pieties violated by such visions in *Romola* and *Middlemarch*, and romantically liberates the self. The answer to this problem is *Daniel Deronda*. In that novel, Eliot finds a magical solution to her ideological dilemma in Deronda's Jewishness, which provides him with a fulfilling romantic identity while incorporating him into the complex totality of a corporate historical culture. Deronda's early liberalism is fruitlessly Hellenistic, a decentred spreading of sympathies which erodes his capacity for principled action: "a too reflective and diffuse sympathy was in danger of paralysing in him that indignation against wrong and selectness of fellowship which are the conditions of moral force". Hebraism provides the essential corrective—a faith which involves "the blending of a complete personal love in one current with a larger duty" through an obedient "submission of the soul to the Highest". Such submission, however, leaves the "personal" values of liberalism intact: Deronda's vision is of "a mind consciously, energetically moving with

the larger march of human destinies, but not the less full of conscience and tender heart for the footsteps that tread near and need leaning-place (*sic*) ".

The problem, in other words, can be "solved" only by the invention of a *displaced* totality outside the sterile detotalisation of post-Reform Bill England--a totality which is then, as it were, instantly exported, as Deronda leaves to discover his destiny in the Middle East. The difficulty then is to bring this factitious totality into regenerative relation with bourgeois England—a difficulty "solved" by Deronda's redemptive influence on the broken, dispirited victim of that society, Gwendolen Harleth. But in attempting this solution the novel splits into self-contradiction—splits, indeed, down the middle. For Daniel can only fulfil his destiny by withdrawing from Gwendolen to the Middle East, abandoning her to a nebulous Arnoldian trust in some ideal goodness. The formal dislocations of *Daniel Deronda* are the product of its attempt to overcome the ideological contradictions from which it emerges; it is in the silence between its "Gwendolen" and "Daniel" episodes that the truth of those contradictions speaks most eloquently.

Middlemarch's relative obliquity to "real" history is in part a consequence of Eliot's belief (compounded of positivism and idealism) in the power of ideas to shape social existence. Yet what the novel manifests is precisely the fatal disjunction between notion and fact, rendering the one emptily utopian and the other banally empirical. If Deronda's visions are to assume historical flesh, the possibility of such contradiction must be eradicated. The novel therefore presses Eliot's trust in the determining force of ideas to a mystical extreme: dreams, desires, shadowy impulses are now grasped as proleptic symbols of what is actually to be. Such dreams effectively conspire in creating the future: Daniel muses that Mordecai's nature may be one of those in which "a wise estimate of consequences is fused in the fire of the passionate belief which determines the consequences it believes in". History becomes the phenomenal expression of spiritual forces at work within it; and there can thus be no essential contradiction between what the imagination seizes as true and what historically transpires. The novel,

in other words, is driven to the desperate recourse of adopting a mystical epistemology to resolve its problems, and so is effectively forced beyond the bounds of realism. The whole implausible structure of coincidence and hidden kinship which props up the narrative suggests a significant transmutation of the realism of *Middlemarch*, where such devices are sparingly used.

In this sense, *Daniel Deronda* marks one major terminus of nineteenth-century realism a realism now buckling under ideological pressures it is unable to withstand. But it is not merely a question of the "aesthetic" being rudely invaded by the "ideological". For *Daniel Deronda* also signifies a crisis-point in the relatively autonomous evolution of realist forms a point at which the problematic *fictionality* of those stolidly self-confident forms is becoming incorporated as a level of signification within the text itself. The novel's notable preoccupation with art is in one sense a displaced desire for the organicist ideal: art liberates the individual subject but exacts submission to an impersonal order, incarnates an ideal excellence but demands much humble labour, elicits an ascetic Hebraism but calls forth a devotion akin to sexual love. Yet it also signifies the text's constant oblique meditation on its own fictive status—on that circular movement whereby "real" events within the fiction are themselves in some sense "fictions" which prefigure a "reality" of illusory proportions. That there could be no Mordecai outside the limits of fictional discourse (as there could indeed be a Bulstrode) is the true index of the novel's ideological dilemma—a dilemma which is nothing less than the crisis of realist signification itself. *Daniel Deronda* is itself a proleptic sign of a desired social reality, but since that social reality is a fictional construct, unable to project itself beyond the bounds of aesthetic discourse, the text can in the end only signify itself. What it discloses, in that process of self-signification, is an absence which must necessarily evade its aesthetic constructions—the suppressed blankness of the abandoned Gwendolen Harleth, sign of the "real" ideological paucity to which the novel is a mythological riposte.

Eliot's fiction, then, represents an attempt to integrate liberal ideology, in both its Romantic and empiricist forms, with certain

pre-industrial, idealist or positivist organic models. It is an enterprise determined in the last instance by the increasingly corporate character of nineteenth-century capitalism during the period of her literary production. Yet this is not to argue for a simple homology between literary and historical systems, or for a reductively diachronic reading of Eliot's *oeuvre*. It is not a question of Eliot's work evolving from pre-industrial "pastoral" to fully-fledged realism in response to some linear development of bourgeois ideology. On the contrary, it is a question of grasping at once the ideological synchronies and formal discontinuities of her texts of theorising the set of disjunctures whereby distinct literary discourses produce a corporatist ideology which is present from the outset. The *differences* of Eliot's fiction are the effect of a continual repermutation of the literary forms into which it is inserted—a repermutation which in each of her texts "privileges" a particular, dominant discourse which "places" and deforms the others. Within this synchronic practice a significant development can be discerned; one from an essentially *metaphorical* closure of ideological conflict (social history as analogous to natural evolution) towards an essentially *metonymic* resolution of such issues ("personal" values, visions and relations as the solution to social ills). The naturalising, moralising and mythifying devices of the novels effect such closures, but in the act of doing so lay bare the imprint of the ideological struggles which beset the texts. It is in the irregular transmutation of one fictional code into another, the series of formal displacements whereby turbulent issues are marginalised yet remain querulously present, that Eliot's organic closures betray their *constructing* functions. What threatens to subvert them is not a suppressed "outside", but the absences and dislocations they internally produce.

As Victorian capitalism moves into its imperialist stage, the true historical basis of the "idyllic" rural organicism *of Adam Bede* becomes progressively exposed. *Impressions of Theophrastus Such* (1879) places its plea for "corporate existence" in the context of nationalist rhetoric and a warning of the dangers involved in undergoing "a premature fusion with immigrants of alien blood". "The pride which identifies us

with a great historic body," Eliot writes, "is a humanising, elevating habit of mind, inspiring sacrifices of individual comfort, gain, or other selfish ambition, for the sake of that ideal whole; and no man swayed by such a sentiment can become completely abject." The corporate society which in *Daniel Deronda* remained a goal to be realised, and so an idealist critique of contemporary England, has now become an effusive celebration of the *status quo*. The voice of liberal humanism has become the voice of jingoist reaction.

3. Charles Dickens

The major fiction of Victorian society was the product of the petty bourgeoisie. The Brontës, Dickens, Eliot, Hardy: it is with them, rather than with Thackeray, Trollope, Disraeli, Bulwer Lytton[22], that the finest achievements of nineteenth-century realism are to be found. Ambiguously placed within the social formation, the petty bourgeoisie was able on the whole to encompass a richer, more significant range of experience than those writers securely lodged within a single class. But it was also able to find epitomised in its own condition some of the most typical contradictions of bourgeois society as a whole. Indeed, "conventional" bourgeois experience in England proved remarkably unpropitious for the production of major fiction. Only writers with an ambivalent class-relation to the society could, it seemed, be open to the contradictions from which major literary art was produced. (This is true, earlier in the century, of Jane Austen, in whose work the situation of the minor gentry offers a peculiarly privileged focus for examining the conflicts and alliances between aristocracy and bourgeoisie.) As the petty-bourgeois realist tradition declines towards the end of the century into naturalism (Gissing, Wells, Bennett), its fraught, problematic relation to the society is, so to speak, confiscated by the *émigré* writers—James and Conrad, and later Eliot and Pound. A similarly ambiguous relationship occurs in twentieth-century Irish society, to produce the major art of Yeats and Joyce.

This is not to argue, however, that major nineteenth-century realism

was the product of the "class-ideology" of the petty bourgeoisie. For there is, strictly speaking, no such ideological sub-formation: "petty-bourgeois ideology" exists as a strikingly pure and contradictory unity of elements drawn from the ideological realms of both dominant and dominated classes in the social formation. What is in question with all of these texts is the peculiarly complex, over-determined character of their mode of insertion into the hegemonic ideological forms—a complexity which is in part the product of literary "realism" itself. For realism, as we have seen in the case of George Eliot, produces in one of its currents a "democratic" ideology— one progressively responsive to suppressed social experience and humbly quotidian destinies. Yet its aesthetic ideology of "type" and "totality" (and we should be in no doubt as to the *ideological* character of such notions) insists on the integration of these elements into a unitary "world view". The ideology of the realist text resides not in this dominant "world view", but in the formal mutations and displacements which signify its attempts to subordinate other modes of discourse. In the case of the earlier Charles Dickens, for example, each text is a veritable traffic-jam of competing fictional modes—Gothic, Romance, moral fable, "social problem", novel, popular theatre, "short story", journalism, episodic "entertainment" —which permits "realism" no privileged status. The later "realism" of Dickens is thus of a notably impure kind —a question, often enough, of "totalising" forms englobing non-realist "contents", of dispersed, conflictual discourses which ceaselessly offer to displace the securely "over-viewing" eye of classical realism. If Dickens's movement towards such realism produces a "totalising" ideology, it is one constantly deconstructed from within by the "scattering" effect of quite contrary literary devices. In the end, Dickens's novels present symbols of contradictory unity (Chancery Court, Circumlocution Office) which are the very principles of the novel's own construction. Only these symbolic discourses can finally provide an "over-view"; but precisely because their coherence is nothing less than one of systematic contradiction, such an over-view is merely the absent space within which disparate rhetorics are articulated.

The fact that Charles Dickens was an urban rather than rural petty bourgeois marks a significant distinction between his fiction and that of George Eliot. Of all the major English writers of the past century and a half, Dickens is perhaps the least contaminated by organicist ideologies. With him, the Romantic humanist critique of industrial capitalism remains strikingly "spontaneous", with none of the elaborate ideological realisation it receives in the work of Carlyle or D. H. Lawrence. Dickens treats the most available contemporary forms of organicism — Young England, medievalism, the cult of Nature, the Oxford Movement[23] — with the contempt of an *urban* petty-bourgeois writer, one for whom there is no satisfactory withdrawal into the mystifications of pastoral. The retreat to Nature in Dickens is for the most part a negative gesture, associated with death and regression to childhood, social disengagement rather than social paradigm. If Nature for George Eliot suggests the socially structured world of rural England, it is for Dickens a locus of sentimental moralism rather than of sociological law. Little Nell is a symbol of natural value expelled from the predatory city, but it is the archetypally urban Quilp who engages his author's imagination. The spontaneous, empiricist character of Dickens's Romantic humanism, evident in the "Christmas spirit" and the vulgar vitalism of *Hard Times*, emerges as a significant aesthetic and ideological weakness. Yet in the mature work that very weakness productively deprives him of a ready-fashioned organicist ideology, *à la Daniel Deronda*, by which to mediate and "resolve" the conflicts in question. In a transitional work like *Dombey and Son*, the absence of such an ideology results in a text twisted and self-divided by the very contradictions it vulnerably reproduces. The famous railways scene, for example, exhilaratedly affirms bourgeois industrial progress at the same time as it protests gloomily against it on behalf of the petty bourgeoisie it dooms to obsolescence. Yet although that protest is partly couched in natural imagery, Dickens has no organicist ideology like Eliot by which to aesthetically integrate his conflicting symbols, no ideological resources by which to secure a reconciliation of "tradition" and "progress". The contradictions remain visibly inscribed in the text, to enrich and enliven its

dramatically irregular development.

A central symbol of Dickens's Romantic humanism is childhood innocence, which the novels bring into a series of complex structural relations with adult experience. Since the child is isolated, victimised and unable to totalise his perceptually fragmented world, the positive value he incarnates figures effectively as a negation. Such negativity clearly reflects the theoretical limitations of Dickens's moralistic critique of bourgeois society: the child's passivity is a dramatic index of his oppression, but also removes him from the world into a realm of untaintable goodness. On the other hand, the child's very blankness brings into dramatic focus the social forces which dominate him; he becomes, in a Brechtian metaphor, the empty stage on which these historically typical forces contend. Oliver Twist is such a negative centre, whose effective absence from his own narrative allows him passively to focus the socially significant; yet his nullity is also determined by the novel's ideological inability to show him as social *product*. To do that, indeed, would be to undercut the very unhinging of Oliver from history which finally ensures his fabular triumph. The novel argues at once that Oliver is and is not the product of bourgeois oppression, just as the "real" world of bourgeois social relations into which he is magically rescued is endorsed against the "unreal" underworld of poverty and crime, while simultaneously being shown up by that underworld as illusory.

Dickens's fiction thus reveals a contradiction between the social reality mediated by childhood innocence, and the transcendental moral values which that innocence embodies. It is a contradiction intrinsic to petty-bourgeois consciousness, which needs to embrace conventional bourgeois ethics in an undermining awareness of the harsh social realities they suppress. One effect of this is a set of formal dissonances in the novels themselves. *Pickwick Papers*, for example, cannot really be a *novel* in the traditional sense, since Pickwick's complacent innocence renders him incapable of any significantly interconnected experience beyond the merely episodic. The book consequently needs a supplementary centre in Sam Weller, who, though officially subordinate (Pickwick's servant), is in fact the master. In a double displacement of

the text's bourgeois blandness, the unpalatable experience it expels from its official narrative erupts elsewhere, in the grotesquely violent, death-obsessed tales by which that narrative is regularly interrupted. In a somewhat parallel way, Quilp in *The Old Curiosity Shop* symbolises the smouldering, anarchic vengeance which the novel wreaks on its own decorous, sentimental story-line.

Dickens's fiction, like Eliot's, deploys literary devices to "resolve" ideological conflict; but his novels are more remarkable than Eliot's for the clarity with which those conflicts inscribe themselves in the fissures and hiatuses of the texts, in their mixed structures and disjunct meanings. It is not that Eliot's work does not also reveal such formal dislocations, as I have suggested; it is rather that Eliot's writing, sustained by an aesthetic as well as social ideology of organic form, strives for such organic closure more consciously and consistently than does Dickens's. His novels, by contrast, offer their self-contradictory forms and internal inconsistencies as part of their historical meaning. Dickens's mature work certainly achieves aesthetic integration, but it is of a significantly different kind from Eliot's. Whereas Eliot's organicist ideology provides a structure for social totalisation, Dickens is forced in his later fiction to use as aesthetically unifying images the very social institutions (the Chancery Court of *Bleak House*, the Circumlocution Office of *Little Dorrit*) which are the object of his criticism. It is, ironically, these very systems of conflict, division and contradiction which provide Dickens with a principle of symbolic coherence. In this sense, the aesthetic unity of his mature work is founded, not on a mythology of "organic community", but on exactly the opposite: on the historical self-divisions of bourgeois society. It is not that the early Dickens's perception of character as idiosyncratic and non-relational yields to a vision of social unity; it is rather that such non-relationship is now shown to be *systemic*—the function of decentred structures like Chancery, finance capitalism and the Circumlocution Office, elusive centres which seem all-pervasive yet everywhere absent. Characters in later Dickens remain individually graphic and grotesque, but are now increasingly grasped as the bearers of these structures, which act as the true

protagonists of the later fiction.

What Eliot's writing attempts to resolve *synchronically*—a conflict between two phases of bourgeois ideology, determined by certain mutations in the historical nature of English capitalism—Dickens's fiction moves through *diachronically*. The anarchic, decentred, fragmentary forms of the early novels correspond in general to an earlier, less organised phase of industrial capitalism; the unified structures of the mature fiction allude to a more intensively coordinated capitalism, with its complex networks of finance capitalism (Merdle in *Little Dorrit*), its progressively centralised state bureaucracy (the Circumlocution Office) and its increasingly monolithic ideological apparatuses (the educational system of *Hard Times*, the juridical structures of *Bleak House*). (The railways of *Dombey and Son* mark a transitional stage in this development—a visibly unifying network which none the less, in the entrepreneurial "spontaneity" of their creation and the heterogeneous quality of experience to which they give rise, recall the arbitrary, explosive energies of the early novels.) Yet this diachronic movement is not one from "individualism" to "community". It is a movement from the novel of the absent centre (innocent child, blankly conventional adult) around which certain contradictions knot themselves, to the novel of the decentred totality—a novel which mimes, in its integrated symbolism, a set of conflicts and non-relations now grasped as systemic.

注释:

1 Utilitarianism:功利主义,主张以最大多数人的最大幸福为道德标准的伦理学理论。19世纪初,功利主义学说以"哲学激进主义"的名称出现于英国,其奠基者为边沁。他于1781年提出"功利主义"这个词以支持心理学的快乐主义理论,把以前使用得最多的"善"解释为最大数量的快乐与最小数量的痛苦。认为个人利益是惟一的现实利益,而社会利益只是个人利益的总和。

2 the "Culture and Society" tradition: "文化与社会"的传统,雷蒙·威廉斯在其名著《文化与社会》中揭示出工业革命以来英国人文学科当中存在的一种文化批评传统。这一思想传统的核心内容是,工业革命之后英国社会固有的自然和谐、有机的文化受到了工业文明的侵蚀,引发了当代精神和文化危机。摆脱危机的出路在于扩大有机共同体(organic community)和重申文化的价值,以对抗机械性的资本主义文明。《文化与社会》一书分析了自伯克以来经马修·阿诺德直到20世纪

的乔治·奥威尔等40位批评家和作家对工业社会的批判。

伯克(Edmond Burke,1729—1797):辉格党政论家,被称为现代保守主义的鼻祖,著有《法国革命论》(*Reflections on the Revolution in France*)。

卡莱尔(Thomas Carlyle,1795—1881):苏格兰散文作家和历史学家,著有《法国革命》和《论英雄、英雄崇拜和历史上的英雄事迹》等。

狄斯累里(Benjamin Disraeli,1804—1881):英国政治家、作家,保守党领袖,两度出任首相,写过小说和政论。《文化与社会》一书评论了他的长篇小说《西比尔》。

罗斯金(John Ruskin,1819—1900):英国著名艺术评论家、社会改革家,推崇哥特复兴式建筑和中世纪艺术,反对经济放任主义,著有《现代画家》、《七盏灯》、《威尼斯之石》等。

3 葛兰西把知识分子分为"传统知识分子"和"有机的知识分子"。区分的标准是知识分子在社会关系总体中的地位,而不是知识分子所掌握的技能。传统知识分子以封建社会中的教士阶层、哲学家、艺术家、文人为代表。他们是独立于统治集团的特殊阶层,是独立的、自治的、具有自我特性的。而有机知识分子是与先进生产方式联系在一起的革命的知识分子。他们能够组织群众和发动群众,与群众紧密结合在一起。葛兰西认为,无产阶级应该造就自己的有机知识分子,在此基础上争取传统知识分子。无产阶级政党的领袖应该是有机知识分子。

作者在原注中说明,作者在本文赋予"有机的"一词的意义与葛兰西所使用的"有机的"一词的意义不同。见注释5。

4 穆勒认为,代表理性功利主义的边沁和代表浪漫主义的柯律治是"当时英国两个伟大的思想源泉"。他们的思想貌似对立,实际上在社会改良问题上存在一定的共识。

5 根据作者原注,有机主义指那些认为自然的生活形式具有自然统一性质的社会和美学思想,在更一般的意义上指整齐统一的系统,以各构成成分和谐、相互依托为特征。有关这一观念比较详尽的解释,见雷蒙·威廉斯的《文化与社会》和《关键词》中相应的词条。

6 作者在原注中认为,到了亨利·詹姆斯时代,文学生产方式发生了重大变化,人物繁多、情节散漫的多卷本小说逐渐被"有机的"单卷本小说所取代,这是资本主义一般生产方式、文学生产方式、"美学"意识形态与主导意识形态要求结合在一起的一个例证。这正是伊格尔顿在本文中着力阐发的内容:主导意识形态对文学形式的影响。

7 阿诺德的名著《文化与无政府》最初以连载的形式发表在杂志上。1866年,要求扩大选举权的工人群众进行游行示威,在海德公园引发了一场小小的骚乱。阿诺德有感而发,提出了自己的政治见解,因此这部文化批评著作经常被视为政治学著作。它反映出阿诺德"文治"、"武功"并用的保守主义政治思想。阿诺德主张一边以强制手段镇压骚乱,一边用文化来驯服工人阶级,以免社会落入无政府状态。"无政府"既指代工人阶级参与政治产生的后果,又指代工人阶级的文化。

8 作者在原注中说明，阿诺德对哪一个阶级在英国实际掌握政治霸权这个问题的看法很不一致，由于他未能将真正的霸权与国家机器的管理区分开来，所以他通常认为贵族仍然是统治阶级。直到 1879 年，他还认为中产阶级不可能掌权，但在《友谊的花环》一书中他却说贵族行使管理职能，中产阶级进行统治。

9 corporate state：社团国家，以职业而不是以地理疆界为基础组成的国家、雇主及工人在各自行业组成社团、企业联合体或同业工会以规范行业内部的相关事务。一般而言，社团理论持有机社会观念，因为同属于某一个有机体，故各个团体之间并不发生利益冲突。因此，社团主义否定阶级斗争不可避免的学说。此外，它同时假设政治问题对大众而言太过复杂，因为一般人只了解与其职业直接相关的问题。

10 阿诺德在《文化与无政府》一书中把英国社会划分为三个阶层：贵族、中产阶级和平民。他认为，自 18 世纪以来，现代英国社会的贵族已经失去了先辈的许多美德，无力承担领导国家的重任，他们对文化和知识生活不再感兴趣，转而重视外表，好田猎，尚武力，与古代的蛮族有共同之处，故阿诺德称其为"野蛮人"。而中产阶级因长期受到浸透希伯莱精神的清教思想的影响，往往循规蹈矩，缺乏意识的自发性，这有碍于他们追求完美。并且，他们对工作的重视程度超过对思想的重视。到了 19 世纪，他们一心攫取财富，而忽略了对知识和美的热爱，因此阿诺德称其为"市侩"。对于平民（工人阶级），阿诺德的态度是矛盾的，有时候认为他们"粗野"、"面目可憎"、"缺乏人性"，有时候又认为他们表现出的同情心超过了其他两个阶级。伊格尔顿认为，阿诺德对英国阶级结构的描述是建立在贵族式的等级观念基础上的，没有把社会阶级看作具有内在关系的现实。

11 特里林（Lionel Trilling，1905—1975）：美国文化批评家，受阿诺德的影响很大。长期任教于哥伦比亚大学，著有批评专著《马修·阿诺德》（1939）和《E. M. 福斯特》（1943），另有论文集《自由的想像》（1950）、《对抗的自我》（1955）、《逃亡者的聚会》（1956）等。

12 *Empedocles on Etna*：《恩培多克勒在埃特那》，马修·阿诺德的戏剧诗，发表于 1852 年。

13 *Das Leben Jesu*：斯特劳斯的《耶稣传》。*Daniel Deronda*：《丹尼尔·德隆达》，乔治·艾略特创作的最后一部长篇小说，书中涉及到维多利亚时期的排犹问题。

14 作者在原注中表明，19 世纪中期以来，英国的社团化形势日益显著，工业单位大规模扩展，农业进入了全面组织起来的"高级农业"时期，资本家的合作经营和合资企业得到发展，铁路一体化，教育和卫生领域出现了日益集中的国家官僚机器。相应的，资产阶级意识形态也呈现出社团化形式：实证主义，基督教社会主义，新封建主义，新黑格尔主义。工人运动中采取的社团化形式有和解工联主义、互助友好社团、储蓄银行等。

15 作者在原注中指出，阶级斗争形势的这种转变与特定文学的发展有密切的关系，盖斯凯尔夫人的《玛丽·巴顿》（1848）和《南方与北方》（1855）在意识形态上有很

大的差距，从中可以看出历史的嬗变。

16 *Silas Marner*:《织工马南》，乔治·艾略特创作的一部较短的长篇小说。这是一部道德伦理小说，作者意在说明纯朴自然的人终将有好报。

17 *The Mill on the Floss*:《弗洛斯河上的磨房》，乔治·艾略特的名作，描写了乡村生活的场景，但作者更为侧重描写人物的心理。在故事的结尾，最终达成和解的两位主人公汤姆和麦吉兄妹死在湍急的洪水中。

18 *Middlemarch*:《米德尔马奇》，乔治·艾略特的名作，描写了19世纪英国外省的风土人情，展现了维多利亚时期的社会风貌。小镇米德尔马奇是更为广阔的世界的缩影。

19 *Adam Bede*:《亚当·比德》，乔治·艾略特以家乡沃里克郡为背景的一部描写乡村生活的小说。

20 *Felix Holt: the Radical*:《费力克斯·霍尔特》，一部以工业革命时期劳工运动为题材的小说。作品反映出作者对社会底层持有同情态度，具有社会改革思想，但同时又惧怕群众性的暴力革命。

21 *Romola*:《罗慕拉》，乔治·艾略特以15世纪末在萨伏那诺拉领导下的意大利佛罗伦萨起义为背景的一部历史传奇。

22 巴尔沃·李顿(Bulwer Lytton,1831—1891):英国外交家，曾任驻印度总督，一生享有诗人的盛名，作品有叙事诗《克莉坦妮斯特拉及其他》、自传体抒情诗《流浪者》以及韵文小说《露西尔》。

23 the Oxford Movement:牛津运动，19世纪英国基督教圣公会内部以牛津大学为中心兴起的运动，旨在反对圣公会内的新教倾向，恢复天主教思想和惯例。查尔斯·纽曼(1789—1857)是这场运动的重要领导人。

弗雷德里克·詹姆逊:跨国资本主义时代的第三世界文学

Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism

Fredric Jameson

Judging from recent conversations among third-world intellectuals, there is now an obsessive return of the national situation itself, the name of the country that returns again and again like a gong, the collective attention to "us" and what we have to do and how we do it, to what we can't do and what we do better than this or that nationality, our unique characteristics, in short, to the level of the "people". This

is not the way American intellectuals have been discussing "America", and indeed one might feel that the whole matter is nothing but that old thing called "nationalism", long since liquidated here and rightly so. Yet a certain nationalism is fundamental in the third world (and also in the most vital areas of the second world), thus making it legitimate to ask whether it is all that bad in the end. Does in fact the message of some disabused and more experienced first-world wisdom (that of Europe even more than of the United States) consist in urging these nation states to outgrow it as fast as possible? The predictble reminders of Kampuchea and of Iraq and Iran do not really seem to me to settle anything or suggest by what these nationalisms might be replaced except perhaps some global American postmodernist culture.

Many arguments can be made for the importance and interest of non-canonical forms of literature such as that of the third world, but one is peculiarly self-defeating because it borrows the weapons of the adversary: the strategy of trying to prove that these texts are as "great" as those of the canon itself. The object is then to show that, to take an example from another non-canonical form, Dashiell Hammett is really as great as Dostoyevsky, and therefore can be admitted. This is to attempt dutifully to wish away all traces of that "pulp" format which is constitutive of sub genres, and it invites immediate failure insofar as any passionate reader of Dostoyevsky will know at once, after a few pages, that those kinds of satisfactions are not present. Nothing is to be gained by passing over in silence the radical difference of non-canonical texts. The third-world novel will not offer the satisfactions of Proust or Joyce; what is more damaging than that, perhaps, is its tendency to remind us of outmoded stages of our own first-world cultural development and to cause us to conclude that "they are still writing novels like Dreiser or Sherwood Anderson".

...

But I would rather argue all this a different way, at least for now: these reactions to third-world texts are at one and the same time perfectly natural, perfectly comprehensible, *and* terribly parochial. If the purpose of the canon is to restrict our aesthetic sympathies, to

develop a range of rich and subtle perceptions which can be exercised only on the occasion of a small but choice body of texts, to discourage us from reading anything else or from reading those things in different ways, then it is humanly impoverishing. Indeed our want of sympathy for these often unmodern third-world texts is itself frequently but a disguise for some deeper fear of the affluent about the way people actually live in other parts of the world—a way of life that still has little in common with daily life in the American suburb. There is nothing particularly disgraceful in having lived a sheltered life, in never having had to confront the difficulties, the complications and the frustrations of urban living, but it is nothing to be particularly proud of either. Moreover, a limited experience of life normally does not make for a wide range of sympathies with very different kinds of people (I'm thinking of differences that range from gender and race all the way to those of social class and culture).

The way in which all this affects the reading process seems to be as follows: as western readers whose tastes (and much else) have been formed by our own modernisms, a popular or socially realistic third-world novel tends to come before us, not immediately, but as though already-read. We sense, between ourselves and this alien text, the presence of another reader, of the Other reader, for whom a narrative, which strikes us as conventional or naive, has a freshness of information and a social interest that we cannot share. The fear and the resistance I'm evoking has to do, then, with the sense of our own non-coincidence with that Other reader, so different from ourselves; our sense that to coincide in any adequate way with that Other "ideal reader"—that is to say, to read this text adequately—we would have to give up a great deal that is individually precious to us and acknowledge an existence and a situation unfamiliar and therefore frightening—one that we do not know and prefer *not* to know.

Why, returning to the question of the canon, *should* we only read certain kinds of books? No one is suggesting we should *not* read those, but why should we not also read other ones? We are not, after all, being shipped to that "desert island" beloved of the devisers of great

books lists. And as a matter of fact and this is to me the conclusive nail in the argument—we all do "read" many different kinds of texts in this life of ours, since, whether we are willing to admit it or not, we spend much of our existence in the force field of a mass culture that is radically different from our "great books" and live at least a double life in the various compartments of our unavoidably fragmented society. We need to be aware that we are even more fundamentally fragmented than that; rather than clinging to this particular mirage of the "centered subject" and the unified personal identity, we would do better to confront honestly the fact of fragmentation on a global scale; it is a confrontation with which we can here at least make a cultural beginning.

A final observation on my use of the term "third world". I take the point of criticisms of this expression, particularly those which stress the way in which it obliterates profound differences between a whole range of non-western countries and situations (indeed, one such fundamental opposition—between the traditions of the great eastern empires and those of the post-colonial African nation states—is central in what follows). I don't, however, see any comparable expression that articulates, as this one does, the fundamental breaks between the capitalist first world, the socialist bloc of the second world, and a range of other countries which have suffered the experience of colonialism and imperialism. One can only deplore the ideological implications of oppositions such as that between "developed" and "underdeveloped" or "developing" countries; while the more recent conception of northern and southern tiers, which has a very different ideological content and import than the rhetoric of development, and is used by very different people, nonetheless implies an unquestioning acceptance of "convergence theory"—namely the idea that the Soviet Union and the United States are from this perspective largely the same thing. I am using the term "third world" in an essentially descriptive sense, and objections to it do not strike me as especially relevant to the argument I am making.

* * *

In these last years of the century, the old question of a properly

world literature reasserts itself. This is due as much or more to the disintegration of our own conceptions of cultural study as to any very lucid awareness of the great outside world around us. We may therefore--as "*humanists*" —acknowledge the pertinence of the critique of present-day humanities by our titular leader, William Bennett, without finding any great satisfaction in his embarrassing solution: yet another impoverished and ethnocentric Graeco-Judaic "great books list of the civilization of the West", "great texts, great minds, great ideas". One is tempted to turn back on Bennett himself the question he approvingly quotes from Maynard Mack: "How long can a democratic nation afford to support *a* narcissistic *minority* so transfixed by its *own image?*" Nevertheless, the present moment does offer a remarkable opportunity to re-think our humanities curriculum in a new way— to re-examine the shambles and ruins of all our older "great books", "humanities", "freshman-introductory" and "core course" type traditions.

Today the reinvention of cultural studies in the United States demands the reinvention, in a new situation, of what Goethe long ago theorized as "world literature". In our more immediate context, then, any conception of world literature necessarily demands some specific engagement with the question of third-world literature, and it is this not necessarily narrower subject about which I have something to say today.

It would be presumptuous to offer some general theory of what is often called third-world literature, given the enormous variety both of national cultures in the third world and of specific historical trajectories in each of those areas. All of this, then, is provisional and intended both to suggest specific perspectives for research and to convey a sense of the interest and value of these clearly neglected literatures for people formed by the values and stereotypes of a first-world culture. One important distinction would seem to impose itself at the outset, namely that none of these cultures can be conceived as anthropologically independent or autonomous, rather, they are all in various distinct ways locked in a life-and-death struggle with first-world cultural imperialism—a cultural struggle that is itself a reflexion of the economic

situation of such areas in their penetration by various stages of capital, or as it is sometimes euphemistically termed, of modernization. This, then, is some first sense in which a study of third-world culture necessarily entails a new view of ourselves, from the outside, insofar as we ourselves are (perhaps without fully knowing it) constitutive forces powerfully at work on the remains of older cultures in our general world capitalist system.

But if this is the case, the initial distinction that imposes itself has to do with the nature and development of older cultures at the moment of capitalist penetration, something it seems to me most enlightening to examine in terms of the marxian concept of modes of production. Contemporary historians seem to be in the process of reaching a consensus on the specificity of feudalism as a form which, issuing from the break-up of the Roman Empire or the Japanese Shogunate, is able to develop directly into capitalism. This is not the case with the other modes of production, which in some sense must be disaggregated or destroyed by violence, before capitalism is able to implant its specific forms and displace the older ones. In the gradual expansion of capitalism across the globe, then, our economic system confronts two very distinct modes of production that pose two very different types of social and cultural resistance to its influence. These are so-called primitive, or tribal society on the one hand, and the Asiatic mode of production[f], or the great bureaucratic imperial systems, on the other. African societies and cultures, as they became the object of systematic colonization in the 1880s, provide the most striking examples of the symbiosis of capital and tribal societies; while China and India offer the principal examples of another and quite different sort of engagement of capitalism with the great empires of the so-called Asiatic mode. My examples below, then, will be primarily African and Chinese; however, the special case of Latin America must be noted in passing. Latin America offers yet a third kind of development—one involving an even earlier destruction of imperial systems now projected by collective memory back into the archaic or tribal. Thus the earlier nominal conquests of independence open them at once to a kind of indirect economic penetration and

control—something Africa and Asia will come to experience only more recently with decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s.

Having made these initial distinctions, let me now, by way of a sweeping hypothesis, try to say what all third-world cultural productions seem to have in common and what distinguishes them radically from analogous cultural forms in the first world. All third-world texts are necessarily, I want to argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: they are to be read as what I will call *national allegories*, even when, or perhaps I should say, particularly when their forms develop out of predominantly western machineries of representation, such as the novel. Let me try to state this distinction in a grossly oversimplified way: one of the determinants of capitalist culture, that is, the culture of the western realist and modernist novel, is a radical split between the private and the public, between the poetic and the political, between what we have come to think of as the domain of sexuality and the unconscious and that of the public world of classes, of the economic, and of secular political power: in other words, Freud versus Marx. Our numerous theoretical attempts to overcome this great split only reconfirm its existence and its shaping power over our individual and collective lives. We have been trained in a deep cultural conviction that the lived experience of our private existences is somehow incommensurable with the abstractions of economic science and political dynamics. Politics in our novels therefore is, according to Stendhal's canonical formulation, a "pistol shot in the middle of a concert".

I will argue that, although we may retain for convenience and for analysis such categories as the subjective and the public or political, the relations between them are wholly different in third-world culture. Third-world texts, even those which are seemingly private and invested with a properly libidinal dynamic—necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national allegory: *the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society.* Need I add that it is precisely this very different ratio of the political to the personal which makes such texts alien to us at first approach, and consequently, resistant to

our conventional western habits of reading?

I will offer, as something like the supreme example of this process of allegorization, the first masterwork of China's greatest writer, Lu Xun. "Diary of a Madman" (1918) must at first be read by any western reader as the protocol of what our essentially psychological language terms a "nervous breakdown". It offers the notes and perceptions of a subject in intensifying prey to a terrifying psychic delusion, the conviction that the people around him are concealing a dreadful secret, and that that secret can be none other than the increasingly obvious fact that they are cannibals. At the climax of the development of the delusion, which threatens his own physical safety and his very life itself as a potential victim, the narrator understands that his own brother is himself a cannibal and that the death of their little sister, a number of years earlier, far from being the result of childhood illness, as he had thought, was in reality a murder. As befits the protocol of a psychosis, these perceptions are objective ones, which can be rendered without any introspective machinery: the paranoid subject observes sinister glances around him in the real world, he overhears tell-tale conversations between his brother and an alleged physician (obviously in reality another cannibal) which carry all the conviction of the real, and can be objectively (or "realistically") represented...

What is reconstructed, however, is a grisly and terrifying objective real world beneath the appearances of our own world: an unveiling or deconcealment of the nightmarish reality of things, a stripping away of our conventional illusions or rationalizations about daily life and existence. It is a process comparable, as a literary effect, only to some of the processes of western modernism, and in particular of existentialism, in which narrative is employed as a powerful instrument for the experimental exploration of reality and illusion, an exploration which, however, unlike some of the older realisms, presupposes a certain prior "personal knowledge". The reader must, in other words, have had some analogous experience, whether in physical illness or psychic crisis, of a lived and balefully transformed real world from which we cannot even mentally escape, for the full horror of Lu Xun's nightmare to

be appreciated...

But this representational power of Lu Xun's text cannot be appreciated properly without some sense of what I have called its allegorical resonance. For it should be clear that the cannibalism literally apprehended by the sufferer in the attitudes and bearing of his family and neighbors is at one and the same time being attributed by Lu Xun himself to Chinese society as a whole: and if this attribution is to be called "figural", it is indeed a figure more powerful and "literal" than the "literal" level of the text. Lu Xun's proposition is that the people of this great maimed and retarded, disintegrating China of the late and post-imperial period, his fellow citizens, are "literally" cannibals: in their desperation. disguised and indeed intensified by the most traditional forms and procedures of Chinese culture, they must devour one another ruthlessly to stay alive. This occurs at all levels of that exceedingly hierarchical society, from lumpens and peasants all the way to the most privileged elite positions in the mandarin bureaucracy. It is, I want to stress, a social and historical nightmare, a vision of the horror of life specifically grasped through History itself, whose consequences go far beyond the more local western realistic or naturalistic representation of cut-throat capitalist or market competition, and it exhibits a specifically political resonance absent from its natural or mythological western equivalent in the nightmare of Darwinian natural selection.

Now I want to offer four additional remarks about this text, which will touch, respectively, on the libidinal dimension of the story, on the structure of its allegory, on the role of the third-world cultural producer himself, and on the perspective of futurity projected by the tale's double resolution. I will be concerned, in dealing with all four of these topics, to stress the radical structural difference between the dynamics of third-world culture and those of the first-world cultural tradition in which we have ourselves been formed.

I have suggested that in third-world texts such as this story by Lu Xun the relationship between the libidinal and the political components of individual and social experience is radically different from what obtains in the west and what shapes our own cultural forms. Let me try to

characterize this difference, or if you like this radical reversal, by way of the following generalization: in the west, conventionally, political commitment is recontained and psychologized or subjectivized by way of the public-private split I have already evoked. Interpretations, for example, of political movements of the 60s in terms of Oedipal revolts are familiar to everyone and need no further comment. That such interpretations are episodes in a much longer tradition, whereby political commitment is re-psychologized and accounted for in terms of the subjective dynamics of *ressentiment* or the authoritarian personality, is perhaps less well understood, but can be demonstrated by a careful reading of anti-political texts from Nietzsche and Conrad all the way to the latest cold-war propaganda.

What is relevant to our present context is not, however, the demonstration of that proposition, but rather of its inversion in third-world culture, where I want to suggest that psychology, or more specifically, libidinal investment, is to be read in primarily political and social terms. (It is, I hope, unnecessary to add that what follows is speculative and very much subject to correction by specialists: it is offered as a methodological example rather than a "theory" of Chinese culture.) We're told, for one thing, that the great ancient imperial cosmologies identify by analogy what we in the west analytically separate: thus, the classical sex manuals are at one with the texts that reveal the dynamics of political forces, the charts of the heavens at one with the logic of medical lore, and so forth. Here already then, in an ancient past, western antinomies--and most particularly that between the subjective and the public or political--are refused in advance...

A different alimentary transgression can be observed throughout Lu Xun's works, but nowhere quite so strikingly as in his terrible little story, "Medicine". The story potrays a dying child--the death of children is a constant in these works—whose parents have the good fortune to procure an "infallible" remedy. At this point we must recall both that traditional Chinese medicine is not "taken", as in the west, but "eaten", and that for Lu Xun traditional Chinese medicine was the supreme locus of the unspeakable and exploitative charlatanry of traditional

Chinese culture in general. In his crucially important *Preface*[2] to the first collection of his stories, he recounts the suffering and death of his own father from tuberculosis, while declining family reserves rapidly disappeared into the purchase of expensive and rare, exotic and ludicrous medicaments. We will not sense the symbolic significance of this indignation unless we remember that for all these reasons Lu Xun decided to study western medicine in Japan—the epitome of some new western science that promised collective regeneration—only later to decide that the production of culture—I am tempted to say, the elaboration of a political culture—was a more effective form of political medicine. As a writer, then, Lu Xun remains a diagnostician and a physician. Hence this terrible story, in which the cure for the male child, the father's only hope for survival in future generations, turns out to be one of those large doughy-white Chinese steamed rolls, soaked in the blood of a criminal who has just been executed. The child dies anyway, of course, but it is important to note that the hapless victim of a more properly state violence (the supposed criminal) was a *political* militant, whose grave is mysteriously covered in flowers by absent sympathizers of whom one knows nothing. In the analysis of a story like this, we must rethink our conventional conception of the symbolic levels of a narrative (where sexuality and politics might be in homology to each other, for instance) as a set of loops or circuits which intersect and overdetermine each other—the enormity of therapeutic cannibalism finally intersecting in a pauper's cemetery, with the more overt violence of family betrayal and political repression.

...

Here too Lu Xun has some lessons for us. This writer of short stories and sketches, which never evolved into the novel form as such, produced at least one approach to the longer form, in a much lengthier series of anecdotes about a hapless coolie named Ah Q, who comes to serve, as we might have suspected, as the allegory of a certain set of Chinese attitudes and modes of behavior. It is interesting to note that the enlargement of the form determines a shift in tone or generic discourse: now everything that had been stricken with the stillness and

emptiness of death and suffering without hope—"the room was not only too silent, it was far too big as well, and the things in it were far too empty"—becomes material for a more properly Chaplinesque comedy. Ah Q's resiliency springs from an unusual—but we are to understand culturally very normal and familiar—technique for overcoming humiliation. When set upon by his persecutors, Ah Q, serene in his superiority over them, reflects:" "It is as if I were beaten by my own son. What is the world coming to nowadays ..." Thereupon he too would walk away, satisfied at having won." Admit that you are not even human, they insist, that you are nothing but an animal! On the contrary, he tells them, I'm worse than an animal, I'm an insect! There, does that satisfy you? "In less than ten seconds, however, Ah Q would walk away also satisfied that he had won, thinking that he was after all "number one in self-belittlement", and that after removing the "self-belittlement" what remained was still the glory of remaining "number one". When one recalls the remarkable self-esteem of the Manchu dynasty in its final throes, and the serene contempt for foreign devils who had nothing but modern science, gunboats, armies, technology and power to their credit, one achieves a more precise sense of the historical and social topicality of Lu Xun's satire.

Ah Q is thus, allegorically, China itself. What I want to observe, however, what complicates the whole issue, is that his persecutors - the idlers and bullies who find their daily pleasures in getting a rise out of just such miserable victims as Ah Q- they too are China, in the allegorical sense. This very simple example, then, shows the capacity of allegory to generate a range of distinct meanings or messages, simultaneously, as the allegorical tenor and vehicle change places: Ah Q is China humiliated by the foreigners, a China so well versed in the spiritual techniques of self-justification that such humiliations are not even registered, let alone recalled. But the persecutors are also China, in a different sense, the terrible self-cannibalistic China of the "Diary of a Madman", whose response to powerlessness is the senseless persecution of the weaker and more inferior members of the hierarchy.

All of which slowly brings us to the question of the writer himself

in the third world, and to what must be called the function of the intellectual, it being understood that in the third-world situation the intellectual is always in one way or another a political intellectual. No third-world lesson is more timely or more urgent for us today, among whom the very term "intellectual" has withered away, as though it were the name for an extinct species. Nowhere has the strangeness of this vacant position been brought home to me more strongly than on a recent trip to Cuba, when I had occasion to visit a remarkable college-preparatory school on the outskirts of Havana. Over some three or four years, Cuban teenagers study poems of Homer, Dante's Inferno, the Spanish theatrical classics, the great realistic novels of the 19th-century European tradition, and finally contemporary Cuban revolutionary novels, of which, incidentally, we desperately need English translations. But the semester's work I found most challenging was one explicitly devoted to the study of the role of the intellectual as such: the cultural intellectual who is also a political militant, the intellectual who produces both poetry and praxis. The Cuban illustrations of this process - Ho Chi Minh[3] and Augustino Nieto --are obviously enough culturally determined: our own equivalents would probably be the more familiar figures of Du Bois and C. L. R. James, of Sartre and Neruda or Brecht, of Kollontai or Louise Michel. But as this whole talk aims implicitly at suggesting a new conception of the humanities in American education today, it is appropriate to add that the study of the role of the intellectual as such ought to be a key component in any such proposals.

I've already said something about Lu Xun's own conception of his vocation, and its extrapolation from the practice of medicine. But there is a great deal more to be said specifically about the *Preface*. Not only is it one of the fundamental documents for understanding the situation of the third world artist, it is also a dense text in its own right, fully as much a work of art as any of the greatest stories. And in Lu Xun's own work it is the supreme example of the very unusual ratio of subjective investment and a deliberately depersonalized objective narration. We have no time to do justice to those relationships, which would demand a line-by-line commentary. Yet I will quote the little fable by which Lu

Xun, responding to requests for publication by his friends and future collaborators, dramatizes his dilemma:

> Imagine an iron house without windows, absolutely indestructible, with many people fast asleep inside who will shortly die of suffocation. But you know that since they will die in their sleep, they will not feel the pain of death. Now if you cry aloud to wake a few of the lighter sleepers, making those unfortunate few suffer the agony of irrevocable death, do you think you are doing them a good turn?

...

In a more general theoretical context and it is this theoretical form of the problem I should now like at least to thematize and set in place on the agenda—we must recover a sense of what "cultural revolution" means. The term, we are told, was Lenin's own, and in that form explicitly designated the literacy campaign and the new problems of universal... We must, however, enlarge the conception still further, to include a range of seemingly very different preoccupations, of which the names of Gramsci and Wilhelm Reich, Frantz Fanon, Herbert Marcuse,[1] Rudolph Bahro, and Paolo Freire, may give an indication of their scope and focus. Overhastily, I will suggest that "*cultural revolution*" as it is projected in such works turns on the phenomenon of what Gramsci called "subalternity", namely the feelings of mental inferiority and habits of subservience and obedience which necessarily and structurally develop in situations of domination—most dramatically in the experience of colonized peoples. But here, as so often, the subjectivizing and psychologizing habits of first-world peoples such as ourselves can play us false and lead us *into* misunderstandings. Subalternity is *not* in that sense a psychological matter, although it governs psychologies; and I suppose that the strategic choice of the term "cultural" aims precisely at restructuring that view of the problem and projecting it outwards into the realm of objective or collective spirit in some non-psychological, but also non-reductionist or non-economistic, materialistic fashion. When a

psychic structure is objectively determined by economic and political relationships, it cannot be dealt with by means of purely psychological therapies; yet it equally cannot be dealt with by means of purely objective transformations of the economic and political situation itself, since the habits remain and exercise a baleful and crippling residual effect. This is a more dramatic form of that old mystery, the unity of theory and practice...

The matter of narrative closure, then, and of the relationship of a narrative text to futurity and to some collective project yet to come, is not, merely a formal or literary-critical issue. "Diary of a Madman" has in fact two distinct and incompatible endings, which prove instructive to examine in light of the writer's own hesitations and anxieties about his social role. One ending, that of the deluded subject himself, is very much a call to the future, in the impossible situation of a well-nigh universal cannibalism: the last desperate lines launched into the void are the words, "Save the children..." But the tale has a second ending as well, which is disclosed on the opening page, when the older (supposedly cannibalistic) brother greets the narrator with the following cheerful remark: "I appreciate your coming such a long way to see us, but my brother recovered some time ago and has gone elsewhere to take up an official post." So, in advance, the nightmare is annulled; the paranoid visionary, his brief and terrible glimpse of the grisly reality beneath the appearance now vouchsafed, gratefully returns to the realm of illusion and oblivion therein again to take up his place in the space of bureaucratic power and privilege. I want to suggest that it is only at this price, by way of a complex play of simultaneous and antithetical messages, that the narrative text is able to open up a concrete perspective on the real future.

* * *

I must interrupt myself here to interpolate several observations before proceeding. For one thing, it is clear to me that *any* articulation of radical difference—that of gender, incidentally, fully as much as that of culture—is susceptible to appropriation by that strategy of otherness

which Edward Said, in the context of the Middle East, called "orientalism".[5] It does not matter much that the radical otherness of the culture in question is praised or valorized positively, as in the preceding pages: the essential operation is that of differentiation, and once that has been accomplished, the mechanism Said denounces has been set in place. On the other hand, I don't see how a first-world intellectual can avoid this operation without falling back into some general liberal and humanistic universalism: it seems to me that one of our basic political tasks lies precisely in the ceaseless effort to remind the American public of the radical difference of other national situations.

But at this point one should insert a cautionary reminder about the dangers of the concept of "culture" itself: the very speculative remarks I have allowed myself to make about Chinese "culture" will not be complete unless I add that "culture" in this sense is by no means the final term at which one stops. One must imagine such cultural structures and attitudes as having been themselves, in the beginning, vital responses to infrastructural realities (economic and geographic, for example), as attempts to resolve more fundamental contradictions—attempts which then outlive the situations for which they were devised, and survive, in reified forms, as "cultural patterns". Those patterns themselves then become part of the objective situation confronted by later generations, and, as in the case of Confucianism, having once been part of the solution to a dilemma, then become part of the new problem.

Nor can I feel that the concept of cultural "identity" or even national "identity" is adequate. One cannot acknowledge the justice of the general poststructuralist assault on the so-called "centered subject", the old unified ego of bourgeois individualism, and then resuscitate this same ideological mirage of psychic unification on the collective level in the form of a doctrine of collective identity. Appeals to collective identity need to be evaluated from a historical perspective, rather than from the standpoint of some dogmatic and placeless "ideological analysis". When a third-world writer invokes this (to us) ideological value, we need to examine the concrete historical situation closely in order to determine the political consequences of the strategic use of this concept.

Lu Xun's moment, for example, is very clearly one in which a critique of Chinese "culture" and "cultural identity" has powerful and revolutionary consequences—consequences which may not obtain in a later social configuration. This is then, perhaps, another and more complicated way of raising the issue of "nationalism" to which I referred earlier.

As far as national allegory is concerned, I think it may be appropriate to stress its presence in what is generally considered western literature in order to underscore certain structural differences. The example I have in mind is the work of Benito Perez Galdos—the last and among the richest achievements of the 19th century realism. Galdos' novels are more visibly allegorical (in the national sense) than most of their better-known European predecessors: something that might well be explained in terms of Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system terminology. Although 19th century Spain is not strictly *peripheral* after the fashion of the countries we are here designating under the term third world, it is certainly *semiperipheral* in his sense, when contrasted with England or France. It is therefore not terribly surprising to find the situation of the male protagonist of *Fortunata vs Jacinta* (1887)—alternating between the two women of the title, between the wife and the mistress, between the woman of the upper-middle classes and the woman of the "people"—characterized in terms of the nation-state itself, hesitating between the republican revolution of 1868 and the Bourbon restoration of 1873. Here too, the same "floating" or transferable structure of allegorical reference detected in Ah Q comes into play: for Fortunata is also married, and the alternation of "revolution" and "restoration" is likewise adapted to her situation, as she leaves her legal home to seek her lover and then returns to it in abandonment.

...

I want to conclude with a few thoughts on why all this should be so and on the origins and status of what I have identified as the primacy of national allegory in third-world culture. We are, after all, familiar with the mechanisms of autoreferentiality in contemporary western literature: is this not simply to be taken as another form of that, in a structurally distinct social and cultural context? Perhaps. But in that case

our priorities must be reversed for proper understanding of this mechanism. Consider the disrepute of social allegory in our culture and the well-nigh inescapable operation of social allegory in the west's Other. These two contrasting realities are to be grasped, I think, in terms of *situational consciousness*, an expression I prefer to the more common term materialism. Hegel's old analysis of the Master-Slave relationship[6] may still be the most effective way of dramatizing this distinction between two cultural logics. Two equals struggle each for recognition by the other: the one is willing to sacrifice life for this supreme value. The other, a heroic coward in the Brechtian, Schweykian sense of loving the body and the material world too well, gives in, in order to continue life. The Master—now the fulfillment of a baleful and inhuman feudal-aristocratic disdain for life without honor—proceeds to enjoy the benefits of his recognition by the other, now become his humble serf or slave. But at this point two distinct and dialectically ironic reversals take place: only the Master is now genuinely human, so that "recognition" by this henceforth sub-human form of life which is the slave evaporates at the moment of its attainment and offers no genuine satisfaction. "The truth of the Master," Hegel observes grimly, "is the Slave; while the truth of the Slave, on the other hand, is the Master." But a second reversal is in process as well: for the slave is called upon to labor for the master and to furnish him with all the material benefits befitting his supremacy. But this means that, in the end, only the slave knows what reality and the resistance of matter really are; only the slave can attain some true materialistic consciousness of his situation, since it is precisely to that that he is condemned. The Master, however, is condemned to idealism—to the luxury of a placeless freedom in which any consciousness of his own concrete situation flees like a dream, like a word unremembered on the tip of the tongue, a nagging doubt which the puzzled mind is unable to formulate.

It strikes me that we Americans, we masters of the world, are in something of that very same position. The view from the top is epistemologically crippling, and reduces its subjects to the illusions of a host of fragmented subjectivities, to the poverty of the individual experience

of isolated monads, to dying individual bodies without collective pasts or futures bereft of any possibility of grasping the social totality. This placeless individuality, this structural idealism which affords us the luxury of the Sartrean blink, offers a welcome escape from the "nightmare of history", but at the same time it condemns our culture to psychologism and the "projections" of private subjectivity. All of this is denied to third-world culture, which must be situational and materialist despite itself. And it is this, finally, which must account for the allegorical nature of third-world culture, where the telling of the individual story and the individual experience cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious telling of the experience of the collectivity itself.

I hope I have suggested the epistemological priority of this unfamiliar kind of allegorical vision; but I must admit that old habits die hard, and that for us such unaccustomed exposure to reality, or to the collective totality, is often intolerable...

Even that resistance is instructive, however; and we may well feel, confronted with the daily reality of the other two-thirds of the globe, that "there was nothing at all attractive about it in fact". But we must not allow ourselves that feeling without also acknowledging its ultimate mocking completion: "Its life was based on the principles of community interdependence."

注释：

1 the Asian mode of production：亚细亚生产方式，东方国家（主要是印度）普遍存在的以农村公社为基础的土地所有制形式。它与西方社会中古代的、封建的和资本主义的生产方式平行存在，直到西方殖民者入侵之前，一直是占据主导地位的所有制形式。土地的真正所有者是农村公社是因为气候和土壤条件的限制使得个人无力承担农业的灌溉任务，从而排除了土地私有的可能。农村公社的极端封闭性导致了社会发展的缓慢性和停滞性。

2 这里所说的 *Preface*，指的是《呐喊·自序》。

3 胡志明（Ho Chi Minh，1890—1969），越南共产党缔造者，越南国家前主席，在60年代是欧洲许多左派学生的崇拜对象。

4 赖希（Wilhelm Reich，1899—1957）：奥地利裔美国精神分析家，曾试图调和弗洛伊德主义和马克思主义。

法农（Frantz Fanon，1925—1961）：阿尔及利亚革命的政治家和社会科学家，毕生

致力于殖民地的自由与解放，他所探讨的问题在后殖民主义思潮中有巨大的影响，代表作有《黑皮肤，白面具》(1952)、《全世界受苦的人们》(1961)和《为了非洲的革命》(1964)。

马尔库塞(Herbert Marcuse,1898—1979)：法兰克福学派重要成员，把法兰克福学派的批判理论用于重新思考自我解放的政治，将弗洛伊德主义与马克思主义结合起来。在60年代末和70年代初，作为美国新左派代言人，他在青年学生中间产生极大的影响，他的主要著作有《爱欲与文明》、《单面人》等。

5 赛义德在《东方学》(*Orientalism*)一书中指出，orientalism 一词有三种含义：以东方为研究对象的一门学科；把东方和西方相对立起来的一种思惟方式；通过作出与东方相关的各种叙述，建构和控制东方的一种权力话语方式。

6 黑格尔在《精神现象学》中，通过对主人和奴隶关系的分析，揭示了自我意识的双重统一性，也就是自我意识在实现自身、确证自身中的中介性。自我意识是通过排斥、否定、依赖另一个自我意识而达到与自身的统一的。主人是通过奴隶意识才被承认为主人的，而奴隶的本质则是主人。因此，自我意识是通过他者以及扬弃他者而获得自身的规定性的。这是自我意识运动的辨证法。

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第九章 女权主义

近三十年来，女权主义是西方最富活力的思潮之一。其影响涉及到诸多方面，包括哲学思想、社会理论、政治学、人类学、文学艺术以及各种各样的文化研究。

女权主义与妇女运动相关。20 世纪 60 年代中后期，西方出现了日益高涨的妇女解放运动，提出十分激进的主张，要求彻底改变现存的世界，被称为“激进的女权主义”。后来、尤其到 70 年代中期，其主张发生了重大变化，开始与文化和思想意识联系起来，逐渐形成了“文化的女权主义”，涉及到文化的各个领域，当然也包括文学和文学批评。“激进的女权主义”提出男女平等和妇女解放，把性别问题视为社会政治问题，导致了妇女意识的改变、激起了妇女的社会热情。“文化的女权主义”强调把妇女从所谓“男性价值”的压迫下解放出来，根据“女性价值”创造一种替代性的文化，其本质是一种道德的、反主流文化的运动，其目的则是改变妇女的形象。

大体上讲，女权主义批评可以分为三个阶段：第一个阶段主要抨击男性的性别歧视；第二个阶段重点研究妇女文学作品；第三个阶段集中于对文学、批评、心理学、社会学和文化的理论研究。

实际上，女权主义是由文学界和学术界的妇女创造的，包括作家、编辑、大学研究生、教师和教授。这些人在 60 年代后期参与了妇女解放运动，对妇女运动的种种主张、要求和社会努力表现出强烈的同情和共鸣。例如美国第一部重要的女权主义批评著作——凯特·米莱特的《性别政治》(1970)——既是一部文学批评著作，同时也是一部充满激情的政治性论著。大多数女权主义者认为，正是由于妇女解放运动，她们才开始注意她们的作品与她们自己生活间的联系，注意她们的心理认同与实际意图的差异，也才注意到她们作为小说的女主人公、作为女作家或女学者的有限的、第二位的作用。她们强调妇女自己的生活经验和文学经验，以一种“转换的经验”唤醒妇女的意识。

因此，在女权主义批评的最初阶段，它集中揭示文学实践中对女性的歪曲和贬抑，例如文学中作为天使或恶魔的模式化的妇女形象、经典和流行著作中对妇女的文字凌辱、在文学史上对妇女作家的排斥等等。女权主义批评家通过强调对妇女的文学虐待和社会虐待之间的关系，加强了她们的地位，引起了人们的重视。她们的努力改变了文学反应的氛围，使读者对种种反女权主义的特征产生了怀疑。到了80年代，甚至男性批评家也注意到，由于对性别歧视和性别问题的高度敏感，他们再也不能忽视或原谅文学中对女性的歪曲和贬抑。于是，对经典著作的兴趣和评价也开始发生变化。

在女权主义批评的第二阶段，女权主义者发现有一种属于她们自己的文学。这种文学具有历史的连续性和题材的一致性，在艺术上也有重要价值，但因男性价值对文化的支配而一直处于被淹没状态。于是女权主义批评着重发掘妇女文学著作，描绘妇女想像力的版图，分析女性的情节结构，使妇女文学作为一个特殊的探索领域展现在世人面前。这种努力导致了各个国家各个历史时期的妇女文学作品的重新发现和重新阅读。结果，大批被淹没的妇女作家重见天日，她们的书信和日记获得发表，研究妇女个人天才与文学传统关系的评传性著作不断出版，妇女写作中的连续性第一次得到明确承认。这些著作不仅描述了19世纪以来妇女文学的发展，而且还从理论上阐述了妇女作家的处境，她们的焦虑，她们的经验，以及她们作品中对男性神话的重写。这些著作所体现的方法、观念和洞察力，经过女权主义者的检验、修正、补充和发展，形成了一种对妇女文学史的系统叙述，展现了二百多年来妇女写作的演变，说明了在男性支配的文化中妇女的社会的、心理的和审美的经验以及由此而形成的、反复出现的形象、题材和情节。

这种发展导致了一种强调女性文学意识的女性审美观念的出现。这种审美观念从一种特殊的女性心理出发，审视一种过去被忽视而现在必须恢复的妇女文化，审视妇女的语言，审视妇女文学的风格和形式。不过，对女性审美观念的确切性质，一开始就存在争议。在70年代，它常常被认同为女性同性爱的意识，或女性同性爱分离主义的政治。因此，希腊神话中亚马孙族女战士的形象，常常被用作独立的女性创造力的象征。女诗人阿德里安娜·里奇曾这样写道："每一个妇女都受到女性力量的驱使，为强有力的女人所吸引，寻求表达那种能量和力度的一种文学——这就是每个妇女身上的同性爱。正是这种同性爱，促使我们以想像的方式感受，以语言的方式表达并把握妇女与妇女之间的全部联

系。正是我们身上的这种同性爱才是创造性的,因为父亲恭顺的女儿只不过是一匹供人骑的马而已。”

但是,许多女权主义者反对这种女性同性爱的观念,反对只通过一种文学风格所表达的女性身份的观念。因此,到80年代,女性同性爱的审美观念便从女性审美观念中分化出来,变成一种特殊的女性主义批评,而女权主义批评家则把注意力转向对母女关系的分析,以母亲的形象代替亚马孙女战士的形象。有些批评家研究艺术创造活动里分娩的隐喻,有些则提出妇女写作是以确定始源的女性诗学为特征,即依赖于女儿对母亲的关系。这种焦点的转变,与其他领域里关于母性的研究相一致,结果导致了女权主义批评与人类学研究的相互渗透。

另一方面,文学批评理论中的男权体制依然存在,女权主义批评必须与意义的双重始源相协调。于是,将妇女写作的不同解释为一种审美表现的努力,导致了对精神分析和美学理论的兴趣。此外,研究妇女写作的过程,还使女权主义者对传统文学批评的理论设想提出了挑战,对文学史的分期断代提出了质疑。然而,如果她们企图创造自己的批评构想,她们就不得不考虑其他批评理论的构成,不得不考虑她们与其他理论的关系。因此在女权主义批评的第三个阶段,女权主义者不仅要求承认妇女的写作,而且要求从根本上反思文学研究的理论基础,要求修正公认的关于写作和阅读的理论设想,因为她们认为这一切都是以男性的文学经验为基础的。

当然,这种理论上的要求与60年代以后各种理论思潮的兴起密切相关。现象学、精神分析理论、结构主义、符号学、接受理论、解构主义、后结构主义和新马克思主义,都对女权主义产生了或多或少的影响;拉康的新弗洛伊德精神分析理论、巴特的结构主义、德里达的解构主义以及福柯的话语理论甚至对某些女权主义者产生了指导作用。结果,由于多种理论的交互影响,到80年代后期,女权主义呈现出分化和多样化的趋势。在后来的各种女权主义批评当中,最突出的是法国的女性主义批评、黑人女权主义批评以及唯物主义的女权主义批评。法国女权主义批评强调妇女和语言的关系,注重语言、哲学、心理分析和其他话语系统中女性的构成,认为打破传统的女性话语是一种表示异议的政治行为。黑人女权主义强调多方面的斗争:反对白人的种族主义(包括白人女权主义者的种族主义),反对经济上的统治和剥削(包括黑人男人的剥削),反对黑人和白人的性别歧视,包括家庭暴力。简言之,必须同时反对种族歧视、性别歧视、异性暴力和阶级压迫。唯物主义的女权主义坚持考察

物质条件，从心理学的深层意识（或无意识）出发，探讨在这种物质条件下社会的安排（包括性别等级）如何得到发展，如何决定着妇女的想像。它认为应该重视社会生活的各个方面，充分发挥妇女在社会中特有的作用，形成新的男/女性的关系。

伊莱恩·肖沃尔特：走向一种女权主义诗学

Toward a Feminist Poetics

Elaine Showalter

In 1977, Leon Edel, the distinguished biographer of Henry James, contributed to a London symposium of essays by six male critics called *Contemporary Approaches to English Studies*.[1] Professor Edel presented his essay as a dramatized discussion between three literary scholars who stand arguing about art on the steps of the British Museum:

> There was Criticus, a short, thick-bodied intellectual with spectacles, who clung to a pipe in his right hand. There was Poeticus, who cultivated a Yeatsian forelock, but without the eyeglasses and the ribbon. He made his living by reviewing and had come to the B. M. to look up something or other. Then there was Plutarchus, a lean and lanky biographer wearing a corduroy jacket.

As these three gentlemen are warming to their important subject, a taxi pulls up in front of them and releases "an auburn-haired young woman, obviously American, who wore ear-rings and carried an armful of folders and an attaché case". Into the museum she dashes, leaving the trio momentarily wondering why femininity requires brainwork. They are still arguing when she comes out, twenty-one pages later.

I suppose we should be grateful that at least one woman—let us call her Critica—makes an appearance in this gathering, even if she is not invited to join the debate. I imagine that she is a feminist critic—in fact, if I could afford to take taxis to the British Museum, I would

think they had perhaps seen me—and it is pleasing to think that while the men stand gossiping in the sun, she is inside hard at work. But these are scant satisfactions when we realize that of all the approaches to English studies current in the 1970s, feminist criticism is the most isolated and the least understood. Members of English departments who can remember what Harold Bloom means by *clinamen*, and who know the difference between Tartu and Barthian semiotics, will remark that they are against feminist criticism and consequently have never read any. Those who have read it, often seem to have read through a glass darkly, superimposing their stereotypes on the critical texts. In his introduction to Nina Auerbach's subtle feminist analysis of *Dombey and Son* in the *Dickens Studies Annual*, for example, Robert Partlow discusses the deplorable but nonexistent essay of his own imagining:

> At first glance, Nina Auerbach's essay... might seem to be a case of special pleading, another piece of women's lib propaganda masquerading as literary criticism, but it is not quite that... such an essay could have been... ludicrous... it could have seen dark phallic significance in curving railroad tracks and upright church pews— but it does not.

In contrast to Partlow's caricature (feminist criticism will naturally be obsessed with the phallus), there are the belligerent assumptions of Robert Boyers, in the Winter 1977 issue of *Partisan Review*, that it will be obsessed with destroying great male artists. In "A Case against Feminist Criticism", Boyers used a single work, Joan Mellen's *Women and Their Sexuality in the New Film* (1973), as an example of feminist deficiency in "intellectual honesty" and "rigor". He defines feminist criticism as the "insistence on asking the same questions of every work and demanding ideologically satisfactory answers to those questions as a means of evaluating it", and concludes his diatribe thus:

> Though I do not think anyone has made a credible case for feminist criticism as a viable alternative to any other mode, no one can

> seriously object to feminists continuing to try. We ought to demand that such efforts be minimally distinguished by intellectual candor and some degree of precision. This I have failed to discover in most feminist criticism.

Since his article makes its "case" so recklessly that Joan Mellen brought charges for libel, and the *Partisan Review* was obliged to print a retraction in the following issue. Boyers hardly seems the ideal champion to enter the critical lists under the twin banners of honesty and rigor. Indeed, his terminology is best understood as a form of intimidation, intended to force women into using a discourse more acceptable to the academy, characterized by the "rigor" which my dictionary defines as strictness, a severe or cruel act, or a "state of rigidity in living tissues or organs that prevents response to stimuli". In formulating a feminist literary theory, one ought never to expect to appease a Robert Boyers. And yet these "cases" cannot continue to be settled, one by one, out of court. The absence of a clearly articulated theory makes feminist criticism perpetually vulnerable to such attacks, and not even feminist critics seem to agree what it is that they mean to profess and defend.

A second obstacle to the articulation of a feminist critical practice is the activist's suspicion of theory, especially when the demand for clarification comes from sources as patently sexist as the egregiously named Boyerses and Mailers of the literary quarterlies. Too many literary abstractions which claim to be universal have in fact described only male perceptions, experiences, and options, and have falsified the social and personal contexts in which literature is produced and consumed. In women's fiction, the complacently precise and systematizing male has often been the target of satire, especially when his subject is woman. George Eliot's impotent structuralist Casaubon is a classic instance, as is Mr. Ramsay, the self-pitying philosopher in Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*. More recently Doris Lessing's Professor Bloodrot in *The Golden Notebook* lectures confidently on orgasm in the female swan; as Bloodrot proceeds, the women in the audience rise one by one and leave. What women have found hard to take in such male characters is

their self-deception, their pretense to objectivity, their emotion parading as reason. As Adrienne Rich[2] comments in *Of Woman Born*, "the term 'rational' relegates to its opposite term all that it refuses to deal with, and thus ends by assuming itself to be purified of the nonrational, rather than searching to identify and assimilate its own surreal or nonlinear elements". For some radical feminists, methodology itself is an intellectual instrument of patriarchy, a tyrannical methodolatry which sets implicit limits to what can be questioned and discussed. "The God Method," writes Mary Daly,

> is *in fact* a subordinate deity, serving higher powers. These are social and cultural institutions whose survival depends upon the classification of disruptive and disturbing information as nondata. Under patriarchy, Method has wiped out women's questions so totally that even women have not been able to hear and formulate our own questions, to meet our own experiences.

From this perspective, the academic demand for theory can only be heard as a threat to the feminist need for authenticity, and the visitor looking for a formula he or she can take away without personal encounter is not welcome. In the United States, where women's study programs offer degree options in nearly three hundred colleges and universities, there are fears that feminist analysis has been coopted by academia, and counterdemands that we resist the pressure to assimilate. Some believe that the activism and empiricism of feminist criticism is its greatest strength, and point to the flourishing international women's press, to new feminist publishing houses, and to writing collectives and manifestos. They are afraid that if tbe theory is perfected, the movement will be dead. But these defensive responses may also be rationalizations of the psychic barriers to women's participation in theoretical discourse. Traditionally women have been cast in the supporting rather than the starring roles of literary scholarship. Whereas male critics in the twentieth century have moved to center stage, openly contesting for primacy with writers, establishing coteries and schools, speaking

unabashedly (to quote Geoffrey Hartman[4]) of their "pen-envy", women are still too often translators, editors, hostesses at the conference and the Festschrift, interpreters; to congratulate ourselves for working patiently and anonymously for the coming of Shakespeare's sister, as Virginia Woolf exhorted us to do in 1928, is in a sense to make a virtue of necessity. In this essay, therefore, I would like to outline a brief taxonomy, if not a poetics, of feminist criticism, in the hope that it will serve as an introduction to a body of work which needs to be considered both as a major contribution to English studies and as part of an interdisciplinary effort to reconstruct the social, political, and cultural experience of women.

Feminist criticism can be divided into two distinct varieties. The first type is concerned with *woman as reader*—with woman as the consumer of male-produced literature, and with the way in which the hypothesis of a female reader changes our apprehension of a given text, awakening us to the significance of its sexual codes. I shall call this kind of analysis the *feminist critique*, and like other kinds of critique it is a historically grounded inquiry which probes the ideological assumptions of literary phenomena. Its subjects include the images and stereotypes of women in literature, the omissions of and misconceptions about women in criticism, and the fissures in male-constructed literary history. It is also concerned with the exploitation and manipulation of the female audience, especially in popular culture and film; and with the analysis of woman-as-sign in semiotic systems. The second type of feminist criticism is concerned with *woman as writer*—with woman as the producer of textual meaning, with the history, themes, genres, and structures of literature by women. Its subjects include the psychodynamics of female creativity; linguistics and the problem of a female language; the trajectory of the individual or collective female literary career; literary history; and, of course, studies of particular writers and works. No term exists in English for such a specialized discourse, and so I have adapted the French term *la gynocritique*: "gynocritics" (although the significance of the male pseudonym in the history of women's writing also suggested the term "georgics").

The feminist critique is essentially political and polemical, with theoretical affiliations to Marxist sociology and aesthetics; gynocritics is more self-contained and experimental, with connections to other modes of new feminist research. In a dialogue between these two positions, Carolyn Heilbrun, the writer, and Catharine Stimpson, editor of the journal *Signs: Women in Culture and Society*, compare the feminist critique to the *Old Testament*, "looking for the sins and errors of the past", and gynocritics to the *New Testament*, seeking "the grace of imagination". Both kinds are necessary, they explain, for only the Jeremiahs of the feminist critique can lead us out of the "Egypt of female servitude" to the promised land of the feminist vision. That the discussion makes use of these Biblical metaphors points to the connections between feminist consciousness and conversion narratives which often appear in women's literature; Carolyn Heilbrun[1] comments on her own text, "When I talk about feminist criticism, I am amazed at how high a moral tone I take."

The Feminist Critique: Hardy

Let us take briefly as an example of the way a feminist critique might proceed, Thomas Hardy's *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, which begins with the famous scene of the drunken Michael Henchard selling his wife and infant daughter for five guineas at a country fair. In his study of Hardy, Irving Howe[5] has praised the brilliance and power of this opening scene:

> To shake loose from one's wife; to discard that drooping rag of a woman, with her mute complaints and maddening passivity; to escape not by a slinking abandonment but through the public sale of her body to a stranger, as horses are sold at a fair; and thus to wrest, through sheer amoral wilfulness, a second chance out of life—it is with this stroke, so insidiously attractive to male fantasy, that *The Mayor of Casterbridge* begins.

It is obvious that a woman, unless she has been indoctrinated into being very deeply identified indeed with male culture, will have a different experience of this scene. I quote Howe first to indicate how the fantasies of the male critic distort the text; for Hardy tells us very little about the relationship of Michael and Susan Henchard, and what we see in the early scenes does not suggest that she is drooping, complaining, or passive. Her role, however, is a passive one; severely constrained by her womanhood, and further burdened by her child, there is no way that *she* can wrest a second chance out of life. She cannot master events, but only accommodate herself to them.

What Howe, like other male critics of Hardy, conveniently overlooks about the novel is that Henchard sells not only his wife but his child, a child who can only be female. Patriarchal societies do not readily sell their sons, but their daughters are all for sale sooner or later. Hardy wished to make the sale of the daughter emphatic and central; in early drafts of the novel Henchard has two daughters and sells only one, but Hardy revised to make it clearer that Henchard is symbolically selling his entire share in the world of women. Having severed his bonds with this female community of love and loyalty, Henchard has chosen to live in the male community, to define his human relationships by the male code of paternity, money, and legal contract. His tragedy lies in realizing the inadequacy of this system, and in his inability to repossess the loving bonds he comes desperately to need.

The emotional center of *The Mayor of Casterbridge* is neither Henchard's relationship to his wife nor his superficial romance with Lucetta Templeman, but his slow appreciation of the strength and dignity of his wife's daughter, Elizabeth-Jane. Like the other women in the book, she is governed by her own heart - man-made laws are not important to her until she is taught by Henchard himself to value legality, paternity, external definitions, and thus in the end to reject him. A self-proclaimed "woman-hater", a man who has felt at best a "supercilious pity" for womankind, Henchard is humbled and "unmanned" by the collapse of his own virile façade, the loss of his mayor's chain, his master's authority, his father's rights. But in Henchard's alleged

weakness and "womanishness", breaking through in moments of tenderness, Hardy is really showing us the man at his best. Thus Hardy's female characters in *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, as in his other novels, are somewhat idealized and melancholy projections of a repressed male self.

As we see in this analysis, one of the problems of the feminist critique is that it is male-oriented. If we study stereotypes of women, the sexism of male critics, and the limited roles women play in literary history, we are not learning what women have felt and experienced, but only what men have thought women should be. In some fields of specialization, this may require a long apprenticeship to the male theoretician, whether he be Althusser[6], Barthes, Macherey[7], or Lacan; and then an application of the theory of signs or myths or the unconscious to male texts or films. The temporal and intellectual investment one makes in such a process increases resistance to questioning it, and to seeing its historical and ideological boundaries. The critique also has a tendency to naturalize women's victimization by making it the inevitable and obsessive topic of discussion. One sees, moreover, in works like Elizabeth Hardwick's *Seduction and Betrayal*, the bittersweet moral distinctions the critic makes between women merely betrayed by men, like Hetty in *Adam Bede*, and the heroines who make careers out of betrayal, like Hester Prynne in *The Scarlet Letter*. This comes danger ously close to a celebration of the opportunities of victimization, the seduction of betrayal.

Gynocritics and Female Culture

In contrast to this angry or loving fixation on male literature, the program of gynocritics is to construct a female framework for the analysis of women's literature, to develop new models based on the study of female experience, rather than to adapt male models and theories. Gynocritics begins at the point when we free ourselves from the linear absolutes of male literary history, stop trying to fit women between the lines of the male tradition, and focus instead on the newly visible world

of female culture. This is comparable to the ethnographer's effort to render the experience of the "muted" female half of a society, which is described in Shirley Ardener's collection *Perceiving Women*. Gynocritics is related to feminist research in history, anthropology, psychology, and sociology, all of which have developed hypotheses of a female subculture including not only the ascribed status, and the internalized constructs of feminity, but also the occupations, interactions, and consciousness of women. Anthropologists study the female subculture in the relationships between women, as mothers, daughters, sisters, and friends; in sexuality, reproduction, and ideas about the body; and in rites of initiation and passage, purification ceremonies, myths, and taboos. Michelle Rosaldo writes in *Woman, Culture, and Society*:

> The very symbolic and social conceptions that appear to set women apart and to circumscribe their activities may be used by women as a basis for female solidarity and worth. When men live apart from women, they in fact cannot control them, and unwittingly they may provide them with the symbols and social resources on which to build a society of their own.

Thus in some women's literature, feminine values penetrate and undermine the masculine systems that contain them; and women have imaginatively engaged the myths of the Amazons, and the fantasies of a separate female society, in genres from Victorian poetry to contemporary science fiction.

In recent years, pioneering work by four young American feminist scholars has given us some new ways to interpret the culture of nineteenth-century American women and the literature that was its primary expressive form. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg's essay "The Female World of Love and Ritual" examines several archives of letters between women, and outlines the homosocial emotional world of the nineteenth century. Nancy Cott's *The Bonds of Womanhood: Woman's Sphere in New England, 1780—1835* explores the paradox of a cultural bondage, a legacy of pain and submission, which nonetheless generates

a sisterly solidarity, a bond of shared experience, loyalty, and compassion. Ann Douglas's ambitious book, *The Feminization of American Culture*, boldly locates the genesis of American mass culture in the sentimental literature of women and clergymen, two allied and "disestablished" post-industrial groups. These three are social historians; but Nina Auerbach's *Communities of Women: An Idea in Fiction* seeks the bonds of womanhood in women's literature, ranging from the matriarchal households of Louisa May Alcott and Mrs. Gaskell to the women's schools and colleges of Dorothy Sayers, Sylvia Plath, and Muriel Spark. Historical and literary studies like these, based on English women, are badly needed; and the manuscript and archival sources for them are both abundant and untouched.

Gynocritics: Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Muriel Spark

Gynocritics must also take into account the different velocities and curves of political, social, and personal histories in determining women's literary choices and careers. "In dealing with women as writers," Virginia Woolf wrote in her 1929 essay, "Women and Fiction", "as much elasticity as possible is desirable; it is necessary to leave oneself room to deal with other things besides their work, so much has that work been influenced by conditions that have nothing whatever to do with art." We might illustrate the need for this completeness by looking at Elizabeth Barrett Browning, whose verse novel *Aurora Leigh* (1856) has recently been handsomely reprinted by the Women's Press. In her excellent introduction Cora Kaplan defines Barrett Browning's feminism as romantic and bourgeois, placing its faith in the transforming powers of love, art, and Christian charity. Kaplan reviews Barrett Browning's dialogue with the artists and radicals of her time; with Tennyson and Clough, who had also written poems on the "woman question"; with the Christian Socialism of Fourier, Owen, Kingsley, and Maurice; and with such female predecessors as Madame de Staël and George Sand. But in this exploration of Barrett Browning's intellectual milieu, Kaplan omits discussion of the male poet whose

influence on her work in the 1850s would have been most pervasive: Robert Browning. When we understand how susceptible women writers have always been to the aesthetic standards and values of the male tradition, and to male approval and validation, we can appreciate the complexity of a marriage between artists. Such a union has almost invariably meant internal conflicts, self effacement, and finally obliteration for the woman, except in the rare cases -Eliot and Lewes, the Woolfs—where the husband accepted a managerial rather than a competitive role. We can see in Barrett Browning's letters of the 1850s the painful, halting, familiar struggle between her womanly love and ambition for her husband and her conflicting commitment to her own work. There is a sense in which she *wants* him to be the better artist. At the beginning of the decade she was more famous than he; then she notes with pride a review in France which praises him more; his work on *Men and Women* goes well; her work on *Aurora Leigh* goes badly (she had a young child and was recovering from the most serious of her four miscarriages). In 1854 she writes to a woman friend:

> I am behind hand with my poem... Robert swears he shall have his book ready in spite of everything for print when we shall be in London for the purpose, but, as for mine, it must wait for the next spring I begin to see clearly. Also it may be better not to bring out the two works together.

And she adds wryly, "If mine were ready I might not say so perhaps."

Without an understanding of the framework of the female subculture, we can miss or misinterpret the themes and structures of women's literature, fail to make necessary connections within a tradition. In 1852, in an eloquent passage from her autobiographical essay "Cassandra", Florence Nightingale identified the pain of feminist awakening as its essence, as the guarantee of progress and free will. Protesting against the protected unconscious lives of middle-class Victorian women, Nightingale demanded the restoration of their suffering:

> Give us back our suffering, we cry to Heaven in our hearts — suffering rather than indifferentism — for out of suffering may come the cure. Better to have pain than paralysis: A hundred struggle and drown in the breakers. One discovers a new world.

It is fascinating to see how Nightingale's metaphors anticipate not only her own medical career but also the fate of the heroines of women's novels in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To waken from the drugged, pleasant sleep of Victorian womanhood was agonizing; in fiction it is much more likely to end in drowning than in discovery. It is usually associated with what George Eliot in *Middlemarch* calls "the chill hours of a morning twilight", and the sudden appalled confrontation with the contingencies of adulthood. Eliot's Maggie Tulliver, Edith Wharton's Lily Bart, Olive Schreiner's Lyndall, Kate Chopin's Edna Pontellier wake to worlds which offer no places for the women they wish to become; and rather than struggling they die. Female suffering thus becomes a kind of literary commodity which both men and women consume. Even in these important women's novels– *The Mill on the Floss*, *The Story of an African Farm*, *The House of Mirth* — the fulfillment of the plot is a visit to the heroine's grave by a male mourner.

According to Dame Rebecca West, unhappiness is still the keynote of contemporary fiction by English women. Certainly the literary landscape is strewn with dead female bodies. In Fay Weldon's *Down Among the Women and Female Friends*, suicide has come to be a kind of domestic accomplishment, carried out after the shopping and the washing-up. When Weldon's heroine turns on the gas, "she feels that she has been half-dead for so long that the difference in state will not be very great". In Muriel Spark's stunning short novel of 1970, *The Driver's Seat*, another half-dead and desperate heroine gathers all her force to hunt down a woman-hating psychopath and persuade him to murder her. Garishly dressed in a purposely bought outfit of clashing purple, green, and white — the colors of the suffragettes (and the colors of the school uniform in *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*)—Lise goes in

search of her killer, lures him to a park, gives him the knife. But in Lise's careful selection of her death-dress, her patient pursuit of her assassin, Spark has given us the devastated postulates of feminine wisdom: that a woman creates her identity by choosing her clothes, that she creates her history by choosing her man. That, in the 1970s, Mr Right turns out to be Mr Goodbar is not the sudden product of urban violence but a latent truth fiction exposes. Spark asks whether men or women are in the driver's seat and whether the power to choose one's destroyer is women's only form of self-assertion. To label the violence or self-destructiveness of these painful novels as neurotic expressions of a personal pathology, as many reviewers have done, is to ignore, Annette Kolodny suggests,

> the possibility that the worlds they inhabit may in fact be real, or true, and for them the only worlds available, and further, to deny the possibility that their apparently "odd" or unusual responses may in fact be justifiable or even necessary.

But women's literature must go beyond these scenarios of compromise, madness, and death. Although the reclamation of suffering is the beginning, its purpose is to discover the new world. Happily, some recent women's literature, especially in the United States, where novelists and poets have become vigorously involved in the women's liberation movement, has gone beyond reclaiming suffering to its reinvestment. This newer writing relates the pain of transformation to history. "If I'm lonely," writes Adrienne Rich in "Song",

> it must be the loneliness
> of waking first, of breathing
> dawn's first cold breath on the city
> of being the one awake
> in a house wrapped in sleep.

Rich is one of the spokeswomen for a new women's writing which

explores the will to change. In her recent book, *Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution*, Rich challenges the alienation from and rejection of the mother that daughters have learned under patriarchy. Much women's literature in the past has dealt with "matrophobia" or the fear of becoming one's mother. In Sylvia Plath's *The Bell Jar*, for example, the heroine's mother is the target for the novel's most punishing contempt. When Esther announces to her therapist that she hates her mother, she is on the road to recovery. Hating one's mother was the feminist enlightenment of the fifties and sixties; but it is only a metaphor for hating oneself. Female literature of the 1970s goes beyond matrophobia to a courageously sustained quest for the mother, in such books at Margaret Atwood's *Surfacing*, and Lisa Alther's recent *Kinflicks*. As the death of the father has always been an archetypal rite of passage for the Western hero, now the death of the mother as witnessed and transcended by the daughter has become one of the most profound occasions of female literature. In analyzing these purposeful awakenings, these reinvigorated mythologies of female culture, feminist criticism finds its most challenging, inspiriting, and appropriate task.

Women and the Novel: the "Precious Specialty"

The most consistent assumption of feminist reading has been the belief that women's special experience would assume and determine distinctive forms in art. In the nineteenth century, such a contribution was ambivalently valued. When Victorian reviewers like G. H. Lewes, Richard Hutton, and Richard Simpson began to ask what the literature of women might mean and what it might become, they focused on the educational, experiential, and biological handicaps of the woman novelist, and this was also how most women conceptualized their situation. Some reviewers, granting women's sympathy, sentiment, and powers of observation, thought that the novel would provide an appropriate, even a happy, outlet for female emotion and fantasy. In the United States, the popular novelist Fanny Fern understood that women had

been granted access to the novel as a sort of repressive desublimation, a harmless channel for frustrations and drives that might otherwise threaten the family, the church, and the state. Fern recommended that women write as therapy, as a release from the stifling silence of the drawing room, and as a rebellion against the indifference and insensitivity of the men closest to them:

> Look around, and see innumerable women, to whose barren and loveless lives this would be improvement and solace, and I say to them, write! write! It will be a safe outlet for thoughts and feelings that maybe the nearest friend you have has never dreamed had place in your heart and brain... It is not *safe* for the women of 1867 to shut down so much that cries out for sympathy and expression, because life is such a maelstrom of business or folly or both that those to whom they have bound themselves, body and soul, recognize only the needs of the former... One of these days, when that diary is found, when the hand that penned it shall be dust, with what amazement and remorse will many a husband or father exclaim, I never knew my wife or my child until this moment.

Fern's scribbling woman spoke with fierce indirectness to the male audience, to the imagined husband or father; her purpose was to shock rather than to please, but the need to provoke masculine response was the controlling factor in her writing. At the turn of the century, members of the Women Writers Suffrage League, an important organization of English novelists and journalists, began to explore the psychological bondage of women's literature and its relationships to a male-dominated publishing industry. Elizabeth Robins, the first president of the league, a novelist and actress who had starred in early English productions of Ibsen, argued in 1908 that no woman writer had ever been free to explore female consciousness:

> The realization that she had access to a rich and as yet unrifled storehouse may have crossed her mind, but there were cogent

> reasons for concealing her knowledge. With that wariness of ages which has come to be instinct, she contented herself with echoing the old fables, presenting to a man-governed world puppets as nearly as possible like those that had from the beginning found such favour in men's sight.
>
> Contrary to the popular impression, to say in print what she thinks is the last thing the woman novelist or journalist is so rash as to attempt. There even more than elsewhere (unless she is reckless) she must wear the aspect that shall have the best chance of pleasing her brothers. Her publishers are not women.

It was to combat this inhibiting commercial monopoly that nineteenth-century women began to organize their own publishing houses, beginning with Emily Faithfull's Victoria Press in the 1870s, and reaching a peak with the flourishing suffrage presses at the beginning of this century. One of the most fervent beliefs of the Women Writers Suffrage League was that the *terra incognita* of the female psyche would find unique literary expression once women had overthrown male domination. In *A Room of One's Own*, Virginia Woolf argued that economic independence was the essential precondition of an autonomous women's art. Like George Eliot before her, Woolf also believed that women's literature held the promise of a "precious speciality", a distinctly female vision.

Feminine, Feminist, Female

All of these themes have been important to feminist literary criticism in the 1960s and 1970s, but we have approached them with more historical awareness. Before we can even begin to ask how the literature of women would be different and special, we need to reconstruct its past, to rediscover the scores of women novelists, poets, and dramatists whose work has been obscured by time, and to establish the continuity of the female tradition from decade to decade, rather than from great woman to great woman. As we recreate the chain of writers

in this tradition, the patterns of influence and response from one generation to the next, we can also begin to challenge the periodicity of orthodox literary history and its enshrined canons of achievement. It is because we have studied women writers in isolation that we have never grasped the connections between them. When we go beyond Austen, the Brontës, and Eliot, say, to look at a hundred and fifty or more of their sister novelists, we can see patterns and phases in the evolution of a female tradition which correspond to the developmental phases of any subcultural art. In my book on English women writers, *A Literature of Their Own*, I have called these the Feminine, Feminist, and Female stages. During the Feminine phase, dating from about 1840 to 1880, women wrote in an effort to equal the intellectual achievements of the male culture, and internalized its assumptions about female nature. The distinguishing sign of this period is the male pseudonym, introduced in England in the 1840s, and a national characteristic of English women writers. In addition to the famous names we all know—George Eliot, Currer, Ellis, and Acton Bell—dozens of other women chose male pseudonyms as a way of coping with a double literary standard. This masculine disguise goes well beyond the title page; it exerts an irregular pressure on the narrative, affecting tone, diction, structure, and characterization. In contrast to the English male pseudonym, which signals such clear self-awareness of the liabilities of female authorship, American women during the same period adopted superfeminine, little-me pseudonyms (Fanny Fern, Grace Greenwood, Fanny Forester), disguising behind these nominal bouquets their boundless energy, powerful economic motives, and keen professional skills. It is pleasing to discover the occasional Englishwoman who combines both these techniques, and creates the illusion of male authorship with a name that contains the encoded domestic message of femininity—such as Harriet Parr who wrote under the pen name "Holme Lee". The feminist content of feminine art is typically oblique, displaced, ironic, and subversive; one has to read it between the lines, in the missed possibilities of the text.

In the Feminist phase, from about 1880 to 1920, or the winning of

the vote, women are historically enabled to reject the accommodating postures of femininity and to use literature to dramatize the ordeals of wronged womanhood. The personal sense of injustice which feminine novelists such as Elizabeth Gaskell and Frances Trollope expressed in their novels of class struggle and factory life become increasingly and explicitly feminist in the 1880s, when a generation of New Women redefined the woman artist's role in terms of responsibility to suffering sisters. The purest examples of this phase are the Amazon utopias of the 1890s, fantasies of perfected female societies set in an England or an America of the future, which were also protests against male government, male laws, and male medicine. One author of Amazon utopias, the American Charlotte Perkins Gilman, also analyzed the preoccupations of masculine literature with sex and war, and the alternative possibilities of an emancipated feminist literature. Gilman's Utopian feminism carried George Eliot's idea of the "precious speciality" to its matriarchal extremes. Comparing her view of sisterly collectivity to the beehive, she writes that

> the bee's fiction would be rich and broad, full of the complex tasks of comb-building and filling, the care and feeding of the young... It would treat of the vast fecundity of motherhood, the educative and selective processes of the group-mothers, and the passion of loyalty, of social service, which holds the hives together.

This is Feminist Socialist Realism with a vengeance, but women novelists of the period—even Gilman, in her short stories—could not be limited to such didactic formulas, or such maternal topics.

In the Female phase, ongoing since 1920, women reject both imitation and protest— two forms of dependency—and turn instead to female experience as the source of an autonomous art, extending the feminist analysis of culture to the forms and techniques of literature. Representatives of the formal Female Aesthetic, such as Dorothy Richardson and Virginia Woolf, begin to think in terms of male and female sentences, and divide their work into "masculine" journalism and "feminine"

fictions, redefining and sexualizing external and internal experience. Their experiments were both enriching and imprisoning retreats into the celebration of consciousness; even in Woolf's famous definition of life: "a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end", there is a submerged metaphor of uterine withdrawal and containment. In this sense, the Room of One's Own becomes a kind of Amazon utopia.

Feminist Criticism, Marxism, and Structuralism

In trying to account for these complex permutations of the female tradition, feminist criticism has tried a variety of theoretical approaches. The most natural direction for feminist criticism to take has been the revision and even the subversion of related ideologies, especially Marxist aesthetics and structuralism, altering their vocabularies and methods to include the variable of gender. I believe, however, that this thrifty feminine making-do is ultimately unsatisfactory. Feminist criticism cannot go around forever in men's ill-fitting hand-me-downs, the Annie Hall of English studies; but must, as John Stuart Mill wrote about women's literature in 1869, "emancipate itself from the influence of accepted models, and guide itself by its own impulses"—as, I think, gynocritics is beginning to do. This is not to deny the necessity of using the terminology and techniques of our profession. But when we consider the historical conditions in which critical ideologies are produced, we see why feminist adaptations seem to have reached an impasse.

Both Marxism and structuralism see themselves as privileged critical discourse, and preempt the claim to superior places in the hierarchy of critical approaches. A key word in each system is "science"; both claim to be sciences of literature, and repudiate the personal, fallible, interpretative reading. Marxist aesthetics offers a "science of the text", in which the author becomes not the creator but the producer of a text whose components are historically and economically determined. Structuralism presents linguistically based models of textual permutations and combinations, offering a "science of literary meaning", a

grammar of genre. The assimilation of these positivist and evangelical literary criticisms by Anglo-American scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s is not, I would argue, a spontaneous or accidental cultural phenomenon. In the Cold War atmosphere of the late 1950s, when European structuralism began to develop, the morale of the Anglo-American male academic humanist was at its nadir. This was the era of Sputnik, of scientific competition with the former Soviet Union, of government money flowing to the laboratories and research centers. Northrop Frye has written ahout the plight of the male intellectual confronting

> the dismal sexist symbology surrounding the humanities which he meets everywhere, even in the university itself, from freshman classes to the president's office. This symbology, or whatever one should call it, says that the sciences, especially the physical sciences, are rugged, aggressive, out in the world doing things, and so symbolically male, whereas the literatures are narcissistic, intuitive, fanciful, staying at home and making the home more beautiful but not doing anything serious and are therefore symbolically female.

Frye's own *Anatomy of Criticism*, published in 1957, presented the first postulates of a systematic critical theory, and the "possibility of literary study's attaining the progressive, cumulative qualities of science".

The new sciences of the text based on linguistics, computers, genetic structuralism, deconstructionism, neoformalism and deformalism, affective stylistics, and psychoaesthetics, have offered literary critics the opportunity to demonstrate that the work they do is as manly and aggressive as nuclear physics—not intuitive, expressive, and feminine, but strenuous, rigorous, impersonal, and virile. In a shrinking job market, these new levels of professionalization also function as discriminators between the marketable and the marginal lecturer. Literary science, in its manic generation of difficult terminology, its establishment of seminars and institutes of postgraduate study, creates an elite

corps of specialists who spend more and more time mastering the theory, less and less time reading the books. We are moving towards a two-tiered system of "higher" and "lower" criticism, the higher concerned with the "scientific" problems of form and structure, the "lower" concerned with the "humanistic" problems of content and interpretation. And these levels, it seems to me, are now taking on subtle gender identities and assuming a sexual polarity—hermeneutics and hismeneutics. Ironically, the existence of a new criticism practiced by women has made it even more possible for structuralism and Marxism to strive, Henchard-like, for systems of formal obligation and determination. Feminists writing in these modes, such as Hélène Cixous and the women contributors to *Diacritics*, risk being allotted the symbolic ghettos of the special issue or the back of the book for their essays.

It is not only because the exchange between feminism, Marxism, and structuralism has hitherto been so one-sided, however, that I think attempts at syntheses have so far been unsuccessful. While scientific criticism struggles to purge itself of the subjective, feminist criticism is willing to assert (in the title of a recent anthology) *The Authority of Experience*. The experience of women can easily disappear, become mute, invalid, and invisible, lost in the diagrams of the structuralist or the class conflict of the Marxists. Experience is not emotion; we must protest now as in the nineteenth century against the equation of the feminine with the irrational. But we must also recognize that the questions we most need to ask go beyond those that science can answer. We must seek the repressed messages of women in history, in anthropology, in psychology, and in ourselves, before we can locate the feminine not-said, in the manner of Pierre Macherey, by probing the fissures of the female text.

Thus the current theoretical impasse in feminist criticism, I believe, is more than a problem of finding "exacting definitions and a suitable terminology", or "theorizing in the midst of a struggle". It comes from our own divided consciousness, the split in each of us. We are both the daughters of the male tradition, of our teachers, our professors, our dissertation advisers, and our publishers--a tradition

which asks us to be rational, marginal, and grateful; and sisters in a new women's movement which engenders another kind of awareness and commitment, which demands that we renounce the pseudo-success of token womanhood and the ironic masks of academic debate. How much easier, how less lonely it is, not to awaken—to continue to be critics and teachers of male literature, anthropologists of male culture, and psychologists of male literary response, claiming all the while to be universal. Yet we cannot will ourselves to go back to sleep. As women scholars in the 1970s we have been given a great opportunity, a great intellectual challenge. The anatomy, the rhetoric, the poetics, the history, await our writing.

I am sure that this divided consciousness is sometimes experienced by men, but I think it unlikely that many male academics would have had the division in themselves as succinctly and publicly labeled as they were for me in 1976 when my official title at the University of Delaware was Visiting Minority Professor. I am deeply aware of the struggle in myself between the professor, who wants to study major works by major writers and to mediate impersonally between these works and the readings of other professors, and the minority, the woman who wants connections between my life and my work and who is committed to a revolution of consciousness that would make my concerns those of the majority. There have been times when the Minority wishes to betray the Professor by isolating herself in a female ghetto; or when the Professor wishes to betray the Minority by denying the troubling voice of difference and dissent. What I hope is that neither will betray the other, because neither can exist by itself. The task of feminist critics is to find a new language, a new way of reading that can integrate our intelligence and our experience, our reason and our suffering, our skepticism and our vision. This enterprise should not be confined to women. I invite Criticus, Poeticus, and Plutarchus to share it with us. One thing is certain: feminist criticism is not visiting. It is here to stay, and we must make it a permanent home.

注释:

1 这是一次高水平的研讨。另五名批评家也很有名,他们是斯坦纳、威廉斯、巴特勒、卡勒和伊格尔顿。

2 里奇(Adrienne Rich,1931—):美国当代著名女诗人。

3 见杰弗里·哈特曼《阅读的命运》(*The Fate of Reading*, 1975)。哈特曼(Geoffrey Hartman,1929—):美国著名批评家、耶鲁学派代表人物之一。他的批评观念的核心是:批评家或读者与作品的关系不是传统上的从属关系,只是对作品进行说明和解释,而是以对话的方式介入作品,揭示读者的创造性。因此解释性的评论本身也是一种文本,它应该合法地被视为一种创作形式。虽然他强调细读文本,但他的阅读总是面向更大的问题,如文学史、文类、文学语言的性质、批评实践以及与之相关的意识形态。

4 海尔布伦(Carolyn Heilbrun,1931—):美国著名女权主义批评家,曾担任北美现代语言协会主席。在哥伦比亚大学任教授时,因校方拒绝了她推荐的一名教授候选人(女权主义者)而一怒辞职。

5 豪(Irving Howe, 1920—):美国著名批评家,他认为批评的责任必须与现代主义的特性相关。

6 阿尔都塞 (Louis Althusser, 1918— 1990):法国哲学家。他强调意识形态的功能,认为一切都处于意识形态的影响之下,但只有通过科学的认识才能意识到这点。他还认为,批评应该提供足够的知识来说明审美效果产生的过程。他的文学意识形态生产理论和症候阅读方法(揭示隐含在文本内的问题)影响甚广。

7 马谢雷 (Pierre Macherey, 1938 -):法国理论家,曾与阿尔都塞一起工作,最著名的著作是《文学生产理论》(1966)。他综合阿尔都塞和拉康的理论和解构主义的方法,以新的方式提出了唯物主义文学批评。

8 肖沃尔特(Elaine Showalter, 1941—):美国当代著名的女权主义批评家,普林斯顿大学教授,主要著作有《她们自己的文学:从勃朗特到莱辛在内的英国妇女小说家》(*A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Bronte to Lessing*)、《新女权主义批评》(*The New Feminist Criticism*)等。

桑德拉·吉尔伯特:女权主义批评家想做什么?

What Do Feminist Critics Want? a Postcard from the Volcano

Sandra M. Gilbert

At the risk of revealing something that will be bad for all feminist critics everywhere, I must confess that I have hardly been able to make up my mind what aspect of feminist criticism to discuss here. I have therefore decided to offer, not a single, unified essay, but what may well seem to be three mini-essays, complete with three different (and I think rather impressive) titles: (1) "The Revisionary Imperative: Feminist Criticism and Western Culture"; (2) "Redundant Women: the Economics of Feminist Criticism"; and (3) "Feminist Mysteries: Male Critics and Feminist Criticism".

Before I launch into the first of these "essays", however, let me take a moment to explain my odd self-division, for so bizarre a rhetorical strategy does require some justification. To begin with, I should note that when I was first asked to participate in this seminar, I felt not only honored but extraordinarily pleased and excited. I knew that as a feminist critic I was going to have an exceptional opportunity, an opportunity to tell an important audience (which would consist largely of chair*men* rather than of chair*persons*) about the work I do and the field I represent. Few feminist critics have such chances. Indeed, we seem lately to have been left to speak more and more to one another rather than to those "out there" whose minds we passionately wish to reach. Thus, flushed with comfortable anticipation, I accepted this opportunity in the most optimistic mood.

However, my mood soon darkened. For when I began thinking about what I ought to say, discussing the matter with friends, organizing priorities, considering possible titles, my confusion grew. As a representative feminist critic, I must make this occasion count and

therefore—so my feminist friends told me and so I heartily agreed—I must not only outline a theory of literary criticism but also summarize a number of crucial moral and political points. Here, in brief and in no special order, are some of the suggestions that were urged on me:

> Tell them what we can do for them.
> Tell them what they can do for us.
> Tell them to hire feminists.
> Tell them not to fire feminists.
> Tell them about the case of X or the fate of Y (feminists who were fired or feminists who weren't).
>
> Tell them to come to our talks.
> Tell them to read our books.
> Tell them what we do.
> Tell them we don't do what they think we do.
> Tell them why they think we do what we don't really do.
> Tell them why they think we are what we really aren't.
> Tell them who we really are and what we really do.

Such a bewildering proliferation of points made three distinct essays almost inevitable. Each would deal in some sense with a pair of central questions—namely, What do feminist critics want? and, How can English departments give it to them? or with the converse of those questions—namely, What do English departments want? and, How can feminist critics give it to them? But one of these presentations, the most important in the long run, would have to outline a theory of what feminist critics want philosophically, as a way of thinking about literary texts. A second, perhaps more immediately pressing discussion would have to analyze the politics of what feminist criticism wants from the structural realities of English departments—that is, what jobs and courses it imagines for its proponents. And a third, the most interesting to a social and literary historian like me, would try to bridge the gulf between the first two. This last little essay would have

to present, in other words, a kind of sociology or psychohistory of feminist criticism as it has functioned in today's academy, explaining why and how the philosophy underlying this particular critical "ism" has so far had comparatively little effect on such political realities of English departments as hiring, promotion, and curriculum development.

Of course, all these potential discussions had even more in common than their concern with different aspects of feminist criticism. It is an axiom of the women's movement that the personal *is* the political: the very title of Kate Millett's influential analysis of feminism and masculinism today—*Sexual Politics*—insists on an inescapable connection between private relationships (bed-room or parlor politics, as it were) and public ones. For feminist critics, however, the axiom can be modified and expanded: not only is the personal the political; the aesthetic is the political, the literary is the political, the rhetorical is the political. In other words, even what appears to be the theoretical cannot easily be disengaged or abstracted from the practical, for every text can be seen as in some sense a political gesture and more specifically as a gesture determined by a complex of assumptions about male-female relations, assumptions we might call sexual poetics.

Perhaps this can most readily be seen if we look back and notice the form in which both I and my feminist colleagues conceived of the points my presentation should make: "Tell *them* what we can do for them... Tell *them* what we do... Tell *them* who we really are." On reflection, my constant reiteration of the word "them" seems odd. Wouldn't it have been more natural *not* to dwell so obsessively on the otherness of my audience? Couldn't my friends and I have devised a list that would read, for example, "describe what we do, explain who we are, analyze our assumptions, defend our poetics", and so forth? Yet I think that we all felt it inevitable to list things in terms of what *I*, representing *us*, should say to *them*. For women's alienation from the sources of power is profound, and I want to argue here that it is not just a personal or a political alienation but that—at least until quite recently—it has also been a philosophical alienation, an aesthetic alienation, a literary alienation.

Ultimately, in fact, it is women's ubiquitous cultural alienation that necessitates what I have called a "revisionary imperative". Thus, as both a problem and a perception, women's otherness is the intellectual center around which my first discussion revolves. For of course women especially educated women like me, a representative feminist critic—do not seem *obviously* alienated. On the contrary, in our use of academic tools - texts, techniques, terminology—I imagine we must appear as deeply implicated in cultural intellectual styles and subjects as our male colleagues are. What, then, do I mean when I speak of the cultural alienation of women and what is this revisionary imperative that I insist on as a solution to the problem? I can best begin to answer these questions by telling one of many stories about my own feminist "conversion".

In 1970 I had a job interview with an English department chairman who quite unexpectedly confided in the middle of an otherwise ordinary conversation that he was alarmed by the demands of some female graduate students. These radical young women believed that classes ought to be devoted to the study of women women in literature, literature by women!

"They want to throw out a thousand years of Western culture," he suddenly said. He spoke bitterly, with a soft, regretful Southern accent. "A thousand yeahs of Westuhn culchuh!"

I was shocked. "Surely not!" I exclaimed.

Looking something like the majestic procession that passes through the third act of *Die Meistersinger*[1], a thousand years of Western culture paraded across my mind; grave monkish scholars, impassioned poets, thought-worn philosophers, and beautiful stately ladies, all dimly glowing, all holding out faintly imploring hands to me, their heir and guardian. *Remember us*, they seemed to signal as their noble robes swept by. *Don't throw us out!*

"Surely," I added (a bit priggishly, I now realize), "we're all equally committed to the preservation of Western culture."

But of course I was wrong. For what feminist criticism and scholarship have taught me in the last twelve years is that, although we

obviously can't "throw out a thousand years of Western culture", we can and must redo our history of those years. Nothing may have been thrown out of that record, but something has been left out: "merely", in Carolyn Kizer's ironic understatement, "the private lives of one-half of humanity"—the private lives of women and sometimes their public lives, too. When I say we must redo our history, therefore, I mean we must review, reimagine, rethink, rewrite, revise, and reinterpret the events and documents that constitute it.

I should note here, incidentally, that words beginning with the prefix *re-* have lately become prominent in the language of feminist humanists, all of whom feel that, if feminism and humanism are not to be mutually contradictory terms, we must return to the history of what is called Western culture and reinterpret its central texts. Virginia Woolf speaks of "rewriting history"; Adrienne Rich notes that women's writing must begin with a "re-vision" of the past; Carolyn Heilbrun observes that we must "reinvent" womanhood; and Joan Kelly declares that we must "restore women to history and... restore our history to women". All, I would argue, are articulating the revisionary imperative that has involved feminist critics in a massive attempt to reform "a thousand years of Western culture".

I myself began to experience this revisionary imperative a few years after my interview with that harassed chairman, and at first my revisionary activities seemed minor enough. My nine-year-old daughter was reading *Little Women* and loving it so much that I reread it along with her. A few months later we read/reread *Jane Eyre* and *Wuthering Heights*. Rereadings led to reinterpretations, and my revisionary impulse became so strong that I was delighted when Susan Gubar, a colleague who was also revising her ideas about these books, suggested that we team-teach a course in literature by women.

Revisionary as we felt—and we were both by now reading and rereading key feminist texts—my colleague and I were not entirely prepared for the new view of literary history that our classroom reinterpretations revealed. We had believed, I guess, that women and men participate equally in a noble republic of the spirit and that both sexes are

equal inheritors of "a thousand years of Western culture". Rereading literature by both women *and* men, however, we learned that, though the pressures and oppressions of gender may be as invisible as air, they are also as inescapable as air, and, like the weight of air, they imperceptibly shape the forms and motions of our lives. Assumptions about the sexes, we saw, are entangled with some of the most fundamental assumptions Western culture makes about the very nature of culture—that "culture" is male, for example, and "nature" female—and we decided that, at least until the nineteenth century, even apparently abstract definitions of literary genres were deeply influenced by psychosocial notions about gender[2]. Again and again, as we explored such sexual poetics, we encountered definitions of cultural authority and creativity that excluded women, definitions based on the notion that (in the words of Gerard Manley Hopkins) "the male quality *is* the creative gift"[3]. The treasures of Western culture, it began to seem, were the patrimony of male writers, or to put it another way, Western culture itself was a grand ancestral property that educated men had inherited from their intellectual forefathers, while their female relatives, like characters in a Jane Austen novel, were relegated to modest dower houses on the edge of the estate.

This distinction between male patrimony, on the one hand, and female penury, on the other, can be seen in countless self-defining texts by male and female writers. But perhaps quotations from two volcano poems, besides being particularly pertinent here, will begin to illustrate both my meaning and my subtitle. Wallace Stevens's "A Postcard from the Volcano" employs very much the same metaphor of the world as an cestral property that I have just used. Imagining his own and his generation's extinction by the symbolic Mount Saint Helens that annihilates every generation, Stevens prophesies also the imaginings of his heirs, "children picking up [his] bones" who will never entirely comprehend his passions. But these uncomprehending children *will* inherit a cosmic mansion that has been in some deep way transformed by *his* language, his literary authority, his power. "We knew for long the mansion's look," he notes. "And what we said of it became / A part of

what it is . . . ," adding that when he is gone, "Children. . . will say of the mansion that it seems / As if he that lived there left behind / A spirit storming in blank walls."[4]

Emily Dickinson, who wrote many more volcano poems than Stevens did, had quite a different attitude toward both the mansion of the cosmos and her own Vesuvian presence:

On my volcano grows the Grass
A meditative spot—
An acre for a Bird to choose
Would be the General thought

How red the Fire rocks below—
How insecure the sod
Did I disclose
Would populate with awe my solitude.

For Dickinson, the gulf between appearance and reality is bleaker, blacker, and more unbridgeable than the one Stevens records. Trained and defined as a lady, she is conscious that she herself seems to be a sort of decorous (and marginal) landscape, "a meditative spot" on the edge of the patriarchal estate, a quiet "acre for a bird to choose". What is unimaginable is her volcanic (and powerful) interiority: the fierce fire, the insecure sod, and the awesomely quaking rock that not only enforce but create her "solitude". Moreover, it is that solitude, so different from Stevens's authoritative wistfulness, which in turn both determines and defines her alienation. Alone, unknown, and unimaginable, she is *other* and possibly awful to everyone, even to herself.

Reading many texts like these two volcano poems and trying to understand their implications for a sexual poetics, I began to have a different version—literally a re-vision—of "a thousand years of Western culture", that grand procession from *Die Meistersinger*. Those grave scholars, impassioned poets, and thought-worn philosophers were all male; the cosmos was their hereditary home, their ancestral mansion,

as it was Stevens's, and thus they were the apprentices as well as the lords and masters who marched across Wagner's glittering stage, while the beautiful stately ladies of my vision, like Wagner's Eva, were quite conscious of being their goals, their prizes, the objects of their desire. And if, like the voice that was great within Wallace Stevens or like Wagner's master singers, the men had the power of speech, the women, like Emily Dickinson, knew that they had, or were supposed to have, the graceful obligation of silence.

But what of the women who refused to be silent or who (again like Dickinson) could not manage an enduring silence? My colleague and I realized that, more than most other participants in a thousand years of Western culture, these women had been forgotten, misunderstood, or misinterpreted. Yet it was they who inspired Virginia Woolf's remark that "towards the end of the eighteenth century a change came about which, if I were rewriting history, I should describe more fully, and think of greater importance than the Crusades or the Wars of the Roses. The middle-class woman began to write".

Significantly, as my colleague and I reread the literature of these women, we saw that what they wrote may have seemed docile enough—may have seemed, indeed, "A meditative spot / An acre for a Bird to choose"—but that, like Dickinson's work, it was often covertly subversive, even volcanic, and almost always profoundly revisionary. In fact, we came to understand that the revisionary imperative we had experienced was itself both an essential part of the female literary tradition we were attempting to recover and a crucial antidote to the female cultural alienation we were trying to overcome. Thus, as we have argued elsewhere, women writers have frequently responded to sociocultural constraints by creating symbolic narratives that express their common feelings of constriction, exclusion, dispossession. In these narratives madwomen like Bertha Mason Rochester function as doubles through whom sane ladies like Jane Eyre (and Charlotte Brontë) can act out fantastic dreams of escape, or volcanic landscapes serve as metaphors through which apparently decorous spinsters like Emily Dickinson can image the eruption of anger into language. But in creating such

symbolic narratives these literary women were revising the world view they had inherited from a society that said women mattered less than men did, a society that thought women barely belonged in the great parade of culture, that defined women as at best marginal and silent tenants of the cosmic mansion and at worst guilty interlopers in that house.

Replacing heroes with heroines, these writers insisted, like Jane Eyre, that "women feel just as men feel... they suffer from too rigid a constraint... precisely as men would suffer". Revising the story of Western culture, they looked at an ordinary woman —a shopgirl, for instance—and declared, with Virginia Woolf, "I would as soon have her true history as the hundred and fiftieth life of Napoleon or seventieth study of Keats which old Professor Z and his like are now inditing." Creating new accounts of the Creation, they asked, with the eighteenth-century poet Anne Finch, Countess of Winchilsea,[5] "How are we fall'n? by mistaken rules? / And Education's, more than Nature's fools...?" In other words, over and over again these women writers asked, as we feminist critics did and do, what has caused the cultural alienation— the silence, the marginality, the secondary status -of women.

But of course, to ask and to try to give revisionary answers to such questions about literary women is also to ask and answer questions about literary men, about the dynamics of male-female relations in the world of letters, about the nexus of genre and gender, about the secret intersections of sexuality and textuality. That these questions address long-standing problems and long-established texts is undeniable, and it is equally undeniable that literary women have asked and answered them for centuries. I would also argue, though, that until quite recently such literary questions and answers have been as prudently disguised, as decorously encoded, as all the symbolic and revisionary narratives the female imagination has produced. What may most distinguish the new literary movement called feminist criticism is precisely its effort to bring to consciousness such ancient, half-conscious questions about textuality and sexuality. Indeed, if I were to try to articulate very succinctly what feminist criticism, as a way of thinking about

literary texts, wants philosophically. I would say that at its most ambitious it wants to decode and demystify all the disguised questions and answers that have always shadowed the connections between textuality and sexuality, genre and gender, psychosexual identity and cultural authority.

Such an enterprise is profoundly exciting. The impulse to revise our understanding of Western literary history and culture is, after all, energizing (and here I understate the case); as a well-known (male) medievalist remarked to me not long ago, "Everything has to be done again", and at the very least our awareness of such a revisionary imperative makes us feminist critics feel *needed*. Moreover, the questions about sexuality and textuality that we have lately decoded or brought to consciousness seem equally invigorating, for all touch on issues that are almost bracingly ontological. What, for instance, could be more fundamental, more a matter of ultimate realities, than an exploration of the relationships between sexual self-definition and literary authority, or an examination of the hidden psychosexual meanings of writing itself, the quintessentially cultural activity that distinguishes us not only from animals but also from one another?

Sadly, however—and here I move into my second essay—many of our male colleagues and students (and a few of our female ones) seem indifferent to the crucial questions that concern us feminist critics; worse, some even seem rather scornful of the excitement our enterprise has generated. Of course, I don't want to generalize too drastically; like every feminist critic, I must confess that some of my best friends are men, for I have a number of male colleagues who not only support and encourage my work (like the medievalist I quoted before) but engage in what I would call feminist criticism themselves. Yet it is nevertheless true —and I imagine I hardly need to document this assertion—that even the word "feminist" often evokes masculinist snickers or worse. Even if we are not seen as wanting to "throw out a thousand years of Western culture", we are perceived as self-indulgent, trendy, frivolous, polemical, or marginal. Indeed, where Bloomians, Derrideans, or Freudians sometimes encounter the rage with which people respond

to ideas that seem genuinely threatening (because truly important), we often meet with the kind of scorn that people reserve for notions they find boring or irritating (because merely trivial).

In an essay that appeared recently in a special issue of the *A D E Bulletin*, Carolyn G. Heibrun puts this point so woefully well that I think I can do no better than quote her here: "I, thirty years girl and woman in the field of English studies, wonder anew that among all the changes of 'the life and thought of our age', only the feminist approach has been scorned, ignored, fled from, at best reluctantly embraced... Deconstruction, semiology, Derrida, Foucault may question the very meaning of meaning as we have learned it, but feminism may not do so." And of course Heilbrun is by and large perfectly correct. Countless new journals of feminist thought have sprung up in the last decade *Feminist Studies*, *Women's Studies*, *Signs*, *Frontiers*, *Chrysalis*, *Michigan Papers in Women's Studies*, *Women and Literature*, and so forth—most of which regularly publish interesting and useful feminist criticism of literature from classical antiquity to the present. In addition, the pages of more general literary/intellectual periodicals, ranging from *PMLA* to *Partisan Review*, from *Critical Inquiry* to *Contemporary Literature*, have begun to include essays in feminist literary criticism with fair regularity. Even the annual MLA convention has lately devoted what seems to be at least a fifth of its sessions to feminist literary issues. Yet within most English departments, as Heilbrun suggests, business goes on pretty much as usual, as if the intellectual transformation recorded in so many journals and meetings simply had not happened. Or rather, business goes on with the usual ferment over the new ideas of newly interesting men—Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, for instance—just as if no significant feminist transformations had taken place.

More specifically, I would elaborate on Heilbrun's statement by noting that what amounts to the massive rejection (or perhaps more accurately, the denial) of feminist criticism has taken three separate but related forms: simple indifference, apparently supportive tokenism, and outright hostility. The first—indifference— is by far the commonest

and in some ways the most vexing form of rejection. As every feminist critic knows, many—indeed, most—of our male colleagues (and a few of our female ones) don't come to our talks, don't read our essays and books, don't in fact concede that we exist as thinkers, teachers, and writers who are part of a significant intellectual movement. Of course, a number of these nonlisteners and nonreaders are probably infamous types we would all, alas, recognize: people who rarely go anywhere except to the supermarket or the faculty club and whose most common out-of-class reading is *TV Guide*. I'm sure, too, that some apparently indifferent souls are really overworked administrators kept late at their desks by affirmative-action forms and budgetary crises, persons whose indifference is more a matter of appearance than reality. Nevertheless, of those who stay away—those who neither read nor listen, those who claim to be ignorant and those who claim to be bored—it seems to me that at least forty or fifty percent are in some sense denying or rejecting the whole enterprise of feminist criticism, and doing so for reasons that at first seem quite inexplicable.

The second form of rejection, which I have called "apparently supportive tokenism", is almost, though not quite, as vexing as simple indifference. Unlike the indifferent nonreader, the tokenist does concede the existence of feminist criticism and even, so it seems at first, the importance of this new literary approach. The tokenist occasionally reads or approvingly quotes an article by a feminist critic and quite genuinely believes that, in Lillian Robinson's words, "every good department should stock one" such creature. But really—and this is why tokenists are tokenists—these apparently supportive colleagues only support feminist criticism because it is "in", it is popular, it is trendy. In fact, they cannot distinguish between one feminist and another, or even between one woman and another. An editor of a very well-known anthology, for instance, told me that, yes, he'd just added some poems by an eighteenth-century literary woman to his book; but when I asked him *which* eighteenth-century literary woman he'd used, he couldn't remember her name. She was a woman, period: a nameless token of trendiness.

In the same way, the tokenist believes that feminist courses should be offered because they bring up enrollments, like classes in sci-fi, film, ecology, and lit., or the detective novel. But he doesn't differentiate among them because they aren't, of course, serious, like courses in Great Books from Plato to Pynchon. The tokenist's point of view is best expressed in the almost liturgical academic credo that J. Hillis Miller[7] offered not long ago at an ADE seminar:

> I believe in the established canon of English and American literature and in the validity of the concept of privileged texts. I think it is more important to read Spenser, Shakespeare, or Milton than to read Borges in translation, or even, to say the truth, to read Virginia Woolf.

Note here that the Serious (indeed, the "privileged"!) Literary Canon is the traditional masculinist one—Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, not, for example, Shakespeare, Milton, Jane Austen, or Shakespeare, Wordsworth, George Eliot—while the interesting otherness of a feminist writer like Virginia Woolf is equated with what Miller evidently perceives as the spurious brilliance of a trendy foreigner: "Borges *in translation*" (my emphasis).

The third form of rejection suffered by feminist criticism is outright hostility, and of course it is tautological even to name this. Nevertheless, it exists: if the indifferent person never heard of feminist criticism and the tokenist thinks every department should stock *one* feminist critic, the hostile man or woman is obviously the person who demands, "What need one?" Lately—and this is not a tautological point—our male colleagues are increasingly reluctant to express such hostility (though a few female colleagues seem to feel "privileged" to do so). Hostility does linger in some benighted places, however, and gets expressed in all kinds of sadly or comically misogynistic ways. In one department, the measured, elegant, and theoretical work of an accomplished young critic was dismissed as "the last war whoop of feminism". In another, members of a search committee rejected almost

every feminist critic who applied for a job in Victorian literature (and three-quarters of the female applicants for the job were feminist critics) with the wonderfully ambiguous phrase "fem. dupe". Consciously, they meant that because these women defined themselves as feminists their credentials must inevitably duplicate those of the one feminist critic who already taught in that department. In other words, "What need *two*?" Unconsciously—well, I wouldn't venture to articulate what they meant unconsciously by "fem. dupe".

In any case, though this form of rejection is distressing (and sometimes costly) for feminist critics, it is certainly clearer and thus less puzzling (and therefore less irksome) than indifference or tokenism. But of course, all these modes of rejection are in some sense both bewildering and painful. Metaphorically speaking, they define those of us who do this kind of work as what the Victorians used to call "redundant women"—women, said the social critic W. R. Greg, "who in place of completing, sweetening, and embellishing the existence of others are compelled to lead an independent and incomplete existence of their own"[6]. Defining us as "redundant", moreover, they devalue our work to students, discourage our admirers, dishearten our junior colleagues, and force us into destructive competition with one another for a few token jobs.

Why? To return to my quotation from Carolyn Heilbrun, why is it that "among all the changes of 'the life and thought of our age', only the feminist approach has been scorned, ignored, fled from, at best reluctantly embraced"? I want to be very fair, so I will concede that a few feminist critics may be at least in part to blame. Some of the early work in the field, and to a lesser extent some work still being done, has been naïve. Some feminist critics, for example, have confused the political with the polemical; quite natural feelings of frustration and anger at injustice have got italicized into shrieks. Other feminist critics, confusing desire with reality, have made what psychologists call "positive role models" out of personages in literary texts or movements who were probably anything but positive. Still other feminist critics have confused fiction with reality and taxed imaginary beings with *not* being

"positive role models".

But these failings are minor, and I suspect each is associated with the intellectual excitement, the revisionary passion, and the undissociated sensibility that are the unique strengths of feminist criticism. Indeed, since feminist criticism does have such strengths, it seems disproportionately hostile to reject or deny its central ideas because of the naïveté of a few of its proponents. Recently, moreover, so much good work has appeared that it seems in another sense disproportionate to blame all feminist critics for the failings of a few. On the contrary, we feminist critics know what our revisionary passion can create because we have produced overviews of women's literature like Elaine Showalter's *A Literature of Their Own* and Ellen Moers's *Literary Women*, fine biographical studies like Cynthia Woolf's *A Feast of Words* and Phyllis Rose's *Woman of Letters*, anthologies like Louise Bernikow's *The World Split Open*, and essay collections like Adrienne Rich's *Lies, Secrets and Silence*.

We know, too—and we wish more of our colleagues knew—that although lately almost everyone thinks literary studies are in the doldrums, the intellectual excitement generated by feminist criticism is especially able to regenerate literary studies. My second topic was to be "what feminist criticism wants from English departments"—in other words, what jobs and courses it imagines for its proponents. But that issue is inextricably related to yet another one of my subjects: what feminist criticism can do for English departments. Because, as Heilbrun also notes, feminist criticism does bring a unique vitality to both the classroom and the curriculum, I think we need, not token jobs and courses, not concessions to trendiness, but as many jobs and courses as the economy of literature will allow. Feminist revisions of traditional periodization and of the received literary canon, for example, suggest that there is far more to learn and to teach than we ourselves were ever taught. At the same time, feminist connections between the personal and the political, the theoretical and the practical, renew those bonds of feeling and thought that T. S. Eliot, that paradigmatic patriarchal critic, regarded as irrevocably severed. In fact, the feminist classroom,

as anybody who has entered one will tell you, is the home of *un*dissociated sensibilities and thus—do I dare to say it?—a volcanically energetic place. But (of course) it is or should be productively volcanic, for the competent teacher of, say, literature by women must learn to harness or channel the powers of Vesuvius.

Finally, though all feminist approaches to literature are in some sense revisionary, our approaches to literature are also as various as those of our most scornfully masculinist colleagues: we are Freudians, deconstructionists, Yale rhetoricians, and Harvard historians. Thus we can contribute to jobs and courses in all the ways that all such theorists can. At the same time, however, the revisionary imperative that we have in common gives us also a common interest not just in the social, rhetorical, or psychological strategies of writing hut in the meaning of writing as a psychosexual act, a matter I have already called "bracingly ontological". It would seem, therefore, that only the most artificially depressed economy could define us as "redundant". Why, then-- why, for the ritual third time around—why doesn't everybody think our work is as necessary as we think it is? Here, at last, I move into my third essay: I want briefly, as I conclude my exposition of what feminist critics want, to explore the associated mystery of what masculinist critics *don't* want, and why.

Putting aside the possibility that feminist criticism really is boring and trivial, a possibility I am not only unwilling to discuss but constitutionally unable to consider, I suppose I should begin my investigation of these feminist/masculinist mysteries by speculating that many of our colleagues may really find us alarming, or at least unnerving. Precisely that passionately *un*dissociated sensibility which gives volcanic energy to the feminist classroom may appear quite threatening. After all, those who have long been silent, those who have not revealed "how red the fire rocks below" their decorously meditative surfaces, would seem to be the Vesuvian creatures most likely to erupt into murderous rage. This is a point deeply understood by Emily Dickinson. In a fairly early piece, she observes that once volcanoes stop being acres for birds to choose, one discovers that

those old-phlegmatic mountains
Usually so still

Bear within—appalling Ordnance.
Fire, and smoke, and gun,
Taking villages for breakfast,
And appalling Men

In another poem she elaborates on this vision, noting in particular what we might only half-frivolously define as the deadly critical vocabulary of the volcano: she speaks of the

Solemn Torrid—*Symbol*—
The lips that never lie—
Whose hissing corals part and shut
And cities ooze away

Yet, though some of our colleagues may flatter us feminist critics by seeing us as solemn symbols, we are surely not very torrid, and though we may write about madwomen, we are rarely madwomen ourselves. As for appalling ordnance and villages for breakfast, we may perhaps fantasize such possibilities but—especially in this time of lowered enrollments, a time when women have actually lost rather than gained ground in the academy—our ordnance tends to be muted and our diet abstemious.

The feminist mysteries whose rituals we enact in lecture rooms and learned journals, moreover, are certainly not death to look upon (though a classicist friend did suggest to me that some men might hesitate to come to our talks on feminist theory for fear of finding themselves in the position of Mnesilochus and Euripides in Aristophanes's *The Poet and the Women*, the play in which male interlopers at the Athenian women's festival called the Thesmophoria become the prisoners of a set of furious females, helpless hostages in the battle of

the sexes). Nor does it seem likely that our feminist critical speech, powerful as I consider it, is so powerful that when we open our truthful mouths "Cities ooze away". After all, no cities of the mind seem to have oozed away lately, though some mental sidewalks may have been covered with a few inches of ash.

Or is it possible that cities, civilizations, literary styles, and subjects *have* begun to ooze away? Though I think feminist criticism is the very opposite of destructive—indeed, I think it is reconstructive rather than deconstructive I want for a moment to meditate on the possibility that many of our colleagues ignore our work because its very existence is somehow a sign of profound changes that have recently shaken Western culture in general and English departments in particular, changes whose implications they do not want to acknowledge. Metaphorically speaking, perhaps whole intellectual villages and cities have disappeared, settlements that once seemed the strongholds of a thousand years of Western culture. In the largest sense, of course, I am referring to the democratization of society that has profoundly transformed most Western cultural institutions, including schools and universities, since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In this sense, too, I am thinking of the accelerated democratization of education that has particularly transformed English departments since the late fifties, giving us (among other phenomena) open enrollment, the sixties, enormous classes followed by tiny classes, extra sections of remedial English, generational squabbles on the faculty, and a whole new literary canon, including not just the works of Borges in translation and the novels of Virginia Woolf but also science fiction, films, women's literature, black literature, Chicano literature, Asian-American literature, native American literature, and more, much more.

More specifically, however, I am thinking of the often disregarded but volcanic eruption of women into the public realm of literary and political culture, as opposed to the private, semiliterate domestic world that most women inhabited until the early or middle nineteenth century. As the director of the United States Census Bureau pointed out not long ago, this explosive transformation of women's lives was especially

marked in the 1970s, the decade during which most feminist critics became feminist critics: "Women changed their attitudes dramatically over the decade," he remarks, "and the effects can be seen in almost every aspect of society." But of course these theatrical-seeming changes had begun quite some time ago, with a feminist movement whose events and effects have been massively and I think deliberately forgotten until recently. More important, I would argue that the turn-of-the-century feminist movement was until recently forgotten for the same reason that feminist criticism has been, in Heilbrun's words, "scorned, ignored, fled from": it has been forgotten because it is central to most aspects of all our lives—central, crucial, and volcanically influential.

To be quite plain, I am saying that we live the way we live now, and think the way we think *now*, because what was once a wholly masculinist, patriarchal culture has begun fragmentarily, haltingly, sometimes even convulsively, but, I suspect, irreversibly, to evolve into a masculinist-feminist culture, a culture whose styles and structures will no longer be patriarchal in the old way, even if they remain patrilineal. I am therefore saying as well that the way we read and write now, the way we imagine literary texts and traditions now, must inevitably and irrevocably change under the pressure of the sociocultural changes we are experiencing. And I am saying, finally, that it may be unnerving or even enervating to confront such changes, especially for those to whom they bring a diminution of authority (and of course I mean men), but also for those to whom they bring an accession of responsibility (and here of course I mean women).

Lest I seem entirely solipsistic in suggesting that changes in male-female relations must and will significantly transform our relation to literary studies, let me observe that a number of quite respectable, unimpeachably masculine (and perhaps even masculinist) literary critics have made very similar assertions. Harold Bloom, for instance, declares in *A Map of Misreading* that "the first true break with literary continuity will be brought about in generations to come, if the burgeoning *religion* of liberated woman spreads from its clusters of enthusiasts to dominate the West. Homer will cease to be the *inevitable precursor*, and the

rhetoric and forms of our literature then may break at last from tradition"[7]. Bloom, it is true, speaks prophetically, using the future tense. But what if he too is simply evading his own secret recognition that this transformation of Western literary tradition has already begun?

Certainly so astute a literary historian as Walter Ong does believe it has begun. Ong tells us, in *The Presence of the Word*, that the late-eighteenth—and early-nineteenth—century "movement to give formal schooling to girls was associated with the growing together of the academic and bourgeois worlds, and... helped wear down on several fronts" classical traditions that included the disputations (and masculinist) art of the polemic, which had been central to academic life, as well as the specialized (and masculinist) use of "language teaching", specifically the teaching of Latin and Greek, "as a male initiation procedure". Psychoanalytically oriented critics of *écriture* like Derrida and Irwin would perhaps influence us to observe that much of the old masculinist energy of oral culture may have been projected into sexualized fantasies about the relation of the phallic pen to "the virgin page". But Ong's vision of the female invasion of history is surely supported by the Derridean perception of the very nature of writing, which, once women were taught it, allowed a detachment, an anonymity, that in the long run had to be liberating, even transformative.

To return to Virginia Woolf one last time, I should say it was no doubt her understanding of the transformative nature of writing that made her dwell so dramatically on that crucial moment in history, that moment "of greater importance than the Crusades or the Wars of the Roses [when] the middle-class woman began to write". In fact, I would argue that we feminist critics are still dwelling on and in that moment, still coming to terms with and through it. I believe that our terms, however, must eventually be everybody's, for as Ong and Bloom and others have also perceived, we are still living in that moment of cultural transformation, even if we are not dwelling on it.

In fact, what feminist critics most want from English departments is the chance to define the terms to which we are coming as we dwell with the volcanic changes we have experienced. What English

departments should want from feminist critics are rigorous and responsible revisions of ourselves, our texts, our traditions. Such re-visions should function in two ways: as new visions or understandings of our literary lives and as new versions or transformations of those lives. Both approaches suggest a possibility that I think unifies all three of my essays but that few people have taken seriously since the Romantic period: the possibility that through literary study we can renew our lives.

注释:

1 *Die Meistersinger*:15 世纪德国一些讲究技巧和文化的职业诗人的称号,用以表示他们不同于吟游诗人。他们代表着德国诗歌发展的一个阶段。这种诗歌和诗人有一套严密的规则和组织。瓦格纳在他的歌剧里对此作了描写,歌剧名字是"Die Meistersinger von Nurnberg",于 1868 年上演。这里指歌剧的第三场。

2 这种看法出自吉尔伯特和格巴所著《阁楼上的疯女人:妇女作家与 19 世纪文学想像》(*The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination*)。吉尔伯特(Sandra M. Gilbert ,1936—)和格巴(Susan Gubar, 1944—)都是美国著名的女权主义批评家,她们的突出贡献在于把美国女权主义批评从以妇女形象为中心扩展到了以妇女主体为中心。受哈罗德·布卢姆的影响(尤其是《影响的焦虑》一书),她们强调社会历史和文学历史的相互关系,同时注重隐喻和转义对文本分析的作用。

3 根据原注,引文出自霍普金斯与友人的通信。霍普金斯(Gerard Manley Hopkins, 1844—1889):英国诗人,曾任都柏林大学教授,诗歌讲究技巧和节奏,但生前未发表过作品,直到 1918 年才由别人编辑出版。

4 根据原注,引自史蒂文斯(Wallace Stevens, 1879—1955)的诗歌《来自火山的明信片》("A Postcard from the Volcano")。

5 温奇尔西(Ann Finch Winchilsea,1661—1720):英国诗人,蒲柏的朋友,常写些欢快的随意诗。

6 米勒(J. Hillis Miller ,1928):美国著名批评家,早期以现象学批评为主,后转向解构主义,成为耶鲁学派的代表人物之一。他著述甚丰,多从修辞方面解构文本,近年来将文学研究与文化研究结合起来。

7 根据原注,引自布卢姆的《误读之图》(*A Map of Misreading*)。布卢姆(Harold Bloom, 1930—):美国著名文学批评家和批评理论家,耶鲁学派代表人物之一。他著述甚丰,其中两部重要的著作《影响的焦虑》和《误读之图》产生了重大影响,前者阐述互文性,后者提出一切阅读都是误读,即读者必然加入自己的东西,但只有主动的误读才是有益的。

埃莱娜·西苏：突围

Sorties

Hélène Cixous

Where is she?

Activity/passivity.
Sun/Moon,
Culture/Nature,
Day/Night,

Father/Mother,
Head/heart,
Intelligible/sensitive.
Logos/Pathos.

Form, convex, step, advance, seed,
Progress.
Matter, concave, ground – which supports
the step, receptacle.

Man
——————
Woman

Always the same metaphor: we follow it, it transports us, in all of its forms, wherever a discourse is organized. The same thread, or double tress leads us, whether we are reading or speaking, through literature, philosophy, criticism, centuries of representation, of reflection.

Thought has always worked by

opposition,
Speech/Writing
High/Low

By dual, *hierarchized* [1] oppositions, Superior/Inferior. Myths, legends, books, Philosophical systems. Wherever an ordering intervenes, a law organizes the thinkable by (dual, irreconcilable; or mitigable, dialectical) oppositions. And all the couples of oppositions are *couples*. Does this mean something? Is the fact that logocentrism subjects thought—all of the concepts, the codes, the values—to a two-term system, related to "the" couple man/woman?

Nature/History,
Nature/Art,
Nature, Mind,
Passion/Action.

Theory of culture, theory of society, the ensemble of symbolic systems art, religion, family, language—everything elaborates the same systems. And the movement by which each opposition is set up to produce meaning is the movement by which the couple is destroyed. A universal battlefield. Each time a war breaks out. Death is always at work.

Father/son	Relationships of authority, of privilege, of force.
Logos/writing	Relationships: opposition, conflict, relief, reversion.
Master/slave	Violence. Repression.

And we perceive that the "victory" always amounts to the same thing: it is hierarchized. The hierarchization subjects the entire conceptual organization to man. A male privilege, which can be seen in the opposition by which it sustains itself, between *activity* and *passivity*.

Traditionally, the question of sexual difference is coupled with the same opposition: activity/passivity.

That goes a long way. If we examine the history of philosophy— in so far as philosophical discourse orders and reproduces all thought—we perceive that: it is marked by an absolute constant, the orchestrator of values, which is precisely the opposition activity/passivity.[2]

In philosophy, woman is always on the side of passivity. Every time the question comes up; when we examine kinship structures; whenever a family model is brought into play; in fact as soon as the ontological question is raised; as soon as you ask yourself what is meant by the question "What is it?"; as soon as there is a will to say something. A will: desire, authority, you examine that, and you are led right back—to the father. You can even fail to notice that there's no place at all for women in the operation! In the extreme the world of "being" can function to the exclusion of the mother. No need for mother -provided that there is something of the maternal: and it is the father then who acts as—is—the mother. Either the woman is passive; or she doesn't exist. What is left is unthinkable, unthought of. She does not enter into the oppositions, she is not coupled with the father (who is coupled with the son).

There is Mallarmé's tragic dream, a father lamenting the mystery of paternity, which mourning tears out of the poet, the mourning of mournings, the death of the beloved son: this dream of a union between the father and the son—and no mother then. Man's dream is the face of death. Which always threatens him differently than it threatens woman.

"an alliance
a union, superb
—and the life
remaining in me

And dream of
masculine
filiation, dream of
God the father
emerging from
himself

I shall use it
to—
so no mother then?"

in his son, — and
no mother then

She does not exist, she may be *nonexistent*; but there *must* be something of her. Of woman, upon whom he no longer depends, he retains only this space, always virginal, matter subjected to the desire that he wishes to imprint.

And if you examine literary history, it's the same story. It all refers back to man to his torment, his desire to be (at) the origin. Back to the father. There is in intrinsic bond between the philosophical and the literary (to the extent that it signifies, literature is commanded by the philosophical) and phallocentrism. The philosophical constructs itself starting with the abasement of woman. Subordination of the feminine to the masculine order which appears to be the condition for the functioning of the machine.

The challenging of this solidarity of logocentrism and phallocentrism has today become insistent enough— the bringing to light of the fate which has been imposed upon woman, of her burial—to threaten the stability of the masculine edifice which passed itself off as eternal-natural; by bringing forth from the world of femininity reflections, hypotheses which are necessarily ruinous for the bastion which still holds the authority. What would become of logocentrism, of the great philosophical systems, of world order in general if the rock upon which they founded their church were to crumble?

If it were to come out in a new day that the logocentric project had always been, undeniably, to found (fund)[3] phallocentrism, to insure for masculine order a rationale equal to history itself?

Then all the stories would have to be told differently, the future would be incalculable, the historical forces would, will, change hands, bodies; another thinking as yet not thinkable will transform the functioning of all society. Well, we are living through this very period when the conceptual foundation of a millenial culture is in process of being undermined by millions of species of mole as yet not recognized.

When they awaken from among the dead, from among the words, from among the laws...

What does one give?

The specific difference that has determined the movement of history as a movement of property is articulated between two economies that define themselves in relation to the problematics of giving.

The (political) economy of the masculine and of the feminine is organized by different requirements and constraints, which, when socialized and metaphorized, produce signs, relationships of power, relationships of production and of reproduction, an entire immense system of cultural inscription readahle as masculine or feminine.

I am careful here to use the *qualifiers* of sexual difference, in order to avoid the confusion man/masculine, woman/feminine: for there are men who do not repress their femininity, women who more or less forcefully inscribe their masculinity. The difference is not, of course, distributed according to socially determined "sexes". Furthermore, when I speak of political economy and of libidinal economy, in putting the two together, I am not bringing into play the false question of origin, that tall tale sustained by male privilege. We must guard against falling complacently or blindly into the essentialist ideological interpretation, as, for example, Freud and Jones, in different ways, ventured to do; in their quarrel over the subject of feminine sexuality, both of them, starting from opposite points of view, came to support the awesome thesis of a "natural", anatomical determination of sexual differenceopposition. And from there on, both implicitly support phallocentrism's position of power.

Let us review the main points of the opposing positions: [Ernest] Jones (in *Early Feminine Sexuality*), using an ambiguous approach, attacks the Freudian theses that make of woman an imperfect man.

For Freud:

1. The "fatality" of the feminine situation is a result of an anatomical "defectiveness".

2. There is only one libido, and its essence is male: the inscription of sexual difference begins only with a phallic phase which both boys and girls go through. Until then, the girl has been a sort of little boy: the genital organization of the infantile libido is articulated by the equivalence activity/masculinity; the vagina has not as yet been "discovered".

3. The first love object being, for both sexes, the mother, it is only for the boy that love of the opposite sex is "natural".

For Jones: femininity is an autonomous "essence"

From the outset (starting from the age of six months) the girl has a *feminine* desire for her father; an analysis of the little girl's earliest fantasms would in fact show that, in place of the breast which is perceived as disappointing, it is the penis that is desired, or an object of the same form (by an analogical displacement). It follows, since we are already into the chain of substitutions, that in the series of partial objects in place of the penis, would come the child—for in order to counter Freud, Jones docilely returns to the Freudian terrain. And then some. From the equation breast-penis-child, he concludes that the little girl experiences with regard to the father a primary desire. (And this would include the desire to have a child by the father as well.) And, of course, the girl also has a primary love for the opposite sex. She too, then, has a right to her Oedipal complex as a primary formation, and to the threat of mutilation by the mother. At last she is a woman, anatomically, without defect: her clitoris is not a minipenis. Clitoral masturbation is not, as Freud claims, a masculine practice. And it would seem in light of precocious fantasms that the vagina is discovered very early.

In fact, in affirming that there is a specific femininity (while in other respects preserving the theses of an orthodoxy) it is still phallocentrism that Jones reinforces, on the pretext of taking the part of femininity (and of God, who he recalls created them male and female - !). And bisexuality vanishes into the unbridged abyss that separates the opponents here.

As for Freud, if we subscribe to what he sets forth when he identifies with Napoleon in his article of 1933 on *The Disappearance of the Oedipus Complex*: "anatomy is destiny", then we participate in the sentencing to death of woman. And in the completion of all History.

That the difference between the sexes may have psychic consequences is undeniable. But they are surely not reducible to those designated by a Freudian analysis. Starting with the relationship of the two sexes to the Oedipal complex, the boy and the girl are oriented toward a division of social roles so that women "inescapably" have a lesser productivity, because they "sublimate" less than men and because symbolic activity, hence the production of culture, is men's doing. [1]

Freud moreover starts from what he calls the *anatomical* difference between the sexes. And we know how that is pictured in his eyes: as the difference between having/not having the phallus. With reference to these precious parts. Starting from what will be specified, by Lacan, as the transcendental signifier.

But *sexual difference* is not determined by the fantasized relationship to anatomy, which is based, to a great extent, upon the point of view, therefore upon a strange importance accorded [by Freud and Lacan] to exteriority and to the specular in the elaboration of sexuality. A voyeur's theory, of course.

No, it is at the level of sexual pleasure [*jouissance*] in my opinion that the difference makes itself most clearly apparent in as far as woman's libidinal economy is neither identifiable by a man nor referable to the masculine economy.

For me, the question "What does she want?" that they ask of woman, a question that in fact woman asks herself because they ask it of her, because precisely there is so little place in society for her desire that she ends up by dint of not knowing what to do with it, no longer knowing where to put it, or if she has any, conceals the most immediate and the most urgent question: "How do I experience sexual pleasure?" What is feminine *sexual pleasure*, where does it take place, how is it inscribed at the level of her body, of her unconscious? And then how is it put into writing?

We can go on at length about a hypothetical prehistory and about a matriarchal era. Or we can, as did Bachofen[7], attempt to reconstitute a gynecocratic society, and to deduce from it poetic and mythical effects that have a powerfully subversive import with regard to the family and to male power.

All the other ways of depicting the history of power, property, masculine domination, the constitution of the State, the ideological apparatus have their effectiveness. But the change taking place has nothing to do with question of "origin". Phallocentrism *is*. History has never produced, recorded anything but that. Which does not mean that this form is inevitable or natural. Phallocentrism is the enemy. Of *everyone*. Men stand to lose by it, differently but as seriously as women. And it is time to transform. To invent the other history.

There is no such thing as "destiny", "nature", or essence, but living structures, caught up, sometimes frozen within historico-cultural limits which intermingle with the historical scene to such a degree that it has long been impossible and is still difficult to think or even to imagine something else. At present, we are living through a transitional period—where the classical structure appears as if it might crack.

To predict what will happen to sexual difference -in another time (in two or three hundred years?) is impossible. But there should be no misunderstanding: men and women are caught up in a network of millenial cultural determinations of a complexity that is practically unanalyzable: we can no more talk about "woman" than about "man" without getting caught up in an ideological theater where the multiplication of representations, images, reflections, myths, identifications constantly transforms, deforms, alters each person's imaginary order and in advance, renders all conceptualization null and void.

There is no reason to exclude the possibility of radical transformations of behavior, mentalities, roles, and political economy. The effects of these transformations on the libidinal economy are unthinkable today. Let us imagine simultaneously a *general* change in all of the structures of formation, education, framework, hence of reproduction, of ideological effects, and let us imagine a real liberation of sexuality,

that is, a transformation of our relationship to our body—and to another body), an approximation of the immense material organic sensual universe that we are, this not being possible, of course, without equally radical political transformations (imagine!). Then "femininity", "masculinity", would inscribe their effects of difference, their economy, their relationships to expenditure, to deficit, to giving, quite differently. That which appears as "feminine" or "masculine" today would no longer amount to the same thing. The general logic of difference would no longer fit into the opposition that still dominates. The difference would be a crowning display of new differences.

But we are still floundering about· with certain exceptions—in the old order.

The masculine future:

There are exceptions. There always have been those uncertain, poetic beings, who have not let themselves be reduced to the state of coded mannequins by relentless repression of the homosexual component. Men or women, complex, mobile, open beings. Admitting the component of the other sex makes them at once much richer, plural, strong, and to the extent of this mobility, very fragile. We invent only on this condition: thinkers, artists, creators of new values, "philosophers" of the mad Nietzchean sort, inventors and destroyers of concepts, of forms, inventors and destroyers of concepts, of forms, the changers of life cannot but be agitated by singularities— complementary or contradictory. This does not mean that in order to create you must be homosexual. But there is no *invention* possible, whether it be philosophical or poetic, without the presence in the inventing subject of an abundance of the other, of the diverse: presons-detached, persons-thought, peoples born of the unconscious, and in each desert, suddenly animated, a springing forth of self that we did not know about- our women, our monsters, our jackals, our Arabs, our fellow-creatures, our fears. But there is no invention of other I's, no poetry, no fiction without a certain homosexuality (interplay therefore of bisexuality) making in me a crystallized work of my ultrasubjectivities. I is this

matter, personal, exuberant, lively masculine, feminine or other in which I delights me and distresses me. And in the concert of personalizations called I, at the same time that you repress a certain homosexuality, symbolically, substitutively, it comes out through various signs-traits, comportments, manners, gestures—and it is seen still more clearly in writing.

Thus, under the name of Jean Genet [6], what is inscribed in the movement of a text which divides itself, breaks itself into bits, regroups itself, is an abundant, maternal, pederastic femininity. A phantasmatical mingling of men, of males, of messieurs, of monarchs, princes, orphans, flowers, mothers, breasts, gravitates around a marvelous "sun of energy" love, which bombards and disintegrates these ephemeral amorous singularities so that they may recompose themselves in other bodies for new passions...

注释:

1 这是作者自造的用法,由 hierarchy 派生出来,作动词用。

2 这是德里达所有考察哲学史的著作力图阐明的问题。在柏拉图、黑格尔和尼采的著作里继续着同样的过程,压制、排斥、疏远妇女。与历史混合在一起的谋杀是男性权力的展示和再现。

3 founde 既表示"建立"也表示"资助"。

4 弗洛伊德的论点是:俄底浦斯情结消失后,超我便取而代之。当孩子开始感到阉割威胁时,他开始在一个非常严厉的超我的帮助下克服俄底浦斯情结。俄底浦斯是男孩经历的一个主要过程:他的第一个爱的对象——女孩——是母亲。但女孩的发展不可避免地为一个不太严厉的超我的压力所控制:发现她被阉割导致一个不太严厉的超我。她永远不可能彻底克服俄底浦斯情结。女性的俄底浦斯情结不是一个主要过程:前俄底浦斯情结阶段对母亲的依恋留给女孩一种困难。由于这种困难,弗洛伊德认为她永远不能恢复;必须中途改变爱的对象(父亲)是一种痛苦的转换,伴随这种转换的是另一种放弃:从前俄底浦斯的性欲过渡到"正常的"性欲意味着放弃阴蒂才能到达阴道。当实现这种"命运"时,妇女有一种减少的象征活动:她们不会失去什么东西,也不会得到什么东西,也无需维护什么东西。

5 巴求芬(J.-J. Bachofen ,1815—1887):瑞士研究女人政权史的史学家。他的计划是表明国家一民族(希腊、罗马、希伯莱等)经历过一个"女人政权"时期,或女人统治时期,然后才出现男权统治。对这个时期只能进行推断,因为它没有历史。巴求芬认为,这种事态对男人是一种侮辱,因此必须加以压制,被历史的遗忘所掩

盖。他还试图创造一种关于女权体制和伟大美的考古学，以阅读最早的尚未谈到的历史文本开始，在征兆层面上展开。他说，女人政权是井然有序的唯物主义。

6 吉内特(Jean Genet，1910—)：法国小说家和剧作家。当西苏举例说明鸡奸中的女性时，指的是他的作品。

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第十章 后现代主义

在今天的文论中，后现代主义无疑是最常见的一个术语。由于它包括了从麦当娜到元叙述、从后福特主义到色情小说的几乎一切事物，所以也可能被某些人认为毫无意义。但无论如何，后现代主义是今天无法回避的一个术语。

这里应该首先说明一下后现代主义与后现代和后现代性的区别。在国内关于后现代主义的讨论中，有些人将这三个术语混为一谈，而实际上它们表示三个不同的概念，虽然这三个概念有着不可分割的联系。简单地说，后现代是个时间概念，指后期资本主义，又称后工业社会、信息社会、跨国资本时期，亦即现代化之后的时代。后现代性是个社会学概念，指后现代时期的社会特征，涉及到生产方式、生产关系、社会结构和意识形态等诸多方面，具有明显的历史和哲学含义。后现代主义是个风格概念，指后现代时期文化艺术表现的特点，包括建筑、文学、音乐、绘画、电影、电视等各个门类。在这三个概念中，更重要的是应当把后现代性与后现代主义区分开来。

后现代性是个比较宽泛的概念，富于更多的社会历史和哲学意义；而后现代主义则比较狭隘，侧重于文化和美学特征。就真理、理性、科学、进步和普遍解放等宏大叙事而言，由于它们被认为自启蒙运动以来现代思想的基本特征，所以后现代性意味着现代性的终结。对后现代性来说，那些期望不仅历史地受到怀疑，而且从一开始就是危险的幻觉，因为它们使种种历史的可能性陷入了观念的束缚。这种现代性的“专制体系”粗暴地破坏真实历史的复杂性和多样性，无情地取消差异，将所有的“他性”变成沉闷的同一性，还常常表现出一种极权政治。它们是些“捉摸不定”的东西，通过在人们眼前晃动可能的理想，分散人们对政治变化的注意。它们包含危险的绝对主义信念，相信变化的生活方式和认识能够基于某种终极的、无可怀疑的单一的原则：理性或历史规律，技术或生产方式，政治乌托邦或普遍的人性。

与现代性相反，对于“反基础论”的后现代性，人们的生活方式是相对的、不确定的，由纯粹的文化成规和传统形成，没有可以认同的始源或宏伟的目标；而所谓的“理论”，大部分只是说明这些继承下来的习惯和机制的一种浮夸方式。根据后现代性的看法，人们无法理性地发现自己的活动，这不仅因为存在着不同的、不一致的、也许无法衡量的理性，而且还因为人们所能提出的任何理性总是由某种前理性的权力、信念、兴趣或欲望的语境形成，而它们本身不可能是理性展现的主体。对后现代性而言，人类生活不存在任何涵盖一切的整体性，不存在统一的理性或固定的中心，惟一存在的是文化或叙述的多样性。这些多样性无法按等级次序排列，也没有优劣之分，因此它们必须尊重本不是自己行为方式中的那种不可破坏的“他性”。知识对文化语境是相对的，因此声言知道世界的“本来面目”只能是一种妄想——因为人们的理解总是片面的、不无偏见的一种解释，而世界本身也决不是特定的。换言之，真理是解释的产物，事实是话语的构成，客观性只是那种已经获得权力的有争议的解释，而人类主体则是与他所思考的现实完全一样的一种虚构，或曰没有任何固定性质或本质的一种自我分裂的实体。

后现代主义可以说是适应后现代性的文化形式。典型的后现代主义艺术作品是随意的、折中的、混杂的、无中心的、不固定的、不连贯的、拼凑的、模仿的。它们忠于后现代性的原则，摈弃形而上学的深刻性，追求一种人为的深度，因而富于游戏性和享乐性，缺少情感，只有表面或暂时的强化。后现代主义怀疑所有已经确认的真理，因此它的形式必然是反讽的，认识论必然是相对的。它否认一切试图反映稳定现实的努力，因此必然有意识地坚持一种形式或语言层面上的存在。它知道自己的虚构缺乏基础和根据，因此只有夸耀它对这一事实的反讽意识，才能保持一种否定的真实性。由于担心孤立的同一性，提防绝对的始源，后现代主义强调“文本互涉”的性质或“互文性”（intertextuality）。它所戏仿加工的其他作品，本身也只不过是这样的加工而已。它所戏仿的东西一部分是过去的历史，但这种历史不再是产生出“现在”的线性因果链条，而是存在于一种永恒的“现在”，因为大量的素材从它自己的语境中抽出，与当代结合在一起。最后，后现代文化不喜欢传统上区分“高级艺术”和“流行艺术”的固定界线或范畴，它通过生产仿制品解构这些界线，有意识地生产流行或通俗作品，使自己成为可以愉悦地消费的商品。后现代主义像本亚明的“机械复制”那样，力图以一种更通俗的艺术打破高级现代主义文化吓人的氛围，怀疑一切所谓“特权的”或“精英的”价值等

级。在后现代主义文化里，不存在好坏高低之分，惟一存在的是不同或差异。由于寻求跨越艺术与普通生活之间的樊篱，有些人认为后现代主义是激进先锋派的复兴——因为传统上的先锋派也曾追求这样的目标。确实，在广告、时尚、生活方式、购物中心和大众传媒里，美学和技术已经互相渗透，而政治也被转变成一种美学的景观。但是，后现代主义对传统的审美判断不屑一顾，而且这种观点在文化研究中产生了明显影响。自80年代以来，文化研究常常不尊重经典作品与通俗艺术的价值区分，甚至不考虑十四行诗和肥皂剧的价值区分。

我们知道，关于后现代性和后现代主义的争论一直存在，而且形式也多种多样。按照大卫·哈威《后现代性的条件》(1989)一书的论述，后现代主义是对资本主义过度积累危机的一种历史的反应。这种危机的征象包括：中心主体的分裂；参照物的丧失；道德判断和科学判断之间的联系崩溃；形象胜于叙述，审美胜于伦理；暂时性和片断性胜过永恒的真理和统一的政治。哈威指出，里根的巫术似的经济学和形象制造，可以说是后现代主义观点的缩影。按照这种观点，无家可归、先进、日益加剧的贫困以及能力的丧失，都通过诉诸于自力更生、创业的个人主义、神圣的家庭和宗教等传统价值来进行辩解。大街上胡涂乱画的景象、城市的腐败以及悲惨的事件等等，变成了媒体镜头的奇怪的滚动的背景；贫困、腐败、失望和绝望，变成了审美乐趣的源泉，或者"他性"和差异的标志。

利奥塔称赞后现代的条件实现了现代主义设想的真正精神。他反对哈贝马斯对后现代主义的指责，不承认后现代主义背叛了启蒙运动的理想，如客观的科学、普遍的道德和法律、独立的艺术等等。他否认源于黑格尔的总体化的世界观，指出那种世界观导致由国家暴力强加的一种有机整体性的、先验的幻像。在他看来，现代性对个人等于是恐怖主义。因此他坚持消除自我认同的主体概念，消除单一的历史目的，代之以一种尼采式的虚无主义或观念主义。更确切地说，他主张一种关于崇高的新康德式的美学，再现无法再现的事物，暗喻"无法再现而可以想像的东西"。利奥塔否认对"整体和一致"的怀旧感，否认"观念和感觉的调和"。他大声疾呼："让我们对整体性开战；让我们目睹不可再现的事物；让我们推动差异，拯救名人的荣誉。"

詹姆逊认为，后现代主义是后期资本主义文化的内在逻辑，是商品形式对文化本身的渗透，简言之是"文化的商业化，商业的文化化"。对詹姆逊来说，后现代主义表示艺术的一种全新的社会定位。他认为，后现代主义不是主题问题，也不是题材问题，而是艺术充分进入商品生产

世界的问题。詹姆逊的解释与马克思主义相联系，认为全球跨国资本主义阶段标志着资本主义发展的一个新的阶段。因此，后现代主义是当前后期资本主义阶段的文化形式，与现实主义是资本主义工业发展阶段特有的艺术形式、现代主义对应于帝国主义和垄断资本主义经济阶段等并无二致。

在论述后现代主义时，詹姆逊强调经济和文化的统一，既与阿多诺和法兰克福学派的现代主义观点一致，又强烈地与之对立。对阿多诺来说，艺术的商品化标志着最后取消任何独立的批评观点。就是说，对经济发展中的支配形式难以从独立的观点出发进行批判；而对詹姆逊来说，文化生产与经济生产的完全统一，使文化从根本上干预经济的文化政治有可能实现。

詹姆逊认为，如果对资本主义的第一次文化反应是现实主义，旨在提供理解这个新经济发展阶段的表现形式，那么现代主义就是承认任何这种表现本身都屈从于社会和经济形式，这些形式会根据不断变化的读者使表现的理解相对化。詹姆逊指出，现代主义在失去关于表现的天真之后，试图发明决定其自身读者的形式，对尚未被任何商品形式介入的未来投射一种内心想像的世界。正是由于这个原因，现代主义的历史才明显具有新形式的创始地位，具有一种先锋的伦理。而且不论这种伦理是美学的还是政治的形式，都会注视着未来，寻求理想的“乔伊斯式的或无产阶级的”读者。詹姆逊认为，远在阿多诺的文化分析之前，现代主义本身便构成一个从结构上反对商业的领域。它将自身投射到现实的努力，其前提是以一种完美的未来人为基础的，而这种人将成为理想艺术的理想读者。

在现代主义建筑里，这种设想最明显，但其不充分性也表现得最清楚。詹姆逊认为，建筑一向是最能表现艺术与经济相结合的领域，因此也是现代主义衰落的神经痛点，就像勒考比西埃或赖特的主张遇到了后工业城市的现实那样。正是出于这种考虑，詹姆逊对后现代主义的分析常常侧重于70年代后期有关建筑的争论。但他指出，如果建筑是最难脱离经济的传统的艺术，那么电影便是后现代的艺术（当然脱离资本主义发展的第一阶段也无法充分理解）——电影是最复杂的工业生产形式的一种产品。

于是，詹姆逊认为，人们必须考虑历史的悖论：这种后现代的媒体概括了现实主义/现代主义/后现代主义的基本美学发展——经典的好莱坞电影表现现实主义（以及关于表现方式的天真的时刻），五六十年代的

欧洲电影再现现代主义的种种矛盾和悖论(戈达尔的电影是其典范),充分发展的后现代电影直到 70 年代初才出现。后现代的电影是这样一种电影:其中高级艺术和低级艺术(常常是不确定的)之间的区分或多或少地已经消失,文化和经济在两个领域的各个层次上反复交叉。这种电影虽然不是普遍的形式,但至少比其它媒体更多地提供了将最古老的、地区的艺术传统与最现代的、全球性的广告运动相结合的可能。詹姆逊指出,这是一种文化形式,它在各个层次上都受到市场营销中的习惯和悖论的渗透,或者说受到一种后现代实践的渗透,在观众被动的再生产和主动的重塑之间摇摆。因此,如果现实主义的政治隐含着改良主义(对社会的理解直接导致社会的控制),现代主义政治是先锋派的(其中关于制度的未来趋向提供政治行动的基础),那么后现代主义的政治究竟是什么尚不清楚。不过非常明显的是,它们会将日益增加的微观政治层面与那些几乎瘫痪了的对全球形式的激动联结起来。

按照詹姆逊的看法,当代电影可以说是最后现代的艺术形式(这里包括它们与摇滚音乐和电视的关系),因此用这种艺术形式对当前的政治无意识可以进行最有效的分析。他认为分析应该从三方面进行:空间、表现性和寓言。而其中最重要的是"形象"的转变。

乔那森·阿拉克:后现代主义:导论

An Introduction: Postmodernism

Jonathan Arac

In the two decades since it first consciously began to define itself, postmodern criticism has chosen to be worldy. Not that it is urbane; this is not a world in which one can or should too easily be at home. Yet the struggle against received forms of reading, writing, and public discourse has not been mundane either. Philosophy, and its difficulties, served a necessary function in countering the technicist emphases of New Criticism and structuralism alike, as well as in marking the difference between a simple quest for relevance and a movement that was willing to wield the weapons of criticism in all their cultural elaboration. Then, in the seventies, postmodernism experienced an exhilarating but unsettling

confluence with poststructuralism, the critique of method, the philosophic cure, that sprung up athwart structuralism.

Now that the sixties have faded emphatically into a past, the radical social and political activities, the urgency of questioning that formed the atmosphere from which postmodernism condensed, no longer define our immediate world. They must not be repressed, however; we must solicit the uncanny without becoming somnambulists. This need locates the dialogue between postmodern criticism and the Anglo American renewal of Marxism that is itself a product of the sixties. The problems of "Western Marxism" are well known from discussions by Perry Anderson[1] and Russell Jacoby, and Edward Said[2] has pertinently exposed the dangers of "traveling theory". Nonetheless, this new Marxism and postmodernism share the conviction that literature and theory and criticism are not only contemplative, not mere superstructure, but active; they share commitments to human life in history. In short, they share the world.

It would be foolish, however, to suggest that this beginning heralds the dawn of a new day. Irving Howe recently looked back to the founding of *Dissent* in 1945 and ruefully explained its premise: "We were saying... that socialism in America had to be seen mostly as an intellectual problem before it could even hope to become a viable movement." At about the same time as Howe's explanation, *Diacritics*[3] published an interview with Fredric Jameson, in which his own current theoretical concerns and the project of *Social Text* are similarily summarized: "No real systemic change in this country will be possible without the minimal first step of the achievement of a social democratic movement [but] that first step will not be possible without two other preconditions... the creation of a Marxist intelligentsia, and that of a Marxist culture." The congruence of analysis is striking, and the endurance of the problem is dismaying.

The bar between culture and politics in the United States that seems to be marked here has stood at least since the first great American novel appeared. Hawthorne set "The Prison Door" as the title of his first chapter. It stands between the "official", political life of "The

Custom House" and the passionate, artistic representation of "The Scarlet Letter", and it blocks the passage from one to the other. Of these two unequal parts that together make up *The Scarlet Letter*, each may be read as the source of the other, yet each is unconscious of the other. The marks that trace their relations remain to be produced through our reading, beyond which lies a task of historical interpretation to revise our sense of politics in the American life of letters.

Postmodernism, *Boundary 2*[1] and the Wider Debate

The preceding remarks introduced a special issue of *Boundary 2: a Journal of Postmodern Literature and Culture*. The history of *Boundary 2* therefore forms a first context for understanding them. When it was founded in the early 1970s, *Boundary 2* projected a clear sense of the "postmodern"; as a university-based intervention in the world of literature, it stood against the classics of modernism as they had been interpreted and institutionalized by the New Criticism. A Sartrean, existential concern for the engagements of worldly life opposed New Critical emphasis on "impersonality" in its many forms, whether distance through myth, hardness through image, or lucidity through point of view. The journal's roots in phenomenology reached back from Sartre to Heidegger, toward a sense of temporality against New Critical modernist spatialization; and beyond Heidegger to Kierkegaard, who offered an understanding of irony quite different from that which was popularized by Robert Penn Warren and Cleanth Brooks. This renewed sense of irony enabled *Boundary 2* critics to elaborate postmodern interpretations of Eliot, Joyce, Yeats, Conrad, and other modernist classics. The "postmodern" thus proved not straightforwardly chronological. It partook of a more complex hermeneutical temporality, which proved confusing to some observers as the journal uncovered an ever-receding history of postmodernism through unsettling received New-Critical interpretations over the whole of Western literature. The best current statement of the journal's point of view is W. V. Spanos, "Postmodern Literature and Its Occasion".

A further complication in the position of *Boundary 2* emerged over time in its relation to issues of political and social life. Although conceived from the beginning as oppositional, its concerns might at first have seemed those of a "personal" individualism, which, however full-bodied in comparison to New Criticism, would remain no more than an alternative aestheticism. Already by the middle of the 1940s, however, Sartre had visibly begun his own turn to politics, and Lucien Goldmann[5] had offered the suggestion that Heidegger's existential phenomenology took its point of departure from the critique of "reification" by Georg Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), to which *Being and Time* (1927) offered an ontological rather than historical analysis. Since, moreover, *Boundary 2* had been founded in part as an attempt to prolong the energies of the 1960s, both its situation and its intellectual genealogy pointed toward what in fact occurred: postmodernism and politics came together in the journal's agenda. Yel Lukács's insistence on "totality" seemed suspiciously like that of the New Critics on the "tradition" or on the work as "icon". In confluence with contemporary revisions of Heidegger in France, the politics of *Boundary 2* proved "deconstructive" like Derrida; like Foucault more concerned with the fields of "micropolitics". This acknowledgment of the micropolitical has allowed *Boundary 2* to take seriously its location as an academic journal, rather than yearning nostalgically for the days of the independent man of letters and looking only with disabling self-contempt at the current place of literary intellectuals.

The postmodernism of *Boundary 2* is only one of many varieties; these essays are part of a larger debate that has been going on around the notion. The discussion has been most notable for its international and interdisciplinary extent, running from architecture through the visual arts and music, through literature and history, to the social and natural sciences, while bringing in contributions from several European cultures beyond the anglophone world (see Hassan, "Postface 1982"). Yet almost no women have figured in the debate, even though many analysts include current feminism among the features of postmodernity. Nancy Fraser's important feminist critique of Habermas stands nearly

alone, although Craig Owens and Andrew Ross have effectively situated feminist work by women in relation to postmodernism. A sampling of significant positions in the overall debate would include those of the English historian Perry Anderson, who was long editor of *New Left Review*; the Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell, whose collaboration with Irving Kristol on *The Public Interest* led to his characterization as a "neoconservative"; the German social philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who is often treated as the heir of Frankfurt-school critical theory; Fredric Jameson, who revitalized American Marxist cultural studies while Professor of French at Yale amid the controversy over deconstruction; Jean-François Lyotard[6], a French philosopher and former independent socialist activist, long involved with the critique of Stalinism; Richard Rorty, whose renewal of American pragmatism led him out of Princeton's philosophy department and into the pages of general literary and cultural journals.

Using even this limited group as a field for comparison, it becomes obvious how little the debate has reached clarity. To begin with, the debate is motivated by evaluative differences. The first significant literary discussions of the "postmodern" some quarter-century ago by Irving Howe and Harry Levin established a clear negative stance: the postmodern was a weak successor to the vigorous glory of literary modernism, brought about because mass society had eroded the artist's vital distance. During the sixties, a more complex attention to new modes of mass media in work by Leslie Fiedler, Susan Sontag, Richard Poirier, and above all Ihab Hassan (see "POSTmodernISM") helped to establish the context within which *Boundary 2* appeared. In recent years, however, the initial hostility, exacerbated by a sense of beleaguerment, has fueled new antipostmodern projects like that of Hilton Kramer's *New Criterion*. So it remains even now typically the case that to "have a position" on postmodernism means not just to offer an analysis of its genesis and contours but to let the world know whether you are for it or against it, and in fairly bald terms. Thus Anderson, Bell, and Habermas all treat postmodernism as something that we could be spared if only people would trade excessive rhetoric for sensible analysis

(at just these moments, however, their own rhetoric swells); Lyotard and Rorty, on the other hand, urge us to adopt postmodern positions. Jameson argues that postmodernism necessarily includes both positive and negative aspects, but that the notion helps us to make sense of our times and therefore should be used; to all who oppose the postmodern, however, this can seem no more than disguised advocacy.

It remains wholly unsettled whether the relation of the "postmodern" to the "modern" is more a break or a continuity. Anderson finds "modern" and "postmodern" alike terms that mask more important facts about the times they purport to describe; Bell finds the postmodern acting out principles that were already dangerous within modernism; and Lyotard finds in the postmodern a sublime potentiality that is realized in the modern, unsettling our usual conception of sequence. Habermas, Jameson, and Rorty agree in finding a significant break between the modern and the postmodern, but there is no consensus as to where the break falls. Jameson, perhaps because he is a professional student of literature, roughly identifies the modern with the first half of the twentieth century and the postmodern with what has come later. Habermas, perhaps because professionally a student of social philosophy, identifies the modern with the still-unfulfilled project of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, while the postmodern remains a threatening shadow rather than something that has quite occurred. Rorty, perhaps because his defining professional engagement was with the analytic epistemological tradition, locates the modern with Descartes and finds the major contours of the postmodern already visible in Hegel.

In their methods of analysis, these figures fall into yet further combinations. Habermas, Lyotard, and Rorty all employ versions of "thin" or "philosophical" history to establish their points; in contrast, Anderson, Bell, and Jameson, even though also writing relatively brief treatments, draw upon a much wider range of empirical materials. On the other hand, Bell joins Lyotard and Rorty in de-emphasizing "totalizing" modes of description and explanation. Among these three, however, further splits appear.

Against attempts to ground Value in Humanity, Nature, or Reason, Rorty insists on the local contingencies of values, approaching a position like that of current literary theory on "interpretive communities". Yet Rorty still relies on the integrity of his local units. He therefore warns "the intellectual" not to become separated from "the social needs of his community", learning from American intellectuals' response to the Vietnam War, which acted "to separate the intellectuals from the moral consensus of the nation". Lyotard's overall position seems to agree with Rorty's; Lyotard contrasts the "*grands récits*" (perhaps best translated "tall tales") that unify human history in the name of Emancipation (the French Revolution) or Speculation (the German university) or both (Marxism) with the language games of "*petits récits*" ("white lies") that operate over smaller units both conceptually and demographically. Yet in exploring "the different" (dispute, conflict, difference), Lyotard looks to situations where power and language intersect to victimize minorities wrongly treated as if they were members of a community from which they actually differ in ways that are "not presentable under the rules of knowledge". As against Rorty, Lyotard does not trust the integrity of "communities" any more than of "totality".

In a mode that he might blush to find Lyotard characterizing as postmodern, Daniel Bell insists against both functionalists and Marxists that there is no integral entity called "society"; between the separate realms of the polity, the economy, and the culture "disjunction" prevails. Bell can therefore assert, in a statement that would seem to be so scandalous that his critics in the debate do not even comment on it, that he is "a socialist in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative in culture". This takes to an extreme notion like that of the "relative autonomy" with which Althusser made possible fresh Marxist thought regarding questions of the state and of culture, and which remains crucial in the attempts by Anderson and Jameson at a "totalizing" frame of argument. Habermas, while insisting on Weber's neo-Kantian separation of rationality into separate spheres of knowledge, morality, and taste (corresponding to science, social organization, and art), tries to

establish a new, if reduced, totality of "everyday life", which in order to flourish must be kept in contact with the results of all three spheres.

It might be thought that the question of art's autonomy would only be a special case of "totality", but in fact yet-different alignments emerge on this issue, which has been crucial, as we have already noted, since the beginning of the postmodernism debate. In Anderson's argument, surprisingly close to traditional Marxist "reflection" theory, the possibilities of art are determined by social conditions but art does not have the power to alter those conditions; for Lyotard, art's value depends on its maintaining itself as a separate "language game", distinct from the discourses of power. On the other side, Rorty's pragmatic anti-Kantianism grants, and encourages, that art and criticism may intervene in speculation and debate on issues that would traditionally have been reserved for natural or moral philosophy; Bell, however, is distressed at the incursion achieved by cultural values into the separate realms of politics and, especially, economics. Habermas and Jameson stand as if explicitly opposed to each other. For Habermas, the postmodern is the threat, carried on from surrealism, to deautonomize art, freeing its energies for use in all of life, but he claims that this is based on a misunderstanding, for: "When the containers of an autonomously developed cultural space are shattered, the contents get dispersed. Nothing remains from a desublimated meaning or a destructured form." Jameson argues that capitalist reification has already destroyed any cultural autonomy, but that cultural modes and practices are now spread throughout the fabric of social life by a process of "acculturation". What remains, therefore, are opportunities for cultural production and criticism much more significant than those that had exised under earlier conditions. The struggle over what Gramsci called "hegemony" in everyday life becomes a significantly political activity once there is no longer a decisive separation of the cultural sphere. The example of Latin American liberation theology powerfully exemplifies the political potential of cultural issues.

I shall return to this question whether a change in the place of art has occurred and if so with what consequences for the power of culture,

but first it is necessary to address an embarrassing fact that this survey of some exemplary positions in the postmodernism debate has rendered painfully plain. A great deal of the controversy in this debate depends on misunderstandings, not at all surprising across so wide a range of disciplinary and national traditions, which obstruct significant direct engagement with the arguments, motives, and implications of the various positions. (In "Mapping the Postmodern", Huyssen offers the most specific discriminations of American, French, and German emphases.) I shall first examine several such misunderstandings in one of the most important essays in the debate, and I shall then turn to one of the most important issues associated with the debate as it has been conducted within the profession of literary study in the United States.

Postmodernism, An Exemplary Essay: Habermas on Modernity

Jürgen Habermas's "Modernity versus Postmodernity" brought the discussion of postmodernism into its current phase. Originally an address upon receiving the Theodor W. Adorno Prize from the city of Frankfurt in 1980, it was subsequently delivered at New York University, translated as the lead article with a notable response by Andreas Huyssen in *New German Critique*, and republished as the first essay in the excellent interdisciplinary reader on postmodernism *The Anti-Aesthetic* (under the title "Modernity—an Incomplete Project"). It provoked responses in the French journal *Critique* by Lyotard and Rorty. Lyotard's reply has appeared in English both in a collection edited by Ihab Hassan and as a supplement to his earlier *The Postmodern Condition*. Rorty's response to Habermas and Lyotard has been published in English both by *Praxis International* and in *Habermas and Modernity*, which includes Habermas's response to the controversy. The significance of "Modernity versus Postmodernity" is manifold. It attempts to reassert a reasoned commitment to the Enlightenment while speaking under the auspices of Adorno, who in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* found contemporary totalitarianism prepared for by the Enlightenment ideal of dominating nature. It participates in Habermas's "reconstruction

of historical materialism", which draws upon all the intellectual resources of the twentieth century in order to redeem the nineteenth-century Marxist science of society. (Thus Habermas is the last major figure in Martin Jay's massive *Marxism and Totality*.) Habermas's essay thus stands for a left-wing progressive view of world history, underwritten by his extraordinary erudition and seriousness and projected in his thousand-page *Theory of Communicative Action*. Yet in making his case, Habermas rapidly dismisses competing political and theoretical positions with an inaccuracy, a failure of understanding, that is shocking in one whose best work so depends on probingly sympathetic critique of others, and whose long-standing ethical norm has been the transcendence of "systematically distorted communication".

Habermas honors Daniel Bell as the "most brilliant of the American neoconservatives", and he rightly recognizes Bell's concern with the "dissolution" of the Protestant ethic that had long dominated American values and with the aftermath of that dissolution, the "adversary culture" "modernism" that now seems to reign, despite the exhaustion of its own original impulses, "dominant but dead", transformed into postmodernism. Habermas goes on the charge that in Bell's analysis, "Neoconservatism shifts onto cultural modernism the uncomfortable burdens of a more or less successful capitalist modernization of the economy and society". (This echoes a point from Raymond Williams, cited by Richard Wolheim and Gerald Graff and echoed by Marshall Berman and Michael Rogin.) Habermas then summarizes Bell's prescription: "What new norm will put a brake on the levelling caused by the social welfare state, so that the virtues of individual competition can again dominate? Bell sees a religious revival as the only solution." I know no treatment of Habermas that challenges these claims; (although Habermas himself has moderated them, without acknowledging the change) we all are grateful for the rhetorical vigor that sweeps away the threat of neoconservatism. Yet these claims do no justice to Bell's arguments, however frustrating we may sometimes find his loose, repetitive, and not wholly consistent exposition.

Bell's major work addressed by Habermas is *The Cultural*

Contradictions of Capitalism (1976), successor to *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973). In keeping with Bell's emphasis on the "disjunction" of society, economy, and culture, the later book emphasizes the cultural as the earlier had the economic. Yet Bell understands that his different realms interact with each other, with effects that include both reinforcement and hindrance. Let me try to sketch Bell's argument as clearly as possible while still acknowledging its blurrinesses. Some five centuries ago, "modernity" produced two new figures, the "bourgeois entrepreneur" and the "independent artist" (freed by the market from patronage). Similar in their origins, these two figures diverged: "radical in economics, the bourgeoisie became conservative in morals and cultural taste", that is to say, developed the Protestant-ethic character structure. During the "early development of capitalism", the radical "unrestrained economic impulse" was held back by this character structure, but in later capitalist development "the Protestant Ethic was undermined not by [cultural] modernism but by capitalism itself": "The greatest single engine in the destruction of the Protestant Ethic was the invention of the installment plan." Bell summarizes: "The breakup of the traditional bourgeois value system, in fact, was brought about by the bourgeois economic system -by the free market, to be precise. This is the source of the contradiction of capitalism in American life." Thus he finds that "the erosion of traditional American values took place on two levels": in the "realm of culture and ideas", to be sure, "but a more fundamental transformation was occurring in the social structure itself: the change in the motivations and rewards of the economic system".

More recently, Bell summarized this topic:

> Bourgeois capitalism, as the sociological form of the modern economy, and avant-garde modernism, as the victorious feature of the culture, had common roots in their repudiation of the past, in their dynamism, in the search for novelty and sanction of change. Yet, inevitably, the different axial principles of these realms (the techno-economic realm segmenting a person into "roles", the

> culture emphasizing the achievement of the whole person) brought the bourgeois economic system into sharp conflict with the modernist culture... Thus are discerned contradictions in the fundamental structures of modern society [that is, *between* realms]. Within the realms, other contradictions have developed... From the 1920s modern corporate capitalism, being geared to mass production and consumption, has promoted a hedonism that has undercut the Protestant Ethic which was the initial motivation or legitimation for individuals in bourgeois society.

Bell does not blame modernism for the damage done by capitalism; instead he analyzes the "cultural contradiction of capitalism" as precisely its own power to undermine the human context on which its success had depended. As one who is a "socialist in economics", Bell has no reason to reject social welfare or to require "individual competition" once more to dominate. He does not believe that the political liberties he values depend on capitalism, and his notion of the "public household" seeks "to detach political liberalism from bourgeois society", for they are only "associated by origin, but not actually interdependent". It is true that he looks to a religious revival, but this is part of being a "conservative culture", not in economics or politics. In the realm of culture "modernism has been the seducer" by undoing "the hold of restraint" and urging "the acceptance of impulse". To be a cultural conservative for Bell cannot mean merely preferring Mann to Barth, Beethoven to Boulez, or Shakespeare to Woody Allen, because in his historical scheme all these figures have worked along the axial principle of the self. No less than Fredric Jameson or Perry Anderson, Bell if taken seriously would have us trying to imagine a new art that responds not to the self, rather to communal norms known in the past as religion but that we must invent anew for our future. (I regret Bell takes no interest in the unselving energies of such a postmodern work as *Gravity's Rainbow*, which follows Slothrop from the uniquely determining perversion of his Pavlovian youth along an anti-Oedipal path until he finally becomes "a crossroads, a living intersection", renewing one of

Longinus's tropes for sublime mobility of identity.) In the meantime, however, Bell adapts Gramsci's analysis of hegemony to suggest that after many centuries in which bourgeois principles dominated culture, especially in religion and education, there is now a "radical disjunction" between cultural and social values, and that "such disjuctions... historically have paved the way for more direct social revolutions". That is to say, precisely because it is now commodified as postmodernism and no longer at its former distance, the antihegemonic force of modernism can now more effectively undo capitalism.

Just as Habermas wished at the beginning of his essay to sweep away American "neoconservatism", which I have tried to suggest is hardly the best way of categorizing Bell, so he also at the end turned against what he considers the self-contradictory "Anti-modernism" based on "modernistic attitudes" of the French "young conservatives" from "Georges Bataille via Michel Foucault to Jacques Derrida". (Habermas develops this topic in "The French Path to Postmodernity".) I shall discuss this issue at greater length in my next section, in relation to the questions surrounding "representation". It is interesting to note, however, that this interpretation by Habermas has not gone uncontested, for there are many, among them Fraser and Jay, to whom it remains important to emphasize the radical potential within poststructuralism. Nonetheless, there are so many who echo Habermas, ranging from Jameson and Berman and the British sociologist Anthony Giddens to Rorty, that it is worth devoting a little more attention to the problem. The fundamental objection offered to Foucault (and with little change to Derrida, but often by different critics) is that his work saps the basis for social action. For one who has so chided our nostalgic wish for grounding as Rorty has, it is remarkable that this becomes the basis for his criticism of Foucault: "Foucault affects to write from a point of view light-years away from the problems of contemporary society. His own efforts at social reform (e.g. of prisons) seem to have no connection with his exhibition of the way in which the 'humane' approach to penal reform tied in with the needs of the modern state". Rorty has forgotten here that the purpose of Foucault's prison work was not

humane reform (that is to say, providing a new representation of prisoners by which they could be better known) but to facilitate prisoners' attempts at representing themselves. Moreover, Rorty does not consider that in defining the project of *Discipline and Punish* as "writing the history of the present", Foucault allied himself with Nietzschean genealogy. This genealogical practice transforms history from a judgment on the past in the name of a present truth to a "counter-memory" that combats our current modes of truth and justice, helping us to understand and change the present by placing it in a new relation to the past. Instead, Rorty cites "writing the history of the present" as evidence of a "remoteness" that arrogates "the eye of a future historian". Rorty therefore concludes that "there is no 'we' to be found in Foucault's writings", but surely a pragmatist can acknowledge that making a "we" is up to us as well as to the author we read. Foucault often claimed that his works were offered as tools; we join him then by using them, and enough of us have done so over the last decade that it should by this time be clear: those who claim that his work depresses are only saying that they have no use for it (although it has evidently energized them at least to rejection; only putative "others" are wholly paralyzed by its torpedo charms).

For the reader at home in the Anglo-American traditions of literary study, probably the strangest moment in Habermas's essay comes in his discussion of the need to maintain an autonomous sphere of art, while also allowing everyday life access to that sphere:

> Albrecht Wellmer has drawn my attention to one way that an aesthetic experience which is not framed around the experts' critical judgments of taste can have its significance altered: as soon as such an experience is used to illuminate the life-historical situation and is related to life problems, it enters into a language game which is no longer that of the aesthetic critic. The aesthetic experience then not only renews the interpretation of our needs in whose light we perceive the world. It permeates as well our cognitive significations and our normative expectations and changes the manner in which

all these moments refer to one another.

What is strange is not the set of connections made, but the idea that without Albrecht Wellmer's inspired suggestion, Habermas would never have thought of the relations between art and life that are the basis of Wordsworth's and Coleridge's poetics, of Emerson's writing, of Arnold's criticism, of Lawrence's "art for *my* sake", of Lionel Trilling's teaching career, and Leavis's belief that close literary analysis was "the discovery and animation of central human values" and therefore in our world "involved you in an assault on a whole system of social and cultural and academic values".

Perhaps no one formed in the American literary academy can really understand what the meaning of art's autonomy has been in philosophic aesthetics (one reason for Richard Rorty's importance is his ability to speak for literature to philosophy). Addressing "The Crisis in Culture" as long ago as 1960, Hannah Arendt observed, "The great works of art are no less misused when they serve purposes of self-education or self-cultivation than when they serve any other purposes: it may be as useful and legitimate to look at a picture in order to perfect one's knowledge of a given period as it is useful and legitimate to use a painting in order to hide a hole in the wall." Yet in those same years, Lionel Trilling taught *Heart of Darkness* and *Death in Venice* explicitly as "background" for his course in modern literature. Following the analysis but not the evaluation of Peter Bürger's brilliant *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, Habermas locates the programmatic, antimodernist "negation of culture" among the surrealists, as one of their "two mistakes". Trilling, however, found the essential note of all modern literature the "disenchantment of our culture with culture itself", its "hostility to civilization".

The power of modern literature, for Trilling, is its uniquely "personal" appeal, its capacity to shake our beliefs about all aspects of our life that have been settled by society, tradition, or habit, and his essay "On the Teaching of Modern Literature" becomes what it describes. Moving from Trilling's own "personal experience" as a teacher, the

essay ironically strips away the pieties of literary study by charting the diminishment effected upon both our literary masterpieces and our selves by their academic institutionalization: "More and more, as the universities liberalize themselves and turn their beneficent imperialistic gaze upon what is called life itself, the feeling grows among our educated classes that little can be experienced unless it is validated by some established intellectual discipline, with the result that experience loses much of its personal immediacy for us and becomes part of an accredited societal activity." Habermas would condemn Trilling's view as antimodernism for its distrust of liberal rationalization, and Bell would condemn it as modernism for its prime emphasis on experience (he draws the notion of "adversary culture" from the preface to the book in which this essay appears). Foucault might have found some interesting resonances in the critique of a "beneficent imperialistic gaze". (Trilling's colleague, collaborator, and student Steven Marcus was instrumental in making Foucault's work known, and as "postmodern", in the United States.)

Postmodernism, An Exemplary Issue: Representation

I cannot resolve the misunderstandings that I have been exposing, but I think that the debate over postmodernism will benefit from this preliminary attempt at clarifying some problems in one of its most important statements. By the same token, I wish to offer a preliminary inquiry into one of the most vexed areas in contemporary theory, that of representation. Here I shall advance a hypothesis of my own about some relations of modern and postmodern.

It would be fruitless to detail all the critics and theorists who have helped to establish "the so-called critique of representation" as a major "form of what must be called postmodernism generally". This discussion ranges over the history of philosophy, bearing particularly on epistemology; the theory of history, whether as concept, practice of writing, or course of actions; debates over politics, whether Marxist attacks on liberalism or libertarian attacks on Marxism; and the history

and future of literature, as the question of "realism" and the larger issue of "narrative" overall. Jacques Derrida ironically notes the consensus among critics that postmodern theorists, especially the French figures associated with poststructuralism, hold one simple view: "representation is bad"; figures as diverse as the DDR Marxist Robert Weimann (in much the richest engagement), the American neorealist Gerald Graff, the English semiotic materialists Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, and the late deconstructive Romanist Eugenio Donato, among many others, can all agree. I disagree, and I am happy to find myself accompanied by Hal Foster, Craig Owens, and Gregory Ulmer in their contributions to *The Anti-Aesthetic*, as well as by Fredric Jameson and Edward Said in much of their recent work. Nonetheless, it remains worth trying to spell out the contours of the problem (on which see also Spariosu), in the hope of changing the consensus.

A residual modernist problematic obstructs our understanding on issues of representation. This problematic contrasts an antirepresentational antihumanism against humanist defenders of representation—across so wide and distinguished a spectrum as that from E. H. Gombrich to Erich Auerbach to Georg Lukács. But current advanced theory crosses these lines: it is antihumanist, but it acknowledges - critically our enmeshment in representation. This change may be related to changes in dominant modes of cultural practice, from easel paintings and novels to films and electronic media, and these in turn to the transformation from national to global modes of social and economic relations.

The received belief that "advanced" theorists are "against" representation had two damaging consequences. On the one hand it seems to require us to discard the concerns and results of much postmodern inquiry if we are to pursue the play of representations in the world, where the power of representation is something sought, indeed passionately struggled for, by groups that consider themselves dominated by alien and alienating representations (e. g., see Said, "Permission to Narrate"). On the other hand, however, it encourages an ultraleftist avant-gardism which assumes that any critic seriously willing to work

with "representation" and its inevitably associated notions of "narrative" and "history", must be dismissed as a reactionary hierarchalist. Both of these positions deprive us of valuable critical resources; both tend to paralyze our critical enterprise into internecine warfare—the further spinning of "theory" without any concrete engagement.

I cannot present the details of how this particular belief has become established within the American academy. I shall only try to demonstrate that much crucial postmodern theory is not against representation and to sketch the recent history of the confused transition from modern to postmodern views on representation. I shall not try to define representation; we know well enough the different things we mean by it. People do it all the time, and the crucial issue is by what means, to what purpose, with what effect—pragmatic questions rather than the essentialist fuss whether we have finally found something that will not prove after all just to be representation again. I will venture to represent the history of representation in a particular narrative, which follows.

The tangled historicity of "representation" offers no convenient place to start. Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes are particularly instructive because they mark the major line of Western metaphysics, yet each strives to reject his predecessor. Plato wished to banish the poets for their practice of mimesis, but to Aristotle mimesis guaranteed the value of poetry. Descartes helped overthrow both Aristotelian physics and Platonic epistemology; knowledge itself became a matter of representation— the tradition Rorty has swerved from in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.

For the modernist case against representation, Virginia Woolf is exemplary. *To the Lighthouse* holds an especially privileged place in discussions of representation because of the analysis Erich Auerbach devoted to it in the final chapter of *Mimesis*. There he found that Woolf challenged the very premises of order on which the Western representational tradition had depended, even as at the same time she culminated that tradition through her work's unremitting attention to the most mundane of everyday details, rendered with the richest existential

seriousness. If Woolf's overall practice, then, stands as part of the modernist case against representation, that case is rendered significantly visible at memorable moments of the novel. The philosophical impasse of Mr. Ramsay—his inability to move from *Q* in the alphabet of thought on to *R*—humorously images that of the whole tradition in which he stands (part of the tangled heritage of Descartes) through the anecdotal figure of fat David Hume, stuck in a bog, and depending on the help of a woman of the people, who requires of him that he say the Lord's Prayer.

Lily Briscoe's painting has clear analogies to Woolf's own project of writing. In a remarkable moment, Woolf follows the consciousness of Mrs. Ramsay as she dissolves into a "wedge-shaped core of darkness", but that moment has been prefigured in Lily's pictorial treatment. Mr. Bankes asks Lily, "What did she wish to indicate by the triangular purple shape, 'just there'?":

> It was Mrs. Ramsay reading to James, she said. She knew his objection—that no one could tell it for a human shape. But she had made no attempt at likeness, she said... If there, in that corner, it was bright, here, in this, she felt the need of darkness... Mr. Bankes was interested. Mother and child, then—objects of universal veneration, and in this case the mother was famous for her beauty—might be reduced, he pondered, to a purple shadow without irreverence.
>
> But the picture was not of them, she said.

This sequence exemplifies what the modernist philosopher Ortegay Gasset was calling the "dehumanization of art", yet Woolf also exposes women's "humanity" as no more than objectification in man's gaze, even of "veneration" (same root as Venus and venereal).

My own language here, when I write of rendering and prefiguring and exemplifying, exploits the resources of representation in order to discuss what I claim is antirepresentational. But to take a stand against representation is not in fact to escape it; by and large modernist polemic

does not succeed, and confusion has come from taking its claims for results.

. . .

The major recent anti-Lukácsian Marxist theorist Althusser--also rested immense weight upon the term "representation". For Althusser ideology "represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence", and by the psychoanalytic premises that support this view, even in communist society ideology will persist, and therefore also representation. In *Reading Capital*, a German term for representation, *Darstellung*, names the "structural, causality" that operates through overdetermination and that Marx showed but never named as such. To produce this absent concept, and in language like that of Derrida's contemporaneous essays, Althusser looks to those moments when Marx represents the capitalist system as "mechanism, a machinery, a machine, a construction". And this is *Darstellung*:

> the very existence of this machinery in its effects: the mode of existence of the stage direction (*mise en scène*) [= *Darstellung*] of the theater which is simultaneously its own stage, its own script, its own actors, the theater whose spectators can, on occasion, be spectators only because they are first of all forced to be its actors, caught by the constraints of a script and parts whose authors they cannot be, since it is in essence *an authorless theater*.

The language of such an anti-*auteur* theory points toward a third aspect of the modernist case against representation, which involves the context of mass culture. For plot was the basis of Aristotelian mimesis, and plot has also been understood as the backbone of mass-cultural appeal, so that high culture retreated from plot, and neoplatonic arguments against plot's seductive power have been renewed. Indeed, in my elementary class on literary theory, students confronted with Aristotle's one-hundred-word summary of the action of the *Odyssey*--a decisive moment in the history of Western thinking about literature, a demonstration of the analytic power to achieve over a thousandfold

reduction, the capacity to perform what the *Ion* suggests neither Socrates nor anyone else in his culture could accomplish—and asked to try a similar exercise on some work that they know and admire, regularly complain that in its plot, the admired work is indistinguishable from something they value so little as a Harlequin romance. Postmodern inquiry has renewed the attempts of Bertolt Brecht and Walter Benjamin to achieve a positive use of mass culture, but modernist hostility to mass culture has ranged from the economic determinism of the Frankfurt-school belief that its place in "the culture industry" necessarily dooms a work to cooperate with the system of domination (a view still fiercely asserted by Wolin), to the formalist conviction, which flourished in *Screen* in the 1970s, that particular signifying practices in themselves are politically reactionary (if realist) or progressive.

The immediate horizon for current debate about representation is "French theory" from the 1960s. My focus now, is restricted to a particular institutionalization that this body of work has undergone in America: the view that as a whole it is against representation, and that in particular Derrida is. Such a view dominates the very series in which this volume is appearing. In *The Structural Allegory*, John Fekete refers to Derrida's "rejection of representation" and specifies that Derrida's "attack on representation" strives to undermine the "structure of representation" because that is the "epistemological foundation" of structuralism. Jochen Schulte-Sasse, co-editor of the series, in introducing Peter Bürger's *Theory of the Avant-Garde* [7], claims that Derrida "subjects to thorough critique the notion of representation" as a part of his attack against "epistemological closures". Schulte-Sasse finds Derrida guilty of employing "the same suspect strategies of exclusion" as does the metaphysics he is deconstructing, a "clear and neat oppositional structure".

I find several problems here. It colonizes Derrida all too easily within institutional Anglo-Saxon philosophy to consider him an epistemologist, even an antiepistemologist; as might be expected of a Heideggerian, he is far more an ontologist than an epistemologist. Rorty, whose work influences those I have been citing, himself knows better in

his direct discussions of Derrida, but this mistake (facilitated by the predominance of the term "representation" in Rorty's critique of foundational epistemology and the term's undeniable prominence in Derrida's work) is part of what has endeared his work to the literary academy. Even more important, however, is that Derrida simply does not attack representation; even where he may be quoted to this effect, he has more to say on the matter.

Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena* argues that what Husserl thought could be treated as "immediate" is instead always already mediated by representation. The inescapability of representation is Derrida's deconstructive point against the metaphysical fantasy of pure presence. Derrida defined the "prime intention" and "ultimate scope" of the book as "affirming *Perception does not exist* or that what is called perception is not primordial, that somehow everything 'begins' by re-presentation". The key term "trace" enters the book in order to elucidate the "re" of representation as part of the most fundamental structure of repetition that is "more 'primordial' than what is phenomenologically primordial".

In *Of Grammatology* it is Rousseau (not Derrida) whose praise of the assembled people is "always a critique of representation". On the other hand, in unraveling the strange graphic of supplementarity, Derrida is perfectly clear that he is following the thread of representation. The design that traces the relation of forces between the two movements of the text, Derrida writes, "seems to us to be represented in the handling of the concept of the supplement". This claim inaugurates his reading, and at its end Derrida hauntingly concatenates the "entire series of supplementary significations" that he has teased out from Rousseau: "the North, winter, death, imagination, representation, the arousal of desires".

Speech and Phenomena features Derrida's claim that "*Phenomenological reduction is a scene, a theater stage*". His whole early essay on Freud operates by staging, as a *mise en scène*, a *Darstellung*, a representation, two series of metaphors in Freud, both of which Freud represents in terms of further instruments of representation: "Psychical *content* will be *represented* by a text whose essence is irreducibly

graphic. The *structure* of the psychical *apparatus* will be *represented* by a writing machine." The layered repetitions of representation here may evoke the passage from Husserl that Derrida quotes epigraphically and then again at the end of *Speech and Phenomena*: "A name on being mentioned reminds us of the Dresden gallery... we wander through the rooms and stop in front of a painting by Teniers which represents a gallery of paintings. Let us further suppose that the paintings of this gallery would represent in their turn paintings, which, on their part, exhibit readable inscriptions and so forth." Derrida's conclusion in the Freud essay echoes his reading of Husserl, while archly underwriting Freud's pansexualism: "Everything begins with reproduction." Here again the connection to issues of technical reproducibility in mass culture is clear.

From the two essays on Artaud that Schulte-Sasse makes his prime examples of Derrida's inadequacies, I can offer only two representative citations. Derrida asks whether Artaud would have "refused the name *representation* for the theater of cruelty". He answers:

> No, provided that we clarify the difficult and equivocal meaning of this notion. Here we would have to be able to play upon all the German words that we indistinctly translate with the unique word representation. The stage, certainly, *will no longer represent*, since it will not operate as an addition, as the sensory illustration of a text already written, thought, or lived outside the stage... The stage will no longer operate as the repetition of a *present*, will no longer *re*-present a present that would exist elsewhere and prior to it... It will not even offer the representation of a present, if present signifies that which is maintained in *front* of me. Cruel representation must permeate me. And nonrepresentation is, thus, original representation, if representation signifies also, the unfolding of a volume, a multidimensional milieu, an experience which produces its own space. *Spacing*...

And here Derrida goes on to the play of trace and differance that

introduces a self-disarticulating distance into what had been credited as immediacy.

I have cited this passage to show that Derrida does not *simply* place Artaud against representation. I cite the next passage to establish that Derrida does not *simply* take any side with regard to representation. Derrida's practice resembles that of novelists. The dream of metaphysics, blind to mortality, sees a world of enchanted giants. Representation, however, is the windmill in which the quest always gets tangled up. The history of metaphysics, our reality, is both the dream and its disabuse, and to gain any glimpse of a different horizon, we must stage this as a process, not state it as a position.

Here, then, Derrida summarizes his first essay on Artaud:

> One entire side of his discourse destroys a tradition which lives *within* difference, alienation, and negativity without seeing their origin and necessity. To reawaken this tradition, Artaud... recalls it to its own motifs: self-presence, unity...etc. In this sense, Artaud...fulfills the most profound and permanent ambition of western metaphysics. But through another twist of his text... Artaud affirms the... law of difference... This duplicity of Artaud's text... has unceasingly obligated us to pass over to the other side of the limit, thereby to demonstrate the closure of the presence within which he had to enclose himself... [T]o an inexpert scrutiny, we could appear to be criticizing Artaud's metaphysics from the standpoint of metaphysics itself, when we are actually delimiting... a necessary dependency of all destructive discourses: they must inhabit the structures they demolish.

Or as Derrida made the same point in *Speech and Phenomena*: "What we are describing as primordial representation can be provisionally designated with this term only within the closure whose limits we are seeking to transgress by setting down and demonstrating various contradictory or untenable propositions within it, attempting thereby to institute a kind of insecurity and open it up to the outside. This can only be

done from a certain inside."

No less than Althusser and Derrida, Michel Foucault devoted crucial work to representation. *The Order of Things* constantly focuses on representation, from its opening pages on Velázquez, but at the same time the book argues for radical historical discontinuity. Representation, therefore, cannot be the same across time. From the Cartesian, classical point of view, there is a problem in the relation of the modern human sciences to representation. For even though the human sciences understand "*man*" precisely as "that living being who... constitutes representations by which he lives, and on the basis of which he possesses that strange capacity of being able to represent to himself precisely that life", the human sciences look to "unconscious mechanisms" rather than to the clearly illuminated conscious space of classical representation. Against this classical objection, Foucault emphasizes that "representation is not consciousness", and "this bringing to light of elements or structures that are never present to consciousness" does not "enable... the human sciences to escape the law of representation". There exists, then, a resemblance *but without filiation* between the human sciences and classical philosophy, which produces a recurrent anachronistic effect: "Every time one tries to use the human sciences to philosophize... one finds oneself imitating the philosophical posture of the eighteenth century". This is Foucault's riposte to Lévi-Strauss's Rousseauism, the vestigial homologue to Derrida's many pages on lévi-Strauss and Rousseau.

Foucault poses a telling formulation of the dilemma of Derrida's that we have encountered--the Samsoinic position of the "destructive" intellectual, inhabiting the edifice he is pulling down—but he construes it as part of our historical moment rather than as an inherent necessity of thought or discourse:

> The human sciences, when dealing with what is representation (in either conscious or unconscious form), find themselves *treating* as their object what is in fact their condition of possibility. They are always animated, therefore, by a... transcendental mobility. They

> never cease to exercise a critical examination of themselves. They proceed from that which is given to representation to that which renders representation possible, but which is still representation. So [they are] constantly demystifying themselves... unveiling... the non-conscious.

For Foucault at this point in his career, no less than for Derrida, there is nothing to do within the enclosure except glimpse the change that will transform everything—in this case the end of "*man*" and a return to the "power of discourse". Foucault's later work, of course, did much to give that formulation specificity and has helped to make possible the deep concern with the mechanisms of representational power that mobilizes so interesting a current project as the new interdisciplinary journal from Berkeley, *Representations*.

I conclude this section with Heidegger's essay "The Age of the World-View" both because Derrida discusses it in a recent essay precisely on representation ("Sending") and because it allows us to consider anew the historical dimensions of the issue. "The Age of the World-View" supports Lucien Goldmann's thesis that Heidegger tries to account ontologically for the features of modern life that Lukács defined through the Marxist problematic of reification. Heidegger begins with the dual constitution of subject and object through Descartes's analysis of knowledge as representation, and he then defines "the basic process of modern times" as "the conquest of the world as picture" -which involves politics and technology.

Heidegger goes beyond Lukács's focus in *History and Class Consciousness* on the characteristically nineteenth-century mode of newspaper journalism; Heidegger cites new mass media, "the unlimited power of representing foreign and remote worlds, made present through the turn of a hand, through the radio". Heidegger neither glories in this new political technology of global representation, nor simply stands against it. With astonishing relevance to current debates over education in the United States, this most conservative of modern thinkers, who more than anyone else in the twentieth century remade our

intellectual life through engagement with ancient Greece, warns that in the face of our historical situation, the "flight to tradition" offers only a mixture of "humility and arrogance", a "blindness and self-deception" that will not enable us to deal with our current needs.

Heidegger also cuts closer to where many of us live. For in defining the new forms of knowledge in our time, he emphasizes its "institutionalization" in a new "business character". The new dealer in knowledge "does business at meetings and gets information at congresses. He contracts to work for publishers, who [thereby] now help to determine what books must be written". Moreover, part of the new structure Heidegger isolates is something that many of us may value because we believe it challenges the usual business of our departmental structures, namely "the greatest possible ability to... switch research", a "regulated mobility of transference and integration of activities with respect to whatever tasks happen to be of paramount importance". This is a chilling warning, set in a lecture from Germany in 1938. Does it have the same force now? Postmodern thinking about the responsibility of intellectuals has had to acknowledge that most critics and artists alike are now institutionally located within the university, another loss of the distance that modernists found a guarantee of independence. This essay of Heidegger's helps clarify the interdependence of representation not only with history and narrative, but also with professionalism and questions of intellectuals as the "new class" (see Gouldner; and Konrád and Szelényi). On all these matters, it is no longer possible *simply* to take sides. By analyzing some of the confusions that have attended recent talk about representation, I hope to have helped make possible more lucid political analyses of the postmodern situation.

Politics: Our Current Debates in Theory and History

Political lucidity requires some sense of what we *mean by politics* at all, and there has been no easy understanding here, either conceptually or historically. More than twenty years ago Peter Sedgwick

charged that the "sociocultural" emphasis of such British "New Left" figures as Stuart Hall, E. P. Thompson, and Raymond Williams was "subversive of political activism". In recent statements that appeared within a few months of each other, Edward Said and Fredric Jameson offer perspectives that show how wide the range of uncertainty can be even among figures, both on the left, who urge that we renew our practices of narrative representation...

As if directly responding to the observations of Said, Jameson insisted, "As far as 'the political' is concerned, any single-slot, single-function definition of it is worse than misleading, it is paralyzing", for the following reasons:

> We are, after all, fragmented beings, living in a host of separate reality-compartments simultaneously; in *each one of those* a certain kind of politics is possible, and if we have enough energy, it would be desirable to conduct all those forms of political activity simultaneously. So the "metaphysical" question: what is politics... is worthwhile only when it leads to enumeration of all the possible options, and not when it lures you into following the mirage of the single great strategic idea.

Since, however, the limitations of discourse necessitate "that we talk about each of these forms of political intervention separately", we must beware of the "supreme misunderstanding", that is, "the misconception that when one modestly outlines a certain form of political activity—such as that which intellectuals in the university can engage in—this 'program' is meant to suggest that this is the *only* kind of politics one should do".

Perhaps Jameson here neglects an aspect of "relative autonomy": the "political" does exist as a realm of state and law. For example, we can speak literally of a "politics of reproduction" because of the battles over the legality of abortion; a "politics of sexuality" because laws forbid certain practices or fail to ensure equal protection to those who engage in them; a "politics of gender" because women have turned to

courts and legislatures in attempting to gain equal access to jobs and equal pay within them. One reason the personal has become the political is because of the agitation for public remedies in areas long considered private, including a professor's expectation that a secretary will make coffee, or that a student will tolerate an unwelcome pat. Jameson does not in fact exclude these concerns, but his conceptualization tends to elide their political specificity.

Jameson's understanding of "reification" (like Bell's "axial principle" of role-segmentation in economics) recognizes the actual fragmentation of intellectual and political life, while his commitment to "totality" (like Bell's "axial principle" of the "whole person" in culture) insists that these parts be understood in relation to a global context. Many developments in twentieth-century Marxism help to elucidate his position. Gramsci's analysis of "hegemony" lays the basis for understanding the cultural sphere (especially education and religion) as not merely a reflection of social and economic relations but instead a means by which those relations may be enforced, amplified, or contested. The Frankfurt-school critique of the "culture industry" gave new insight into culture as a means of domination, and if modified by the ideas of Brecht and Benjamin on "refunctioning", suggested the possibility of the mass media as an arena for political contests (see Kipnis). Althusser's conception of "ideological state apparatuses" helps to make clear how even if politics may ultimately mean smashing the state, or taking over the state, or forming a new state, nonetheless activity in the area of culture may be understood in relation to those ultimates.

In Said's terms, then, it is probable that a Marxist "reading" of a "canonical" work is in and of itself no more significant a political challenge than a deconstructive reading, an archetypal reading, or any other "approach"; all alike contribute to legitimating the academic literary institution as autonomous. If, however, Marxist literary critics make part of their argument a challenge to the idea of "literary criticism" itself, demonstrating and challenging the social uses which such an idea has served, we move toward the political (although Evan Watkins raises cogent doubts). The crucial contemporary agenda is elaborating the

relations that join the nexus of classroom, discipline, and profession to such political areas as those of gender, race, and class, as well as nation.

The current movement from "literary" to "cultural" studies, from "literary criticism" to "criticism", shows this direction, as was ironically, sadly, but accurately understood by Harry Levin as early as 1960. He observed then of the separation of the sphere of high culture, "The thought that a man of letters should consider himself a practitioner of the fine arts, or that he should be designated professionally as an artist, is a legacy from Flaubert's generation which is not likely to outlast Joyce's hy long." Like Habermas now, Levin then valued the process of separation understood by both as part of the Enlightenment's heritage, but Levin saw it as already past: "Instead of a tension between the uncomprehending majority and the saving remnant... there has heen a *détente*, a relaxation, and a collaboration for mutual profit... But this is a subject notoriously better appreciated by professors of sociology and experts on mass communication than it is by old-fashioned scholars and modernist critics". Postmodern critics, new-fashioned scholars, can carry on a significant political activity by relating the concerns once enclosed within "literature" to a broader cultural sphere that is itself related to, although not identical with, the larger concerns of the state and economy.

At best, however, the idea of "cultural politics" must remain vexed. The history of cultural opposition movements in the United States helps to specify some of this discomfort. The 1930s is our usual point of reference, but already then there was a previous history. Malcolm Cowley's[8] work for the *New Republic* in the thirties was closely sympathetic to the conjunction of cultural and political radicalism, coming close to fellow traveling with communism. He had already lived through both Greenwich Village bohemianism and aesthetic expatriation, as he described in *Exile's Return*, published in 1934, the year *Partisan Review* was founded as an organ of the John Reed Club. That memoir both illuminates Daniel Bell's arguments about the erosion of the "Protestant Ethic" and shows that concerns about the "co-optation"

of the avant-garde are no longer novel.

In discussing the "ideas" characteristic of Greenwich Village's bohemian ways of living around 1920, Cowley emphasizes that "from the standpoint of the business- Christian ethic then represented by the *Saturday Evening Post*", they were "corrupt". For "this older ethic... was a *production* ethic"; its "great virtues" included "industry, foresight, thrift, and personal initiative". Against this, however, there emerged "a new ethic that encouraged people to buy, a *consumption ethic*":

> Many of the Greenwich Village ideas proved useful in the altered situation. Thus, *self-expression* and *paganism* encouraged demand for all sorts of products- modern furniture, beach pajamas, cosmetics, colored bathrooms with toilet paper to match. *Living for the moment* meant buying an automobile, radio or house, using it now and paying for it tomorrow. *Female equality* was capable of doubling the consumption of products- cigarettes, for example—that had formerly been used by men alone. Even *changing place* would help to stimulate business in the country from which the artist was being expatriated. The exiles of art were also trade missionaries; involuntarily they increased the foreign demand for fountain pens, silk stockings, grapefruit and portable typewriters.

The socially serious 1930s, then, found the preceding generation, which we link with modernism at its height, already liable to the charges that critics urge against postmodernism. Located halfway between, echoing Cowley's language of 1934 and prefiguring that of Charles Newman in 1984, Harry Levin[9] wrote in 1960 of postmodernism: "This is reproduction, not production; we are mainly consumers rather than producers of art. We are readers of reprints and connoisseurs of high fidelity, even as we are gourmets by virtue of the expense account and the credit card. For our wide diffusion of culture is geared to the standardizations of our economy, and is peculiarly susceptible to inflationary

trends... The independence of our practitioners, when they are not domesticated by institutions of learning, is compromised more insidiously by the circumstances that make art a business." Taken further, such analysis leads to the important contemporary topic of intellectuals as a "new class", a group fully interested in social struggles, rather than independent of them (see Gouldner; and Konrád and Szelényi).

Independence is difficult to analyze. At one extreme, independence is merely isolation, irrelevance. Independence is valuable only as a relation to that from which, or perhaps by means of which, one is independent, but this opens a further danger of purely reactive independence...

We lack the history of American intellectuals from the thirties through the sixties that will allow us fully to make sense out of these crossings back and forth, yet they continue to haunt our current situation. It is in principle well known that Habermas's extreme sensitivity to the political dangers of what he reckons antimodernism can be understood in relation to the history of Germany in the twentieth century, for in the two decades before the Nazis came to power, the German academy was full of antimodernist polemic, transmitted from the intellectual concerns of teachers to the agitational concerns of students...

It is important that American academics involved in the study of current "theory" be aware of such contexts, here as well as abroad, yet even this is not enough. For Habermas's sensitivity to antimodernism forgets that in the 1920s, it was the modernizing wing in the academy that set in motion the rhetoric of "crisis"; this rhetoric was seized by the antimodernists for their own purposes, which they made prevail. ... Coming from this German experience, Adorno and others of the Frankfurt school found in the American "culture industry" signs of incipient fascism, seizing on some of the same elements ("the amiable fumblings of the 'little man'") that to Howe and Coser defined the residue of the Stalinist popular front. Theories of "totalitarianism" appealed to the 1950s by promising to resolve these inconsistencies, but it is now generally conceded that in offering a typology of deviation such theories overlooked too much history.

The lesson of history is that we must know both our history and our difference from our history. In 1937, when William Phillips and Philip Rahv of *Partisan Review* proclaimed that the existing contradiction between Marxism and American traditions required a "Europeanization" of American culture if Marxism were to flourish here, who would have imagined that the heritage of the "New York intellectuals" would so firmly oppose the recent excitement over "European theory"? When a young lifetime later in 1974, Warren Susman echoed in a new key Henry James's litany of American absences, "Why have we... no Luxemburg, no Gramsci, no Lukács, no Gorz, no Althusser?", who would have imagined the "arresting historical change" Perry Anderson proclaimed in 1984; for Marxist theory, "today the *predominant* centres of intellectual production... lie in the English-speaking world".

注释：

1 安德森(Perry Anderson, 1938—)：英国马克思主义批评家、历史学家，《新左派》杂志主编。主要著作有《西方马克思主义探讨》(1976)、《交锋地带》(1992)和《后现代性的起源》(1998)等。

2 赛义德(Edward W. Said, 1935—)：巴勒斯坦裔美国著名批评家，中学毕业后赴美国求学，获哈佛大学博士学位。后定居美国，一直在哥伦比亚大学任教，现为该校客座教授。他对欧洲当代批评理论的阐释在美国产生了重大影响。他以批评的态度支持福柯及其理论，但对德里达的理论则不以为然。他的国际影响主要在于他的后殖民理论，这种理论集中体现在《东方主义》(1978)和《文化与帝国主义》(1993)两部著作当中。

3《辩证批评》(*Diacritics*)：以评论当代批评理论著作为主的美国杂志，始创于1970年，每年四期。1982年秋季出版了弗雷德里克·詹姆逊专号，刊载了怀特和伊格尔顿等著名批评家的文章。这里所说的访谈是在詹姆逊与格林、卡勒和克莱因之间进行的。

4《疆界 2》(*Boundary 2*)：美国著名学术杂志，始创于1970年，副标题为"a Journal of Postmodern Literature and Culture"，主要发表关于后现代主义的文章。随着刊物声誉的增长和文化研究的发展，1990年改为"an International Journal of Literature and Culture"。含义是"跨越，跨越一个边界进入未知的世界，或者进入一个加速现代主义终结而又不是一个真正时期的'阶段'"。

5 戈德曼(Lucien Goldmann, 1913— 1970)：法国哲学家和社会学家。他深受马克思和卢卡奇的影响，提出了发生学结构主义观念。其理论基础是：一切思想都倾向于系统地创造某种作为思维主体的个人与世界的联系。

6 利奥塔(Jean François Lyotard, 1924—1997):法国哲学家。积极参与后现代主义的争论,其《后现代状况》(1979)已成为研究后现代争论的必读之作。

7《先锋派理论》(*Theory of the Avant Garde*, 1984)的主要观点是:文学和艺术的社会历史不可能通过把个体作品的内容与社会历史相联系来解释。真正使个体艺术作品与历史相联系的,是艺术作品的社会地位及它在社会中的作用和声望。

8 考利(Malcolm Cowley, 1898—1993):美国著名文学评论家,其著作没有固定的理论方法,但其对文本的细读和阐释为许多文学研究者提供了借鉴。

9 列文(Harry Levin, 1912—):美国著名文学评论家,曾长期任哈佛大学客座教授,以研究现实主义和传奇的关系著称。他在美国首创文学作品题材的比较研究,对比较文学的发展做出了重要贡献。

帕特丽夏·沃:困境?:女权主义者、后现代主义者和现代美学中未解决的问题

Stalemates?: Feminists, Postmodernists and Unfinished Issnes in Modern Aesthetics

Patricia Waugh

George Eliot's Mr. Brooke could not have known as be reflected upon the perils of reading Adam Smith that his reservations at out the benefits of a little theory would become central to many of the aesthetic debates of the late twentieth century: "The fact is, human reason may carry you a little too far--over the hedge in fact. It carried me a good way at one time; but I saw it would not do. I pulled up; I pulled up in time. But not too hard." Gentle deceleration is preferred, as he goes on to explain, because "we must have Thought, else we shall be landed back in the dark ages"[1].

However, reading much of the aesthetic theory arising out of the so-called "Postmodern debate", it is difficult to avoid feeling that not only are we landed back in the dark ages but that it is the rationalisms of Enlightenment thought that have marooned us there in the first place.

Modernity, we are told, is coming to an end, strangled by its own contradictory logic, born astride of the grave which has become its own

abyss. Just as Greek civilization or the Feudal Age had come to an end and just as Nietzsche had announced the death of God a century earlier, so contemporary theorists like Foucault have announced the end of modern Western man, a face in the sand eroded by an ever encroaching sea. Yet while postmodernist thinkers (dare one say it—largely male) were proclaiming their own death (the end of humanism), feminists were in their most optimistic vein. For postmodernists, modernity might be exhausted, but for feminists it was clearly unfinished, needing to be renovated perhaps, but not abandoned. Postmodernism was first used as a period term in the early fifties by Arnold Toynbee who announced that we were entering the fourth and final phase of Western history: one of irrationalism, anxiety and helplessness. If Modernism had tried to anchor in consciousness (that of the heroic socially alienated artist) a centre which could no longer hold, Postmodernism had shown us an even darker side of modernity and the aporias of its aesthetic. It had shown that there is nothing for consciousness to be anchored to: no universal ground of truth, justice or reason, so that consciousness itself is thus "decentred", no longer origin, author, location of intentional agency but a function through which impersonal forces pass and intersect — Dover beach displaced by an international airport lounge. In this context art seems to have no special role. In a world where truth is only the effect of power or rhetoric, where all interpretative models are provisional and contingent, neither the Romantic concept of poets as the unacknowledged legislators of mankind, nor the late Romantic (Freudian) concept of universal mind as a poeticizing instrument, seem to carry any validity. Both concepts seemed to have been turned back on themselves in a bleak parody: if everything is fictional or textual then there can be no way of saying that one act or text is better than another; no ethics, no aesthetics because existence is itself aestheticized and no ideology because no "truth": at best provisional consensus, pragmatism, interpretative communities.

Such is the generally Apocalyptic vision of much postmodern thought. But, as Kermode had reminded us in the late sixties, if we do not have a sense of an ending, we invent one: concordances are

reassuting, they produce the illusion of retrospective significance. Endings confer meaning and for all human beings. "the End they imagine will reflect their irreducibly intermediary preoccupations... we thrive on epochs"[2]. Could it be that Postmodernism is the Ending invented by its theorists searching for their own significance? Of what will that significance consist? Why have feminists on the whole, though registering the transitionality of the current epoch, not represented it through the same sense of an ending? Redemption through retrospective narrative significance is in itself, of course, also central to the modernist aesthetic. In that key text for Modernism. *Heart of Darkness*, when Marlow chooses to interpret Kurtz's acknowledgement of "the horror" as an heroic act, one can see in Marlow's eloquence a mirror of Kurtz's own; it is the retrospective narrative rather than the experiential act which "redeems". But, despite the heroic adventure story quest form, redemption can, in the end, only be offered through the rhetorical structures of that same Enlightenment vocabulary which Conrad's text has exposed as corrupt and fraudulent. Nevertheless, to read this text is to feel that one remains in a state of hesitation about whether it is art or experience which redeems. Not so with Postmodernism. Here, the sense of an ending has *continuously* to be revised through the endless deferral of repeated narrative reconstruction. There can be no experience outside text. History is narratives. The End is the insight that there can he no ending, no beginning, no ground and no telos. Again, however, in this world of hyperinflated discourse, one may begin to feel, indeed, that it is not the worst so long as we can say it is the worst, and thus to begin to question *whose* Apocalypse is being represented.

Which brings me to silence. And at last to feminism. Nietzsche's critique of Enlightenment modernity was basically that it had not been modern enough. He saw all its major institutions and categories of thought as redescriptions of Christianity; a slave mentality which could not confront the existence of the "will to truth" as a form of the "will to power". Postmodernism seems, in its renunciation of modernity, to have embraced an insistent secularism. It seems to me though that its rhetoric of Apocalypse is just as insistently religious as the modernist search

for redemption through Art. Just as the narratives of Modernism search for their own selfgrounded formal redemption, so too the narratives of postmodern theory seek a self-overcoming, though one outside the ultimately Aristotelian notion of form which underlies the modernist concept of formal autonomy. What alarms me as a feminist, however, is the pervasive redescription of this posibility of redemption, this space of the sacred beyond the linearity of Aristotelian form, as the space of the feminine Kurtz's Intended continues to be used as the justification for that necessary Lie which seems to offer us a Paradise regained outside the logic of modernity. Before this tendency is examined more closely, however, I wish to look briefly and more generally at the history of the relations between feminism and Postmodernism.

Modernity, Postmodernism and Feminism

Feminism as a discourse clearly arises out of modernity and its models of reason, justice and subjectivity. Feminism, however, has also been one of the discourses which has with similar clarity revealed some of the most entrenched and disguised contradictions and limitations of Enlightenment thought. To this extent, it can be seen as intrinsically postmodern, if problematically so. Yet, until very recently, the debates within Postmodernism have tended to ignore those taking place within feminist discourse, and vice versa. Things have begun to change. Feminist theory has developed a self-conscious awareness of its own hermeneutic perspectivism based on the recognition of a central contradiction in its attempts to define an epistemology; that women seek equality and vaiorisation for a gendered identity which has been constructed through the very culture and ideology that feminism seeks to challenge. In fact, one can see such contradictions manifesting themselves as early as 1971 in Kristeva's essay "Women's Time". The concept of a "women's identity" functions in terms both of affirmation and negation, even within feminism itself. There can be no simple legitimation for feminists in throwing off a "false consciousness" and revealing a true "female self". To embrace "difference" in essentialist terms is to come dangerously

close to reproducing that very patriarchal construction of gender which feminists have set out to contest.

Feminism of late, therefore, has developed a self-reflexive mode: questioning its own legitimating procedures in a manner which seems to bring it close to a Postmodernism which has absorbed the lessons of poststructuralism and consists at the most general level of a crisis of legitimation across culture, politics and aesthetic theory and practice. The slogan "Let us wage war on totality", however, could be Postmodernism's response to that earlier slogan of the feminist movement, "The personal is the political". But if the latter can be seen as a rallying cry, the former implies a hostile attitude towards its implicit ideals of collectivism and community. In fact the feminist cry situated its politics firmly within what Lyotard wishes to denounce and what Jürgen Habermas calls the "project of modernity"[3]. It will be my argument that even if feminists have come to recognize in their discourses some of the epistemological doubt and perspectivism that afflicts Postmodernism, feminism must still continue to define itself as an emancipatory movement broadly within the terms of the aforementioned project. Is it possible for feminists to draw on the aesthetics of Postmodernism as strategies for narrative disruption without embracing its nihilistic pragmatism? Surely to assume otherwise is in itself to embrace a naively reflectionist aesthetic which sees representation necessarily reflective of prior structures or ideologies. Can feminists occupy a position of hermeneutic perspectivism which questions epistemology without, therefore, relinquishing ethics in an embrace of hermeneutic anarchism where no discourse is seen as more valid than any other, simply more useful at a particular time or place? Can feminism remain opposed to Postmodernism's circular tendency to project itself onto the contemporary world and thus, not surprisingly, to find in that world an affirmation of its own theoretical presuppositions? Can it in other words continue to resist the implicitly religious terminology of the Postmodern sense of an Ending while recognizing the force of its critique of epistemology?

One way of approaching these issues is to think about the

implications of the various models of subjectivity with which feminists and postmodernists have worked. What the preceding discussion has suggested is that the epistemological and ethical contradictions now confronting both of them are fundamentally issues about identity and difference. Subjective transformation has been central to feminist agendas for political change. Similarly, over the last thirty years, the deconstruction of liberal individualism and the dissolution of traditional aesthetic conceptualisations of character have been central to postmodern art and theory. Like feminism, Postmodernism has been engaged in a re-examination of the Enlightenment concepts of subjectivity, truth and reason enshrined in the belief that human beings are collectively engaged in a progressive movement towards moral and intellectual self-realization through the application to their situation of a universal rational faculty.

Personal freedom or autonomy in these terms has been defined as freedom from the irrational forces within and the social forces without. Freud's work has been seen as axiomatic for the former and the work of Marx for the latter. The focus of much postmodern theory has been to dismantle the basic assumptions of their writing to lay bare an epistemology and methodology which, it is argued, is at one with an oppressive and authoritarian rationalism which has produced terror in place of emancipation and disguised its will to power as a disinterested "scientific" desire for truth. The self-determining subject has had a similarly difficult time of it in postmodern fiction. Such fictions are often enactments of the frustration of attempting to find correspondences to their linguistic condition outside of language itself. In Robert Coover's "Panel Game", he parodies the attempt to find an allencompassing truth in language by showing the narrator caught up in a maze of the myriad possibilities of meaning, of *paroles* with no discoverable *langues*, while all the possible formal functions of language — emotive, referential, poetic, conative, phatic and finally, metalingual — whirl about him. "So think. Stickleback. Freshwaterfish. Freshwaterfish: green seaman. Seaman: semen. Yes, but green: raw? spoiled? vigorous? Stickle: stubble. Or maybe scruple. Back: Bach: Bachus: Bachate: berry. Rawberry? Strawberry."

Through the emphasis on the arbitrary associations of sound, rhyme and image, attention is drawn to the formal organization of language and away from its referential potential. The quotation could almost be an exercise in Jakobsonian linguistics as the internal operations of language produce that poetic equivalence which endlessly substitutes one arbitrary phoneme for another: Stickleback. Freshwaterfish (metonymic). Freshwaterfish: green seaman (metonymic/metaphoric) seaman: semen (metaphoric).

In Donald Barthelme's fictions abstract nouns and passive constructions almost entirely replace personal assertion or human agency[1]. The story "Brain Damage" begins: "At the restaurant, sadness was expressed"; moods are reflexes of disembodied signifiers rather than of personal feeling. Endless lists, catalogues, insistent stylisation flaunt the materiality of writing as depthlessness, again seem to present a self-conscious articulation of the rules of selection and combination in grammar, an endless play of linguistic substitution for its own sake; metaphors proliferate, syntax continuously breaks down. The reader is offered sentences such as: "The world is sagging, snagging, scaling, spalling, pulling, pinging, pitting, warping, checking, fading, chipping, cracking, yellowing, leaking, staling, shrinking and in dynamic unbalance." Certainly this sentence is, for as the material world shrinks, the linguistic one expands and it is the materiality of language again, what Jameson has characterized as the schizophrenic present of Postmodernism, which is obsessively foregrounded.

Barthelme's sentence, of course, enacts entropy, another postmodern image of Apocalypse. I think Jameson is quite correct, however, in the essay mentioned above, to connect the "schizophrenic" tendency in Postmodernism with a pervasive nostalgia. It is worth thinking about this in relation to feminism. It seems to me that postmodernist writing is pervaded by a nihilism produced through nostalgia (Nietzsche is one of several thinkers who have connected these impulses). Often in such texts the possibility of humanist affirmation is destroyed by an insistent and excessive but familiar enough Romantic desire to rediscover a transcendent metaphysical truth, an essence of Being, whose impossible

realization produces the urge to render absurd or to destroy altogether what can be: the human subject as an ethical, affective and effective historical agent.

In Pynchon's *V*, for example, V functions as both goal and negation of Stencil's quest for transcendent meaning and is pictured thus:

> skin radiant with the bloom of some new plastic; both eyes glass but now containing some photoelectric cells, connected by silver electrodes to optic nerves of purest copper wire leading to a brain exquisitely wrought as a diode matrix ever could be. Soleroid relays would be her ganglia, serio-actuators move her flawless nylon limbs, hydraulic fluid be sent by a platinum heart-pump through buthyrane veins and arteries.[5]

For those who wish to equate "*totality*" with *totalitarianism* (as Lyotard at times) or to conflate linguistic or textual with political subversion, then such postmodern strategies, which appear to dissolve humanist subjectivity into textual play, have been hailed as the only means of resisting the oppressive structures of global capitalism, of patriarchal surveillance and control of the pleasure principle. They are seen as part of the assault on the bondage of thought to regulative ideals such as "*truth*" and "*goodness*". In response, one might point out some obvious difficulties here: why is V a woman, and surely it matters that Nietzsche insisted that such regulative ideals were tied to what he saw as phallic castration, an emasculation of the intellect he associated with all emancipatory movements, particularly feminism. The idea of truth as untruth has repeatedly been articulated through the image of the seductive woman, a Salome who is only her veils, whose adornments disguise a gaping absence. She continues to appear with monotonous frequency in the metaphorical femininity of postmodern writing. This grotesque version of the wearisome metaphor, for example, appears in Nietzsche's *My Sister and I*: "Truth is still elusive. However, she is no longer a young girl but an old bitch with all her front teeth missing." Before examining in more depth what such rhetoric means for actual women, whether,

indeed, Pynchon's V assaults the oppressive structures of late Capitalism for women, in particular, we need first to look at the historical and philosophical foundations of postmodernist and feminist aesthetics and to see whether it is indeed possible to move beyond the position of stalemate.

Founding Assumptions: Feminism and Postmodernism

Fredric Jameson has suggested that Postmodernism's most radical insight may be seen as the view that the bourgeois individual subject is not only a thing of the past but also a myth. We have never possessed this sort of autonomy: "Rather this construct is merely a philosophical and cultural mystification which sought to persuade people that they had individual subjects and possessed this unique personal identity." If the subject is a myth and if narrative as the reflection of the grand "master plot" of history is a redundant illusion, why should I have the feeling, as I read much postmodernist writing, that its apocalyptic nihilism about the possibility of ethical and imaginative subjective existence is grounded in that very nostalgia of which I spoke earlier? A nostalgia for an ideal autonomous self. Nostalgia involves the projection of the self onto history through identification. It rewrites history in the terms of desire, for to see the past as past is to recognize one's own mortality and temporality, fundamentally to disturb one's sense of presence. Nostalgia is the desire to recover the past as Paradise, as a myth of origins. Identification, however, necessitates ideal images with which to identify. It seems to me that feminists are highly unlikely to bear this sort of relationship to history or to the ideal autonomous self central to the discourses of modernity. Those who have been excluded from the constitution of that so-called "universal subject"—whether for reasons of gender, class, race, sexuality—are unlikely either to long nostalgically for what they have never experienced or possessed or to revel in the "jouissance" of its disintegration. Never having experienced it as an ethical ideal which might be materially realized they are unlikely therefore to fall into nihilistic Apocalypticism at the recognition it may simply not

be realizable at all in its pure or original form.

They will be more likely surely to want to occupy its position and to be able to offer a critique from both within and outside of it. In my view, the decenrted and fragmented subject of much postmodernist writing is one whose existence is premised upon the disintegration of a pre-existing belief in the possibility of realizing the full autonomous subject of Enlightenment rhetoric, of German Idealist philosophy and Kantian aesthetics. It is present at least as a structure of feeling if not fully articulated. It is clear from recent feminist scholarship that most women are unlikely to bave experienced history in this way. Thus the goals of agency, autonomy and self-determination are not ones which feminists have taken for granted or glibly seen as exhausted. They are ideals which feminism has helped to reformulate, modify and challenge. Feminism needs a subject and it seems to me it has found a means of articulating it which both avoids the fetishization of Pure Reason as the locus of subjecthood and the irrationalism born out of the perceived failure of this ideal.

Alternative Histories

As part of our current experience, of the impossibility ultimately of separating knowledge from experience (which both Postmodernism and feminism have taught us), it is difficult to talk about "origins" in relation to either. Postmodernism is a notoriously unstable concept, whether used in the more narrow aesthetic sense or the philosophical or sociological one. It entered American criticism in the fifties in Charles Olson's attempt to define the existence of a new non-anthropocentric poetry whose Heideggerian antihumanism was directed at seeing "man" as in the world, an object among objects. A similar tendency can be detected at around the same time in the French New Novel and its theorization in the writings of Robbe-Grillet and in Susan Sontag's rejection of a hermeneutic depth/surface model of interpretation for a return to the sensual surface, an "erotics" of literature. John Barth talked of abandoning the literature of exhaustion for the essentially parodic

literature of replenishment, Leslie Fiedler of a new art which would bridge the gap between high and mass culture. For both Sontag and Ihab Hassan, in particular, Postmodernism, an art of the surface was the contemporary period's answer to Adorno's "negative aesthetics" of Modernism; an art which in making itself opaque and difficult would refuse consumption even as it partook of a culture of consumption. By the early eighties, however, the term shifts from one used to describe a range of aesthetic practices involving playful irony, parody, self-consciousness, fragmentation, to one which encompasses a more general shift in thought and seems to register a pervasive cynicism about the progressivist ideals of modernity and a sense of a new cultural epoch in which distinctions between critical and functional knowledge break down and in which capitalism in its last and most insidious phase invades everything, leaving no oppositional space outside itself. Just as many novels of the seventies had displayed the hidden processes of artistic production, so too poststructuralist thought now proceeded by exposing the concealed rhetorical mechanisms which both produce and subvert conceptual meaning. Both undermine classical conceptions of representation in which truth precedes or determines the representations which either communicate it directly or mediate it indirectly. Postmodernism had gradually become a phrase describing a whole new "episteme" of Western culture.

None of this says or said much about gender of feminism. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, although postmodern theory increasingly draws on a highly idealized and generalized notion of femininity as "other" in its search for a space outside of the disintegrating logic of modernity, it rarely talks about (or to, one suspects) actual women or about feminism as a political practice. Yet there are obvious historical points of contact: both attacked the Romantic-Modernist cultivation of the Aesthetic as an autonomous realm, both assault Enlightenment discourses which universalize white, Western, middle-class male experience. Both recognize the need for a new ethics. Fundamentally each has offered critiques of foundationalist thinking to produce the recognition that gender is not a consequence of anatomy just as social institutions do not so much reflect

universal truths as construct historical and provisional ones. Postmodernism is "grounded" in the epistemological problematization of grounding itself, of the idea of identity as absolute or truth as essential. In terms of aesthetic practice, writers like Barth or Borges foreground epistemological and ontological questions about the construction of the "real" and the "self" by playing metafictionally on the textual paradox of the book as artefact and the book as world. Others, such as Rushdie, foreground the paradox of history as both a series of events which happened and also the imposition of a retrospective, paradigmatic and provisional linguistic structure which is itself the product of its own historical situation conceived of as an interplay of textual paradigms... ad infinitum. Postmodern writing may, indeed, proceed from this critique of foundationalism to social or political critique. In Salman Rushdie's *Shame*, for example, the intervention of alternative narrative voices is used as part of a critique of regimes of "truth" as effects of power. As a strategy for dismantling oppressive concepts of truth, such narrative perspectivism is highly effective, but in a text where all positions are seen to be effects of rhetoric, the possibility of an oppositional space is also dismantled.

Feminism has also, of course, provided its own critique of essentialist and foundationalist assumptions. Arguably, though, however it draws upon postmodern narrative strategies, it cannot repudiate entirely the framework of enlightened modernity without perhaps fatally undermining itself as an emancipatory politics. In proceeding through the demands of political practice, feminism must posit some belief in the notion of effective human agency, the necessity for historical continuity in formulating identity and a belief in historical progress. Even if people are shaped by historical forces, they are not simply reflexive epiphenomena of impersonal deep structures or of a global agonistics of circulating and competing language games. Feminism must believe in the possibility of a community of address situated in an oppositional space which can allow for the connection of the "small personal voice" (Doris Lessing's term) of one feminist to another and to other liberationist movements. One writer producing personal confessional novels about "women's

identity" can then be seen to connect with the activity of another woman rewriting the history of slavery or one camped on the mud of Greenham Common, even as they accept and recognize each other's differences.

Glancing through the various Postmodernisms, in fact, one can see how the range of conceptualizations of difference has entered feminist theory and aesthetic practice. An invigorating imaginative playfulness has appeared in recent feminist writing. Too often though political claims are made for avant-garde formal disruption which are difficult to justify. Ironically one can again see a reflectionist aesthetics at work here which sees one form of disruption simply reflecting another sort. Concepts are transferred unproblematically from the context of aesthetic to political practice with no analysis of the sort of problems mentioned above. Surely feminists should keep in mind the centrality to his work of Lyotard's assertion that emancipatory discourses are no longer possible because there can no longer be a belief in privileged metadiscourses which transcend local and contingent conditions in order to ground the "truths" of all first order discourses[6]. According to this view, gender can only be seen as positional, shifting, and cannot be used cross-culturally to explain the practices of human societies. In one sense this is the state of affairs feminism is aiming for in the ideal society it imagines to be possible. It should not, however, mean that feminists should abandon their struggle against sexual oppression because "gender" as a metanarrative is necessarily a repressive enactment of metaphysical authority. Lyotard unnecessarily conflates the concept of totality with that of totalitarianism. Feminists should remember that "totalities", political unity, need not mean uniformity, that they can be enabling and liberating.

The postmodern concept of language games, dissensus and dispersal, developed by Lyotard's reading of Wittgenstein, has again often been naively appropriated by an avant-garde desire to conflate linguistic or textual disruption with political subversion and to claim a massive political significance for formally innovative writing, modernist and postmodernist. Feminists such as Kristeva have done as much as postmodernists

like Lyotard to popularize this concept. It is here that the dangerous metaphor of "femininity" as "otherness" is most apparent in what seems to me to be the reproduction of a masculine space of the sacred which continues to be dependent upon concepts which deny the *material existence* of actual women. From Nietzsche through Hassan and Lacan, femininity has been used to signify an "otherness" which has effectively been essentialized as the disruption of the legitimate (viewed as everything from the logic of the Law of the Father—the psychoanalytic version of God—to the Logocentric). This "otherness" has itself been variously expressed as the repressed other, the hysterical body, the semiotic, the pre-oedipal, ecstatic, fluid, the maternal body. Women, however, have no privileged access to it, though several male avant-garde writers can speak it. In fact, as often as not this celebration of difference goes hand in hand with an amazing indifference to the material and psychological circumstances of actual women. The postmodern espousal of psychotextual "decentring" as liberatory says little about women as beings in the world who continue to find themselves displaced and invisible even within a critique of epistemology which has supposedly, in deconstructing the centre, therefore done away with the margins. The idea of alterity as feminine can be seen as the attempt to name a space outside the rationalizing logic of modernity—a new space of the sacred. As in most religious discourses, it promises a non-linear space outside the sense of ending, a space of redemption beyond time, language, fixity. Within postmodern psychoanalytic theory it has been described as "the body without organs" (the small boy's view of the mother?), "becoming woman" (the male fantasy of plenitude) and the "hysterical body" (the female object through which psychoanalysis first arrived at its definition of the implicitly masculine subject). It seems that as postmodernists obsessively register their sense of the collapsing legitimacy of the frameworks of Western knowledge, they are also registering unconsciously and metaphorically a fear specifically of the loss of the legitimacy of Western *patriarchal* grand narratives: a new form of fear of women, in effect. As always, appropriation becomes one of the means of dealing with this. Is it a coincidence that at the very historical

moment when (male) postmodernists intensify their interest in (and master through their own discourses) a (religious) space described as the "feminine" and nothing to do with actual women, feminists are establishing an (enlightened modern) sense of their coherent identity as women through the very categories and discourses which postmodernists claim to have dismantled and done away with in the name of this "femininity". Surely this has an ominously familiar ring to it? Could one see the oppressed (women) returning in the form of the repressed (femininity) in postmodern discourse only to be worked through and mastered yet again in the language of theory?

If femininity has become, once more, a metaphor for a state beyond metaphysics, feminists should be certain that its tenor is not simply the contemporary theoretical counterpart to the Victorian parlor. If they have any suspicions then they should continue to hammer through its boundaries, those between public and private, in an assertion of their continued belief in their own capacity for agency and historical reconstruction. If Barthes writes a pseudo-autobiography to articulate the idea that "to write an essay on oneself may seem a pretentious idea, but it is a simple idea, simple as the idea of suicide", feminists should remind themselves that the shelves of books by Barthes in libraries all over the world proclaim a confidence in his authorship even as he disclaims it. They should not be surprised then that so many women writers in the seventies articulated a desire to become "authors of their own lives" at precisely the moment that Barthes was announcing the death of that concept. Whose death?

Jean Baudrillard's work, it seems to me, is even more problematic for feminism. For him postmodernity signifies the state of contemporary culture which exists as a simulacrum of signs where the information age has utterly dissolved identity through reflections to maskings, to complete absence. In this perspective all that literature can do is to play off "alternative worlds" in a state of pluralistic anarchy where the subject is simply a simulating machine of commercial images, the mass a *silent* majority and the very idea of resistance, an absurdity. Simulation replaces imagination and human beings are left with no capacity to

reshape their world even in their own heads. They act like the characters in Robert Coover's novel *Gerald's Party* (1986), as dense points of transmission for all the cop and thriller and porn movies which construct their desires and which churn out incessantly throughout this text in an orgy of hedonistic sensationalism. It may be that Coover is using the parodic mode of the postmodern to offer a critique of postmodernity from within its own codes, but again one is left with the claustrophobic sense that there can be no real opposition to it because there is no place outside. In most versions of the postmodern, in fact, any claim to a substantive reality outside representation, is discredited; if signs determine reality, there can be no opposition because no space which is not already reproduced.

One difficulty in discussing Postmodernism is that the apocalypticism of the theory may have unduly affected our response to the fictional artefacts (if I may be so old-fashioned as to hang onto such a distinction). It seems to me this is an important distinction to hang onto, because it is evident that many women writers are using postmodern aesthetic strategies of disruption to re-imagine the world in which we live, while resisting the nihilistic implications of the theory. Certainly one can see the writing of Angela Carter, Jeanette Winterson, Margaret Atwood, Maggie Gee, Fay Weldon, to name but a few, in this way. This is perhaps not so very surprising since women have always experienced themselves in a "postmodern" fashion -decentred, lacking agency, defined through others. Which is why, it seems to me, they had to attempt to occupy the centre in the early seventies. It is why women began to seek a subjective sense of agency and collective identity within the terms of the discourses of modernity at precisely the moment when postmodernists were engaged in the repudiation of such discourses, proclaiming the "death of the author" and the end of humanism. Much feminist fiction of this period, therefore, was either confessional or concerned with the idea of discovering an authentic identity. If its philosophical roots are clearly anywhere it is in existentialism rather than post-structuralism. It may now appear to be philosophically naive and formally unadventurous, espousing an uncontested aesthetics of expressive

realism or a simple reversal of the romance quest plot which did little to problematize ideologies of romantic love or essential identity. I have argued that perhaps feminist writers needed to formulate a sense of identity, history and agency within these terms before they could begin to deconstruct them. However, feminist writers did not subsequently rush off to embrace the postmodern—indeed they have largely maintained a cautions distance, certainly from much of the theory. This is where I shall declare my own distance as a feminist in offering some "grand and totalizing" narratives which allow us to think of subjectivity in ways which neither simply repeat the Enlightenment concept of modernity nor repudiate it in an embrace of anarchic dispersal.

Rethinking Subjectivity and Aesthetics: Alternative Feminist Positions

I want to suggest, somewhat tentatively, that despite differences in the theoretical construction of modernity and postmodernity, common to them both is the inheritance of a particular ideal of subjectivity defined in terms of transcendence and pure rationality. Postmodernism can be seen as a response to the perceived failure of this ideal. This notion of subjectivity, whether expressed through Descartes's rational "I" and refined into Kant's categorical imperatives, or through Nietzsche's "übermensch" or Lacan's phallogocentric symbolic order, has not only excluded women but has made their exclusion on the grounds of emotionality, failure of abstract intellect or whatever, the basis of its own identity. This position has been reproduced across philosophy, psychoanalysis and literature. In viewing this situation as fundamentally unchanged, I am, in effect, repudiating the postmodern notion that there are no longer any generally legitimated metanarratives. What I am saying is that patriarchal metanarratives function just as effectively within our so-called "postmodern age" as in any other age and in its metaphorical play on notions of the feminine they continue insidiously to function powerfully within postmodern theory itself.

Jameson has diagnosed postmodernism as the schizophrenic condition of late capitalism, but I would argue that the autonomous

transcendent self of German Idealism. Enlightenment humanism, European Romanticism and realist aesthetics and the impersonally fragmented self of Postmodernism are a product of the same cultural tradition. Schizophrenia is clinically defined as a splitting of thought and feeling: the "schizophrenia" of Postmodernism can be seen as a fin-de-siècle parody or caricature of a dualism inherent in the Western tradition of thought where the self is defined as a transcendent rationality which necessitates splitting off what is considered to be the irrational, emotion, and projecting it as the "feminine" onto actual women. It is to see T. S. Eliot's "dissociation of sensibility" from a feminist rather than a High Tory position. Freud, of course, has taught us that reason and feeling are inextricably bound up with each other, but even he believed that ego could and should master id, that impersonal reason is the basis of personal autonomy. Increasingly in this century, such a contracted "rational" self cannot make sense of the world: whether in the fictions of Kafka or Bellow, for example, or in the aetiolated dramas of Samuel Beckett. When transcendence fails however, the threat of disorder is seen to come from the split off (and therefore uncontrollable) aspects of the psyche, the non-rational projected onto and thus defining women, racial minorities, so-called "sexual deviants" or even "the masses".

Postmodernism may seek to locate the possibility of disruption or "jouissance" in this space, but in continuing to regard it as "feminine", whether it speaks of actual women or not, then it simply continues the process of projection and does little to overcome the dualism and psychological defensiveness inherent in it. Often in postmodernist fiction, for example, traditional images of the castrating female, the unknown and therefore uncontrollable woman, are overlaid in a technological age with their representation as machines which have outstripped the controlled and rational dominance of the male (one thinks of V again). The "emotionality" thus projected onto the feminine or onto women in order to retain rationality and autonomy as the core of masculine identity produces both images of woman as the "other" of romantic desire *and* woman who, thus beyond control, threatens annihilation or incorporation. If feminists wish to argue a politics of femininity as avant-garde

disruptive desire they should first think about some of the meanings of, for example, V or Nurse Ratched.

In fact, in both modernist and postmodernist writing, when order conceived of as a circumscribed rationality seems no longer to cohere in either the self or in history, then it is projected onto the impersonal structures of language or of history conceived of as myth, a static and synchronic space. Despite the new "perspectivism" which enters literary history in the early part of the century, the potential for the re-evaluation of the relations between subjectivity and objectivity, so many of the aesthetic manifestoes of the time and later critical accounts of the period emphasise "impersonality", "autonomy", "objectivity", "universal" "significant form", "spatial form", "objective correlative" — even when many of the artefacts, such as *Ulysses*, clearly problematize such notions. The New Critical theorization of literature, in particular the modernist text, as an autonomous linguistic structure, reinforced this. Since then the increasing professionalization of literature has extended this: defamiliarization, systems of signs, the death of the author, the free play of the signifier, simulations...

One can see in much modernist literature both the attempted assertion and the failure of Enlightened modernity's ideal of autonomy. The belief in absolute self-determination, whether that of Stephen Dedalus or Mr. Ramsay, is always discovered to be dependent on the desires of others. Whereas a transcendent being could anchor desire as absolute, to express it in relation to others is always seen to produce delusion, deception, jealousy, a whole variety of epistemological crises which modernist texts explore. The possibility of Art itself as an absolute autonomous realm, however, often comes to take the place of the sacred here. Art, as religion, seems to offer precisely that illusion of utter self-determination and transcendence which relations with other mortals must always shatter. It is interesting how many of the male heroes of modernist literature achieve an apparent self-determination in aesthetic terms through a refusal of social relationship. Hence the figure of the alienated artist who affirms his own autonomy, his independence from the mediation of others at the price of the cessation of human relationship

and desire: Marcel writing in his room, Ralph Touchett vicariously living through Isabel, Malone talking to himself, Mann's Leverkühn, Hesse's Steppenwolf. Art as the impersonal focus for desire displaces the possibility of human relationship because it involves no mediation through the desire of the other. Hovering behind these texts is Nietzsche's self-creating and self-affirming artist for whom to recognize the other would be to fall into a slave mentality.

In my view it is the identification of self with an impossible ideal of autonomy which can be seen to produce the failure of love and relationship in so many texts by male modernist and postmodernist writers. Can one rethink the self outside of this concept without abandoning subjectivity to dispersal and language games? Not only do I believe that one can, I also believe that many feminist writers have done so. This is the really "grand and totalizing" part of my argument. It seems to me that autonomy defined as transcendence, impersonality and absolute independence, whether an idealized goal or a nostalgic nihilism, whether informing the aesthetics of Modernism or those of Postmodernism, is not a mode with which most feminists, nor indeed, most women, can very easily identify. Feminist theory, though drawing on anti-humanist discourses to sharpen its understanding of social processes, has emphasised that "impersonal" historical determinants are lived out through experience. This distance from anti-humanist discourse has allowed feminist academics to connect with grass roots activists outside the academy. Their own historical experience has tended to develop in women strongly "humanist" qualifies in the broader sense of the term and feminism has always been rooted in women's subjective experience of the conflicting demands of home and work, family and domestic ties and the wider society.

Psychoanalysis, Gender and Aesthetics

Jürgen Habermas has recently suggested that modernity is not exhausted, simply unfinished. His view of this is not incompatible with some of the ideas I am trying to develop here. What he has argued is

that instead of abandoning its ideals we need to modify them by redefining the model of Reason which underlies them. His work is part of a tradition of critical thinking which sees Enlightenment reason failing because defined too narrowly in the terms of an instrumental, purposive or utilitarian epistemology. He proposes instead a model of what he calls "communicative reason", based on speech act theory and emphasizing not individual autonomy but intersubjectivity.[7] Like so many theorists within the postmodern debate, however, he seems singularly unaware of many of the developments in feminist thinking over the last twenty years. It seems to me that many feminists have been working for some time with models which are not fundamentally incompatible with Habermas's whether or not they have used them in specifically theoretical ways. I will now examine some of these ideas and suggest that through them it is possible to arrive not only at an alternative definition of the aesthetic but also of subjectivity itself.

According to most psychoanalytic theories and their popularly disseminated forms, subjecthood is understood as the achievement of separation. Maturity is seen to be reached when the dependent infant comes to regard its primary caretaker (nearly always a woman) as simply an object through which it defines its own identity and position in the world. This is then maintained through the defensive patrolling of boundaries. Implicit then in most theories of identity is the assumption that the "otherness" analysed by feminists from de Beauvoir on, is the necessary condition of women — certainly as long as women mothers. Separation and objectivity rather than relationship and connection become the markers of identity. Freudian theory has been used to support this view. Both the liberal self and the postmodern "decentred subject" can be articulated through Freud's notion of the unconscious, dominated by instinctual and universal drives seeking impossible gratification. In the liberal version, ego as rationality can master the drives either intrapsychically or with the help of the silent, impersonal and objective analyst who will be uncontaminated by countertransference. In the postmodern version, rationality breaks down and the anarchy of desire as impersonal and unconscious energy is unleashed either in the freeplay of

the signifier of the avant-garde text or that of the marketplace of Late Capitalism. Freud's infant hovers behind both; an autoerotic isolate, inherently aggressive and competitive, its sexuality and identity oedipally resolved only by fear, seeking to discharge libidinal energy which is necessarily in conflict with "rational" and "enlightened" concern for others and for society as a whole.

Can we imagine alternative models of subjectivity? If knowledge is inextricably bound up with experience then it seems that we certainly can, for this is not a description of universal experience. In fact Freud himself hints at other possibilities in less familiar parts of his writings. In the paper "On Narcissism", for example, he says: "A strong egotism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill and we are bound to fall ill if in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love." In fact, in the development of selfhood, the ability to conceive of oneself as separate from and mutually independent with the parent develops with the ability to accept one's dependency and to feel secure enough to relax the boundaries between self and other without feeling one's identity to be threatened. Why, then, is autonomy always emphasized as the goal of maturity? Why not emphasize equally the importance of maintaining connection and intersubjectivity? As Joan Rivière has argued, "There is no such thing as a single human being pure and simple, unmixed with other human beings... we are members one of another." Parts of other people, the parts we have had relationships with, are parts of us, so the self is both constant and fluid, ever in exchange, ever redescribing itself through its encounters with others. It seems to be this recognition of mediation as that which renders total self-determination impossible which so many male modernist and postmodernist writers find unacceptable. Yet much women's, particularly feminist, writing has been different in that it has neither attempted to transcend relationship through the impersonal embrace of Art as formal autonomy or sacred space nor through rewriting its own Apocalyptic sense of an ending.

Returning to psychoanalysis, however, one can see some of the reasons why the definition of subjectivity as transcendence and autonomy

has been so powerful and why it has come to be seen not as a description of the experience of most white, Western males, but of universal structures of subjectivity. In psychoanalytic terms, if subjectivity is defined as separateness, its acquisition will involve radical disidentification with women in a society where women are normally the exclusive caretakers of children. This will be true even for girls who, at the level of gender, will also seek to identify with the mother. Fathers are not perceived as threatening non-identity for in classical analysis they are seen as outside the pre-oedipal world of primary socialization with its intense ambivalences and powerful Imagos. They are from the start associated with the clear, rational world of work and secondary socialization. Object relations theorists like Nancy Chodorow, however, have pointed out that the desire for radical disidentification with the mother will be more acute for boys for the perception of women as mothers will be bound up with pre-oedipal issues of mergence and potential loss of identity requiring a culturally reinforced masculine investment in denial and separation. The world of secondary socialization associated with the father comes to be seen as superior and as inherently male. Subjectivity thus comes to be seen as autonomy or as role-definition through work. Truth is defined as objectivity and transcendence. Science in the form of an instrumental technology will be overvalued and defined in terms of objectivity; philosophy comes to deal only with universal and metaphysical truths (whatever the theoretical challenges to these notions). Women (or the "feminine") come to be identified in Cartesian or post-structuralist philosophy with all that cannot be rationally controlled and thus threatening dissolution or non-identity: mortality, the body, desire, emotionality, nature. Poststructuralist "femininity" is simply another way of making actual femininity safe, of controlling through a process of naming which in post-structuralist fashion prises the term utterly away from the anatomical body of woman.

If the female sex thus represents, in Sartre's words "the obscenity... of everything which gapes open" [8], then men seem to be justified in their instrumental attitude to women and to everything, including nature, which has been "feminized" and which must therefore be

distanced, controlled, aestheticized, subdued (one might call this the Gilbert Osmond syndrome). Women appear threatening in this way because they carry the culture's more widespread fear of the loss of boundaries, of the uncontrollable, more threatening because unconsciously split off in order to retain the purity of a subjectivity, a humanness defined as autonomy, pure reason and transcendence. Cartesian dualism thus persists along with strict empiricism in science and impersonality and formalism in literary theory and criticism.

If women's identity is broadly speaking, and allowing for a range of differences, experienced in terms which do not necessarily valorize separation at the expense of connection, one would expect some expression of this in fictional writing as well as in theory. Women's sense of ego is more likely, for psychological and cultural reasons, to consist of a more diffuse sense of the boundaries of self and their notion of identity understood in relational and intersubjective terms. Virginia Woolf has been so important for feminist literary criticism because both formally and thematically her work articulates a critique of patriarchal institutions through its exploration of the relatedness of subjects and of subjects and objects. Beyond this, however, she simultaneously offers a critique of the exclusive identification of women with relationality through an exploration of its negative effects in characters like Mrs. Dalloway and Mrs. Ramsay. For relationality as the basis of identity in a society where women are perceived as culturally inferior, has often functioned to reinforce their desire to please, to serve others and seek definition through them, internalizing masochistically any anger about this as a failure of (essential) femininity. We are back, therefore, to the contradiction at the heart of feminism expressed at the beginning of this essay: that women have sought recognition for a concept of identity which they simultaneously attempt to change, viewing it as a construction of patriarchy. The formal and thematic expression of identity as mutually defined, the centrality of primary affectional relationships need not, however, be experienced in pathological ways, and, indeed, as writers like Alice Walker, Doris Lessing and Toni Morrison have recently shown us, are essential for the survival of the human race. Freud emphasized

that the development of the ego is the work of culture. If that culture's ideal of selfhood is that of an impersonal, contained rationality, then it seems to me that culture can only produce incomplete and divided human beings. Postmodern beings.

Much feminist writing has, over the last thirty years, explored modes of relational identity, often, indeed, also drawing on postmodern ideas about "situatedness" or using its techniques of parody, irony, playfulness. Such a relational understanding of identity makes possible ethically and imaginatively, a new, negative capability which can transform both the Enlightened discourses of emancipation as well as those of subjectivity. A writer whose work is particularly important in this respect, for example, is Doris Lessing. In her novel *Memoirs of a Survivor* (1976), she explores how Utopian impulses fail because they are still tied to a model of human subjectivity based on autonomy, separateness and overvaluation of a particular definition of rationality. The narrator, struggling to preserve an order within her psyche which has disappeared from the world outside, finds herself drawn towards a perception of the fundamental interdependence of human beings, of the persistence in us of an elemental hunger, the need to be fed—the novel abounds with images of eating and orality—to give food and to receive it, which binds us physically and psychologically to one another. She reflects:

> As for our thoughts, our intellectual apparatus, our rationalisms and our deductions, our logics and so on, it can be said with absolute certainty that dogs and cats and monkeys cannot make a rocket or fly to the moon or weave artificial dress materials out of the by-products of petroleum, but as we sit in the ruins of this variety of intelligence it is hard to give it much value.[9]

The most frightening aspect of the "now" of this novel is that its children of violence, the wild, anarchic, semi-humans born out of upheaval and brutality, out of the failures of over-rationalized logic and the denial of human relational need, can no longer recognize their own or other's needs, cannot nurture each other and have, literally, turned cannibal and

are consuming each other. For Lessing, salvation can only come through a profound and full recognition of our relational being, which means trying to imagine a world not constructed as an extension of a model of self as isolated, competitive ego nor one where ethics is reduced to nihilistic performance. She may use the formal modes of postmodern art but to articulate an imaginative world which is very far from those which emerge in most postmodern theory. Lessing's novel is apocalyptic in the sense that it is set after a holocaust, but it does not proclaim either the end of modernity nor the end of hope. We can compare this with, for example, Kroker's vision of postmodernity as a "dead space which will be marked by increasing and random outbursts of political violence, schizoid behavior and the implosion of all signs of communication, as Western culture runs down toward the brilliant illumination of a final burn out"[10]. If Lessing's "small personal voice" is heard only as a whisper, it seems to me it can, drawing on postmodern *aesthetic* forms, speak to more people, women and men, but in ways which resist Kroker et al.'s *theoretically* ubiquitous postmodern Bang.

注释：

1 引自乔治·艾略特名作《米德尔马奇》。

2 引自弗兰克·克尔默德的《结尾的意义》。这是他 1965 年在布里恩·茅尔学院的系列演讲。

3 引自哈贝马斯的《现代性哲学话语》(*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*)。哈贝马斯(J. Habermas, 1929—)：德国哲学家，曾协助阿多诺在法兰克福社会研究所工作。他突出的贡献之一是长篇巨著《交往行为理论》。在这部著作里，他分析了西方资本主义的现状，探讨了对人的"生活世界"构成严重威胁的破坏性因素以及它们产生的原因和后果，并提出了一些批判性的理论设想。

4 引自巴塞尔姆(D. Barthelme)的小说《城市生活》(*City Life*, 1971)。巴塞尔姆(1931—)：美国小说家，常以超现实的手法写出荒诞的故事，被称为典型的后现代主义作家。

5 引自品钦的小说《V》。品钦 (Thomas Pynchon, 1937—)：美国著名小说家，《V》是他的代表作之一，另一部代表作是《万有引力之虹》(1973)。他善于利用自己的想像描写荒诞的社会现实，具有某些科幻小说的特点。

6 引自利奥塔(Jean-Francois Lyotard)的《后现代状况》(*The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge*, 1984)。

7 引自哈贝马斯的《现代性哲学话语》。

8 引自法国哲学家萨特的《存在与虚无》(*Being and Nothingness*, 1958)。

9 引自莱辛的小说《幸存者的回忆》(*Memoirs of Survivor*, 1976)。莱辛(Doris Lessing, 1919—):英国当代女作家,作品中多反映女性观点。

10 引自克罗克(A. Kroker)和库克(D. Cook)合著的《后现代景象》(*The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Cultures and Hyper-Aesthetics*, 1988)。

弗雷德里克·詹姆逊:符号的历险

The Adventures of the Sign

Fredric Jameson

Postmodernism is one significant framework in which to describe what happened to culture in the 1960s, but a full discussion of this hotly contested concept is not possible here. Such a discussion would want to cover, among other things, the following features: that well-known poststructuralist theme, the "death" of the subject (including the creative subject, the *auteur* or the "genius"); the nature and function of a *culture of the simulacrum* (an idea developed out of Plato by Deleuze and Baudrillard to convey some specificity of a reproducible object world, not of copies or reproductions marked as such, but of a proliferation of trompe-l'oeil copies *without originals*); the relation of this last to media culture of the "society of the spectacle" (Debord), under two heads: (1) the peculiar new status of the image, the "material" or what might better be called the "literal" , signifier: a materiality or literality from which the older sensory richness of the medium has been abstracted (just as on the other side of the dialectical relationship, the old individuality of the subject and his/her "brushstrokes" have equally been effaced); and (2) the emergence, in the work's temporality, of an aesthetic of *textuality* or what is often described as schizophrenic time: the eclipse, finally, of all depth, especially *historicity* itself, with the subsequent appearance of pastiche and nostalgia art (what the French call *la mode rétro*), and including the supersession of the accompanying models

of depthinterpretation in philosophy (the various forms of hermeneutics, as well as the Freudian conception of "repression", of manifest and latent levels).

What is generally objected to in characterizations of this kind is the empirical observation that all these features can be abundantly located in this or that variety of high modernism; indeed, one of the difficulties in specifying postmodernism lies in its symbiotic or parasitical relationship to the latter. In effect, with the canonization of a hitherto scandalous, ugly, disonant, amoral, antisocial, bohemian high modernism offensive to the middle classes, its promotion to the very figure of high culture generally, and perhaps most important, its enshrinement in the academic institution, postmodernism emerges as a way of making creative space for artists now oppressed by those henceforth hegemonic modernist categories of irony, complexity, ambiguity, dense temporality, and particularly, aesthetic and utopian monumentality. In some analogous way, it will be said, high modernism itself won its autonomy from the preceding hegemonic realism (the symbolic language or mode of representation of classical or market capitalism). But there is a difference in that realism itself underwent a significant mutation: it became *naturalism* and at once generated the representation forms of mass culture (the narrative apparatus of the contemporary best seller is an invention of naturalism and one of the most stunningly successful of French cultural exports). High modernism and mass culture then develop in dialectical opposition and interrelationship with one another. It is precisely the waning of their opposition, and some new conflation of the forms of high and mass culture, that characterizes postmodernism itself.

The historical specificity of postmodernism must therefore finally be argued in terms of the social functionality of culture itself. As stated above, high modernism, whatever its overt political content, was oppositional and marginal within a middle-class Victorian or Philistine or gilded-age culture[1]. Although postmodernism is equally offensive in all the respects enumerated (think of punk rock or pornography), it is no longer at all oppositional in that sense; indeed, it constitutes the very dominant or hegemonic aesthetic of consumer society itself and

significantly serves the latter's commodity production as a virtual laboratory of new forms and fashions. The argument for a conception of postmodernism as a periodizing category is thus based on the presupposition that, even if *all* the formal features enumerated above were already present in the older high modernism, the very significance of those features changes when they become a cultural *dominant*, with a precise socio-economic functionality.

At this point it may be well to shift the terms (or the "code") of our description to the seemingly more traditional one of a cultural sphere, a conception developed by Herbert Marcuse in what is to my mind his single most important text, the great essay "The Affirmative Character of Culture" (1937). (It should he added that the conception of a "public sphere" generally is a very contemporary one in Germany in the works of Habermas and Negt and Kluge, where such a system of categories stands in interesting contrast to the code of "levels" or "instances" in French poststructuralism.) Marcuse there rehearses the paradoxical dialectic of the classical (German) aesthetic, which projects as play and "purposefulness without purpose" a Utopian realm of beauty and culture beyond the fallen empirical world of money and business activity, thereby winning a powerful critical and negative value through its capacity to condemn, by its own very existence, the totality of *what is*, at the same time forfeiting all ability to social or political intervention in what is, by virtue of its constitutive disjunction or autonomy from society and history.

The account therefore begins to coincide in a suggestive way with the problematic of autonomous or semi-autonomous levels developed in the preceding section. To historicize Marcuse's dialectic, however, would demand that we take into account the possibility that in our time this very autonomy of the cultural sphere (or level or instance) may be in the process of modification; and that we develop the means to furnish a description of the process whereby such modification might take place, as well as of the prior process whereby culture became "autonomous" or "semi-autonomous" in the first place.

This requires recourse to yet another (unrelated) analytic code, one

more generally familiar to us today, since it involves the now classical structural concept of the sign, with its two components, the signifier (the material vehicle or image-sound or printed word) and the signified (the mental image, meaning, or "conceptual" content), and a third component — the external object of the sign, its reference or "referent" — henceforth expelled from the unity and yet haunting it as a ghostly residual aftereffect (illusion or ideology). The scientific value of this conception of the sign will be bracketed here since we are concerned, on the one hand, to historicize it, to interpret it as a conceptual symptom of developments in the period, and, on the other, to "set it in motion", to see whether changes in its inner structure can offer some adequate small-scale emblem or electrocardiogram of changes and permutation in the cultural sphere generally throughout this period.

Such changes are already suggested by the fate of the "referent" in the "conditions of possibility" of the new structural concept of the sign (a significant ambiguity must be noted, however; theorists of the sign notoriously glide from a conception of reference as designating a "real" object outside the unity of signifier and signified to a position in which the signified itself — or meaning, or the idea or the concept of a thing — becomes somehow identified with the referent and stigmatized along with it; we will return to this below). Saussure, at the dawn of the semiotic revolution, liked to describe the relationship of signifier to signified as that of the two sides, the recto and verso of a sheet of paper. In what is then a logical sequel, and a text that naturally enough becomes equally canonical, Borges will push "representation" to the point of imagining a map so rigorous and referential that it becomes coterminous with its object. The stage is then set for the structuralist emblem par excellence, the Moebius Strip, which succeeds in peeling itself off its referent altogether and thus achieves a free-floating closure in the void, a kind of absolute self-referentiality and autocirculatory from which all remaining traces of reference, or of any externality, have triumphantly been effaced.

To be even more eclectic about it, I will suggest that this process, seemingly internal to the sign itself, requires a supplementary explanatory

code, that of the more universal process of reification and fragmentation at one with the logic of capital itself. Nonetheless, taken on its own terms, the inner convulsions of the sign is a useful initial figure of the process of transformation of culture generally, which must in some first moment (that described by Marcuse) separate itself from the "referent" the existing social and historical world itself, only in a subsequent stage of the 1960s, in what is here termed "postmodernism", to develop further into some new and heightened, free-floating, self-referential "autonomy".

The problem now turns around this very term, "autonomy", with its paradoxical Althusserian modification, the concept of "semi-autonomy". The paradox is that the sign, as an "autonomous" unity in its own right as a realm divorced from the referent, can preserve that initial autonomy, and the unity and coherence demanded by it, only at the price of keeping a phantom of reference alive, as the ghostly reminder of its own outside or exterior, since this allows it closure, self-definition, and an essential boundary line. Marcuse's own tormented dialectic expresses this dramatically in the curious oscillation whereby his autonomous realm of beauty and culture returns upon some "real world" to judge and negate it, at the same time separating itself so radically from that real world as to become a place of mere illusion and impotent "ideals", the "infinite" and so on.

The first moment in the adventures of the sign is perplexing enough as to demand more concrete, if schematic, illustration in the most characteristic cultural productions themselves. It might well be demonstrated in the classical French *nouveau roman* (in particular the novels of Robbe-Grillet himself), which established its new language in the early 1960s, using systematic variations of narrative segments to "undermine" representation, yet in some sense confirming this last by teasing and stimulating an appetite for it.

Because an American illustration seems more appropriate, however, something similar may be seen in connection with the final and canonical form of high modernism in American poetry, namely the work of Wallace Stevens[2], which becomes, in the years following the poet's death in 1956, institutionalized in the university as a purer and more

quintessential fulfillment of poetic language than the still impure (read: ideological and political) works of an Eliot or a Pound, and can therefore be numbered among the literary "events" of the early 1960s. As Frank Lentricchia has shown, in *After the New Criticism*[3], the serviceability of Stevens' poetic production for this normative and hegemonic role depends in large measure on the increasing conflation, in that work of poetic practice and poetic theory:

> This endlessly elaborating poem
> Displays the theory of poetry
> As the life of poetry...

"Stevens" is therefore a locus and fulfillment of aesthetics and aesthetic theory fully as much as the latter's exemplar and privileged exegetical object; the theory or aesthetic ideology in question is very much an affirmation of the "autonomy" of the cultural sphere in the sense developed above, a valorization of the supreme power of the poetic imagination over the "reality" it produces. Stevens' work, therefore, offers an extraordinary laboratory situation in which to observe the autonomization of culture as a process: a detailed examination of his development (something for which we have no space here) would show how some initial "set toward" or "attention to" a kind of poetic *pensée sauvage*, the operation of great preconscious *stereotypes*, opens up a vast inner world in which little by little the images of things and their ideas begin to be substituted for the things themselves. Yet what distinguishes this experience in Stevens is the sense of a vast systematicity in all this, the operation of a whole set of cosmic oppositions far too complex to be reduced to the schemata of "structuralist" binary oppositions, yet akin to those in spirit, and somehow pregiven in the Symbolic Order of the mind, discoverable to the passive exploration of the "poetic imagination", that is, of some heightened and impersonal power of free association in the realm of "objective spirit" or "objective culture" . The examination would further show the strategic limitation of this process to landscape, the reduction of the ideas and images of things to the names for things,

and finally to those irreducibles that are place names, among which the exotic has a privileged function (Key West, Oklahoma, Yucatan, Java). Here the poetic "totality" begins to trace a ghostly mimesis or *analogon* of the totality of the imperialist world system itself, with Third World materials in a similarly strategic, marginal, yet essential place (much as Adorno showed how Schoenberg's twelve-tone system unconsciously produced a formal imitation of the "total system" of capital). This very unconscious replication of the "real" totality of the world system in the mind is then what allows culture to separate itself as a closed and self-sufficient "system" in its own right: reduplication, and at the same time, floating above the real. It is an impulse shared by most of the great high modernisms, as has been shown most dramatically in the recent critiques of architectural modernism, in particular of the international style, whose great monumental objects constitute themselves, by protecting a protopolitical and utopian spirit of transformation *against* a fallen city fabric all around them and, as Venturi has demonstrated, end up necessarily displaying and speaking of themselves alone. Now, this also accounts for what must puzzle any serious reader of Stevens's verse, namely the extraordinary combination of verbal richness and experimental hollowness or impoverishment in it (the latter being attributable as well to the impersonality of the poetic imagination in Stevens, and to the essentially contemplative and epistemological stance of the subject in it, over and against the static object world of his landscapes).

The essential point here, however, is that this characteristic movement of the high modernist impulse needs to justify itself by way of an ideology, an ideological supplement which can generally be described as that of "existentialism" (the supreme fiction, the meaninglessness of a contingent object world unredeemed by the imagination, etc.). This is the most uninteresting and banal dimension of Stevens' work, yet it betrays along with other existentialisms (e.g., Sartre's tree root in *Nausea*) that fatal seam or link that must be retained in order for the contingent, the "outside world", the meaningless referent, to be just present enough dramatically to be overcome within the language. Nowhere is this ultimate point so clearly deduced, over and over again, as in

Stevens, in the eye of the blackbird, the angels, or the Sun itself—that last residual vanishing point of reference as distant as a dwarf star upon the horizon, yet which cannot disappear altogether without the whole vocation of poetry and the poetic imagination being called back into question. Stevens thus exemplifies for us the fundamental paradox of the "autonomy" of the cultural sphere: the sign can become autonomous only by remaining semi-autonomous, and the realm of culture can absolutize itself over against the real world only at the price of retaining a final tenuous sense of that exterior or external world of which it is the replication and the imaginary double.

All of this can also be demonstrated by showing what happens when, in a second moment, the perfectly logical conclusion is drawn that the referent is itself a myth and does not exist, a second moment hitherto described as postmodernism. Its trajectory can be seen as a movement from the older *Nouveau roman* to that of Sollers or of properly "schizophrenic" writing, or from the primacy of Stevens to that of John Ashbery[1]. This new moment is a radical break (which can be localized around 1967 for reasons to be given later), but it is important to grasp it as dialectical, that is, as a passage from quantity to quality in which the *same* force, reaching a certain threshold of excess, in its prolongation now produces qualitatively distinct effects and seems to generate a whole new system.

That force has been described as reification, but we can now also begin to make some connections with another figural language used earlier: in a first moment, reification "liberated" the sign from its referent, but this is not a force to be released with impunity. Now, in a second moment, it continues its work of dissolution, penetrating the interior of the sign itself and liberating the signifier from the signified, or from meaning proper. This play, no longer of a realm of signs, but of pure or literal signifiers freed from the ballast of their signifieds, their former meanings, now generates a new kind of textuality in all the arts (and in philosophy as well, as we have seen above) and begins to project the mirage of some ultimate language of pure signifiers which is also frequently associated with schizophrenic discourse. (Indeed, the Lacanian theory of

schizophrenia — a language disorder in which syntactical time breaks down and leaves a succession of empty signifiers, absolute moments of a perpetual present, behind itself — has offered one of the more influential explanations and ideological justifications for postmodernist textual practice.)

Such an account would have to be demonstrated in some detail by way of a concrete analysis of the postmodernist experience in all the arts today; but the present argument can be concluded by drawing the consequences of this second moment — the aculture of the signifier or of the simulacrum — for the whole problematic of some "autonomy" of the cultural sphere which has concerned us here. For that autonomous realm is not itself spared by the intensified process by which the classical sign is dissolved; if its autonomy depended paradoxically on its possibility of remaining "semiautonomous" (in an Althusserian sense) and of preserving the last tenuous link with some ultimate referent (or, in Althusserian language, of preserving the ultimate unity of a properly "structural totality"), then evidently in the new cultural moment culture will have ceased to be autonomous, and the realm of an autonomous play of signs becomes impossible, when that ultimate final referent to which the balloon of the mind was moored is now definitively cut. The break-up of the sign in mid-air determines a fall back into a now absolutely fragmented and anarchic social reality; the broken pieces of language (the pure signifiers) now fall again into the world, as so many more pieces of material junk among all the other rusting and superannuated apparatuses and buildings that litter the commodity landscape and that strew the "collage city", the "delirious New York" of a postmodernist late capitalism in full crisis.

But, returning to a Marcusean terminology, all of this can also be said in a different way: with the eclipse of culture as an autonomous space or sphere, culture itself falls into the world, and the result is not its disappearance but its prodigious expansion, to the point where culture becomes coterminous with social life in general: now all the levels become "acculturated", and in the society of the spectacle, the image, or the simulacrum, everything has at length become cultural, from the

superstructures down into the mechanisms of the infrastructure itself. If this development then places acutely on the agenda the neo-Gramscian problem of a new cultural politics today — in a social system in which the very status of both culture and politics have been profoundly, functionally, and structurally modified — it also renders problematic any further discussion of what used to be called "culture" proper, whose artifacts have become the random experiences of daily life itself.

注释：

1 middle-class Victorian or Philistine or gilded-age culture：指资本主义迅速发展时期的市民文化。

2 史蒂文斯(Wallace Stevens，1879—1955)：美国最重要的现代诗人之一。他的诗最大特点是给予自我自主的幻觉："无视时间、地点和历史，想像从它自己'千里眼'的视觉里构成教蝼世人的寓言。"

3《新批评之后》(*After the New Criticism*，1980)为兰特里夏所著。兰特里夏(Frank Lentricchia，1940 —)：美国著名批评家，杜克大学教授。《新批评之后》是其成名作，该书对20世纪60年代以来的新理论进行了概括、分析和批评，并对新批评进行了严厉的批判。

4 阿什贝利(John Ashbery，1927 —)：美国诗人、剧作家和艺术评论家。诗作受法国超现实主义影响，意象错综复杂。

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第十一章 新历史主义

要从两个方面讲解新历史主义。一是看它如何研究历史,二是看它如何研究文学。

所谓新,自然是与传统历史主义相对而言。从历史方面讲,传统历史主义关注历史事件本身。以"太平天国"为例,传统历史主义者研究这场声势浩大的农民起义的起因、历史背景、人物、结果等等。新历史主义者对历史事件本身的兴趣不大。他们研究的对象是当时和事后的历史书、历史小说、文献资料、民间传说、文学作品等如何反映、记载、阐释历史事件,并从中了解它们所反映的当时当地的政治、思想和文化背景。新历史主义者认为,历史事件和人物是阐释的对象,历史本质上是语言的阐释,这种叙述话语不可避免地具有主观、想像和虚构成分。他们指出:对历史事件和人物的理解和评述在很大程度上取决于写历史的人的主观性,而他的主观性又在很大程度上取决于本人的政治和思想观念以及当时占统治地位的话语和文化背景。

传统的历史主义在20世纪60年代后受到结构主义、后结构主义思潮的冲击。福柯等结构主义者认为,"历史"不再是一种客观存在,历史的客观性或真实性只是一种幻想,既然历史也是一种文本,它同样是阐释的对象。美国加州大学教授海登·怀特说,历史作为一种叙述话语形式是有虚构成分的。这样,一向以"真实"自居的历史在新历史主义者面前就失去了它的真实性。

新历史主义者认为,许多已出版的历史书或是统治阶级的文人所写,或是经统治阶级的专设机构审查通过,代表了统治阶级的观点,不可能反映真实的历史。近期日本修改中学历史教科书,粉饰、歪曲日本军国主义的侵略事实,便是很好的一例。清朝统治阶级御用文人写的有关"太平天国"的历史书也不可能真实、正确地反映这一历史事件。

正因为如此,新历史主义者把目光转向那些被统治阶级边缘化了的阶级和群体所说或所写的奇闻、轶事、传说、笑话、野史、歌谣等。

海德格尔、萨特、福柯等思想家在新历史主义兴起前就颠覆了历史文本的权威性、真实性和神秘性。原来以为文学文本是虚构的，历史文本是真实的。如今，历史文本的虚构性被揭示、文学和历史之间的界限就更模糊了。“文史互通”自然顺理成章。

这是新历史主义同传统历史主义在研究历史方面的差异。

新历史主义如何研究文学？

传统历史主义者在研究某一文学作品时，总是设法再现作者的原意、世界观和写作时的文化背景。他们关注的是版本、校注、作者的自传、关于作者的传记等。新历史主义者认为，这种研究方法近似历史研究，忽略了文学本身的特点。他们主张在文学作品中了解社会和文学作品写作时的社会，把对文本(text)的研究和对语境(context，即社会或文化背景)的研究结合起来。也就是美国加州大学伯克莱分校英语系教授斯蒂芬·格林布拉特在其名著《文艺复兴时期的自我塑造：从莫尔到莎士比亚》中所说的，新历史主义要“深入文学作品世界的社会存在和文学作品反映的社会存在”。

新历史主义者把语境分为三个层次：

一、写作的语境，即作者的原意、自传、回忆录、关于作者的传记、日记、档案资料以及作者写作时的政治、社会和文化背景等。

二、接受的语境，即不同的读者、组织机构和群体如何阅读、阐释同一文本。

三、批评的语境，即批评家的批评背景。

格林布拉特1982年在《文类》发表的一篇文章中首先使用“新历史主义”一词。他后来改用“文化诗学”，因为新历史主义者把整个文化当作研究对象，并认为历史和文化有不可分割的关系，有许多互通之处。正如不少批评家所说，“新历史主义”是“一个没有确切指涉的措词”。它既是历史研究、文学艺术研究、文化研究，又涉及到马克思主义、心理学、人类学等不同学科。因此，有的批评家称其为“跨学科研究”，或者说它并非一种批评理论，而是一种批评方法。批评界对新历史主义众说纷纭，即便是新历史主义者内部意见也不统一，被称为“新历史主义者”的学者也常常发表不同的甚至相互矛盾的论点。

爱德华·佩奇特在PLMA第102期(1987)上发表《新历史主义和它的不满：文艺复兴时期戏剧的戏剧化》，文中戏拟《共产党宣言》的用词说：“一个幽灵在批评理论界游荡，一个叫新历史主义的幽灵”。他认为，尽管新历史主义包含许多批评实践，其核心是“一种马克思主义批评理

论”。他的论点遭到其他批评理论家的反对。而一些自称是马克思主义者的批评理论家不仅否认新历史主义者是马克思主义者，而且批评他们逃避政治参与。

另一个著名新历史主义者、美国加州大学圣地亚哥分校教授路易斯·蒙特罗斯1986年发表了一篇题为“文化诗学和政治学”的文章，指出：新历史主义的目的之一是重新描述文本与产生文本的文化制度之间的关系。他说，新历史主义旨在探索文本的政治和权力因素，因为作家写作时，思想观念必然受到各种权力机构及其话语的控制或影响。

新历史主义接受福柯和阿尔都塞的观点，认为社会机构尤其是话语塑造人的“经验”。福柯强调，话语总是植根于社会机构，社会和政治的权力只有通过话语才能得到实施。“男尊女卑”在母系社会并不存在。只有当男权控制了各权力机构并产生男权话语时，才出现了“男尊女卑”。同理，所谓的对与错、性正常与不正常、疯癫与不疯癫、犯罪与清白、暴力与非暴力等话语乃是一时一地的权力和文化界定。清朝统治者称“太平军”使用“暴力”搞“暴乱”，而他们却不用“暴力”一词来称谓对“太平军”的镇压。

格林布拉特以英国16世纪的文学（尤其是戏剧）为例。他认为，要了解英国文艺复兴时期的文学作品，就必须把文学作品同都铎王朝的权力机构和这一时期的文化联系起来。

英国都铎和斯图亚特王朝时期，常常发生王权被篡夺或王权旁落。这正是文艺复兴时代英国戏剧（以莎士比亚的戏剧为代表），尤其是历史剧和悲剧的一个重要题材。格林布拉特和蒙特罗斯等新历史主义者在这些戏剧中看到了都铎王朝对失去权力的忧虑。在1601年英国伦敦发生的埃塞克斯起义前，以颠覆王朝权力为主题的《理查二世》上演。当时的伊丽莎白女王后来承认，剧中的理查二世是影射她，并抱怨：“这一悲剧在剧院和广场上已经演出了40次之多。”

新历史主义者看重的正是英国文艺复兴时期戏剧的政治性。在他们看来，历史和文学是权力和政治关系的故事。关于如何阐释《理查二世》，则是见仁见智。有人认为它在警示臣民：“不要造反，造反没有好下场。”有人则认为，它的主旨是非神化王朝权力，有号召百姓颠覆王朝的戏剧效果。这正是伊丽莎白女王对此剧上演忧心忡忡的原因所在。

由此可见，文化和文学与政治、权力、历史是不可分割的。英国19世纪著名散文家、历史学家、哲学家托马斯·卡莱尔说：“诗歌史是一个国家的历史的精髓。”

文艺复兴时期的文学为何成为新历史主义者文学研究的侧重点？

因为人文主义孕育了一种不同于中世纪的新文化。文艺复兴从古希腊、罗马继承了古典主义对文学艺术的社会、政治、美学效力的重视。要探索、研究文学与历史、社会、政治和权力的关系，要了解文学不仅反映历史事实和语境，而且参与历史的发展和政治，即文学与社会、历史、语境相互作用，文艺复兴时期的文学是理想的对象。新历史主义者还认为，美学表述体现市场关系。他们把伊丽莎白时代的戏剧比作市场资本主义，称"社会的一切产品"均在"舞台上流通"。他们把表述之间的流通看成是货币市场的交易。

把文学艺术作品等同商品和货币，反映了当今资本主义世界商业文明的巨大控制力和渗透力以及商品意识的膨胀。英国"文化唯物主义"反对这一观点，虽然文化唯物主义和新历史主义在许多问题上持相同论点（如文本与语境的关系，文本表现权力关系的建构，话语的重要性和它同权力的关系等）。

新历史主义者认为，没有一个文本（无论是历史或文学）的作者能大胆宣称他的文本具有纯粹的原创性，因为任何文本都是参照其他已有的文本写成的，文本的这种互文性是不容否认的。文本的意义并不存在固定的、一成不变的、普遍的标准，它随着时间与地点的变化而变化，永远处于变化中。格林布拉特说，他主张新历史主义的研究方法，是为了"与死者对话"，即今人从此时此地的文化语境出发，去阐释当时当地的文本，从中看出不同文化语境中不同的阐释。

新历史主义的出现说明文学研究中历史批评的重新崛起。多年来各种形式主义的批评理论在文学研究中关注文本本体，抛开社会和历史考虑，走向了片面和极端，致使"新批评"在批评理论界独领风骚数十年。新历史主义和文化唯物主义使文学研究从文本的狭小天地回归广阔的社会和文化空间，把文本与语境结合起来，是有可取之处的。

希利斯·米勒 1986 年出任美国现代语言学会(MLA)主席。他就职演说中的一段话多少说明了新历史主义出现时美国批评理论界的风向。他说："过去几年，文学研究经历了一次突变，几乎完全摆脱了理论，即不像以往那样关注语言本体，而是相应地转向历史、文化、社会、政治、体制、阶级和性别局限、社会背景以及物质基础。"

新历史主义恢复了被各种形式主义批评理论抹杀的历史维度并结束了形式主义在批评理论界多年的风光。它兼顾形式和内容的文学研究方法无疑是可取的。但是，它也存在这样或那样的缺陷。最明显的一

点是：当史实与虚构被混淆时，历史也就丧失了它的客观性和真实性，变成了任人揉捏的泥团。历史的主观性和虚构性虽然在现实中存在，我们应强调的仍是历史对事实的尊重和历史的客观性。

斯蒂芬·格林布拉特：《英国文艺复兴时期形式的威力》介绍

Introduction to *The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance*

Stephen Greenblatt

"I am Richard II. Know ye not that?" exclaimed Queen Elizabeth[1] on August 4, 1601, in the wake of the abortive Essex[2] rising. On the day before the rising, someone had paid the Lord Chamberlain's Men forty shillings to revive their old play about the deposing and killing of Richard II. As far as we know, the play—almost certainly Shakespeare's—was performed only once at the Globe[3], but in Elizabeth's bitter recollection the performance has metastasized: "this tragedy was played 40 times in open streets and houses[4]".

The Queen enjoyed and protected the theater; against moralists who charged that it was a corrupting and seditious force, she evidently sided with those who replied that it released social tensions, inculcated valuable moral lessons, and occupied with harmless diversion those who might otherwise conspire against legitimate authority. But there were some in the Essex faction who saw in the theater the power to subvert, or rather the power to wrest legitimation from the established ruler and confer it on another. This power, notwithstanding royal protection, censorship, and the players' professions of unswerving loyalty, could be purchased for forty shillings.

The story of Richard II was obviously a highly charged one in a society where political discussion was conducted, as in parts of the world today, with Aesopian indirection[5]. Clearly it is not the text alone—over which the censor had some control—that bears the full significance of

Shakespeare's play, or of any version of the story. It is rather the story's full situation the genre it is thought to embody, the circumstances of its performance, the imaginings of its audience—that governs its shifting meanings. "40 times in open streets and houses": for the Queen the repeatability of the tragedy, and hence the numbers of people who have been exposed to its infection, is part of the danger, along with the fact (or rather her conviction) that the play had broken out of the boundaries of the playhouse, where such stories are clearly marked as powerful illusions, and moved into the more volatile zone—the zone she calls "open"—of the streets. In the streets the story begins to lose the conventional containment of the playhouse, where audiences are kept at a safe distance both from the action on stage and from the world beyond the walls. And in the wake of this subversive deregulation, the terms that mark the distinction between the lucid and the real become themselves problematic: are the "houses" to which Elizabeth refers public theaters or private dwellings where her enemies plot her overthrow? can "tragedy" be a strictly literary term when the Queen's own life is endangered by the play?

Modern historical scholarship has assured Elizabeth that she had nothing to worry about: *Richard II* is not at all subversive but rather a hymn to Tudor order. The play, far from encouraging thoughts of rebellion, regards the deposition of the legitimate king as a "sacrilegious" act that drags the country down into "the abyss of chaos"; "that Shakespeare and his audience regarded Bolingbroke[6] as a usurper", declares J. Dover Wilson[7], "is incontestable". But in 1601 neither Queen Elizabeth nor the Earl of Essex were so sure; after all, someone on the eve of a rebellion thought the play sufficiently seditious to warrant squandering two pounds on the players, and the Queen understood the performance as a threat. Moreover, even before the Essex rising, the actual deposition scene was carefully omitted from the first three quartos of Shakespeare's play and appears for the first time only after Elizabeth's death.

How can we account for the discrepancy between Dover Wilson's historical reconstruction and the anxious response of the figures whose

history he purports to have accurately reconstructed? The answer lies at least in part in the difference between a conception of art that has no respect whatsoever for the integrity of the text ("I am Richard II. Know ye not that?") and one that hopes to find, through historical research, a stable core of meaning within the text, a core that united disparate and even contradictory parts into an organic whole. That whole may provide a perfectly orthodox celebration of legitimacy and order, as measured by homilies, royal pronouncements, and official propaganda, but the Queen is clearly responding to something else: to the presence of *any* representation of deposition, whether regarded as sacrilegious or not; to the choice of this particular story at this particular time; to the place of the performance; to her own identity as it is present in the public sphere and as it fuses with the figure of the murdered king. Dover Wilson is not a New Critic: he does not conceive of the text as an iconic object whose meaning is perfectly contained within its own formal structure. Yet for him historical research has the effect of conferring autonomy and fixity upon the text, and it is precisely this fixity that is denied by Elizabeth's response.

Dover Wilson's work is a distinguished example of the characteristic assumptions and methods of the mainstream literary history practiced in the first half of our century, and a further glance at these may help us to bring into focus the distinctive assumptions and methods exemplified in the essays collected in this volume. To be sure, these essays are quite diverse in their concerns and represent no single critical practice; a comparative glance, for example, at the brilliant pieces by Franco Moretti and John Traugott will suggest at once how various this work is. Yet diverse as they are, many of the present essays give voice, I think, to what we may call the new historicism, set apart from both the dominant historical scholarship of the past and the formalist criticism that partially displaced this scholarship in the decades after World War Two. The earlier historicism tends to be monological; that is, it is concerned with discovering a single political vision, usually identical to that said to be held by the entire literate class or indeed the entire population ("In the eyes of the later middle ages", writes Dover Wilson,

Richard II "represented the type and exemplar of royal martyrdom". This vision, most often presumed to be internally coherent and consistent, though occasionally analyzed as the fusion of two or more elements, has the status of an historical fact. It is not thought to be the product of the historian's interpretation, nor even of the particular interests of a given social group in conflict with other groups. Protected then from interpretation and conflict, this vision can serve as a stable point of reference, beyond contingency, to which literary interpretation can securely refer. Literature is conceived to mirror the period's beliefs, but to mirror them, as it were, from a safe distance.

The new historicism erodes the firm ground of both criticism and literature. It tends to ask questions about its own methodological assumptions and those of others; in the present case, for example, it might encourage us to examine the ideological situation not only of *Richard II* but of Dover Wilson on *Richard II*. The lecture from which I have quoted—"The Political Background of Shakespeare's *Richard II* and *Henry IV*"—was delivered before the German Shakespearean Society, at Weimar, in 1939. We might, in a full discussion of the critical issues at stake here, look closely at the relation between Dover Wilson's reading of *Richard II*—a reading that discovers Shakespeare's fears of chaos and his consequent support for legitimate if weak authority over the claims of ruthless usurpers—and the eerie occasion of his lecture ("these plays", he concludes, "should be of particular interest to German students at this moment of that everlasting adventure which we call history").

Moreover, recent criticism has been less concerned to establish the organic unity of literary works and more open to such works as fields of force, places of dissension and shifting interests, occasions for the jostling of orthodox and subversive impulses. "The Elizabeth playhouse, playwright, and player," writes Louis Adrian Montrose in a brilliant recent essay, "exemplify the contradictions of Elizabethan society and make those contradictions their subject. If the world is a theatre and the theatre is an image of the world, then by reflecting upon its own artifice, the drama is holding the mirror up to nature."[8] As the

problematizing of the mirror metaphor suggests, Renaissance literary works are no longer regarded either as a fixed set of texts that are set apart from all other forms of expression and that contain their own determinate meanings or as a stable set of reflections of historical facts that lie beyond them. The critical practice represented in [*The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance*] challenges the assumptions that guarantee a secure distinction between "literary foreground" and "political background" or, more generally, between artistic production and other kinds of social production. Such distinctions do in fact exist, but they are not intrinsic to the texts; rather they are made up and constantly redrawn by artists, audiences, and readers. These collective social constructions on the one hand define the range of aesthetic possibilities within a given representational mode and, on the other, link that mode to the complex network of institutions, practices, and beliefs that constitute the culture as a whole. In this light, the study of genre is an exploration of the poetics of culture.

注释：

1 Elizabeth：英国女王伊丽莎白一世（1558—1603）。

2 埃塞克斯（Robert Devereaux Essex，1566—1601）：史称 2nd Earl of Essex，1599 至 1600 年任爱尔兰总督，1601 年企图在伦敦反叛，事败后被处死。

3 the Globe：the Globe Theatre，英国伦敦上演莎士比亚戏剧的"环球剧院"。

4 this tragedy was played 40 times in open streets and houses：这是伊丽莎白女王对文物收藏家兰巴德（William Lambarde）所说的。houses 指"剧院"（playhouses）。

5 Aesopian indirection：伊索寓言式的拐弯抹角。

6 博林布鲁克（Henry Bolingbroke）：《理查二世》（*Richard II*）一剧中的真实历史人物。

7 威尔逊（John Dover Wilson）：《莎士比亚的〈理查二世〉和〈亨利四世〉的历史背景》（"The Political Background of Shakespeare's *Richard II* and *Henry IV*"，1939）一文的作者。

8 引自蒙特罗斯（Louis Adrian Montrose）名为"演出的目的"（"The Purpose of Playing：Reflections on a Shakespearean Anthropology"，1980）的文章。

理查德·威尔逊:介绍:新历史主义的历史意义

Introduction: Historicizing New Historicism

Richard Wilson

New Historicism and New Philosophy

New Historicism is the name given to the return of history in literary criticism over the last ten years. According to one account, it was a movement that began punctually at the beginning of the 1980s, when the American critic Stephen Greenblatt edited a selection of Renaissance essays and announced that they constituted a "new historicism".

Greenblatt later remarked that for reasons he could not have predicted, the name stuck and proliferated, until by the end of the decade its momentum had become such a roller-coaster it made him "giddy with amazement". In fact, the circulation of the name which Greenblatt imagined he invented is itself a prime instance of New Historicism's own premise that, contrary to "the humanist trivialization" of history, no author is the origin or owner of his/her meaning, but that all statements are written through by pre-existing texts, which having intersected then disperse. If the New Historicism burst suddenly into existence around 1980, it did so, by its own definition, as the conjunction of a number of prior *discourses*, or ways of speaking, about literature and language, and not by inspiration of any single individual. And if it was associated momentarily with a time and place and person, its dissemination during the next decade was a perfect illustration of its thesis that meaning can never be fixed, since language is in perpetual contest. This Introduction will trace the strands of theory that fused to create New Historicism, in an attempt to locate it as a historical phenomenon, while the Postscript will examine some of the ways in which the movement has since fragmented as it has collided with and generated other

kinds of criticism.

Stephen Greenblatt himself proposes a big bang theory of the origin of New Historicism, with speculation that the lectures of the French social thinker Michel Foucault at Berkeley in October 1980 ignited a theoretical explosion. But there is irony in this tribute, since the message Foucault hrought to America was that there is no founding moment, because every utterance or event has to be understood as part of something else. Thus, Foucault's thesis that truth is an effect of words and knowledge, the exercise of power, has to be understood itself in the context of the rejection of the totalizing drive of Marxism in the aftermath of May 1968[1]... The generation of '68 learned what Saussure propounded: that men and women are not primarily economic beings, but talking animals, created by and in words. This lesson was turned against the revolution itself, when at the height of the crisis de Gaulle disappeared, and for twenty-four hours there was no head of state in France. Like a crafty Shakespearean duke, he had secretly flown to Germany to monitor the carnival; but what his absence and return dramatized was that power, as Roland Barthes saw, was not concentrated in some centre but dispersed throughout society. "In our innocence," Barthes recalled, "we believed power was a political object; we learned that power is an ideological object, that it creeps in where we do not recognize it, into institutions, teaching... even the forces of liberation themselves. Power is plural, we discovered... Make a revolution to destroy it, power will spring up again. And the reason why power is invincible is that the object in which it is carried for all human eternity is language: the language that we speak and write."

...

The dark wisdom that *power* is *productive rather than repressive*, since there can be no escape from the prison-house of words, underlies the problematic that developed during the 1970s from which New Historicism would emerge. It was a cultural paranoia exemplified by Foucault's pronouncement that "Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere". Alongside the Freudian pessimism of Lacan, Foucault's Nietzschean collapse

of "knowledge" into "power" and refusal of the "truth" of science inspired the Parisian movement that called itself the New Philosophy, with which New Historicism would share much ground.

. . .

Cultural Poetics

. . .

What distinguished New from old historicism was the knowledge that the historic moments of the Reagan Presidency[2] were not only projected onto film, but turned out to be stolen from Hollywood. Where criticism had been concerned with the historicity of texts, New Historicism grasped the textuality of history with an acuity born of a decade when the leader of the West lived, as Greenblatt observed, "within the movies" that shaped his identity and rhetoric, and which he was unable or unwilling to separate from reality. New Historicism, shared, that is to say, the post-modern vertigo about what Jean Baudrillard melodramatized as "the disappearance of reality" ; the sensation that "today the image is not only a mirror or counterpart of the real, but begins to contaminate reality and to model it, conforms to reality the better to distort it: it appropriates reality for its own ends, anticipates it to the point that the real no longer has time to be produced". The awareness that "a government is sustained not by the gun, but by the effects of texts" was common to all varieties of post-structuralism, but New Historicism was marked by the alacrity with which it adopted Jacques Derrida's maxim that "There is nothing outside of texts" . Where Glucksmann courted controversy in arguing that "German fascism was born not in a territory but a text instituted long before Hitler" (Glucksmann 1977) Greenblatt and others were equally "strong textualists" in tracing the West's domination to "the wonderful self-validating circularity" of its textual "construction of reality". Thus, perhaps the most influential of Foucauldians, Edward the Duke would inevitably return to punish us for the desires he incited. Nor was a preference for Renaissance literature accidental to this daunting scenario.

Every school of criticism has an elective affinity with a particular period, and New Historicism gravitated, like Foucault, to the threshold of the modern era to explore the dialectic of repression and desire at a time when even a sentimentalist such as Bakhtin could recognize a narrowing of carnival culture as popular laughter was outlawed. If New Historicism had a favorite line, then, it would have been Kent's from the end of *King Lear*: "All's cheerless, dark, and deadly."

History and the market

Earlier theorists, such as the New Critics, had valorized Renaissance culture as the ideal of organic unity and order; but New Historicism followed Foucault in reading it as the site of the "dividing practices" that have made us modern subjects. And where criticism had mystified Shakespeare as an incarnation of spoken English, it found the plays embedded in other *written texts*, such as penal, medical and colonial documents. Read within this archival continuum, what they represented was not harmony but the violence of the Puritan attack on carnival, the imposition of slavery, the rise of patriarchy, the hounding of deviance, and the crashing of prison gates during what Foucault called "the Age of Confinement, at the dawn of carceral society". "My subject," Foucault told the Californian professors, "is our subjection: how we turned ourselves into the objects of our own social science, our prisons, asylums and hospitals, and of our own conscience." So compelling was this account of the genesis of our subjectivity, that even a critic like Louis Montrose found it hard to resist. His 1983 essay on *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, printed in *Representations*, the New Historicist flagship, typified the manoeuvres of the American Left when faced with the premise that the "will to power" circumscribes the human subject not in economic relations but in signs. Shakespeare's comedy is powerful, Montrose proposes, to the extent it "creates the culture by which it is created, shapes the fantasies by which it is shaped", and thereby engenders "the cycle of sexual and familial violence, fear, and betrayal" which constitutes the relations of the sexes. The

"intertextual irony" that pervades *A Midsummer Night's Dream* "contaminates" the play with "recurrent bestiality and incest... rapes and disastrous marriage", which, together with the "habitual victimization of women", the Elizabethan text then recycles. But there is, it seems, no historical ground from which to end the vicious circle.

If it was Barthes who spelt out the homology between this cycle of oppression and the system linguists call *langue*—the given language with its regime of syntax and grammar, it was Foucault who made language identical with power. The Catholic confessional and Freud's consulting room have this in common, he reasoned, that they both require us to produce ourselves as docile subjects by coaxing us to talk. The "talking cure" was paradigmatic, in his account, of the "formidable materiality" of all discourse, as, imagining we are liberated or absolved, we manacle ourselves in words. This was the "discourse theory" that allowed New Historicism to equate the transactions of language with those of capitalism, by conflating verbal with market forces, as Greenblatt did in his book *Shakespearean Negotiations*. For though "the circulation of social energy" in the production and consumption of Renaissance drama was not, he insisted, part of any "totalizing system", the exchanges of "cultural capital" he described turned out to be those of the marketplace, as, "by moving certain things—principally ordinary language, but also metaphors, ceremonies, dances, emblems, items of clothing, well-worn stories, and so forth—from one cultural zone to another", poetics obeyed the hidden hand of "trade and trade-offs". Written at the climax of the speculative boom fuelled by junk bonds, this subsumption of language into the techniques of the dealing room chimed with Reaganomics and its campaign to universalize market competition as human nature. Likewise, Greenblatt's claim that capitalism generates an "inexhaustible oscillation" of "boundary making and breaking" echoed the neo liberal proposition that since "the economic approach provides a framework for all human behavior", the oppressed only make it worse for themselves by struggle.

The history restored by New Historicism was a history, then, oddly recalling that of modernism, with its gyre and wheel of fire.

Modernism replaced history with eternally recurrent myth; in the eighties New Historicism repressed historical reality in favor of what Greenblatt called "the circulatory rhythms of American... production and consumption". With such worship of the market, criticism was in tune with the historian Francis Fukuyama, who in 1989 proclaimed "the end of history" with the universality of consumer capitalism. The textuality of history was a function, it transpired, of the ubiquity of the shopping mall, where image and commodity were one, the media produced desire, and there seemed to be no exterior reality outside "virtual space". According to Jameson, all postmodernism fuses form with content; and the dogma that a historical referent no longer exists, because history is a story, suited English departments drilled in formalist New Criticism. To be fair, New Historicists never stated that fact and fiction were one, but encouraged by historians such as Natalie Davis and Robert Darnton, their quest for fiction in the archives was liable to efface the historicity of texts. In 1968 Barthes predicted that the historian would become a literary critic, since "History is henceforth not so much *the real* as *the intelligible*"; but the consequence of reading history for rules governing discourses about the body, pleasure, sexuality or crime, was that all these discrete *histories*, as Foucault termed them, converged in a monologue of mastery. By the mid-eighties New Historicism was being applied to later periods, but, as Mark Seltzer showed with *Henry James and the Art of Power*, even the nineteenth-century novel was complicit in the same mechanism of discipline and surveillance. Thus, by fetishizing power as coterminous with language, New Historicism had mistaken what linguists call *parole* —specific individual utterance for the entire potential system, so "confusing life under capitalism with the nature of reality as it must always be".

...

New Historicism broke the base/superstructure, text/context dichotomy, by insisting that works of art are themselves events, which intervene materially in history, rather than mirrors of reality. But the danger in this iconolatry was that history would be aestheticized into a spectacle or game. Nietzsche was often cited as a precursor of such an

ironic disinterest, but Greenblatt's identification of Elizabethan theatre with market capitalism, on the ground that "everything produced by society" was circulated "through the stage", was closer to the idea of "the state as a work of art" in Jakob Burckhardt's *The Civilization of the Renaissance*, itself rooted in the pessimism of Schopenhauer[3]. Burckhardt had been a subject of New Historicism, when Hayden White demonstrated in a pioneering study that his exaltation of the Renaissance as "a period when the 'cultural' cut itself free of subordination to politics and religion, to float above, dominate, and determine the forms they would take", had more to do with Swiss conservatism after the aborted revolution of 1848, than pre-1600 Italy. Burckhardt's irony before the brute force of the *condottieri*, "realistic" refusal to moralize, and sense of "the Renaissance as nothing but the free play" of individuals, was the cynicism, according to this reading, of a middle class that had betrayed its former liberal ideals. But though Greenblatt traced to Burckhardt his concept of "the self and state as works of art", he did not connect his own ironic stance as a man of '68 with that of the ex-Liberal of 1848. Yet it was precisely *irony* which Alan Liu, in a monumental extension of New Historicism to Wordsworth in 1989, feared in its "demystifying strategies". "How can historical criticism prevent itself from hardening into (in)difference", Liu asked, if it robs history of a "material determinant"? If history was a mere play of "difference", he considered, with no relation to the present, it could provoke only "Foucauldian laughter, wonder, shock, and irony", but "irony", he added, "is not by itself criticism".

Cultural Materialism

The heyday of New Historicism was the mid-eighties. After the Crash of 1987, and notwithstanding Fukuyama, it became more difficult to declare "the end of history", or simply to admire winners and losers for the entrepreneurialism of their will to play against the invisible croupier of the market. What was required of criticism, Liu advised, was "to identify with the past", rather than to speculate, by

discerning within it its own "sense of history: its emergent awareness that it is at once an ideological formation" and a process. Instead of irony, "the greatest of the holdovers of New Criticism" , a *new* New Historicism would admit "a certain 'foreknowledge' of the past within the present" . Thus, criticism would need to defy postmodern fashion, and reinstate something of the "grand narrative", if it was to make sense of the historicity of texts as well as the textuality of historicity. To read the past for "the history of the present" , Foucault always said, had been his project; and he had given warrant for the turn back towards what Liu called "the past's own worry over the fact that it is not simply the past", when he observed in an essay called "The Order of Discourse" , that every text is scored by the conditions of its existence, since "as history teaches, discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for and by which struggle takes place". Access to discourse and controls upon it, such as censorship or means of distribution, are its material determinants; so discourse, which shapes struggle, is shaped by struggle as it evolves, and if language constructs reality, it is also constructed *within* it. This theory of dialectical meaning was very close to that proposed by Althusser, who also wrote of the "internal distantiation" within each work, caused by the friction of surrounding ideologies; and for critics such as Liu it was vital to grasp the dialectic if "the sense of history" was ever to be restored to literary texts.

...

For Belsey then, the importance of Foucault was not in his depressing scenario of panoptic power, but in his insight that history is "fictioned from a political reality that renders it true" ; and it was the duty of the historicist critic to apply this axiom to the category of Literature, so as to bring out the contradictory definitions assigned to men and women as subjects whose meanings "slide in history" . From the Renaissance onwards, she saw, canonical works like *Macbeth* had served to install the nation-state, nuclear family and individual subject, but these institutions had been constructed over other practices, such as witchcraft or regicide, which a historical reading would recover

within the text as a means of encountering the contingency of every discourse.

If the "ism" of New Historicism bracketed history within irony, British historicist critics stressed the reality of combat in which people were "killed and mutilated" for control of meaning. As Belsey noted, even "the word 'I' meant something new in the late sixteenth century", making it the site of contest; and in *The Subject of Tragedy* she analyzed this conflict as it was acted out in Renaissance drama, whose tragic subject was subjectivity itself. Absent from medieval plays, the autonomy of the freeborn Englishman was defined, she showed, in opposition to his mute, submissive wife. But for feminists, the value of Renaissance texts was that they exposed the instability of this system of difference. In the story of Alice Arden, condemned for murdering her husband in 1551, Belsey traced a battle over marriage itself, in which an "unruly woman" defied subordination. If the meaning of man or woman is culturally determined, such criticism averred, cultural struggle is no game. Unlike those Whiggish Marxists who read Shakespearean drama as a cutting-edge of the English Revolution, Belsey took the Foucauldian point that authority produces resistance as its "difference, its visibility" ; but "Subjects exceed the space allotted to them" , she asserted, "work to challenge as well as confirm the existing order" , since "The subject, however defined... does not stay in place. Meaning, the condition of subjectivity, is a location of change". To British historicist critics in the eighties, therefore, Renaissance texts were sites of conflict, not containment. As Richard Wilson demonstrated in his essay on *Julius Caesar*, they read Shakespearean carnival for its vulnerability to, rather than mastery of the popular violence from which it arose. Where Bakhtin had idealized the crowd, materialist criticism would admit that "power uses circuses" ; but it would also affirm that no sign system, however dominant, is truly global. As the London apprentices proved when they commandeered the Globe, if a culture aspires to universality, it is also likely to be gatecrashed.

"The history of the subject in the seventeenth century," Belsey decided, "indicates that our subjectivity is not natural, inevitable or

eternal; on the contrary, it is produced and reproduced in and by specific power relations." Where British historicists differed from their American counterparts, then, was in the latters' structuralist assumption that cultures maintain themselves somehow by self-regulation, without effective social agency or transformations. Thus, in *The Tremulous Private Body* of 1984, by Francis Barker, the story told is again the grim Foucauldian one, of how the body came during the seventeenth century to be dissected on the anatomy table, while the rational, interiorised subject was distilled in the self-censored and gendered discourse of a diarist such as Pepys. But what compels Barker is not the ineluctability of this process, but the inconsistencies in the construction of the bourgeois subject; so that *Hamlet* may be read as an exemplary text precisely because it does *not* conform to modern critical standards of individual psychology or motivation. Barker starts, therefore, from the prince's statement that he has "that within which passes show", taking this to mean that he refuses the "forced" breath... Together with all forms, moods, shapes of the ancient regime, as he gropes towards an "inner reality". "*Hamlet* is nothing but the prince's evasion of a series of positions offered him," Barker deduces; yet "the point is not to supply this absence, but to aggravate its historical significance... From its vantage on the threshold of the modern the text reveals the emptiness of the myth of the autonomous individual. Rather than a gap to be filled, Hamlet's mystery is a void to be celebrated, therefore, against the individualist illusion of man as free and full of meaning: a fable which it is still ours to undo today". Nothing could contrast more with Greenblatt's existential panic, at the end of *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, that "to abandon the craving for freedom... in our culture, is to die".

As it hardened into Cultural Poetics, American New Historicism imitated linguistics in its retreat from history, privileging synchrony over diachrony, paradigm over syntagm, and *langue* over *parole*. Paradoxically, it was the very continuity of the English monarchy between the reigns of the two Elizabeths that convinced British critics, by contrast, that "our culture" was not a closed, self-generating or

inescapable system. As Alan Sinfield pointed out in his essay on *Macbeth*, the "uncanny resemblance between the Gunpowder Plot[4] and the 1984 Brighton Bombing" of the Conservative Cabinet by the IRA[5], was enough to remind those in the vicinity that in writing of Renaissance drama they were "dealing with live issues" still in violent contention. The incomplete nature of England's seventeenth-century revolution had long preoccupied Marxist historiography, but the new literary historicism coincided with a Revisionist history that repudiated economic determinism and emphasized the stability of English society, particularly at local level. Without sharing a Tory tendency in this Revisionism, critics such as Sinfield accepted its main thrust, that the British monarchy has been as innovative as those who resisted its aggression. In *Macbeth*, therefore, it was possible to uncover the strategies by which the British state has been perpetuated despite "persistent structural difficulties". And since the eighties were the most confrontational decade in recent British political history, when Margaret Thatcher's spurning of consensus unmasked a ruthless will to power in battles with trade unionists, pacifists, poll tax protestors and civil rights campaigners, Sinfield read Shakespeare's tragedy as a blueprint for the legitimation of state violence. Macbeth's bloody deeds are applauded when they serve Duncan, we are reminded, and questioned only when he himself becomes a usurper; but it is by identifying this contradiction at the root of the Absolutist state, Sinfield argued, that oppositional criticism can unravel the ideology sustaining its successor, the so-called United Kingdom.

As Cultural Poetics hermeticized culture, then, into a self-sustaining sign system, British critics were engaged in a reading of Renaissance drama that located the material struggles inscribed in literature. Cultural Materialism was the name they adopted in contradistinction to Cultural Poetics and as a statement of a conviction that "writing, teaching, and other modes of communicating all contribute to the long-term establishment of legitimacy". Though the name had been coined by Raymond Williams, Cultural Materialism was above all inflected by Althusser's theory that though ideology is produced "in

words", it has a material existence since it is *reproduced* in institutions such as the theatre or university. So, like the Althusserian "Regulation Theory" economists, Cultural Materialists recognized that capitalism has no developmental logic, but without abandoning a belief in struggle as the means of transition from one regime to another. Their recurring refrain, quoted by Jonathan Dollimore in a 1985 collection entitled *Political Shakespeare*, was that "ruling culture does not define the whole of culture... and it is the task of the oppositional critic to re-read culture so as to amplify the voices of the ruled, exploited, oppressed, and excluded". For Dollimore, therefore, a tragedy such as *The White Devil*[6] indicates both the Jacobean domination of women, and the way their fate was tied to an entire system of exploitation. We inherit a narrative of oppression, he acknowledged, but our duty as re-readers is to show that "It did not, and still does not, need to be so". In this stress on the ongoing potential for resistance, Cultural Materialism was thus encouraged by Gramsci's proposition that hegemony is decided in a ceaseless "war of position" that occurs between the world's great battles. "Pessimism of the intellect; optimism of the will": Gramsci's famous dictum could apply to these critics, who insisted that texts can be rewritten, as Brecht rewrote Shakespeare, since there is indeed "subversion, no end of subversion" to be carried onward.

Representations do shape history, Cultural Materialists agreed, but are shaped by history in turn, since they are terrains of struggle as well as of submission. This was also the finding of the American critic Leonard Tennenhouse in *Power on Display*, which endorsed the Foucauldian line that Renaissance "stagecraft collaborated with statecraft in producing spectacles of state", but then described the Shakepearean theatre as a place where real events punctured the stage-managed frame. So, though Jacobean city comedy strove to bind London to patriarchy, it could not permanently cow its freemen or Levellers. Feast table and festival became irrelevant to the marketplace when the servile began to call the tune. Bakhtin, had theorized such contestation with his more convincing notion of *heteroglossia*, whereby the fair became the intersection of colliding dialects and languages. Out of such

a contest, the dominant accent would not always emerge victorious, as Peter Stallybrass and Allon White observed in *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*. In *Bartholemew Fair* Ben Jonson bid adieu to the dirt and laughter of the crowd, but the role he then assumed was the dictatorship of the library, where "his plays were to become fitting companions" to unread tomes. So if Kafka provided the slogan that an empire of words brooks no subversion, Cultural Materialists responded that, by imagining itself all powerful, Literature struck the pose of Kafka's "Fasting Showman" , whose fate is to die of starvation in a sideshow, whilst "the crowds hurry on past"...

注释:

1 1968 年 5 月巴黎发生了"五月风暴"事件。

2 the Reagan Presidency: 美国总统里根任期。

3 叔本华(Arthur Schopenhauer,1788 1860),德国哲学家。

4 the Gunpowder Plot:火药阴谋。1605 年 11 月 5 日,一些罗马天主教徒企图在英国国会开会期间炸毁国会大厦,事败。

5 the IRA:爱尔兰共和军(the Irish Republican Army)。

6 *The White Devil*:《白魔鬼》,英国剧作家韦伯斯特(John Webster,1580—1625)的剧作,1608 年上演,1612 年出版。

洛伊丝·泰森:新历史主义

New Historicism

Lois Tyson

Most of us raised to think about history in the traditional way would read an account of a Revolutionary War battle written by an American historian in 1944 and ask, if we asked anything at all, "Is this account accurate?" or "What does this battle tell us about the 'spirit of the age' in which it was fought?" In contrast, a new historicist would read the same account of that battle and ask, "What does this account tell us about the political agendas and ideological conflicts of the culture that produced and read the account in 1944?" New historical interest in the

battle itself would produce such questions as, "At the time in which it was fought, how was this battle represented (in newspapers, magazines, tracts, government documents, stories, speeches, drawings, and photographs) by the American colonies or by Britain (or by European countries), and what do these representations tell us about how the American Revolution shaped and was shaped by the cultures that represented it?"

As you can see, the questions asked by traditional historians and by new historicists are quite different, and that's because these two approaches to history are based on very different views of what history is and how we can know it. Traditional historians ask, "What happened?" and "What does the event tell us about history?" In contrast, new historicists ask, "How has the event been interpreted?" and "What do the interpretations tell us about the interpreters?"

For most traditional historians, history is a series of events that have a *linear*, *causal* relationship: event A caused event B; event B caused event C; and so on. Furthermore, they believe we are perfectly capable, through *objective* analysis, of uncovering the facts about historical events, and those facts can sometimes reveal the spirit of the age, that is, the world view held by the culture to which those facts refer. Indeed, some of the most popular traditional historical accounts have offered a key concept that would explain the world view of a given historical population, such as the Renaissance notion of the Great Chain of Being—the cosmic hierarchy of creation, with God at the top of the ladder, human beings at the middle, and the lowliest creatures at the bottom—which has been used to argue that the guiding spirit of Elizabethan culture[1] was a belief in the importance of order in all domains of human life. You can see this aspect of the traditional approach in history classes that study past events in terms of the spirit of an age, such as the Age of Reason or the Age of Enlightenment, and you can see it in literature classes that study literary works in terms of historical periods, such as the Neoclassical, Romantic, or Modernist periods. Finally, traditional historians generally believe that history is *progressive*, that the human species is improving over the course of time,

advancing in its moral, cultural, and technological accomplishments.

New historicists, in contrast, don't believe we have clear access to any but the most basic facts of history. We can know, for example, that George Washington was the first American president and that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo. But our understanding of what such facts mean, of how they fit within the complex web of competing ideologies and conflicting social, political, and cultural agendas of the time and place in which they occurred is, for new historicists, strictly a matter of interpretation, not fact. Even when traditional historians believe they are sticking to the facts, the way they contextualize those facts (including which facts are deemed important enough to report and which are left out) determines what story those facts will tell. From this perspective, there is no such thing as a presentation of facts; there is only interpretation. Furthermore, new historicists argue that reliable interpretations are, for a number of reasons, difficult to produce.

The first and most important reason for this difficulty, new historicists believe, is the *impossibility of objective analysis*. Like all human beings, historians live in a particular time and place, and their views of both current and past events are influenced in innumerable conscious and unconscious ways by their own experience within their own culture. Historians may believe they're being objective, but their own views of what is right and wrong, what is civilized and uncivilized, what is important and unimportant, and the like, will strongly influence the ways in which they interpret events. For example, the traditional view that history is progressive is based on the belief, held in the past by many Anglo-European historians, that the so-called "primitive" cultures of native peoples are less evolved than, and therefore inferior to, the so-called "civilized" Anglo-European cultures. As a result, ancient cultures with highly developed art forms, ethical codes, and spiritual philosophies, such as the tribal cultures of Native Americans and Africans, were often misrepresented as lawless, superstitious, and savage.

Another reason for the difficulty in producing reliable interpretations of history is its complexity. For new historicists, history cannot

be understood simply as a linear progression of events. At any given point in history, any given culture may be progressing in some areas and regressing in others. And any two historians may disagree about what constitutes progress and what doesn't, for these terms are matters of definition. That is, history isn't an orderly parade into a continually improving future, as many traditional historians have believed. It's more like an improvised dance consisting of an infinite variety of steps, following any new route at any given moment, and having no particular goal or destination. Individuals and groups of people may have goals, but human history does not.

Similarly, while events certainly have causes, new historicists argue that those causes are usually multiple, complex, and difficult to analyze. One cannot make simple causal statements with any certainty. In addition, causality is not a one-way street from cause to effect. Any given event—whether it be a political election or a children's cartoon show—is a product of its culture, but it also affects that culture in return. In other words, all events—including everything from the creation of an art work, to a televised murder trial, to the persistence of or change in the condition of the poor—*are shaped by and shape* the culture in which they emerge.

In a similar manner, our *subjectivity*, or selfhood, is shaped by and shapes the culture into which we were born. For most new historicists, our individual identity is not merely a product of society. Neither is it merely a product of our own individual will and desire. Instead, individual identity and its cultural milieu inhabit, reflect, and define each other. Their relationship is mutually constitutive (they create each other) and dynamically unstable. Thus, the old argument between determinism and free will can't be settled because it rests on the wrong question: "Is human identity socially determined or are human beings free agents?" For new historicism, this question cannot be answered because it involves a choice between two entities that are not wholly separate. Rather, the proper question is, "What are the processes by which individual identity and social formations—such as political, educational, legal, and religious institutions and ideologies—create,

promote, or change each other?" For every society constrains individual thought and action within a network of cultural limitations while it *simultaneously* enables individuals to think and act. Our subjectivity, then, is a lifelong *process* of negotiating our way, consciously and unconsciously, among the constraints and freedoms offered, at any given moment in time, by the society in which we live.

Thus, according to new historicists, *power* does not emanate only from the top of the political and socioeconomic structure. According to French philosopher Michel Foucault, whose ideas have strongly influenced the development of new historicism, power *circulates* in all directions, to and from all social levels, at all times. And the vehicle by which power circulates is a never-ending proliferation of *exchange*: (1) the exchange of material goods through such practices as buying and selling, bartering, gambling, taxation, charity, and various forms of theft; (2) the exchange of people through such institutions as marriage, adoption, kidnapping, and slavery; and (3) the exchange of ideas through the various discourses a culture produces.

A *discourse* is a social language created by particular cultural conditions at a particular time and place, and it expresses a particular way of understanding human experience. For example, you may be familiar with the discourse of modern science, the discourse of liberal humanism, the discourse of white supremacy, the discourse of ecological awareness, the discourse of Christian fundamentalism, and the like. And as you read the chapters of this textbook, you will become familiar with the discourses of psychoanalytic criticism, Marxist criticism, feminist criticism, and so on. Although the word *discourse* has roughly the same meaning as the word *ideology*, and the two terms are often used interchangeably, the word *discourse* draws attention to the role of language as the vehicle of ideology.

From a new historical perspective, no discourse, by itself, can adequately explain the complex cultural dynamics of social power. For there is no *monolithic* (single, unified, universal) spirit of an age, and there is no adequate *totalizing* explanation of history (an explanation that provides a single key to all aspects of a given culture). There is,

instead, a dynamic, unstable interplay among discourses: they are always in a state of flux, overlapping and competing with one another (or, to use new historical terminology, *negotiating* exchanges of power) in any number of ways at any given point in time. Furthermore, no discourse is permanent. Discourses wield power for those in charge, but they also stimulate opposition to that power. This is one reason why new historicists believe that the relationship between individual identity and society is mutually constitutive: on the whole, human beings are never merely victims of an oppressive society, for they can find various ways to oppose authority in their personal and public lives.

For new historicism, even the dictator of a small country doesn't wield absolute power on his own. To maintain dominance, his power must circulate in numerous discourses, for example, in the discourse of religion (which can promote belief in the "divine right" of kings or in God's love of hierarchical society), in the discourse of science (which can support the reigning elite in terms of a theory of Darwinian "survival of the fittest"), in the discourse of fashion (which can promote the popularity of leaders by promoting copycat attire, as we saw when Nehru jackets were popular and when the fashion world copied the style of First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy), in the discourse of the law (which can make it a treasonous offense to disagree with a ruler's decisions), and so on.

As these examples suggest, what is "right", "natural", and "normal" are matters of definition. Thus, in different cultures at different points in history, homosexuality has been deemed abnormal, normal, criminal, or admirable. The same can be said of incest, cannibalism, and women's desire for political equality. In fact, Michel Foucault has suggested that all definitions of "insanity", "crime", and sexual "perversion" are social constructs by means of which ruling powers maintain their control. We accept these definitions as "natural" only because they are so ingrained in our culture.

Just as definitions of social and anti-social behavior promote the power of certain individuals and groups, so do particular versions of historical events. Certainly, the whitewashing of General Custer's[2]

now-infamous military campaigns against Native Americans served the desire of the white American power structure of his day to obliterate Native American peoples so that the government could seize their lands. And that same whitewashing continued to serve the white American power structure for many a decade beyond Custer's time, for even those who had knowledge of Custer's misdeeds deemed it unwise to air America's dirty historical laundry, even in front of Americans. Analogously, had the Nazis won World War II, we would all be reading a very different account of the war, and of the genocide of millions of Jews, than the accounts we read in American history books today. Thus, new historicism views historical accounts as narratives, as stories, that are inevitably biased according to the point of view, conscious or unconscious, of those who write them. The more unaware historians are of their biases—that is, the more "objective" they think they are—the more those biases are able to control their narratives.

So far, we've seen new historicism's claims about what historical analysis *cannot* do. Historical analysis (1) cannot be objective, (2) cannot adequately demonstrate that a particular spirit of the times or world view accounts for the complexities of any given culture, and (3) cannot adequately demonstrate that history is linear, causal, or progressive. We can't understand a historical event, object, or person in isolation from the web of discourses in which it was represented because we can't understand it in isolation from the meanings it carried at that time. The more we isolate it, the more we will tend to view it through the meanings of our own time and place and, perhaps, our own desire to believe that the human race is improving with the passage of time.

...

For new historicism considers history a text that can be interpreted the same way literary critics interpret literary texts, and conversely, it considers literary texts cultural artifacts that can tell us something about the interplay of discourses, the web of social meanings, operating in the time and place in which those texts were written. Let's take a closer look at each of these claims by discussing, first, the key

elements of new historical practice and, then, the implications of new historicism for literary criticism.

By and large, we know history only in its textual form, that is, in the form of the documents, written statistics, legal codes, diaries, letters, speeches, tracts, news articles, and the like in which are recorded the attitudes, policies, procedures, and events that occurred in a given time and place. That is, even when historians base their findings on the kinds of "primary sources" listed above, rather than on the interpretations of other historians (secondary sources), those primary sources are almost always in the form of some sort of writing. As such, they require the same kinds of analysis literary critics perform on literary texts. For example, historical documents can be studied in terms of their rhetorical strategies (the stylistic devices by which texts try to achieve their purposes); they can be deconstructed to reveal the limitations of their own ideological assumptions; and they can be examined for the purpose of revealing their explicit and implicit patriarchal, racist, and homophobic agendas. In addition, historical accounts—secondary sources, written during the period in question or at a later date—can be analyzed in the same manner.

In other words, new historicists consider both primary and secondary sources of historical information forms of narrative. Both tell some kind of story, and therefore those stories can be analyzed using the tools of literary criticism. Indeed, we might say that in bringing to the foreground the suppressed historical narratives of marginalized groups—such as women, people of color, the poor, the working class, gay men and lesbians, prisoners, the inhabitants of mental institutions, and so on—new historicism has deconstructed the white, male, Anglo-European historical narrative to reveal its disturbing, hidden sub-text: the experiences of those peoples it has oppressed in order to maintain the dominance that allowed it to control what most Americans know about history.

In fact, a focus on the historical narratives of marginalized peoples has been such an important feature of new historicism that some theorists have asked how new historicists can accept narratives from

oppressed peoples any more readily than they have accepted narratives from the patriarchal Anglo-European power structure. One answer to this question is that a plurality of voices, including an equal representation of historical narratives from all groups, helps insure that a *master narrative*—a narrative told from a single cultural point of view that, nevertheless, presumes to offer the only accurate version of history—will no longer control our historical understanding. At this point in time, we still do not have an equal representation of historical narratives from all groups. And even as the historical narratives of some groups are becoming more and more numerous, such as those of women and people of color, those narratives generally do not receive the same kind of attention as patriarchal Anglo-European narratives do in the classroom, where most of us learn about history. Therefore, new historicism tries to promote the development of and gain attention for the histories of marginalized peoples.

A plurality of historical voices also tends to raise issues that new historicism considers important, such as how ideology operates in the formation of personal and group identity, how a culture's perception of itself (for example, Americans' belief that they are rugged individualists) influences its political, legal, and social policies and customs, and how power circulates in a given culture. We can see how a plurality of historical voices tends to raise these kinds of issues if we imagine the differences among the following hypothetical college courses on the American Revolution: (1) a course that studies traditional American accounts of the war; (2) a course that contrasts traditional American accounts of the war with traditional British, French, Dutch, and Spanish accounts of the war, countries for whom the American Revolution was but a moment in their struggle for colonial power, primarily in the Caribbean; (3) and a course that contrasts the above accounts with Native American accounts of the war recorded from the oral histories of tribes that were affected by it.

As we move, in our imagination, from the first course to the second and then to the third, our focus moves further away from the "factual" content of historical accounts and foregrounds, instead, the

ways in which history is a text that is interpreted by different cultures to fit the ideological needs of their own power structures, which is a new historical concern. In this context, new historicism might be defined as the history of stories cultures tell themselves about themselves. Or, as a corrective to some traditional historical accounts, new historicism might be defined as the history of lies cultures tell themselves. Thus, there is no history, in the traditional sense of the term. There are only representations of history.

In addition to its focus on marginalized historical narratives, new historical analysis involves what is called *thick description*, a term borrowed from anthropology. Thick description attempts, through close, detailed examination of a given cultural production—such as birthing practices, ritual ceremonies, games, penal codes, works of art, copyright laws, and the like—to discover the meanings that particular cultural production had for the people in whose community it occurred and to reveal the social conventions, cultural codes, and ways of seeing the world that gave that production those meanings. Thus, thick description is not a search for facts but a search for meanings, and as the examples of cultural productions listed above illustrate, thick description focuses on the personal side of history—the history of family dynamics, of leisure activities, of sexual practices, of childrearing customs—as much as or more than on such traditional historical topics as military campaigns and the passage of laws. Indeed, because traditional historicism tended to ignore or marginalize private life as subjective and irrelevant, new historicism tries to compensate for this omission by bringing issues concerned with private life into the foreground of historical enquiry.

Let me summarize an example of thick description offered by anthropologist Clifford Geertz in *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Imagine a young man winking at someone across a crowded room. A "thin description" of the event would describe it as a rapid contraction of the right eyelid period. A thick description would attempt to find out what the wink *meant* in the context in which it occurred. First, was it a wink—that is, a public gesture intended to communicate a message—or

just an involuntary twitch? If it was a wink, was it a wink performing its usual activity of imparting a conspiratorial signal? Or was it a fake wink, intended to make others believe a conspiracy was underway when, in fact, it was not? In this case, the wink would not mean conspiracy but deception. Or was it a parody of the fake wink just described, intended to satirize the person who winked in order to deceive? In this case, the wink would mean neither conspiracy nor deception, but ridicule. Now suppose that, in this last example, the would-be satirist is unsure of his ability: he doesn't want to be mistaken for someone merely twitching or winking; he wants his friends to know that he's mocking someone. So to be sure he can do it properly, he practices his satirical wink in front of a mirror. In this case, the wink would have a complicated meaning: it would be the rehearsal of a parody of a friend faking a wink to deceive others that a conspiracy is underway. Although this example of thick description may push the point a bit far, it illustrates the new historical notion that history is a matter of interpretations, not facts, and that interpretations always occur within a framework of social conventions.

Finally, new historicism's claim that historical analysis is unavoidably subjective is not an attempt to legitimize a self-indulgent, "anything goes" attitude toward the writing of history. Rather, the inevitability of personal bias makes it imperative that new historicists be as aware of and as forthright as possible about their own psychological and ideological positions relative to the material they analyze so that their readers can have some idea of the human "lens" through which they are viewing the historical issues at hand. This practice is called *self positioning*.

For example, near the end of Louis Montrose's new historical essay, "Professing the Renaissance: the Poetics and Politics of Culture", he announces his own biases, which include those produced by his role as a Renaissance scholar and professor. He tells us that he has a personal investment in those representations of the Renaissance in texts for which he feels a particular affinity, such as those of Shakespeare and Spenser. Furthermore, he acknowledges that, in analyzing these

texts, he writes about issues that are socially relevant today because he wants to participate not only in the current re-thinking of Elizabethan culture but in the current re-thinking of our own. Finally, Montrose admits that although his writing works to undermine traditional historical approaches to literary scholarship—such as the traditional demarcation of a finite period called the Renaissance to which specific cultural qualities are attributed he has, as a professor and Renaissance scholar, "a complex and substantial stake in sustaining and reproducing the very institutions whose operations [he] wish[es] to call into question".

Before we discuss the implications of new historicism for literary criticism, let's pause for a moment to review its key concepts.

1. The writing of history is a matter of interpretations, not facts. Thus, all historical accounts are narratives and can be analyzed using many of the tools used by literary critics to analyze narrative.

2. History is neither linear (it does not proceed neatly from cause A to effect B and from cause B to effect C) nor progressive (the human species is not steadily improving over the course of time).

3. Power is never wholly confined to a single person or a single level of society. Rather, power circulates in a culture through exchanges of material goods, exchanges of human beings, and most important for literary critics, as we'll see below, exchanges of ideas through the various discourses a culture produces.

4. There is no monolithic (single, unified, universal) spirit of an age, and there is no adequate totalizing explanation of history (an explanation that provides a single key to all aspects of a given culture). There is only a dynamic, unstable interplay among discourses, the meanings of which the historian can try to analyze, though that analysis will always be incomplete, accounting for only a part of the historical picture.

5. Personal identity—like historical events, texts, and artifacts is shaped by and shapes the culture in which it emerges. Thus, cultural categories such as normal and abnormal, sane and insane, are matters of definition. Put another way, our individual identity consists of the narratives we tell ourselves about ourselves, and we draw the material

for our narratives from the circulation of discourses that constitutes our culture.

6. All historical analysis is unavoidably subjective. Historians must therefore reveal the ways in which they know they have been positioned, by their own cultural experience, to interpret history.

New Historicism and Literature

How, specifically, do new historical concepts operate in the domain of literary criticism? Although new historical literary criticism embeds our study of literary texts in the study of history, the study of history, as we've just seen, isn't what it used to be. Therefore, new historical criticism has little in common with traditional historical criticism. The latter, which dominated literary studies in the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth, confined itself largely to studies of the author's life, in order to discover his or her intentions in writing the work, or to studies of the historical period in which the work was written, in oredr to reveal the spirit of the age, which the text was then shown to embody. For traditional literary historians, literature existed in a purely subjective realm, unlike history, which consisted of objectively discernable facts. Therefore, literature could never be interpreted to mean anything that history didn't authorize it to mean.

As you may know, the New Criticism, which dethroned traditional historical criticism and controlled literary studies from the 1940s to the 1960s, rejected traditional historicism's approach to literature. For the New Critics, the only thing literary historians could offer was interesting background material about literary works. The understanding of a text's meaning, however, has nothing whatsoever to do with history, the New Critics argued, because great literary works are timeless, autonomous (self-sufficient) art objects that exist in a realm beyond history. As a result of New Critical dominance, the historical study of literature faded into the background and tried to content itself with the

tasks New Criticism deemed its proper work: for example, providing background material on authors' lives and times- which would not, however, be used to interpret their works—and preserving, through the provision of accurate editions of revered works, the canon of great literature.

New historicism, which emerged in the late 1970s, rejects both traditional historicism's marginalization of literature and New Criticism's enshrinement of the literary text in a timeless dimension beyond history. For new historical critics, a literary text doesn't embody the author's intention or illustrate the spirit of the age that produced it, as traditional literary historians asserted. Nor are literary texts self-sufficient art objects that transcend the time and place in which they were written, as New Critics believed. Rather, literary texts are cultural artifacts that can tell us something about the interplay of discourses, the web of social meanings, operating in the time and place in which the text was written. And they can do so because the literary text is, itself, part of the interplay of discourses, a thread in the dynamic web of social meaning. For new historicism, the literary text and the historical situation from which it emerged are equally important because text (the literary work) and context (the historical conditions that produced it) are mutually constitutive: they create each other. Like the dynamic interplay between individual identity and society, literary texts shape and are shaped by their historical contexts.

Perhaps we can best see how new historical critics differ from their traditional counterparts by noting some of the ways in which new historical readings of specific literary works might contrast with traditional historical readings of those same works. We'll look at two well-known texts, Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1902) and Toni Morrison's *Beloved* (1987). It's interesting to note that, in our first example, the author wrote about a situation—Europe's commercial exploitation of Africa—produced by his own society and one that he'd experienced first-hand. In our second example, the author wrote about a population—former slaves struggling to survive both their own memories of the past and the harsh realities of daily life in antebellum Ohio—

that had lived over one hundred years before the publication of her novel. However, neither Conrad's first-hand experience with his subject matter nor Morrison's temporal distance from hers means that either narrative is necessarily more "accurate" than the other. For traditional historical criticism, the historical accuracy of both texts must be judged by comparisons with historical accounts of the populations represented. And for new historicism, historical "accuracy" is never a certainty: *Heart of Darkness* and *Beloved* offer us interpretations of the populations they depict, which we can use, in turn, to help us interpret both those populations and the circulation of discourses within which Conrad and Morrison wrote these novels.

A traditional historical reading of *Heart of Darkness* might analyze, based on historical accounts of European activities in the Congo during the nineteenth century, how faithful the novel is to the historical realities of European exploitation of human and natural resources in its quest for ivory. Was the waste of human life as flagrant as Conrad portrays it? What were the politics involved in the division of African territories among various European powers and in the administration of those territories? Or a traditional literary historian might examine biographical materials in order to determine what parts of the novel are drawn from Conrad's actual experience during his own trip up the Congo River as a steamship captain for a Belgian company. To what extent are Marlow's experiences actually those of Conrad? To what extent does the novel depict events that Conrad saw or heard about himself? Finally, a traditional historical critic might analyze biographical materials in order to learn about Conrad's creative imagination. What was the influence on Conrad's writing of his early interest in the great explorers of the nineteenth century? Did he keep extensive journals of his experiences as a sailor, or did he write largely from memory? How did his experience in the Congo, including the permanent impairment of his health that resulted therefrom, affect his artistic production?

Similarly, a traditional historical reading of *Beloved* might analyze—based on historical accounts of nineteenth-century American slaves, slave holders, and former slaves—whether or not Morrison's

depiction of this aspect of American experience is faithful to historical reality. Do her portraits of the Garners, their neighbors, Schoolteacher, and the Bodwins accurately represent the range of values held by slave owners and abolitionists at that time? Did Morrison capture the conflicting viewpoints that delineate the spirit of that troubled age? Or a traditional historical reading might investigate the circumstances of the novel's composition in order to find the historical sources of her characters, setting, and plot. For example, to what extent was Sethe's story modeled on that of runaway slave Margaret Garner, who, like Sethe, killed her baby daughter to save her from being returned to her master's plantation? What other characters and events in the novel are based on actual historical figures and events? What specific historical sources—newspaper accounts, slave narratives, legal documents, records of the middle passage, history books, and the like—did Morrison draw upon? Finally, a traditional historical critic might analyze the author's reading habits in order to find evidence of the influence of other literary works on her own artistic technique. What African-American literature, historical fiction, or southern fiction did she read, and can their influence be perceived in the novel's plot, characterization, or style?

In contrast to these traditional historical concerns, a new historical analysis of *Heart of Darkness* might examine the ways in which Conrad's narrative embodies two conflicting discourses present in his own culture: anti-colonialism and Eurocentrism. The novel's anti-colonialist theme, which seems to be a primary focus of the text, can be seen in its representation of the evils of Europe's subordination and exploitation of African peoples. However, as Chinua Achebe observes, the novel nevertheless speaks from an (apparently unconscious) Eurocentric perspective: Marlow's harrowing insight into the European character consists of his realization that Europeans are, beneath their veneer of civilization, as "savage" as the African peoples they intend to subdue, which means that African tribal culture is held to epitomize "savagery". Or, despite the novel's Eurocentric bias, a new historical critic might analyze the text as a kind of prototype, or early

embodiment, of new historical analysis. As Brook Thomas points out, Conrad's novel debunks the traditional historicist belief that history is progressive, that the human species improves over time; and its narrative structure, which obscures plot events behind a hazy veil of subjective description, implies that we do not have access to a clear, unbiased view of the past. Finally, a new historical analysis of *Heart of Darkness* might examine the history of the novel's reception by critics and the reading public to discover how the novel shaped and was shaped by discourses circulating at its point of origin (the time and place in which the book was written and published) and over the passage of time, including speculations about its relationship to possible future audiences. For example, how might the novel's reception over time reveal the ways in which interpretations of the text shaped and have been shaped by the discourses of historical progressivism, social Darwinism, white supremacy, Afrocentrism, multiculturalism, new historicism, and so on?

Similarly, a new historical analysis of *Beloved* might examine how the novel's departures from the historical accounts on which it is based constitute a revision of those accounts, that is, an interpretation of the history it represents. For example, to what extent do the transformations of Denver and Paul D, as they come to understand Sethe's experience, function as a guide for our own understanding of Sethe's historical situation? Or a new historical critic might examine how *Beloved* was shaped by and has shaped the modern debate between two conflicting views of slavery: (1) that slaves were, for the most part, reduced to a childlike dependency upon their masters and (2) that slaves managed, much more thoroughly and consistently than has been reported by traditional white historians, to build a coherent system of resistance through the creation of their own coded forms of communication, the establishment of their own communal ties, and the strategic use of personae (such as the "happy slave" or the "dim-witted slave") as camouflage for their opinions, intentions, and subversive activities. Finally, a new historical reading might investigate the circulation of mid-nineteenth-century discourses with which specific elements of the plot

interact. For example, how do the various views of Sethe depicted in the novel—such as those of Schoolteacher, Mrs. Garner, Amy Denver, Mr. Bodwin, Stamp Paid, Ella, Beloved, and Paul D -reinforce or undermine the mid-nineteenth-century discourses of white supremacy, abolitionism, male supremacy, and motherly love?

As you may have noticed, in all of the above examples of traditional historical criticism, history—the historical situation represented in the text, the population portrayed, the author's life and times—is an objective reality that can be known and against which the subjective literary work is interpreted or measured. In contrast, in the new historical examples, the focus is on how the literary text functions, itself, as a historical discourse interacting with other historical discourses: those circulating at the time and place in which the text is set, at the time the text was published, or at later points in the history of the text's reception. For new historicism is concerned not with historical events as events, but with the ways in which events are interpreted, with historical discourses, with ways of seeing the world and modes of meaning. Indeed, as we saw earlier, historical events are viewed by new historicists not as facts to be documented but as "texts" to be "read" in order to help us speculate about how human cultures, at various historical "moments", have made sense of themselves and their world. We can't really know exactly what happened at any given point in history, but we can know what the people involved believed happened- we can know from their own accounts the various ways in which they interpreted their experience—and we can interpret those interpretations.

For new historical literary critics, then, the literary text, through its representation of human experience at a given time and place, is an interpretation of history. As such, the literary text maps the discourses circulating at the time it was written and is, itself, one of those discourses. That is, the literary text shaped and was shaped by the discourses circulating in the culture in which it was produced. Likewise, our interpretations of literature shape and are shaped by the culture in which we live.

注释：

1 Elizabethan culture：伊丽莎白一世时代(1558 -1603)是英国文学艺术的繁荣时期。

2 卡斯特(George Armstrong Custer，1839- 1876)：镇压印第安人的美国将军。1876年的一次战斗中，他率领的部队被印第安人消灭。

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第十二章　后殖民主义

90 年代以来，在诸流派各领风骚的当代文论领域，后殖民主义文学批评理论是举足轻重的一支。在许多批评家看来，后殖民主义文学批评大致遵循这样的两条路数：从社会和历史背景入手来解读后殖民文学作品（所谓的后殖民文学，就是那些对殖民关系进行批判性反思的作品），探讨它们产生的社会和历史影响；重新解读与殖民活动有关的经典文学作品（往往从后结构主义的视角出发，解构其中蕴涵的殖民主义话语）。

作为一种文化政治话语，究其社会根源，用伊格尔顿的话说，后殖民主义反映了从 70 年代就开始衰退的第三世界革命民族主义到"后革命"状况的历史性转变。其实，它也是对业已结束的、以武力侵略和经济掠夺为特征的西方殖民主义和正在悄然推行的、以经济和文化渗透为主要手段的新殖民主义作出的深刻反思和批判。在思想渊源上，它与后结构主义等有着盘根错节的理论联系：后结构主义的话语分析以及它对欧洲中心论的批判为后殖民主义批评提供了分析策略和视角；反过来，后殖民主义理论也为脱离社会现实的后结构主义披上了一层政治外衣。难怪有人说，后殖民思想是后现代主义最后一处避难所，后现代主义借此来为自己玩世不恭和迷恋物质消费的行为辩护；西方马克思主义，尤其是葛兰西的霸权理论和阿尔都塞的意识形态理论，既为后殖民主义提供了理论工具，同时也深化了它反对殖民主义话语的政治内涵。这些复杂交错的思想联系，形成了各派理论在不同批评领地之间穿梭旅行的局面。

在战后声势浩大的反殖民主义政治运动中，出现了许多对殖民主义进行文化批判和抵制的著作，它们是后殖民主义经常使用的一笔丰厚的参考资源。弗朗兹·法农在阿尔及利亚反法国殖民斗争中写就的《黑皮肤，白面具》（1952）、《垂死的殖民主义：阿尔及利亚革命的第五年》（1959）、《全世界受苦的人们》（1961，语出欧仁·鲍狄埃的《国际歌》）等反殖民主义著作中深刻剖析了欧洲殖民者在推行殖民化过程中采用的

各种文化控制手段以及在殖民地造成的严重后果，同时在文化层面上从语言、意识形态、知识等问题入手，阐述了反抗殖民主义的各种策略。法农分析了黑人民族文化和艺术经历的三个发展阶段（从盲目吸收殖民者文化、开始有意识地挖掘民族传统文化资源到利用文学和艺术直接投身于民族解放斗争），揭示了黑人长期在殖民统治下形成的自轻自贱、急于同白人认同的奴性心态，对于后人阐释后殖民文学和文化给予了极大的启发。

严格说来，法农的著作属于政治理论范围，真正开后殖民文化理论之先河，并产生振聋发聩般效果的是巴勒斯坦裔美国学者爱德华·赛义德。他的代表作《东方主义》(1978)梳理和检视了欧洲（主要是英国和法国）18 世纪以来的东方学研究传统，发掘出贯穿于其中的一整套表述东方社会的霸权话语。这种话语显现为一种观念体系，左右了西方人对东方的看法，密切配合了欧洲在东方的殖民活动，从而将殖民主义合法化。在赛义德看来，orientalism 这个词有三层含义：首先是指一门学科，欧洲研究者进行的研究活动，这些研究者既包括历史学家、社会学家、人类学家以及语文学家等职业性学术人，还包括政府里为殖民事务出谋划策的专家；其次，是指建立在"东方"和"西方"本体论和认识论区分基础上的一种思维方式，即西方把东方想像为自身的对立面，所持有的"非我族类其心必异"这样一种心态；第三，是这个词表达的最主要的意思，指一套严密的话语系统，它支撑和制约着西方对东方的思考、想像和描述。赛义德在这本书中借鉴了福柯的话语分析方法。在福柯看来，话语是一个高度监控系统，控制和规定了特定社会中人们的表述方式和手段；话语总是与权力相关联，致力于维护支配性的社会制度。东方主义就是这样一种隐蔽在东方学研究之中稳固殖民关系、与殖民势力沆瀣一气对付东方的合作制度。在东方主义话语中，东方总是作为一个与西方相对立的"他者"形象出现的。在东方学家的笔下，东方社会成为野蛮、落后、专制、腐败这些固定形象的代名词，有待于欧洲文明去拯救；东方人也就变成卑琐、懦弱、狡诈、荒淫、纵欲、缺乏理性和有待于教化的族类，欧洲的权威和欧洲人的正面形象由此而建立和突显出来。于是，西方优于东方并应该凌驾于东方之上也就随之成为一条无可争议的真理。打着这条真理的旗号，殖民统治就可以冠冕堂皇地大行其道。东方主义话语中渗透着一股强烈的欧洲中心论思想。它视欧洲文化为圭臬，作为衡量其他文化的绝对标准。

在 1993 年出版的又一部重要著作《文化与帝国主义》之中，赛义德

开扩了《东方主义》的视线，不再仅仅聚焦于东方学所考察的中东地区，而是力图“描述现代西方本土与海外殖民地之间的关系”。他用了很长的篇幅分析了英国小说在使帝国主义合理化方面所发挥的作用，揭示出文化形式与帝国主义的海外殖民活动之间的共谋关系，借以说明文学以隐蔽的方式参与了欧洲的海外扩张，“欧洲伟大的现实主义小说所达到的一个极为重要的目的，即不声不响地获得了社会对海外扩张的赞同”。海外殖民地不仅为作品提供了背景，而且成为小说家化解现实冲突的一个重要手段：大英帝国的海外殖民地要么是主人公在本土经受挫败之后大发横财再衣锦还乡的好去处，要么是深受情感伤害的主人公远避国内人事纠纷、重新开始生活的理想乐园。即便是那些与英帝国的殖民行为没有直接联系的作品，例如菲尔丁、理查逊以及斯特恩等人的小说，也反映出与殖民主义相似的价值观：“克服艰难险阻的拼搏精神，通过原则与利益相结合的技巧，耐心地建立权力”。

后殖民主义与女权主义之间有一种天然的联系，女性和殖民地民族之间有内在的相似性，都处于边缘的位置，都被视为异己的他者，并且它们都在研究和捍卫在压迫性的结构（殖民主义和父权制）内部被边缘化了的他者。早期的女权主义批评，同初期的民族主义性质的后殖民主义批评一样，试图颠倒压迫性的支配结构，即以女性话语取代男性话语，以族群中心主义取代欧洲中心主义。随着理论研讨的深入和批评实践的累积，它们放弃了这些简单的做法。在理论取向上，越来越倾向于后结构主义的思路，试图打破父权制权威和殖民主义权威赖以存身的基础：二元对立。这些天然的亲和力导致后殖民主义和女权主义频繁地交流和沟通，许多女性后殖民主义批评家同时也是女权主义批评家，孟加拉裔美国学者加亚特里·斯皮瓦克是其中最著名的一员。她在“属下能说话吗?”一文中阐发了最初由葛兰西提出的“属下”(subaltern)观念，斯皮瓦克用“属下”来指涉那些处于社会边缘位置的被压迫的臣属阶级。她以印度的寡妇殉夫制度为例来说明，在表述这类现象的历史著作中无法听到“属下”妇女真正的愿望，白人殖民者标榜废除寡妇殉夫制度是“白人正在从褐色男人那里救出褐色女人”的义举；而印度本土主张恢复这一制度的父权制维护者却辩解说“妇女实际想死”，无论哪一种声音都没有代表深受双重压迫的“属下”妇女的声音，这个问题的答案必然是否定的。推而广之，把问题的视野推广到整个殖民地，不难得出如下结论：殖民地人民，无论男性还是女性，他们内心中的真实想法是无法在充斥殖民话语的世界中得到真实表述的，他们都成了沉默的他者。在“三个女

性文本和一个帝国主义批判”这篇比较典型的后殖民主义批评文章中，斯皮瓦克重新解读了女权主义经典文本《简·爱》，分析了其续篇、出生于多米尼加的英国小说家简·里斯的《藻海无边》(*Wide Sargasso Sea*)。女权主义批评通常认为，《简·爱》树立了一个具有强烈个性和充满独立自主精神的女权主义高大形象，斯皮瓦克却揭示出《简·爱》中隐藏的一种地道的殖民主义话语，简·爱个人见识的提高和高大形象的树立，是以牺牲被禁锢在阁楼上的那位疯女人、罗切斯特夫人伯莎·梅森为代价的。在勃朗特的笔下，伯莎·梅森这位殖民地出生的克里奥尔的后代，面色“黑一块，白一块”，她居住的房间仿佛是野兽的巢穴，她的身上体现出白人殖民者眼中殖民地人民的固定形象：疯狂、酗酒、淫荡和热衷暴力。

早期的后殖民主义文学批评强调殖民地原住民文化身份的独特性，并把重建纯正的文化身份视为集体性的政治抵制的重要内容，但后殖民文化理论的近期发展却对此提出了质疑。后殖民主义理论另一位代表人物英国学者霍米·巴巴(此人是在印度长大的波斯人)，在《文化的定位》中提出后殖民文化“混杂”(hybridity)理论，产生了很大影响。大多数后殖民主义批评家都认为，在后殖民社会中，殖民地原住民文化与殖民者文化之间呈现出“你中有我、我中有你”这种犬牙交错形态，未尝不是多元文化共生的优点。这种现象表明，在文化接触中，殖民者文化完全消弭了被殖民文化传统，这样的单向过程并没出现。相反，倒是在激烈的文化冲突中，被殖民者文化中的某些独特的东西顽强地留存下来，成为新的文化形态中的一个重要组成部分。文化杂交现象的出现，并不是建立在原住民独立的文化传统完全消失的基础上，而是与这些文化传统的持续存在和不断吸收外来影响有关。就此而言，后殖民文化的混杂性也具有抵制殖民文化同化的意义。但是，不难看出，在后殖民社会不对等的文化交换过程中，原住民的传统文化始终处于弱势地位，更多地扮演着一个无可奈何的被动角色。

爱德华·赛义德:《文化与帝国主义》导言

Culture and Imperialism: Introduction

Edward Said

About five years after *Orientalism* was published in 1978, I began to gather together some ideas about the general relationship between culture and empire that had become clear to me while writing that book. The first result was a series of lectures that I gave at universities in the United States, Canada, and England in 1985 and 1986. These lectures form the core argument of the present work, which has occupied me steadily since that time. A substantial amount of scholarship in anthropology, history, and area studies has developed arguments I put forward in *Orientalism*, which was limited to the Middle East. So I, too, have tried here to expand the arguments of the earlier book to describe a more general pattern of relationships between the modern metropolitan West and its overseas territories.

What are some of the non-Middle Eastern materials drawn on here? European writing on Africa, India, parts of the Far East, Australia, and the Caribbean; these Africanist and Indianist discourses, as some of them have been called, I see as part of the general European effort to rule distant lands and peoples and, therefore, as related to Orientalist descriptions of the Islamic world, as well as to Europe's special ways of representing the Caribbean islands, Ireland, and the Far East. What are striking in these discourses are the rhetorical figures one keeps encountering in their descriptions of "the mysterious East", as well as the stereotypes about "the African [or Indian or Irish or Jamaican or Chinese] mind", the notions about bringing civilization to primitive or barbaric peoples, the disturbingly familiar ideas about flogging or death or extended punishment being required when "they" misbehaved or became rebellious, because "they" mainly understood force or violence best; "they" were not like "us", and for that reason deserved to be

ruled.

Yet it was the case nearly everywhere in the non-European world that the coming of the white man brought forth some sort of resistance. What I left out of *Orientalism* was that response to Western dominance which culminated in the great movement of decolonization all across the Third World. Along with armed resistance in places as diverse as nineteenth-century Algeria, Ireland, and Indonesia, there also went considerable efforts in cultural resistance almost everywhere, the assertions of nationalist identities, and, in the political realm, the creation of associations and parties whose common goal was self-determination and national independence. Never was it the case that the imperial encounter pitted an active Western intruder against a supine or inert non-Western native; there was *always* some form of active resistance, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, the resistance finally won out.

These two factors– a general world-wide pattern of imperial culture, and a historical experience of resistance against empire inform this book in ways that make it not just a sequel to *Orientalism* but an attempt to do something else. In both books I have emphasized what in a rather general way I have called "culture". As I use the word, "culture" means two things in particular. First of all it means all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure. Included, of course, are both the popular stock of lore about distant parts of the world and specialized knowledge available in such learned disciplines as ethnography, historiography, philology, sociology, and literary history. Since my exclusive focus here is on the modern Western empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I have looked especially at cultural forms like the novel, which I believe were immensely important in the formation of imperial attitudes, references, and experiences. I do not mean that only the novel was important, but that I consider it *the* aesthetic object whose connection to the expanding societies of Britain and France is particularly interesting to study. The prototypical modern realistic novel is *Robinson Crusoe*, and

certainly not accidentally it is about a European who creates a fiefdom for himself on a distant, non-European island.

A great deal of recent criticism has concentrated on narrative fiction, yet very little attention has been paid to its position in the history and world of empire. Readers of this book will quickly discover that narrative is crucial to my argument here, my basic point being that stories are at the heart of what explorers and novelists say about strange regions of the world; they also become the method colonized people use to assert their own identity and the existence of their own history. The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course; but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future—these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative. As one critic has suggested, nations themselves *are* narrations. The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them. Most important, the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment mobilized people in the colonial world to rise up and throw off imperial subjection; in the process, many Europeans and Americans were also stirred by these stories and their protagonists, and they too fought for new narratives of equality and human community.

Second, and almost imperceptibly, culture is a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each society's reservoir of the best that has been known and thought, as Matthew Arnold[1] put it in the 1860s. Arnold believed that culture palliates, if it does not altogether neutralize, the ravages of a modern, aggressive, mercantile, and brutalizing urban existence. You read Dante or Shakespeare in order to keep up with the best that was thought and known, and also to see yourself, your people, society, and tradition in their best lights. In time, culture comes to be associated, often aggressively, with the nation or the state; this differentiates "us" from "them", almost always with some degree of xenophobia. Culture in this sense is a source of identity, and a rather combative one at that, as we see in recent

"returns" to culture and tradition. These "returns" accompany rigorous codes of intellectual and moral behavior that are opposed to the permissiveness associated with such relatively liberal philosophies as multiculturalism and hybridity. In the formerly colonized world, these "returns" have produced varieties of religious and nationalist fundamentalism.

In this second sense culture is a sort of theater where various political and ideological causes engage one another. Far from being a placid realm of Apollonian gentility, culture can even be a battleground on which causes expose themselves to the light of day and contend with one another, making it apparent that, for instance, American, French, or Indian students who are taught to read *their* national classics before they read others are expected to appreciate and belong loyally, often uncritically, to their nations and traditions while denigrating or fighting against others.

Now the trouble with this idea of culture is that it entails not only venerating one's own culture but also thinking of it as somehow divorced from, because transcending, the everyday world. Most professional humanists as a result are unable to make the connection between the prolonged and sordid cruelty of practices such as slavery, colonialist and racial oppression, and imperial subjection on the one hand, and the poetry, fiction, philosophy of the society that engages in these practices on the other. One of the difficult truths I discovered in working on this book is how very few of the British or French artists whom I admire took issue with the notion of "subject" or "inferior" races so prevalent among officials who practiced those ideas as a matter of course in ruling India or Algeria. They were widely accepted notions, and they helped fuel the imperial acquisition of territories in Africa throughout the nineteenth century. In thinking of Carlyle or Ruskin, or even of Dickens and Thackeray, critics have often, I believe, relegated these writers' ideas about colonial expansion, inferior races, or "niggers" to a very different department from that of culture, culture being the elevated area of activity in which they "truly" belong and in which they did their "really" important work.

Culture conceived in this way can become a protective enclosure: check your politics at the door before you enter it. As someone who has spent his entire professional life teaching literature, yet who also grew up in the pre-World War Two colonial world, I have found it a challenge *not* to see culture in this way—that is, antiseptically quarantined from its worldly affiliations but as an extraordinarily varied field of endeavor. The novels and other books I consider here I analyze because first of all I find them estimable and admirable works of art and learning, in which I and many other readers take pleasure and from which we derive profit. Second, the challenge is to connect them not only with that pleasure and profit but also with the imperial process of which they were manifestly and unconcealedly a part; rather than condemning or ignoring their participation in what was an unquestioned reality in their societies, I suggest that what we learn about this hitherto ignored aspect actually and truly *enhances* our reading and understanding of them.

Let me say a little here about what I have in mind, using two well-known and very great novels. Dickens's *Great Expectations* (1861) is primarily a novel about self-delusion, about Pip's vain attempts to become a gentleman with neither the hard work nor the aristocratic source of income required for such a role. Early in life he helps a condemned convict, Abel Magwitch, who, after being transported to Australia, pays back his young benefactor with large sums of money; because the lawyer involved says nothing as he disburses the money, Pip persuades himself that an elderly gentlewoman, Miss Havisham, has been his patron. Magwitch then reappears illegally in London, unwelcomed by Pip because everything about the man reeks of delinquency and unpleasantness. In the end, though, Pip is reconciled to Magwitch and to his reality; he finally acknowledges Magwitch—hunted, apprehended, and fatally ill—as his surrogate father, not as someone to be denied or rejected, though Magwitch is in fact unacceptable, being from Australia, a penal colony designed for the rehabilitation but not the repatriation of transported English criminals.

Most, if not all, readings of this remarkable work situate it

squarely within the metropolitan history of British fiction, whereas I believe that it belongs in a history both more inclusive and more dynamic than such interpretations allow. It has been left to two more recent books than Dickens's— Robert Hughes's magisterial *The Fatal Shore* and Paul Carter's brilliantly speculative *The Road to Botany Bay*—to reveal a vast history of speculation about and experience of Australia, a "white" colony like Ireland, in which we can locate Magwitch and Dickens not as mere coincidental references in that history, but as participants in it, through the novel and through a much older and wider experience between England and its overseas territories.

Australia was established as a penal colony in the late eighteenth century mainly so that England could transport an irredeemable, unwanted excess population of felons to a place, originally charted by Captain Cook, that would also function as a colony replacing those lost in America. The pursuit of profit, the building of empire, and what Hughes calls social *apartheid* together produced modern Australia, which by the time Dickens first took an interest in it during the 1840s (in *David Copperfield* Wilkins Micawber happily immigrates there) had progressed somewhat into profitability and a sort of "free system" where laborers could do well on their own if allowed to do so. Yet in Magwitch

> Dickens knotted several strands in the English perception of convicts in Australia at the end of transportation. They could succeed, but they could hardly, in the real sense, return. They could expiate their crimes in a technical, legal sense, but what they suffered there warped them into permanent outsiders. And yet they were capable of redemption as long as they stayed in Australia.

Carter's exploration of what he calls Australia's spatial history offers us another version of that same experience. Here explorers, convicts, ethnographers, profiteers, soldiers chart the vast and relatively empty continent each in a discourse that jostles, displaces, or incorporates the others. Botany Bay is therefore first of all an Enlightenment

discourse of travel and discovery, then a set of travelling narrators (including Cook) whose words, charts, and intentions accumulate the strange territories and gradually turn them into "home". The adjacence between the Benthamite[2] organization of space (which produced the city of Melbourne) and the apparent disorder of the Australian bush is shown by Carter to have become an optimistic transformation of social space, which produced an Elysium for gentlemen, an Eden for laborers in the 1840s. What Dickens envisions for Pip, being Magwitch's "London gentleman", is roughly equivalent to what was envisioned by English benevolence for Australia, one social space authorizing another.

But *Great Expectations* was not written with anything like the concern for native Australian accounts that Hughes or Carter has, nor did it presume or forecast a tradition of Australian writing, which in fact came later to include the literary works of David Malouf, Peter Carey, and Patrick White. The prohibition placed on Magwitch's return is not only penal but imperial: subjects can be taken to places like Australia, but they cannot be allowed a "return" to metropolitan space, which, as all Dickens's fiction testifies, is meticulously charted, spoken for, inhabited by a hierarchy of metropolitan personages. So on the one hand, interpreters like Hughes and Carter expand on the relatively attenuated presence of Australia in nineteenth-century British writing, expressing the fullness and earned integrity of an Australian history that became independent from Britain's in the twentieth century; yet, on the other, an accurate reading of *Great Expectations* must note that after Magwitch's delinquency is expiated, so to speak, after Pip redemptively acknowledges his debt to the old, bitterly energized, and vengeful convict, Pip himself collapses and is revived in two explicitly positive ways. A new Pip appears, less laden than the old Pip with the chains of the past— he is glimpsed in the form of a child, also called Pip; and the old Pip takes on a new career with his boyhood friend Herbert Pocket, this time not as an idle gentleman but as a hardworking trader in the East, where Britain's other colonies offer a sort of normality that Australia never could.

Thus even as Dickens settles the difficulty with Australia, another

structure of attitude and reference emerges to suggest Britain's imperial intercourse through trade and travel with the Orient. In his new career as colonial businessman, Pip is hardly an exceptional figure, since nearly all of Dickens's businessmen, wayward relatives, and frightening outsiders have a fairly normal and secure connection with the empire. But it is only in recent years that these connections have taken on interpretative importance. A new generation of scholars and critics—the children of decolonization in some instances, the beneficiaries (like sexual, religious, and racial minorities) of advances in human freedom at home—have seen in such great texts of Western literature a standing interest in what was considered a lesser world, populated with lesser people of color, portrayed as open to the intervention of so many *Robinson Crusoes*.

By the end of the nineteenth century the empire is no longer merely a shadowy presence, or embodied merely in the unwelcome appearance of a fugitive convict but, in the works of writers like Conrad, Kipling, Gide, and Loti, a central area of concern. Conrad's *Nostromo* (1904)—my second example—is set in a Central American republic, independent (unlike the African and East Asian colonial settings of his earlier fictions), and dominated at the same time by outside interests because of its immense silver mine. For a contemporary American the most compelling aspect of the work is Conrad's prescience: he forecasts the unstoppable unrest and "misrule" of the Latin American republics (governing them, he says, quoting Bolivar[3], is like plowing the sea), and he singles out North America's particular way of influencing conditions in a decisive yet barely visible way. Holroyd, the San Francisco financier who backs Charles Gould, the British owner of the San Tomé mine, warns his protégé that "we won't be drawn into any large trouble" as investors. Nevertheless,

> We can sit and watch. Of course, some day we shall step in. We are bound to. But there's no hurry. Time itself has got to wait on the greatest country in the whole of God's universe. We shall be giving the word for everything—industry, trade, law, journalism,

> art, politics, and religion, from Cape Horn clear over to Surith's Sound, and beyond it, too, if anything worth taking hold of turns up at the North Pole. And then we shall have the leisure to take in hand the outlying islands and continents of the earth. We shall run the world's business whether the world likes it or not. The world can't help it—and neither can we, I guess.

Much of the rhetoric of the "New World Order" promulgated by the American government since the end of the Cold War—with its redolent self-congratulation, its unconcealed triumphalism, its grave proclamations of responsibility—might have been scripted by Conrad's Holroyd: we are number one, we are bound to lead, we stand for freedom and order, and so on. No American has been immune from this structure of feeling, and yet the implicit warning contained in Conrad's portraits of Holroyd and Gould is rarely reflected on since the rhetoric of power all too easily produces an illusion of benevolence when deployed in an imperial setting. Yet it is a rhetoric whose most damning characteristic is that it has been used before, not just once (by Spain and Portugal) but with deafeningly repetitive frequency in the modern period, by the British, the French, the Belgians, the Japanese, the Russians, and now the Americans.

Yet it would be incomplete to read Conrad's great work simply as an early prediction of what we see happening in twentieth-century Latin America, with its string of United Fruit Companies, colonels, liberation forces, and American-financed mercenaries. Conrad is the precursor of the Western views of the Third World which one finds in the work of novelists as different as Graham Greene, V. S. Naipaul,[1] and Robert Stone, of theoreticians of imperialism like Hannah Arendt[5], and of travel writers, film-makers, and polemicists whose specialty is to deliver the non-European world either for analysis and judgement or for satisfying the exotic tastes of European and North American audiences. For if it is true that Conrad ironically sees the imperialism of the San Tomé silver mine's British and American owners as doomed by its own pretentious and impossible ambitions, it is also true that he writes as a

man whose Western view of the non-Western world is so ingrained as to blind him to other histories, other cultures, other aspirations. All Conrad can see is a world totally dominated by the Atlantic West, in which every opposition to the West only confirms the West's wicked power. What Conrad cannot see is an alternative to this cruel tautology. He could neither understand that India, Africa, and South America also had lives and cultures with integrities not totally controlled by the gringo imperialists and reformers of this world, nor allow himself to believe that anti-imperialist independence movements were not all corrupt and in the pay of the puppet masters in London or Washington.

These crucial limitations in vision are as much a part of *Nostromo* as its characters and plot. Conrad's novel embodies the same paternalistic arrogance of imperialism that it mocks in characters like Gould and Holroyd. Conrad seems to be saying, "We Westerners will decide who is a good native or a bad, because all natives have sufficient existence by virtue of our recognition. We created them, we taught them to speak and think, and when they rebel they simply confirm our views of them as silly children, duped by some of their Western masters." This is in effect what Americans have felt about their southern neighbors: that independence is to be wished for them so long as it is the kind of independence *we* approve of. Anything else is unacceptable and, worse, unthinkable.

It is no paradox, therefore, that Conrad was both anti-imperialist and imperialist, progressive when it came to rendering fearlessly and pessimistically the self-confirming, self-deluding corruption of overseas domination, deeply reactionary when it came to conceding that Africa or South America could ever have had an independent history or culture, which the imperialists violently disturbed but by which they were ultimately defeated. Yet lest we think patronizingly of Conrad as the creature of his own time, we had better note that recent attitudes in Washington and among most Western policymakers and intellectuals show little advance over his views. What Conrad discerned as the futility latent in imperialist philanthropy—whose intentions include such ideas as "making the world safe for democracy"—the United States

government is still unable to perceive, as it tries to implement its wishes all over the globe, especially in the Middle East. At least Conrad had the courage to see that no such schemes ever succeed--because they trap the planners in more illusions of omnipotence and misleading self-satisfaction (as in Vietnam), and because by their very nature they falsify the evidence.

All this is worth bearing in mind if *Nostromo* is to be read with some attention to its massive strengths and inherent limitations. The newly independent state of Sulaco that emerges at the end of the novel is only a smaller, more tightly controlled and intolerant version of the larger state from which it has seceded and has now come to displace in wealth and importance. Conrad allows the reader to see that imperialism is a system. Life in one subordinate realm of experience is imprinted by the fictions and follies of the dominant realm. But the reverse is true, too, as experience in the dominant society comes to depend uncritically on natives and their territories perceived as in need of *la mission civilisatrice*[6].

However it is read, *Nostromo* offers a profoundly unforgiving view, and it has quite literally enabled the equally severe view of Western imperialist illusions in Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* or V. S. Naipaul's *A Bend in the River*, novels with very different agendas. Few readers today, after Vietnam, Iran, the Philippines, Algeria, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iraq, would disagree that it is precisely the fervent innocence of Greene's Pyle or Naipaul's Father Huismans, men for whom the native can be educated into "our" civilization, that turns out to produce the murder, subversion, and endless instability of "primitive" societies. A similar anger pervades films like Oliver Stone's *Salvador*, Francis Ford Coppola's *Apocalypse Now*, and Constantin Costa-Gavras's *Missing*, in which unscrupulous CIA operatives and powermad officers manipulate natives and well-intentioned Americans alike.

Yet all these works, which are so indebted to Conrad's anti-imperialist irony in *Nostromo*, argue that the source of the world's significant action and life is in the West, whose representatives seem at

liberty to visit their fantasies and philanthropies upon a mind-deadened Third World. In this view, the outlying regions of the world have no life, history, or culture to speak of, no independence or integrity worth representing without the West. And when there is something to be described it is, following Conrad, unutterably corrupt, degenerate, irredeemable. But whereas Conrad wrote *Nostromo* during a period of Europe's largely uncontested imperialist enthusiasm, contemporary novelists and filmmakers who have learned his ironies so well have done their work *after* decolonization, *after* the massive intellectual, moral, and imaginative overhaul and deconstruction of Western representation of the non-Western world, *after* the work of Frantz Fanon, Amílcar Cabral, C. L. R. James, Walter Rodney, *after* the novels and plays of Chinua Achebe, Ngugi wa Thiongo, Wole Soyinka, Salman Rushdie, Gabriel García Márquez,[7] and many others.

Thus Conrad has passed along his residual imperialist propensities, although his heirs scarcely have an excuse to justify the often subtle and unreflecting bias of their work. This is not just a matter of Westerners who do not have enough sympathy for or comprehension of foreign cultures—since there are, after all, some artists and intellectuals who have, in effect, crossed to the other side Jean Genet, Basil Davidson, Albert Memmi, Juan Goytisolo, and others. What is perhaps more relevant is the political willingness to take seriously the alternatives to imperialism, among them the existence of other cultures and societies. Whether one believes that Conrad's extraordinary fiction confirms habitual Western suspicions about Latin America, Africa, and Asia, or whether one sees in novels like *Nostromo* and *Great Expectations* the lineaments of an astonishingly durable imperial worldview, capable of warping the perspectives of reader and author equally: *both* those ways of reading the real alternatives seem outdated. The world today does not exist as a spectacle about which we can be either pessimistic or optimistic, about which our "texts" can be either ingenious or boring. All such attitudes involve the deployment of power and interests. To the extent that we see Conrad both criticizing and reproducing the imperial ideology of his time, to that extent we can characterize our own present

attitudes: the projection, or the refusal, of the wish to dominate, the capacity to damn, or the energy to comprehend and engage with other societies, traditions, histories.

The world has changed since Conrad and Dickens in ways that have surprised, and often alarmed, metropolitan Europeans and Americans, who now confront large non-white immigrant populations in their midst, and face an impressive roster of newly empowered voices asking for their narratives to be heard. The point of my book is that such populations and voices have been there for some time, thanks to the globalized process set in motion by modern imperialism; to ignore or otherwise discount the overlapping experience of Westerners and Orientals, the interdependence of cultural terrains in which colonizer and colonized co-existed and battled each other through projections as well as rival geographies, narratives, and histories, is to miss what is essential about the world in the past century.

For the first time, the history of imperialism and its culture can now be studied as neither monolithic nor reductively compartmentalized, separate, distinct. True, there has been a disturbing eruption of separatist and chauvinist discourse, whether in India, Lebanon, or Yugoslavia, or in Afrocentric, Islamocentric, or Eurocentric proclamations; far from invalidating the struggle to be free from empire, these reductions of cultural discourse actually prove the validity of a fundamental liberationist energy that animates the wish to be independent, to speak freely and without the burden of unfair domination. The only way to understand this energy, however, is historically: and hence the rather wide geographical and historical range attempted in this book. In our wish to make ourselves heard, we tend very often to forget that the world is a crowded place, and that if everyone were to insist on the radical purity or priority of one's own voice, all we would have would be the awful din of unending strife, and a bloody political mess, the true horror of which is beginning to be perceptible here and there in the re-emergence of racist politics in Europe, the cacophony of debates over political correctness and identity politics in the United States, and—to speak about my own part of the world -the intolerance of religious

prejudice and illusionary promises of Bismarckian despotism, à la Saddam Hussein and his numerous Arab epigones and counterparts.

What a sobering and inspiring thing it is therefore not just to read one's own side, as it were, but also to grasp how a great artist like Kipling (few more imperialist and reactionary than he) rendered India with such skill, and how in doing so his novel *Kim* not only depended on a long history of Anglo-Indian perspective, but also, in spite of itself, forecast the untenability of that perspective in its insistence on the belief that the Indian reality required, indeed beseeched British tutelage more or less indefinitely. The great cultural archive, I argue, is where the intellectual and aesthetic investments in overseas dominion are made. If you were British or French in the 1860s you saw, and you felt, India and North Africa with a combination of familiarity and distance, but never with a sense of their separate sovereignty. In your narratives, histories, travel tales, and explorations your consciousness was represented as the principal authority, an active point of energy that made sense not just of colonizing activities but of exotic geographies and peoples. Above all, your sense of power scarcely imagined that those "natives" who appeared either subservient or sullenly uncooperative were ever going to be capable of finally making you give up India or Algeria. Or of saying anything that might perhaps contradict, challenge, or otherwise disrupt the prevailing discourse.

Imperialism's culture was not invisible, nor did it conceal its worldly affiliations and interests. There is a sufficient clarity in the culture's major lines for us to remark the often scrupulous notations recorded there, and also to remark how they have not been paid much attention. Why they are now of such interest as, for instance, to spur this and other books derives less from a kind of retrospective vindictiveness than from a fortified need for links and connections. One of imperialism's achievements was to bring the world closer together, and although in the process the separation between Europeans and natives was an insidious and fundamentally unjust one, most of us should now regard the historical experience of empire as a common one. The task then is to describe it as pertaining to Indians *and* Britishers, Algerians

and French, Westerners *and* Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and Australians despite the horrors, the bloodshed, and the vengeful bitterness.

My method is to focus as much as possible on individual works, to read them first as great products of the creative or interpretative imagination, and then to show them as part of the relationship between culture and empire. I do not believe that authors are mechanically determined by ideology, class, or economic history, but authors are, I also believe, very much in the history of their societies, shaping and shaped by that history and their social experience in different measure. Culture and the aesthetic forms it contains derive from historical experience, which in effect is one of the main subjects of this book. As I discovered in writing *Orientalism*, you cannot grasp historical experience by lists or catalogues, and no matter how much you provide by way of coverage, some books, articles, authors, and ideas are going to be left out. Instead, I have tried to look at what I consider to be important and essential things, conceding in advance that selectivity and conscious choice have had to rule what I have done. My hope is that readers and critics of this book will use it to further the lines of inquiry and arguments about the historical experience of imperialism put forward in it. In discussing and analyzing what in fact is a global process, I have had to be occasionally both general and summary; yet no one, I am sure, would wish this book any longer than it is!

Moreover, there are several empires that I do not discuss: the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, the Ottoman, and the Spanish and Portuguese. These omissions, however, are not at all meant to suggest that Russia's domination of Central Asia and Eastern Europe, Istanbul's rule over the Arab world, Portugal's over what are today's Angola and Mozambique, and Spain's domination in both the Pacific and Latin America have been either benign (and hence approved of) or any less imperialist. What I am saying about the British, French, and American imperial experience is that it has a unique coherence and a special cultural centrality. England of course is in an imperial class by itself, bigger, grander, more imposing than any other; for almost two

centuries France was in direct competition with it. Since narrative plays such a remarkable part in the imperial quest, it is therefore not surprising that France and (especially) England have an unbroken tradition of novel-writing, unparalleled elsewhere. America began as an empire during the nineteenth century, but it was in the second half of the twentieth, after the decolonization of the British and French empires, that it directly followed its two great predecessors.

There are two additional reasons for focussing as I do on these three. One is that the idea of overseas rule- jumping beyond adjacent territories to very distant lands—has a privileged status in these three cultures. This idea has a lot to do with projections, whether in fiction or geography or art, and it acquires a continuous presence through actual expansion, administration, investment, and commitment. There is something systematic about imperial culture therefore that is not as evident in any other empire as it is in Britain's or France's and, in a different way, the United States'. When I use the phrase "a structure of attitude and reference", this is what I have in mind. Second is that these countries are the three in whose orbits I was born, grew up, and now live. Although I feel at home in them, I have remained, as a native from the Arab and Muslim world, someone who also belongs to the other side. This has enabled me in a sense to live on both sides, and to try to mediate between them.

In fine, this is a book about the past and the present, about "us" and "them", as each of these things is seen by the various, and usually opposed and separated, parties. Its moment, so to speak, is that of the period after the Cold War, when the United States has emerged as the last superpower. To live there during such a time means, for an educator and intellectual with a background in the Arab world, a number of quite particular concerns, all of which have inflected this book, as indeed they have influenced everything I have written since *Orientalism*.

First is a depressing sense that one has seen and read about current American policy formulations before. Each great metropolitan center that aspired to global dominance has said, and alas done, many of the same things. There is always the appeal to power and national interest

in running the affairs of lesser peoples: there is the same destructive zeal when the going gets a little rough, or when natives rise up and reject a compliant and unpopular ruler who was ensnared and kept in place by the imperial power; there is the horrifically predictable disclaimer that "we" are exceptional, not imperial, not about to repeat the mistake of earlier powers, a disclaimer that has been routinely followed by making the mistake, as witness the Vietnam and Gulf wars. Worse yet has been the amazing, if often passive, collaboration with these practices on the part of intellectuals, artists, journalists whose positions at home are progressive and full of admirable sentiments, but the opposite when it comes to what is done abroad in their name.

It is my (perhaps illusory) hope that a history of the imperial adventure rendered in cultural terms might therefore serve some illustrative and even deterrent purpose. Yet though imperialism implacably advanced during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, resistance to it also advanced. Methodologically then I try to show the two forces together. This by no means exempts the aggrieved colonized peoples from criticism; as any survey of post-colonial states will reveal, the fortunes and misfortunes of nationalism, of what can be called separatism and nativism, do not always make up a flattering story. It too must be told, if only to show that there have always been alternatives to Idi Amin and Saddam Hussein. Western imperialism and Third World nationalism feed off each other, but even at their worst they are neither monolithic nor deterministic. Besides, culture is not monolithic either, and is not the exclusive property of East or West, nor of small groups of men or women.

Nonetheless the story is a gloomy and often discouraging one. What tempers it today is, here and there, the emergence of a new intellectual and political conscience. This is the second concern that went into the making of this book. However much there are laments that the old course of humanistic study has been subject to politicized pressures, to what has been called the culture of complaint, to all sorts of egregiously overstated claims on behalf of "Western" or "feminist" or "Afrocentric" and "Islamocentric" values, that is not all there is today.

Take as an example the extraordinary change in studies of the Middle East, which when I wrote *Orientalism* were still dominated by an aggressively masculine and condescending ethos. To mention only works that have appeared in the last three or four years · Lila Abu-Lughod's *Veiled Sentiments*, Leila Ahmed's *Women and Gender in Islam*, Fedwa Malti-Douglas's *Woman's Body, Woman's World*—a very different sort of idea about Islam, the Arabs, and the Middle East has challenged, and to a considerable degree undermined, the old despotism. Such works are feminist, but not exclusivist; they demonstrate the diversity and complexity of experience that works beneath the totalizing discourses of Orientalism and of Middle East (overwhelmingly male) nationalism; they are both intellectually and politically sophisticated, attuned to the best theoretical and historical scholarship, engaged but not demagogic, sensitive to but not maudlin about women's experience; finally, while written by scholars of different backgrounds and education, they are works that are in dialogue with, and contribute to, the political situation of women in the Middle East.

Along with Sara Suleri's *The Rhetoric of English India* and Lisa Lowe's *Critical Terrains*, revisionist scholarship of this sort has varied, if it has not altogether broken up the geography of the Middle East and India as homogenous, reductively understood domains. Gone are the binary oppositions dear to the nationalist and imperialist enterprise. Instead we begin to sense that old authority cannot simply be replaced by new authority, but that new alignments made across borders, types, nations, and essences are rapidly coming into view, and it is those new alignments that now provoke and challenge the fundamentally static notion of *identity* that has been the core of cultural thought during the era of imperialism. Throughout the exchange between Europeans and their "others" that began systematically half a millennium ago, the one idea that has scarcely varied is that there is an "us" and a "them", each quite settled, clear, unassailably self-evident. As I discuss it in *Orientalism*, the division goes back to Greek thought about barbarians, but, whoever originated this kind of "identity" thought, by the nineteenth century it had become the hallmark of imperialist

cultures as well as those cultures trying to resist the encroachments of Europe.

We are still the inheritors of that style by which one is defined by the nation, which in turn derives its authority from a supposedly unbroken tradition. In the United States this concern over cultural identity has of course yielded up the contest over what books and authorities constitute "our" tradition. In the main, trying to say that this or that book is (or is not) part of "our" tradition is one of the most debilitating exercises imaginable. Besides, its excesses are much more frequent than its contributions to historical accuracy. For the record then, I have no patience with the position that "we" should only or mainly be concerned with what is "ours", any more than I can condone reactions to such a view that require Arabs to read Arab books, use Arab methods, and the like. As C. L. R. James used to say, Beethoven belongs as much to West Indians as he does to Germans, since his music is now part of the human heritage.

Yet the ideological concern over identity is understandably entangled with the interests and agendas of various groups—not all of them oppressed minorities—that wish to set priorities reflecting these interests. Since a great deal of this book is all about what to read of recent history and how to read it, I shall only quickly summarize my ideas here. Before we can agree on what the American identity is made of, we have to concede that as an immigrant settler society superimposed on the ruins of considerable native presence, American identity is too varied to be a unitary and homogenous thing; indeed the battle within it is between advocates of a unitary identity and those who see the whole as a complex but not reductively unified one. This opposition implies two different perspectives, two historiographies, one linear and subsuming, the other contrapuntal and often nomadic.

My argument is that only the second perspective is fully sensitive to the reality of historical experience. Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogenous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic. This, I believe, is as true of the contemporary United States as it is of

the modern Arab world, where in each instance respectively so much has been made of the dangers of "un-Americanism" and the threats to "Arabism". Defensive, reactive, and even paranoid nationalism is, alas, frequently woven into the very fabric of education, where children as well as older students are taught to venerate and celebrate the uniqueness of *their* tradition (usually and invidiously at the expense of others). It is to such uncritical and unthinking forms of education and thought that this book is addressed as a corrective, as a patient alternative, as a frankly exploratory possibility. In its writing I have availed myself of the utopian space still provided by the university, which I believe must remain a place where such vital issues are investigated, discussed, reflected on. For it to become a site where social and political issues are actually either imposed or resolved would be to remove the university's function and turn it into an adjunct to whatever political party is in power.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. Despite its extraordinary cultural diversity, the United States is, and will surely remain, a coherent nation. The same is true of other English-speaking countries (Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Canada) and even of France, which now contains large groups of immigrants. Much of the polemical divisiveness and polarized debate that Arthur Schlesinger speaks of as hurting the study of history in *The Disuniting of America* is there of course, but it does not, in my opinion, portend a dissolution of the republic. On the whole it is better to explore history rather than to repress or deny it; the fact that the United States contains so many histories, many of them now clamoring for attention, is by no means to be suddenly feared since many of them were always there, and out of them *an* American society and politics (and even a style of historical writing) were in fact created. In other words, the result of present debates over multiculturalism is hardly likely to be "Lebanonization", and if these debates point a way for political changes and changes in the way women, minorities, and recent immigrants see themselves, then that is not to be feared or defended against. What does need to be remembered is that narratives of emancipation and enlightenment in their strongest form

were also narratives of *integration* not separation, the stories of people who had been excluded from the main group but who were now fighting for a place in it. And if the old and habitual ideas of the main group were not flexible or generous enough to admit new groups, then these ideas need changing, a far better thing to do than reject the emerging groups.

The last point I want to make is that this book is an exile's book. For objective reasons that I had no control over, I grew up as an Arab with a Western education. Ever since I can remember, I have felt that I belonged to both worlds, without being completely *of* either one or the other. During my lifetime, however, the parts of the Arab world that I was most attached to either have been changed utterly by civil upheavals and war, or have simply ceased to exist. And for long periods of time I have been an outsider in the United States, particularly when it went to war against, and was deeply opposed to, the (far from perfect) cultures and societies of the Arab world. Yet when I say "exile" I do not mean something sad or deprived. On the contrary belonging, as it were, to both sides of the imperial divide enables you to understand them more easily. Moreover New York, where the whole of this book was written, is in so many ways the exilic city *par excellence*; it also contains within itself the Manichean structure of the colonial city described by Fanon. Perhaps all this has stimulated the kinds of interests and interpretations ventured here, but these circumstances certainly made it possible for me to feel as if I belonged to more than one history and more than one group. As to whether such a state can be regarded as really a salutary alternative to the normal sense of belonging to only one culture and feeling a sense of loyalty to only one nation, the reader must now decide.

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注释:

1 阿诺德认为,文化是世界上思想和知识的精华。这一看法在1864年发表的"当前批评的功用"一文中明确提出,后来在1869年正式出版的《文化与无政府状态》一书中加以重申。

2 边沁(Jeremy Bentham,1748—1832):英国哲学家和法学家,功利主义伦理学的代表,认为利益是行为的惟一标准和目的,若每个人关心自己的利益,就会达到"最大多数人的最大幸福"。主要著作有《道德及立法原则》、《义务论或道德科学》等。

3 玻利瓦尔(Simon Bolivar,1783—1830):委内瑞拉政治家,南美西班牙殖民地独立战争领袖,一生中曾把六个国家从西班牙殖民统治中解放出来,获"解放者"称号。

4 格林(Graham Greene,1904—1991):英国小说家和剧作家,其作品以引人入胜的情节揭露世间的卑劣和丑恶,间谍小说《斯坦布尔列车》风行一时,另有《核心问题》等多部作品。

奈保尔(V. S. Naipaul,1932—):长期居留英国的特立尼达作家,后殖民文学的代表人物,主要著作有《比斯瓦斯先生寻屋记》、《河湾》、《信仰者之间》等。他的小说勾画出殖民主义崩溃后第三世界共同面临的某些政治、社会、文化困境。不同文化和生活方式之间的矛盾和混合始终是他关注的主题。

5 阿伦特(Hannah Arendt,1906—1975):美国著名政治思想家,德国犹太人后裔,主要著作有《集权主义的起源》、《人类的状况》等。

6 *la mission civilisatrice*:法文,文明的使命。

7 阿奇贝(Chinua Achebe,1930—):长期用英文从事创作的尼日利亚作家,他创作的小说《瓦解》、《动荡》、《神箭》、《人民公仆》描写了当地部族文化的崩溃。

雄哥(Ngugi wa Thiongo,1938—):肯尼亚小说家。

索因卡(Wole Soyinka,1934—):尼日利亚英文作家,1986年诺贝尔文学奖得主,主要著作以剧本为主。

拉什迪(Salman Rushdie,1947—):英籍印度作家,主要著作有《子夜出生的孩子》和《撒旦诗篇》。

马尔克斯(Gabriel García Márquez, 1927—):拉丁美洲魔幻现实主义代表作家,主要作品有《百年孤独》、《枯枝败叶》、《没有人给他写信的上校》等。

加亚特里·斯皮瓦克:
三个女性文本和一种帝国主义批判

Three Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism

Gayatri Spivak

It should not be possible to read nineteenth-century British literature without remembering that imperialism, understood as England's social mission, was a crucial part of the cultural representation of

England to the English. The role of literature in the production of cultural representation should not be ignored. These two obvious "facts" continue to be disregarded in the reading of nineteenth-century British literature. This itself attests to the continuing success of the imperialist project, displaced and dispersed into more modern forms.

If these "facts" were remembered, not only in the study of British literature but in the study of the literatures of the European colonizing cultures of the great age of imperialism, we would produce a narrative, in literary history, of the "worlding" of what is now called "the Third World". To consider the Third World as distant cultures, exploited but with rich intact literary heritages waiting to be recovered, interpreted, and curricularized in English translation fosters the emergence of "the Third World" as a signifier that allows us to forget that "worlding", even as it expands the empire of the literary discipline.

It seems particularly unfortunate when the emergent perspective of feminist criticism reproduces the axioms of imperialism. A basically isolationist admiration for the literature of the female subject in Europe and Anglo-America establishes the high feminist norm. It is supported and operated by an information-retrieval approach to "Third World" literature which often employs a deliberately "nontheoretical" methodology with self-conscious rectitude.

In this essay, I will attempt to examine the operation of the "worlding" of what is today "the Third World" by what has become a cult text of feminism: *Jane Eyre*. I plot the novel's reach and grasp, and locate its structural motors.

...

I need hardly mention that the object of my investigation is the printed book, not its "author". To make such a distinction is, of course, to ignore the lessons of deconstruction. A deconstructive critical approach would loosen the binding of the book, undo the opposition between verbal text and the biography of the named subject "Charlotte Brontë", and see the two as each other's "scene of writing". In such a reading, the life that writes itself as "my life" is as much a production in psychosocial space (other names can be found) as the book that is

written by the holder of that named life—a book that is then consigned to what *is* most often recognized as genuinely "social" : the world of publication and distribution. To touch Brontë's "life" in such a way, however, would be too risky here. We must rather strategically take shelter in an essentialism which, not wishing to lose the important advantages won by U. S. mainstream feminism, will continue to honor the suspect binary oppositions—book and author, individual and history- and start with an assurance of the following sort: my readings here do not seek to undermine the excellence of the individual artist. If even minimally successful, the readings will incite a degree of rage against the imperialist narrativization of history, that it should produce so abject a script for her. I provide these assurances to allow myself some room to situate feminist individualism in its historical determination rather than simply to canonize it as feminism as such.

Sympathetic U. S. feminists have remarked that I do not do justice to Jane Eyre's subjectivity. A word of explanation is perhaps in order. The broad strokes of my presuppositions are that what is at stake, for feminist individualism in the age of imperialism, is precisely the making of human beings, the constitution and "interpellation" of the subject not only as individual but as "individualist". This stake is represented on two registers: childbearing and soul making. The first is domestic-society-through-sexual-reproduction cathected as "compassionate love"; the second is the imperialist project cathected as civil-society-through-social-mission. As the famale individualist, not-quite/not-male, articulates herself in shifting relationship to what is at stake, the "native female" as such (*within* discourse, *as* a signifier) is excluded from any share in this emerging norm. If we read this account from an isolationist perspective in a "metropolitan" context, we see nothing there but the psychobiography of the militant female subject. In a reading such as mine, in contrast, the effort is to wrench oneself away from the mesmerizing focus of the "subject-constitution" of the female individualist.

To develop further the notion that my stance need not be an accusing one, I will refer to a passage from Roberto Fernández Retamar's "Caliban[1]". José Enrique Rodó had argued in 1900 that the model for

the Latin American intellectual in relationship to Europe could be Shakespeare's Ariel. In 1971 Retamar, denying the possibility of an identifiable "Latin American Culture", recast the model as Caliban. Not surprisingly, this powerful exchange still excludes any specific consideration of the civilizations of the Maya, the Aztecs, the Incas, or the smaller nations of what is now called Latin America. Let us note carefully that, at this stage of my argument, this "conversation" between Europe and Latin America (without a specific consideration of the political economy of the "worlding" of the "native") provides a sufficient thematic description of our attempt to confront the ethnocentric and reverse-ethnocentric benevolent double bind (that is, considering the "native" as object for enthusiastic information-retrieval and thus denying its own "wording") that I sketched in my opening paragraphs.

In a moving passage in "Caliban", Retamar locates both Caliban and Ariel in the postcolonial intellectual:

> There is no real Ariel-Caliban polarity: both are slaves in the hands of Prospero, the foreign magician. But Caliban is the rude and unconquerable master of the island, while Ariel, a creature of the air, although also a child of the isle, is the intellectual.

> The deformed Caliban—enslaved, robbed of his island, and taught the language by Prospero—rebukes him thus: "You taught me language, and my profit on't/Is, I know how to curse."

As we attempt to unlearn our so-called privilege as Ariel and "seek from [a certain] Caliban the honor of a place in his rebellious and glorious ranks", we do not ask that our students and colleagues should emulate us but that they should attend to us. If, however, we are driven by a nostalgia for lost origins, we too run the risk of effacing the "native" and stepping forth as "the real Caliban", of forgetting that he is a name in a play, an inaccessible blankness circumscribed by an interpretable text. The stagings of Caliban work alongside the narrativization of history: claiming to *be* Caliban legitimizes the very individualism that we

must persistently attempt to undermine from within.

Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, in an article on history and women's history, shows us how to define the historical moment of feminism in the West in terms of female access to individualism. The battle for female individualism plays itself out within the larger theater of the establishment of meritocratic individualism, indexed in the aesthetic field by the ideology of "the creative imagination". Fox-Genovese's presupposition will guide us into the beautifully orchestrated opening of *Jane Eyre*.

It is a scene of the marginalization and privatization of the protagonist: "There was no possibility of taking a walk that day... Out-door exercise was now out of the question. I was glad of it," Brontë writes. The movement continues as Jane breaks the rules of the appropriate topography of withdrawal. The family at the center withdraws into the sanctioned architectural space of the withdrawing room or drawing room; Jane inserts herself — "I slipped in" — into the margin "a small breakfast-room *adjoined* the drawing room".

The manipulation of the domestic inscription of space within the upwardly mobilizing currents of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century bourgeoisie in England and France is well known. It seems fitting that the place to which Jane withdraws is not only not the withdrawing room but also not the dining room, the sanctioned place of family meals. Nor is it the library, the appropriate place for reading. The breakfast room "contained a book-case". As Rudolph Ackerman wrote in his *Repository* (1823), one of the many manuals of taste in circulation in nineteenth-century England, these low bookcases and stands were designed to "contain all the books that may be desired for a sitting-room without reference to the library". Even in this already triply off-center place, "having drawn the red moreen curtain nearly close, I [Jane] was shrined in double retirement".

Here in Jane's self-marginalized uniqueness, the reader becomes her accomplice: the reader and Jane are united— both are reading. Yet Jane still preserves her odd privilege, for she continues never quite doing the proper thing in its proper place. She cares little for reading what is meant to be read: the "letter-press". *She* reads the pictures. The

power of this singular hermeneutics is precisely that it can make the outside inside. "At intervals, while turning over the leaves of my book, I studied the aspect of that winter afternoon." Under "the clear panes of glass", the rain no longer penetrates, "the drear November day" is rather a one-dimensional "aspect" to be "studied", not decoded like the "letter-press" but, like pictures, deciphered by the unique creative imagination of the marginal individualist.

Before following the track of this unique imagination, let us consider the suggestion that the progress of *Jane Eyre* can be charted through a sequential arrangement of the family/counter-family dyad. In the novel, we encounter, first, the Reeds as the legal family and Jane, the late Mr. Reed's sister's daughter, as the representative of a near incestuous counter-family; second, the Brocklehursts, who run the school Jane is sent to, as the legal family and Jane, Miss Temple, and Helen Burns as a counter-family that falls short because it is only a community of women; third, Rochester and the mad Mrs. Rochester as the legal family and Jane and Rochester as the illicit counter-family. Other items may be added to the thematic chain in this sequence: Rochester and Céline Varens as structurally functional counter-family; Rochester and Blanche Ingram as dissimulation of legality—and so on. It is during this sequence that Jane is moved from the counter-family to the family-in-law. In the next sequence, it is Jane who restores full family status to the as-yet-incomplete community of siblings, the Riverses. The final sequence of the book is a *community* of *families*, with Jane, Rochester, and their children at the center.

In terms of the narrative energy of the novel, how is Jane moved from the place of the counter-family to the family-in-law? It is the active ideology of imperialism that provides the discursive field.

(My working definition of "discursive field" must assume the existence of discrete "systems of signs" at hand in the socius, each based on a specific axiomatics. I am identifying these systems as discursive fields. "Imperialism as social mission" generates the possibility of one such axiomatics. How the individual artist taps the discursive field at hand with a sure touch, if not with transhistorical clairvoyance, in

order to make the narrative structure move I hope to demonstrate through the following example. It is crucial that we extend our analysis of this example beyond the minimal diagnosis of "racism".)

Let us consider the figure of Bertha Mason, a figure produced by the axiomatics of imperialism. Through Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole, Brontë renders the human/animal frontier as acceptably indeterminate, so that a good greater than the letter of the Law can be broached. Here is the celebrated passage, given in the voice of Jane:

> In the deep shade, at the further end of the room, a figure ran backwards and forwards. What it was, whether beast or human being, one could not... tell; it grovelled, seemingly, on all fours; it snatched and growled like some strange wild animal; but it was covered with clothing, and a quantity of dark, grizzled hair, wild as a mane, hid its head and face.

In a matching passage, given in the voice of Rochester speaking *to* Jane, Brontë presents the imperative for a shift beyond the Law as divine injunction rather than human motive. In the terms of my essay, we might say that this is the register not of mere marriage or sexual reproduction but of Europe and its not-yet-human Other, of soul making. The field of imperial conquest is here inscribed as Hell:

> One night I had been awakened by her yells... it was a fiery West Indian night...
>
> "This life," said I at last, "is hell! this is the air those are the sounds of the bottomless pit! *I have a right* to deliver myself from it if I can... Let me break away, and go home to God!"
>
> ...
>
> A wind fresh from Europe blew over the ocean and rushed through the open casement; the storm broke, streamed, thundered, blazed, and the air grew pure... It was true Wisdom that consoled me in that hour, and showed me the right path...

> The sweet wind from Europe was still whispering in the refreshed leaves, and the Atlantic was thundering in glorious liberty...
>
> "Go," said Hope, "and live again in Europe... You have done all that God and Humanity require of you."

It is the unquestioned ideology of imperialist axiomatics, then, that conditions Jane's move from the counter-family set to the set of the family-in-law. Marxist critics such as Terry Eagleton have seen this only in terms of the ambiguous *class* position of the governess[2]. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, on the other hand, have seen Bertha Mason only in psychological terms, as Jane's dark double.[3]

I will not enter the critical debates that offer themselves here. Instead, I will develop the suggestion that nineteenth-century feminist individualism could conceive of a "greater" project than access to the closed circle of the nuclear family. This is the project of soul making beyond "mere" sexual reproduction. Here the native "subject" is not almost an animal but rather the object of what might be termed the terrorism of the categorical imperative.

I am using "Kant" in this essay as a metonym for the most flexible ethical moment in the European eighteenth century. Kant words the categorical imperative, conceived as the universal moral law given by pure reason, in this way: "In all creation every thing one chooses and over which one has any power, may be used *merely as means*; man alone, and with him every rational creature, is an *end in himself*." It is thus a moving displacement of Christian ethics from religion to philosophy. As Kant writes: "With this agrees very well the possibility of such a command as : *Love God above everything, and thy neighbor as thyself*. For as a command it requires respect for a law which *commands love* and does not leave it to our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle."

The "categorical" in Kant cannot be adequately represented in determinately grounded action. The dangerous transformative power of philosophy, however, is that its formal subtlety can be travestied in the

service of the state. Such a travesty in the case of the categorical imperative can justify the imperialist project by producing the following formula: *make* the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself. This project is presented as a sort of tangent in *Jane Eyre*, a tangent that escapes the closed circle of the *narrative* conclusion. The tangent narrative is the story of St. John Rivers, who is granted the important task of concluding the text.

At the novel's end, the *allegorical* language of Christian psychobiography—rather than the textually constituted and seemingly *private* grammar of the creative imagination which we noted in the novel's opening—marks the inaccessibility of the imperialist project as such to the nascent "feminist" scenario. The concluding passage of *Jane Eyre* places St. John Rivers within the fold of *Pilgrim's Progress*. Eagleton pays no attention to this but accepts the novel's ideological lexicon, which establishes St. John Rivers' heroism by identifying a life in Calcutta with an unquestioning choice of death. Gilbert and Gubar, by calling *Jane Eyre* "plain Jane's progress", see the novel as simply replacing the male protagonist with the female. They do not notice the distance between sexual reproduction and soul making, both actualized by the unquestioned idiom of imperialist presuppositions evident in the last part of *Jane Eyre*:

> Firm, faithful, and devoted, full of energy, and zeal, and truth, [St. John Rivers] labours for his race... His is the sternness of the warrior Greatheart, who guards his pilgrim convoy from the onslaught of Apollyon... His is the ambition of the high master-spirit[s]... who stand without fault before the throne of God; who share the last mighty victories of the Lamb; who are called, and chosen, and faithful.

Earlier in the novel, St. John Rivers himself justifies the project: "My vocation? My great work?... My hopes of being numbered in the band who have merged all ambitions in the glorious one of bettering their race—of carrying knowledge into the realms of ignorance—of

substituting peace for war—freedom for bondage—religion for superstition—the hope of heaven for the fear of hell?" Imperialism and its territorial and subject-constituting project are a violent deconstruction of these oppositions.

When Jean Rhys, born on the Caribbean island of Dominica, read *Jane Eyre* as a child, she was moved by Bertha Mason: "I thought I'd try to write her a life." *Wide Sargasso Sea*, the slim novel published in 1965, at the end of Rhys' long career, is that "life".

I have suggested that Bertha's function in *Jane Eyre* is to render indeterminate the boundary between human and animal and thereby to weaken her entitlement under the spirit if not the letter of the Law. When Rhys rewrites the scene in *Jane Eyre* where Jane hears "a snarling, snatching sound, almost like a dog quarrelling" and then encounters a bleeding Richard Mason, she keeps Bertha's humanity, indeed her sanity as critic of imperialism, intact. Grace Poole, another character originally in *Jane Eyre*, describes the incident to Bertha in *Wide Sargasso Sea*: "So you don't remember that you attacked this gentleman with a knife?... I didn't hear all he said except 'I cannot interfere legally between yourself and your husband'. It was when he said 'legally' that you flew at him." In Rhys' retelling, it is the dissimulation that Bertha discerns in the word "legally" --not an innate bestiality that prompts her violent *re*action.

In the figure of Antoinette, whom in *Wide Sargasso Sea* Rochester violently renames Bertha, Rhys suggests that so intimate a thing as personal and human identity might be determined by the politics of imperialism. Antoinette, as a white Creole child growing up at the time of emancipation in Jamaica, is caught between the English imperialist and the black native. In recounting Antoinette's development, Rhys reinscribes some thematics of Narcissus.

There are, noticeably, many images of mirroring in the text. I will quote one from the first section. In this passage, Tia is the little black servant girl who is Antoinette's close companion: "We had eaten the same food, slept side by side, bathed in the same river. As I ran, I thought, I will live with Tia and I will be like her... When I was close

I saw the jagged stone in her hand but I did not see her throw it... We stared at each other, blood on my face, tears on hers. It was as if I saw myself. Like in a looking glass."

A progressive sequence of dreams reinforces this mirror imagery. In its second occurrence, the dream is partially set in a *hortus conclusus*, or "enclosed garden" —Rhys uses the phrase a Romance rewriting of the Narcissus topos as the place of encounter with Love. In the enclosed garden, Antoinette encounters not Love but a strange threatening voice that says merely "in here", inviting her into a prison which masquerades as the legalization of love.

In Ovid's[1] *Metamorphoses*, Narcissus' madness is disclosed when he recognizes his Other as his self: "Iste ego sum". Rhys makes Antoinette see her *self* as her Other, Brontë's Bertha. In the last section of *Wide Sargasso Sea*, Antoinette acts out *Jane Eyre's* conclusion and recognizes herself as the so-called ghost in Thornfield Hall: "I went into the hall again with the tall candle in my hand. It was then that I saw her—the ghost. The woman with streaming hair. She was surrounded by a gilt frame but I knew her." The gilt frame encloses a mirror: as Narcissus' pool reflects the selfed Other, so this "pool" reflects the Othered self. Here the dream sequence ends, with an invocation of none other than Tia, the Other that could not be selfed, because the fracture of imperialism rather than the Ovidian pool intervened. (I will return to this difficult point.) "That was the third time I had my dream, and it ended... I called 'Tia' and jumped and woke." It is now, at the very end of the book, that Antoinette/Bertha can say: "Now at last I know why I was brought here and what I have to do." We can read this as her having been brought into the England of Brontë's novel: "This cardboard house" -a book between cardboard covers "where I walk at night is not England". In this fictive England, she must play out her role, act out the transformation of her "self" into that fictive Other, set fire to the house and kill herself, so that Jane Eyre can become the feminist individualist heroine of British fiction. I must read this as an allegory of the general epistemic violence of imperialism, the construction of a self-immolating colonial subject

for the glorification of the social mission of the colonizer. At least Rhys sees to it that the woman from the colonies is not sacrificed as an insane animal for her sister's consolidation.

Critics have remarked that *Wide Sargasso Sea* treats the Rochester character with understanding and sympathy. Indeed, he narrates the entire middle section of the book. Rhys makes it clear that he is a victim of the patriarchal inheritance law of entailment rather than of a father's natural preference for the firstborn: in *Wide Sargasso Sea*, Rochester's situation is clearly that of a younger son dispatched to the colonies to buy an heiress. If in the case of Antoinette and her identity, Rhys utilizes the thematics of Narcissus, in the case of Rochester and his patrimony, she touches on the thematics of Oedipus. (In this she has her finger on our "historical moment". If, in the nineteenth century, subject-constitution is represented as childbearing and soul making, in the twentieth century psychoanalysis allows the West to plot the itinerary of the subject from Narcissus「the "imaginary"」to Oedipus「the "symbolic"」. This subject, however, is the normative male subject. In Rhys' reinscription of these themes, divided between the female and the male protagonist, feminism and a critique of imperialism become complicit.)

In place of the "wind from Europe" scene, Rhys substitutes the scenario of a suppressed letter to a father, a letter which would be the "correct" explanation of the tragedy of the book. "I thought about the letter which should have been written to England a week ago. Dear Father..." This is the first instance: the letter not written. Shortly afterward:

> Dear Father. The thirty thousand pounds have been paid to me without question or condition. No provision made for her (that must be seen to)... I will never be a disgrace to you or to my dear brother the son you love. No begging letters, no mean requests. None of the furtive shabby manoeuvres of a younger son. I have sold my soul or you have sold it, and after all is it such a bad bargain? The girl is thought to be beautiful, she is beautiful. And yet

. . .

This is the second instance: the letter not sent. The formal letter is uninteresting: I will quote only a part of it:

> Dear Father, we have arrived from Jamaica after an uncomfortable few days. This little estate in the Windward Islands is part of the family property and Antoinette is much attached to it... All is well and has gone according to your plans and wishes. I dealt of course with Richard Mason... He seemed to become attached to me and trusted me completely. This place is very beautiful but my illness has left me too exhausted to appreciate it fully. I will write again in a few days' time.

And so on.

Rhys' version of the Oedipal exchange is ironic, not a closed circle. We cannot know if the letter actually reaches its destination. "I wondered how they got their letters posted," the Rochester figure muses. "I folded mine and put it into a drawer of the desk... There are blanks in my mind that cannot be filled up." It is as if the text presses us to note the analogy between letter and mind.

Rhys denies to Brontë's Rochester the one thing that is supposed to be secured in the Oedipal relay: the Name of the Father, or the patronymic. In *Wide Sargasso Sea*, the character corresponding to Rochester has no name. His writing of the final version of the letter to his father is supervised, in fact, by an image of the *loss* of the patronymic: "There was a crude bookshelf made of three shingles strung together over the desk and I looked at the books, Byron's poems, novels by Sir Walter Scott, *Confessions of an Opium Eater*... and on the last shelf, *Life and Letters of*... The rest was eaten away."

Wide Sargasso Sea marks with uncanny clarity the limits of its own discourse in Christophine, Antoinette's black nurse. We may perhaps surmise the distance between *Jane Eyre* and *Wide Sargasso Sea* by remarking that Christophine's unfinished story is the tangent to the

latter narrative, as St. John Rivers' story is to the former. Christophine is not a native of Jamaica; she is from Martinique. Taxononically, she belongs to the category of the good servant rather than that of the pure native. But within these borders, Rhys creates a powerfully suggestive figure.

Christophine is the first interpreter and named speaking subject in the text. "The Jamaican ladies had never approved of my mother, 'because she pretty like pretty self,' Christophine said," we read in the book's opening paragraph. I have taught this book five times, once in France, once to students who had worked on the book with the well-known Caribbean novelist Wilson Harris, and once at a prestigious institute where the majority of the students were faculty from other universities. It is part of the political argument I am making that all these students blithely stepped over this paragraph without asking or knowing what Christophine's patois, so-called incorrect English, might mean.

Christophine is, of course, a commodified person. "'She was your father's wedding present to me,' explains Antoinette's mother, 'one of his presents.'" Yet Rhys assigns her some crucial functions in the text. It is Christophine who judges that black ritual practices are culture-specific and cannot be used by whites as cheap remedies for social evils, such as Rochester's lack of love for Antoinette. Most important, it is Christophine alone whom Rhys allows to offer a hard analysis of Rochester's actions, to challenge him in a face-to-face encounter. The entire extended passage is worthy of comment. I quote a brief extract:

> "She is Creole girl, and she have the sun in her. Tell the truth now. She don't come to your house in this place England they tell me about, she don't come to your beautiful house to beg you to marry with her. No, it's you come all the long way to her house-it's you beg her to marry. And she love you and she give you all she have. Now you say you don't love her and you break her up. What you do with her money, eh?" [And then Rochester, the white man, comments silently to himself] Her voice was still quiet

but with a hiss in it when she said "money".

Her analysis is powerful enough for the white man to be afraid: "I no longer felt dazed, tired, half hypnotized, but alert and wary, ready to defend myself."

Rhys does not, however, romanticize individual heroics on the part of the oppressed. When the Man refers to the forces of Law and Order, Christophine recognizes their power. This exposure of civil inequality is emphasized by the fact that, just before the Man's successful threat, Christophine had invoked the emancipation of slaves in Jamaica by proclaiming: "No chain gang, no tread machine, no dark jail either. This is free country and I am free woman."

As I mentioned above, Christophine is tangential to this narrative. She cannot be contained by a novel which rewrites a canonical English text within the European novelistic tradition in the interest of the white Creole rather than the native. No perspective *critical* of imperialism can turn the Other into a self, because the project of imperialism has always already historically refracted what might have been the absolutely Other into a domesticated Other that consolidates the imperialist self. The Caliban of Retamar, caught between Europe and Latin America, reflects this predicament. We can read Rhys' reinscription of Narcissus as a thematization of the same problematic.

Of course, we cannot know Jean Rhys' feelings in the matter. We can, however, look at the scene of Christophine's inscription in the text. Immediately after the exchange between her and the Man, well before the conclusion, she is simply driven out of the story, with neither narrative nor characterological explanation or justice. "'Read and write I don't know. Other things I know.' She walked away without looking back."

Indeed, if Rhys rewrites the madwoman's attack on the Man by underlining of the misuse of "legality", she cannot deal with the passage that corresponds to St. John Rivers' own justification of his martyrdom, for it has been displaced into the current idiom of modernization and development. Attempts to construct the "Third World

Woman" as a signifier remind us that the hegemonic definition of literature is itself caught within the history of imperialism. A full literary reinscription cannot easily flourish in the imperialist fracture or discontinuity, covered over by an alien legal system masquerading as Law as such, an alien ideology established as only Truth, and a set of human sciences busy establishing the "native" as self-consolidating Other.

In the Indian case at least, it would be difficult to find an ideological clue to the planned epistemic violence of imperialism merely by rearranging curricula or syllabi within existing norms of literary pedagogy. For a later period of imperialism—when the constituted colonial subject has firmly taken hold straightforward experiments of comparison can be undertaken, say, between the functionally witless India of *Mrs. Dalloway*, on the one hand, and literary texts produced in India in the 1920s, on the other. But the first half of the nineteenth century resists questioning through literature or literary criticism in the narrow sense, because both are implicated in the project of producing Ariel. To reopen the fracture without succumbing to a nostalgia for lost origins, the literary critic must turn to the archives of imperial governance.

...

The essay concludes with an analysis of *Frankenstein*.

注释：

1 这里所提到的卡立班(Caliban)以及下文出现的爱丽尔(Ariel)和普罗斯佩罗(Prospero)都是莎士比亚剧作《暴风雨》中的人物。《暴风雨》是后殖民主义批评经常提及的作品。根据文中原注，作者所引用的这篇文章的全名是"Caliban: Notes towards a Discussion of Culture in Our America"。

2 见伊格尔顿的《权力的神话》(*Myths of Power: a Marxist Study of the Brontes*)(1975)。作者在原注中认为，这个视角是伊格尔顿这部著作的一个基本预设。

3 在吉尔伯特(Sandra Gilbert)和格巴(Susan Gubar)在女权主义批评名作《阁楼上的疯女人：妇女作家与19世纪的文学想像》(1979)中，《简·爱》是主要的分析文本。

4 奥维德(Ovid，公元前43 公元17)：古罗马诗人，《变形记》(*Metamorphoses*)是他的代表作。

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第十三章　文化研究

文化研究是近一二十年以来在英美批评界日益盛行的一股新思潮，它与女权主义、后结构主义和后殖民主义批评等有着难以割舍的联系。它还采纳和吸收了社会学、人类学和政治学的研究方法和视角，表现出一种打破文学研究藩篱、倡导跨学科研究的倾向。

与专门剖析经典著作的纯文学批评不同，文化研究的对象是纷繁复杂的当代文化形式和现象，尤其是处于非主流地位的，以影响为媒质的当代大众文化以及其他同样处于边缘地位的女性文化、工人阶级亚文化和少数族群(minority ethnic)的文化体验和身份。文化研究中的“文化”已经不再是传统意义上的知识产物和活动，而是林林总总的日常生活方式。今天，在美国一些大学的课堂里，文学教授津津乐道的是英国小说家伊恩・弗莱明的 007 通俗小说、肥皂剧和麦当娜，而不是往日奉为经典的弥尔顿和莎士比亚的名著。

这标明一种趋势——突破过去狭隘的文学研究领域，把流行文化纳入研究视野。美国大学的一些文学教授甚至提出以文化研究取代文学研究。

英国文化研究脱胎于 F. R. 利维斯和 T. S. 艾略特的文化观念和文学批评。它萌生于两种反叛，一是反叛文化精英主义，二是反叛经济决定论。文化研究在反叛中确立了自身的思想特征。利维斯在《大众文明与少数者文化》和《文化与环境》这两部文化批评著作中，利用细读式文学分析解读了流行小说、广播、电影和广告等所谓的“大众文明”，呼吁文化精英肩负教育大众的重任，以挽颓风。艾略特在那本著名的小册子《略论文化的定义》(1948)中承认，文化不仅限于学校传播的知识。他把文化定义为一种生活方式，将文化的含义扩大到了文学和艺术之外。他们的思想和论述从反方向启发了文化研究，并对文化研究的创始人雷蒙・威廉斯文化思想的形成提供了理论起点。《文化与社会》和《漫长的革命》几近于对利维斯主义和马克思主义的综合。

威廉斯从利维斯那里继承了整体性的文化观念和细读式分析方法，批判了将“大众文明与少数者文化”对立起来的文化精英主义。同时，他从马克思主义那里继承了对统治阶级的政治、经济和文化权力进行的激进的社会批判。《文化与社会》确定了文化分析的任务，将文化界定为全部生活方式，是“意义和价值观”的表现，文化分析的任务就是要澄清某种生活方式中缊含的意义和价值观。他反对利维斯把文化还原为由精英们把持的理想的经典作品的文化观，也不赞同把文化看做是历史和经济发展进程的副产品的文化观。他将文化视为一个自足的研究领域。

在《漫长的革命》中，威廉斯具体提出了文化分析的手段。他认为，分析一个时期的文化必须考察当时人们思想中普遍存在的情感结构。他在书中分析了19世纪英国流行文化形式和机制。他在六七十年代的文化研究实践中把电影、电视、体育、音乐等流行文化形式与经典文学作品相比较，认为二者对于理解普遍的文化体验同样具有启迪意义。

理查德·霍加特的《识字的用途》(1957)是文化研究的一部力作。霍加特力主恢复和探讨流行的、工人阶级的文化，因为英国一向认为高雅文学才是文化，而工人阶级的文化因受歧视而失去了它的声音。霍加特认为文化是人民的表达，应该让边缘化群体(如工人阶级)的文化恢复它消失了的声音。马克思主义理论则把大众文化看做是一种意识形态强加的东西，把它作为一种压迫性的意识形态构成来研究。这两种文化研究相互作用和影响，对文化研究的发展起了至关重要的作用。霍加特在《识字的用途》中沿用了利维斯式文学分析方法，勾画出城市工人阶级传统文化的衰变历程。他用人类学研究手法叙述了20世纪30年代英国的工人阶级文化，用实用批评的方法分析二战后涌现出的各种大众文化形式，并对老式工人阶级文化受到新型商业文化的侵蚀深表忧虑。

《识字的用途》为早期(六七十年代初)文化研究提供了研究范式和重要启示：它坚持工人阶级文化的合法性和有机整体性，认为在大众文化大举入侵的形势下工人阶级完全有能力创造出自己的流行文化形式，自主地选择大众文化提供的文化产品。E.P.汤普森的《英国工人阶级的形成》论述了工业革命初期工人阶级的阶级意识和文化的形成过程，着重从文化而不是从经济角度看待英国工人阶级意识的形成。

在威廉斯和霍加特直接推动下，伯明翰大学当代文化研究中心于1974年成立，这标志着文化研究制度化的开端。一般认为，当代文化研究中心的研究工作代表了英国文化研究的成果和方向。总的说来，在60年代，文化研究中心侧重于工人阶级文化研究；70年代重视媒体文化和

青年亚文化研究;80年代以来重视种族研究和性别研究。纵观文化研究的发展历程,普遍认为有两种研究范式支配着当代文化研究中心的批评实践:文化论和结构论。这两种范式分别代表文化研究的两个发展阶段。文化论强调人的能动作用、价值观和经验,对于从社会学和史学角度全面认识社会具有重要作用。威廉斯、霍加特和汤普森等人的上述著作是这种研究范式的体现;60年代的文化研究工作开创了这一范式,斯图亚特·霍尔和佩迪·沃内尔合著的《流行艺术》(1964)是遵循这种范式的一部代表作。60年代后期,欧陆结构主义和以阿尔都塞、葛兰西为主要代表的西方马克思主义开始对文化研究产生重大影响,文化研究相应地进入了结构论范式阶段。

结构论范式强调社会状况对于人能动作用的限制,带有强烈的反人本主义色彩。与文化论范式相反,结构论没有把文化视为某一社会群体的客观化经验,而是把文化当作"生成和领会意义的场地……在建构、体验和阐释社会现实方面发挥决定和推动作用的场域"。葛兰西的"霸权"理论中一条重要思想是,他把文化和意识形态领域视为社会统治阶级和被统治阶级在建构社会意义时相互冲突的领域。在阿尔都塞的意识形态理论中,文化或意识形态不仅仅是人类经验的表现,而且是意识和主体性的前提和基础,社会现实就是通过它被建构、生产和阐释出来的。结构论模式的缺点在于它带有更浓厚的决定论色彩,过于淡化人的主观能动作用。

70年代文化研究的主要成就表现在青年亚文化研究和媒体研究。在葛兰西和阿尔都塞理论的启发下,文化研究详尽揭示了文化形成社会意识的机制,努力发掘社会边缘群体与主导阶级之间的文化权力关系。换言之,它张扬底层阶级和边缘群体争取文化支配权力的斗争。主导阶级施展其文化霸权优势,将符合自身利益的社会意义阐释成为全社会所认可的"公意"。从属群体则不同程度地抵制这一做法,他们从维护自身利益的角度出发,形成自己对社会现象的理解。这一时期涌现的重要青年亚文化研究著作有:《亚文化:风格的意义》(1976)、《仪式抵抗》(1976)、《学习劳动》(1979)等。这些著作总的倾向是强调人类对压迫性社会环境的创造性反应能力,赞美他们的反抗精神,青年亚文化被视为抵制占主导地位的中产阶级意识形态的一股文化力量,尽管他们离经叛道的反抗行为往往只是象征性的,根本不可能动摇现存的社会的基础。

相比之下,这一时期的媒体研究较为强调传播过程中结构的决定作用,观众对媒体的接受受到意识形态、从属和支配关系以及霸权的制约。

简言之，人的能动作用受到不均衡的权力关系的限制。同一时期较为著名的媒体研究著作有《全国报道的电视的观众》、《家庭电视》、《十字路口：电视连续剧的戏剧性》、《观看达拉斯》以及《监控危机》等。种族也被纳入文化研究的视野内，文化研究中心集体编写的《帝国反击：70年代英国的种族和种族主义》(1982)探讨了70年代的种族主义与英国社会危机的关系。文化研究对妇女问题、种族问题的关切是同时期西方社会声势浩大的女权主义运动和人权运动在文化领域内的反映。

文化研究是一个宽泛却又具体的问题。詹姆逊在"论文化研究"一文中指出：文化研究是一种愿望，探讨这种愿望最好从政治和社会的角度入手，将它视为一项促成"历史大联合"的事业，而不是理论化地将它视为某种新学科的规划图。他认为，最好把文化研究理解为一种探讨社会普遍问题的特殊方式，而不是属于少数人的或专门化的领域。因此，文化研究应该欢迎混杂的"身份"，对各种新的复杂结构进行宣传和分析。詹姆逊提出以"协力关系网"概念取代"单一作者"概念。也就是说，在文化研究中，不存在真正的"个体文本"，其研究客体是各种各样的协力关系。如果没有力图结合、引导、协调各种身份、各种责任和立场的促动性张力，就不可能出现真正有意义的富有成效的作品和思想。詹姆逊指出，所谓张力也指文本与社会、上层建筑与基础之间的张力，或者说是文化由社会现实想像世界的转位。因此，人们应该把多种意识形态的各种影响和承诺所导致的张力，看成是截然不同的张力；构成某种思想内涵的是对这些张力做出反应的行为，而不是得以得出结论的分析，也不是排除矛盾把多种意识形态的运作压制成一个统一的大方案。各种群体"身份"之间的张力构成文化研究的一个重要方面。

从"协力关系网"出发，詹姆逊又提出了"连接"的概念。在文化中，这种"连接"常常是一种突发性的整体建构，其中种族、性别、阶级、民族、民族性乃至性生活相互交错，汇合到一起，形成一个发生作用的整体结构。这种结构不可避免地是一种"复合结构"，一种不仅通过相似性而且通过差异性相"连接"的结构。在詹姆逊看来，"连接"是文化研究的一个重要的理论问题。若想清楚地了解"连接"的多种动力，必须全面理解作为单个群体的文化的种种表现。他认为，任何一个群体都不能单独拥有一种文化，文化是一个群体接触并观察另一个群体时对所发现的氛围或者说是那个群体陌生奇异之处的外化。换句话说，文化是一种"他者"(other)思想，即信仰或宗教之类的东西被投射到"陌生的头脑"里去。信仰并非一个群体本身拥有的东西，虽然人们确实常常谈论"我们自己的"

文化、宗教、信仰或其他一些东西。詹姆逊指出，必须把文化看做是群体之间关系赖以实现的工具或媒体，必须把文化揭示为一种他体的概念，否则就无法理解这种在历史中形成的复杂的关系。群体之间的文化存在着这样那样的差异。在文化交流中，一个群体借用另一个群体的文化，是一个群体对另一个群体的承认和敬意。强大的群体也向弱小的群体表示敬意和承认，并借鉴和模仿他们的文化。他认为，文化是群体做出象征性行为的空间，文化研究必须考虑各群体之间的关系。在文化研究实践中，他强调三个层次上的解读。第一是政治层次，方法是把各种文本(包括社会文本)作为一种象征或寓言。例如列维-斯特劳斯在研究印第安人的面饰时，把内在的形式结构作为一种社会象征：均衡匀称的纹面图案其实是下层印第安人对部落中的不平等关系在审美层面上的一种纯形式的解决。第二是社会层次，将关注的对象转向群体(或阶级关系)，转向文本中隐含的意识形态。例如布洛赫从神话故事对欲望的满足和对美好的向往中解读出阶级反抗的声音。第三是人类生产层次，也是三者中最重要的层次。不同生产方式的存在导致对抗，群体间的矛盾形成政治、社会和历史生活的焦点，例如资本主义在帝国主义阶段所导致的殖民主义、在当前后期资本主义所导致的后殖民主义等等。詹姆逊本人就是从生产方式入手解读出后现代主义或后期资本主义的文化逻辑的。

雷蒙·威廉斯：
马克思主义文化理论中的基础与上层建筑

Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory

Raymond Williams

Any modern approach to a Marxist theory of culture must begin by considering the proposition of a determining base and a determined superstructure. From a strictly theoretical point of view this is not, in fact, where we might choose to begin. It would be in many ways preferable if we could begin from a proposition which originally was equally central, equally authentic: namely the proposition that social being

determines consciousness. It is not that the two propositions necessarily deny each other or are in contradiction. But the proposition of base and superstructure, with its figurative element, with its suggestion of a fixed and definite spatial relationship, constitutes, at least in certain hands, a very specialized and at times unacceptable version of the other proposition. Yet in the transition from Marx to Marxism, and in the development of mainstream Marxism itself, the proposition of the determining base and the determined superstructure has been commonly held to be the key to Marxist cultural analysis.

It is important, as we try to analyse this proposition, to be aware that the term of relationship which is involved, that is to say "determines", is of great linguistic and theoretical complexity. The language of determination and even more of determinism was inherited from idealist and especially theological accounts of the world and man[1]. It is significant that it is in one of his familiar inversions, his contradictions of received propositions, that Marx uses the word which becomes, in English translation, "determines" (the usual but not invariable German word is *bestimmen*). He is opposing an ideology that had been insistent on the power of certain forces outside man, or, in its secular version, on an abstract determining consciousness. Marx's own proposition explicitly denies this, and puts the origin of determination in men's own activities.[2] Nevertheless, the particular history and continuity of the term serves to remind us that there are, within ordinary use -and this is true of most of the major European languages quite different possible meanings and implications of the word "determine". There is, on the one hand, from its theological inheritance, the notion of an external cause which totally predicts or prefigures, indeed totally controls a subsequent activity. But there is also, from the experience of social practice, a notion of determination as setting limits, exerting pressures.[3]

Now there is clearly a difference between a process of setting limits and exerting pressures, whether by some external force or by the internal laws of a particular development, and that other process in which a subsequent content is essentially prefigured, predicted and controlled by a preexisting external force. Yet it is fair to say, looking at

many applications of Marxist cultural analysis, that it is the second sense, the notion of prefiguration, prediction or control, which has often explicitly or implicitly been used.

Superstructure: Qualifications and Amendments

The term of relationship is then the first thing that we have to examine in this proposition, but we have to do this by going on to look at the related terms themselves. "Superstructure" (*Überbau*) has had most attention. In common usage, after Marx, it acquired a main sense of a unitary "area" within which all cultural and ideological activities could be placed. But already in Marx himself, in the later correspondence of Engels, and at many points in the subsequent Marxist tradition, qualifications were made about the determined character of certain superstructural activities. The first kind of qualification had to do with delays in time, with complications, and with certain indirect or relatively distant relationships. The simplest notion of a superstructure, which is still by no means entirely abandoned, had been the reflection, the imitation or the reproduction of the reality of the base in the superstructure in a more or less direct way. Positivist notions of reflection and reproduction of course directly supported this. But since in many real cultural activities this relationship cannot be found, or cannot be found without effort or even violence to the material or practice being studied, the notion was introduced of delays in time, the famous lags; of various technical complications; and of indirectness, in which certain kinds of activity in the cultural sphere— philosophy, for example— were situated at a greater distance from the primary economic activities. That was the first stage of qualification of the notion of superstructure: in effect, an operational qualification. The second stage was related but more fundamental, in that the process of the relationship itself was more substantially looked at. This was the kind of reconsideration which gave rise to the modern notion of "mediation", in which something more than simple reflection or reproduction—indeed something radically different from either reflection or reproduction—actively occurs. In the

later twentieth century there is the notion of "homologous structures",[1] where there may be no direct or easily apparent similarity, and certainly nothing like reflection or reproduction, between the superstructural process and the reality of the base, but in which there is an essential homology or correspondence of structures, which can be discovered by analysis. This is not the same notion as "mediation", but it is the same kind of amendment in that the relationship between the base and the superstructure is not supposed to be direct, nor simply operationally subject to lags and complications and indirectnesses, but that of its nature it is not direct reproduction.

These qualifications and amendments are important. But it seems to me that what has not been looked at with equal care is the received notion of the "base" (*Basis*, *Grundlage*). And indeed I would argue that the base is the more important concept to look at if we are to understand the realities of cultural process. In many uses of the proposition of base and superstructure, as a matter of verbal habit, "the base" has come to be considered virtually as an object, or in less crude cases, it has been considered in essentially uniform and usually static ways. "The base" is the real social existence of man. "The base" is the real relations of production corresponding to a stage of development of the material productive forces. "The base" is a mode of production at a particular stage of its development. We make and repeat propositions of this kind, but the usage is then very different from Marx's emphasis on productive activities, in particular structural relations, constituting the foundation of all other activities. For while a particular stage of the development of production can be discovered and made precise by analysis, it is never in practice either uniform or static. It is indeed one of the central propositions of Marx's sense of history that there are deep contradictions in the relationships of production and in the consequent social relationships. There is therefore the continual possibility of the dynamic variation of these forces. Moreover, when these forces are considered, as Marx always considers them, as the specific activities and relationships of real men, they mean something very much more active, more complicated and more contradictory than the developed

metaphorical notion of "the base" could possibly allow us to realize.

The Base and the Productive Forces

So we have to say that when we talk of "the base", we are talking of a process and not a state. And we cannot ascribe to that process certain fixed properties for subsequent translation to the variable processes of the superstructure. Most people who have wanted to make the ordinary proposition more reasonable have concentrated on refining the notion of superstructure. But I would say that each term of the proposition has to be revalued in a particular direction. We have to revalue "determination" towards the setting of limits and the exertion of pressure, and away from a predicted, prefigured and controlled content. We have to revalue "superstructure" towards a related range of cultural practices, and away from a reflected, reproduced or specifically dependent content. And, crucially, we have to revalue "the base" away from the notion of a fixed economic or technological abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in real social and economic relationships, containing fundamental contradictions and variations and therefore always in a state of dynamic process.

It is worth observing one further implication behind the customary definitions. "The base" has come to include, especially in certain twentieth-century developments, a strong and limiting sense of basic industry. The emphasis on heavy industry, even, has played a certain cultural role. And this raises a more general problem, for we find ourselves forced to look again at the ordinary notion of "productive forces". Clearly what we are examining in the base is primary productive forces. Yet some very crucial distinctions have to be made here. It is true that in his analysis of capitalist production Marx considered "productive work" in a very particular and specialized sense corresponding to that mode of production. There is a difficult passage in the *Grundrisse* in which he argues that while the man who makes a piano is a productive worker, there is a real question whether the man who distributes the piano is also a productive worker; but he probably is, since

he contributes to the realization of surplus value. Yet when it comes to the man who plays the piano, whether to himself or to others, there is no question: he is not a productive worker at all. So piano-maker is base, but pianist superstructure. As a way of considering cultural activity, and incidentally the economics of modern cultural activity, this is very clearly a dead-end. But for any theoretical clarification it is crucial to recognize that Marx was there engaged in an analysis of a particular kind of production, that is capitalist commodity production. Within his analysis of this mode, he had to give to the notion of "productive labor" and "productive forces" a specialized sense of primary work on materials in a form which produced commodities. But this has narrowed remarkably, and in a cultural context very damagingly, from his more central notion of *productive forces*, in which, to give just brief reminders, the most important thing a worker ever produces is himself, himself in the fact of that kind of labor, or the broader historical emphasis of men producing themselves, themselves and their history. Now when we talk of the base, and of primary productive forces, it matters very much whether we are referring, as in one degenerate form of this proposition became habitual, to primary production within the terms of capitalist economic relationships, or to the primary production of society itself, and of men themselves, the material production and reproduction of real life. If we have the broad sense of productive forces, we look at the whole question of the base differently, and we are then less tempted to dismiss as superstructural, and in that sense as merely secondary, certain vital productive social forces, which are in the hroad sense, from the beginning, basic.

Uses of Totality

Yet, because of the difficulties of the ordinary proposition of base and superstructure, there was an alternative and very important development, an emphasis primarily associated with Lukács, on a social "totality". The totality of social practices was opposed to this layered notion of base and a consequent superstructure. This concept of a totality

of practices is compatible with the notion of social being determining consciousness, but it does not necessarily interpret this process in terms of a base and a superstructure. Now the language of totality has become common. and it is indeed in many ways more acceptable than the notion of base and superstructure. If we come to say that society is composed of a large number of social practices which form a concrete social whole, and if we give to each practice a certain specific recognition, adding only that they interact, relate and combine in very complicated ways, we are at one level much more obviously talking about reality, but we are at another level withdrawing from the claim that there is any process of determination. And this I, for one, would be very unwilling to do. Indeed, the key question to ask about any notion of totality in cultural theory is this: whether the notion of totality includes the notion of intention.

Intention, the notion of intention, restores the key question, or rather the key emphasis. For while it is true that any society is a complex whole of such practices, it is also true that any society has a specific organization, a specific structure, and that the principles of this organization and structure can be seen as directly related to certain social intentions, intentions by which we define the society, intentions which in all our experience have been the rule of a particular class. One of the unexpected consequences of the crudeness of the base/superstructure model has been the too easy acceptance of models which appear less crude-models of totality or of a complex whole -but which exclude the facts of social intention, the class character of a particular society and so on. And this reminds us of how much we lose if we abandon the superstructural emphasis altogether. Thus I have great difficulty in seeing processes of art and thought as superstructural in the sense of the formula as it is commonly used. But in many areas of social and political thought -- certain kinds of ratifying theory, certain kinds of law, certain kinds of institution, which after all in Marx's original formulations were very much part of the superstructure -in all that kind of social apparatus, and in a decisive area of political and ideological activity and construction, if we fail to see a superstructural element we fail to recognize

reality at all. These laws, constitutions, theories, ideologies, which are so often claimed as natural, or as having universal validity or significance, simply have to be seen as expressing and ratifying the domination of a particular class. Indeed the difficulty of revising the formula of base and superstructure has had much to do with the perception of many militants—who have to fight such institutions and notions as well as fighting economic battles —that if these institutions and their ideologies are not perceived as having that kind of dependent and ratifying relationship. if their claims to universal validity or legitimacy are not denied and fought, then the class character of the society can no longer be seen. And this has been the effect of some versions of totality as the description of cultural process. Indeed I think we can properly use the notion of totality when we combine it with that other crucial Marxist concept of "hegemony".

The Complexity of Hegemony

It is Gramsci's great contribution to have emphasized hegemony[5], and also to have understood it at a depth which is, I think, rare. For hegemony supposes the existence of something which is truly total. which is not merely secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the substance and limit of common sense for most people under its sway, that it corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure. For if ideology were merely some abstract, imposed set of notions, if our social and political and cultural ideas and assumptions and habits were merely the result of specific manipulation, of a kind of overt training which might be simply ended or withdrawn, then the society would be very much easier to move and to change than in practice it has ever been or is. This notion of hegemony as deeply saturating the consciousness of a society seems to me to be fundamental. And hegemony has the advantage over general notions of totality, that it at the

same time emphasizes the facts of domination.

Yet there are times when I hear discussions of hegemony and feel that it too, as a concept, is being dragged back to the relatively simple, uniform and static notion which "superstructure" in ordinary use had become. Indeed I think that we have to give a very complex account of hegemony if we are talking about any real social formation. Above all we have to give an account which allows for its elements of real and constant change. We have to emphasize that hegemony is not singular; indeed that its own internal structures are highly complex, and have continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same token, that they can be continually challenged and in certain respects modified. That is why instead of speaking simply of "the hegemony", "a hegemony", I would propose a model which allows for this kind of variation and contradiction, its sets of alternatives and its processes of change.

For one thing that is evident in some of the best Marxist cultural analysis is that it is very much more at home in what one might call *epochal* questions than in what one has to call *historical* questions. That is to say, it is usually very much better at distinguishing the large features of different epochs of society, as commonly between feudal and bourgeois, than at distinguishing between different phases of bourgeois society, and different moments within these phases; that true historical process which demands a much greater precision and delicacy of analysis than the always striking epochal analysis which is concerned with main lineaments and features.

The theoretical model which I have been trying to work with is this. I would say first that in any society, in any particular period, there is a central system of practices, meanings and values, which we can properly call dominant and effective. This implies no presumption about its value. All I am saying is that it is central. Indeed I would call it a corporate system, but this might be confusing, since Gramsci uses "corporate" to mean the subordinate as opposed to the general and dominant elements of hegemony. In any case what I have in mind is the central, effective and dominant system of meanings and values, which are

not merely abstract but which are organized and lived. That is why hegemony is not to be understood at the level of mere opinion or mere manipulation. It is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary understanding of the nature of man and of his world. It is a set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives. But this is not, except in the operation of a moment of abstract analysis, in any sense a static system. On the contrary we can only understand an effective and dominant culture if we understand the real social process on which it depends: I mean the process of incorporation. The modes of incorporation are of great social significance. The educational institutions are usually the main agencies of the transmission of an effective dominant culture, and this is now a major economic as well as a cultural activity; indeed it is both in the same moment. Moreover, at a philosophical level, at the true level of theory and at the level of the history of various practices, there is a process which I call the *selective tradition*: that which, within the terms of an effective dominant culture, is always passed off as "*the* tradition", "*the* significant past". But always the selectivity is the point; the way in which from a whole possible area of past and present, certain meanings and practices are chosen for emphasis, certain other meanings and practices are neglected and excluded. Even more crucially, some of these meanings and practices are reinterpreted, diluted, or put into forms which support or at least do not contradict other elements within the effective dominant culture. The processes of education; the processes of a much wider social training within institutions like the family; the practical definitions and organization of work; the selective tradition at an intellectual and theoretical level: all these forces are involved in a continual making and remaking of an effective dominant culture, and on them, as experienced, as built into our living, its reality depends. If what we learn there were merely an imposed ideology, or if it were only the isolable meanings and

practices of the ruling class, or of a section of the ruling class, which gets imposed on others, occupying merely the top of our minds, it would be - and one would be glad—a very much easier thing to overthrow.

It is not only the depths to which this process reaches, selecting and organizing and interpreting our experience. It is also that it is continually active and adjusting; it isn't just the past, the dry husks of ideology which we can more easily discard. And this can only be so, in a complex society, if it is something more substantial and more flexible than any abstract imposed ideology. Thus we have to recognize the alternative meanings and values, the alternative opinions and attitudes, even some alternative senses of the world, which can be accommodated and tolerated within a particular effective and dominant culture. This has been much underemphasized in our notions of a superstructure, and even in some notions of hegemony. And the underemphasis opens the way for retreat to an indifferent complexity. In the practice of politics, for example, there are certain truly incorporated modes of what are nevertheless, within those terms, real oppositions, that are felt and fought out. Their existence within the incorporation is recognizable by the fact that, whatever the degree of internal conflict or internal variation, they do not in practice go beyond the limits of the central effective and dominant definitions. This is true, for example, of the practice of parliamentary politics, though its internal oppositions are real. It is true about a whole range of practices and arguments, in any real society, which can by no means be reduced to an ideological cover, but which can nevertheless be properly analysed as in my sense corporate, if we find that, whatever the degree of internal controversy and variation, they do not in the end exceed the limits of the central corporate definitions.

But if we are to say this, we have to think again about the sources of that which is not corporate; of those practices, experiences, meanings, values which are not part of the effective dominant culture. We can express this in two ways. There is clearly something that we can call alternative to the effective dominant culture, and there is something

else that we can call oppositional, in a true sense. The degree of existence of these alternative and oppositional forms is itself a matter of constant historical variation in real circumstances. In certain societies it is possible to find areas of social life in which quite real alternatives are at least left alone. (If they are made available, of course, they are part of the corporate organization.) The existence of the possibility of opposition, and of its articulation, its degree of openness, and so on, again depends on very precise social and political forces. The facts of alternative and oppositional forms of social life and culture, in relation to the effective and dominant culture, have then to be recognized as subject to historical variation, and as having sources which are very significant as a fact about the dominant culture itself.

Residual and Emergent Cultures

I have next to introduce a further distinction, between *residual* and *emergent* forms, both of alternative and of oppositional culture. By "residual" I mean that some experiences, meanings and values, which cannot be verified or cannot be expressed in terms of the dominant culture, are nevertheless lived and practised on the basis of the residue — cultural as well as social of some previous social formation. There is a real case of this in certain religious values, by contrast with the very evident incorporation of most religious meanings and values into the dominant system. The same is true, in a culture like Britain, of certain notions derived from a rural past, which have a very significant popularity. A residual culture is usually at some distance from the effective dominant culture, but one has to recognize that, in real cultural activities, it may get incorporated into it. This is because some part of it, some version of it and especially if the residue is from some major area of the past will in many cases have had to be incorporated if the effective dominant culture is to make sense in those areas. It is also because at certain points a dominant culture cannot allow too much of this kind of practice and experience outside itself, at least without risk. Thus the pressures are real, but certain genuinely residual meanings

and practices in some important cases survive.

By "emergent" I mean, first, that new meanings and values, new practices, new significances and experiences, are continually being created. But there is then a much earlier attempt to incorporate them, just because they are part—and yet not a defined part—of effective contemporary practice. Indeed it is significant in our own period how very early this attempt is, how alert the dominant culture now is to anything that can be seen as emergent. We have then to see, first, as it were a temporal relation between a dominant culture and on the one hand a residual and on the other hand an emergent culture. But we can only understand this if we can make distinctions, that usually require very precise analysis, between residual-incorporated and residual not incorporated, and between emergent-incorporated and emergent not incorporated. It is an important fact about any particular society, how far it reaches into the whole range of human practices and experiences in an attempt at incorporation. It may be true of some earlier phases of bourgeois society, for example, that there were some areas of experience which it was willing to dispense with, which it was prepared to assign as the sphere of private or artistic life, and as being no particular business of society or the state. This went along with certain kinds of political tolerance, even if the reality of that tolerance was malign neglect. But I am sure it is true of the society that has come into existence since the last war, that progressively, because of developments in the social character of labor, in the social character of communications, and in the social character of decision, it extends much further than ever before in capitalist society into certain hitherto resigned areas of experience and practice and meaning. Thus the effective decision, as to whether a practice is alternative or oppositional, is often now made within a very much narrower scope. There is a simple theoretical distinction between alternative and oppositional, that is to say between someone who simply finds a different way to live and wishes to be left alone with it, and someone who finds a different way to live and wants to change the society in its light. This is usually the difference between individual and small group solutions to social crisis and those solutions which properly

belong to political and ultimately revolutionary practice. But it is often a very narrow line, in reality, between alternative and oppositional. A meaning or a practice may be tolerated as a deviation, and yet still be seen only as another particular way to live. But as the necessary area of effective dominance extends, the same meanings and practices can be seen by the dominant culture, not merely as disregarding or despising it, but as challenging it.

Now it is crucial to any Marxist theory of culture that it can give an adequate explanation of the sources of these practices and meanings. We can understand, from an ordinary historical approach, at least some of the sources of residual meanings and practices. These are the results of earlier social formations, in which certain real meanings and values were generated. In the subsequent default of a particular phase of a dominant culture, there is then a reaching back to those meanings and values which were created in real societies in the past, and which still seem to have some significance because they represent areas of human experience, aspiration and achievement, which the dominant culture undervalues or opposes, or even cannot recognize. But our hardest task, theoretically, is to find a non-metaphysical and non-subjectivist explanation of emergent cultural practice. Moreover, part of our answer to this question bears on the process of persistence of residual practices.

Class and Human Practice

We have indeed one source to hand from the central body of Marxist theory. We have the formation of a new class, the coming to consciousness of a new class. This remains, without doubt, quite centrally important. Of course, in itself, this process of formation complicates any simple model of base and superstructure. It also complicates some of the ordinary versions of hegemony, although it was Gramsci's whole purpose to see and to create by organization that hegemony of a proletarian kind which would be capable of challenging the bourgeois hegemony. We have then one central source of new practice, in the

emergence of a new class. But we have also to recognize certain other kinds of source, and in cultural practice some of these are very important. I would say that we can recognize them on the basis of this proposition: that no mode of production, and therefore no dominant society or order of society, and therefore no dominant culture, in reality exhausts the full range of human practice, human energy, human intention...

Now if we go back to the cultural question in its most usual form What are the relations between art and society, or literature and society?—In the light of the preceding discussion, we have to say first that there are no relations between literature and society in that abstracted way. The literature is there from the beginning as a practice in the society. Indeed until it and all other practices are present, the society cannot be seen as fully formed. A society is not fully available for analysis until each of its practices is included. But if we make that emphasis we must make a corresponding emphasis: that we cannot separate literature and art from other kinds of social practice, in such a way as to make them subject to quite special and distinct laws. They may have quite specific features as practices, but they cannot be separated from the general social process. Indeed one way of emphasizing this is to say, to insist, that literature is not restricted to operating in any one of the sectors I have been seeking to describe in this model. It would be easy to say, it is a familiar rhetoric, that literature operates in the emergent cultural sector, that it represents the new feelings, the new meanings, the new values. We might persuade ourselves of this theoretically, by abstract argument, but when we read much literature, over the whole range, without the sleight-of-hand of calling literature only that which we have already selected as embodying certain meanings and values at a certain scale of intensity, we are bound to recognize that the act of writing, the practices of discourse in writing and speech, the making of novels and poems and plays and theories, all this activity takes place in all areas of the culture.

Literature appears by no means only in the emergent sector, which is always, in fact, quite rare. A great deal of writing is of a residual

kind, and this has been deeply true of much English literature in the last half-century. Some of its fundamental meanings and values have belonged to the cultural achievements of long-past stages of society. So widespread is this fact, and the habits of mind it supports, that in many minds "literature" and "the past" acquire a certain identity, and it is then said that there is now no literature: all that glory is over. Yet most writing, in any period, including our own, is a form of contribution to the effective dominant culture. Indeed many of the specific qualities of literature—its capacity to embody and enact and perform certain meanings and values, or to create in single particular ways what would be otherwise merely general truths—enable it to fulfill this effective function with great power. To literature, of course, we must add the visual arts and music, and in our own society the powerful arts of film and of broadcasting. But the general theoretical point should be clear. If we are looking for the relations between literature and society, we cannot either separate out this one practice from a formed body of other practices, nor when we have identified a particular practice can we give it a uniform, static and ahistorical relation to some abstract social formation. The arts of writing and the arts of creation and performance, over their whole range, are parts of the cultural process in all the different ways, the different sectors, that I have been seeking to describe. They contribute to the effective dominant culture and are a central articulation of it. They embody residual meanings and values, not all of which are incorporated, though many are. They express also and significantly some emergent practices and meanings, yet some of these may eventually be incorporated, as they reach people and begin to move them. Thus it was very evident in the sixties, in some of the emergent arts of performance, that the dominant culture reached out to transform, or seek to transform, them. In this process, of course, the dominant culture itself changes, not in its central formation, but in many of its articulated features. But then in a modern society it must always change in this way, if it is to remain dominant, if it is still to be felt as in real ways central in all our many activities and interests.

Critical Theory as Consumption

What then are the implications of this general analysis for the analysis of particular works of art? This is the question towards which most discussion of cultural theory seems to be directed: the discovery of a method, perhaps even a methodology, through which particular works of art can be understood and described. I would not myself agree that this is the central use of cultural theory, but let us for a moment consider it. What seems to me very striking is that nearly all forms of contemporary critical theory are theories of *consumption*. That is to say, they are concerned with understanding an object in such a way that it can profitably or correctly be consumed. The earliest stage of consumption theory was the theory of "taste", where the link between the practice and the theory was direct in the metaphor. From taste there came the more elevated notion of "sensibility", in which it was the consumption by sensibility of elevated or insightful works that was held to be the essential practice of reading, and critical activity was then a function of this sensibility. There were then more developed theories, in the 1920s with I. A. Richards, and later in New Criticism, in which the effects of consumption were studied directly. The language of the work of art as object then became more overt. "What effect does this work ('the poem' as it was ordinarily described) have on me?" Or, "What impact does it have on me?" as it was later to be put in a much wider area of communication studies. Naturally enough, the notion of the work of art as *object*, as *text*, as an isolated artifact, became central in all these later consumption theories. It was not only that the practices of *production* were then overlooked, though this fused with the notion that most important literature anyway was from the past. The real social conditions of production were in any case neglected because they were believed to be at best secondary. The true relationship was seen always as between the taste, the sensibility or the training of the reader and this isolated work, this object "as in itself it really is", as most people came to put it. But the notion of the work of art as

object had a further large theoretical effect. If you ask questions about the work of art seen as object, they may include questions about the components of its production. Now, as it happened, there was a use of the formula of base and superstructure which was precisely in line with this. The components of a work of art were the real activities of the base, and you could study the object to discover these components. Sometimes you even studied the components and then projected the object. But in any case the relationship that was looked for was one between an object and its components. But this was not only true of Marxist suppositions of a base and a superstructure. It was true also of various kinds of psychological theory, whether in the form of archetypes, or the images of the collective unconscious, or the myths and symbols which were seen as the *components* of particular works of art. Or again there was biography, or psychobiography and its like, where the components were in the man's life and the work of art was an object in which components of this kind were discovered. Even in some of the more rigorous forms of New Criticism and of structuralist criticism, this essential procedure of regarding the work as an object which has to be reduced to its components, even if later it may be reconstituted, came to persist.

Objects and Practices

Now I think the true crisis in cultural theory, in our own time, is between this view of the work of art as object and the alternative view of art as a practice. Of course it is at once argued that the work of art *is* an object: that various works have survived from the past, particular sculptures, particular paintings, particular buildings, and these are objects. This is of course true, but the same way of thinking is applied to works which have no such singular existence. There is no *Hamlet*, no *Brothers Karamazov*[6], no *Wuthering Heights*, in the sense that there is a particular great painting. There is no *Fifth Symphony*[7], there is no work in the whole area of music and dance and performance, which is an object in any way comparable to those works in the visual arts

which have survived. And yet the habit of treating all such works as objects has persisted because this is a basic theoretical and practical presupposition. But in literature (especially in drama), in music and in a very wide area of the performing arts, what we permanently have are not objects but *notations*[8]. These notations have then to be interpreted in an active way, according to the particular conventions[9]. But indeed this is true over an even wider field. The relationship between the making of a work of art and its reception is always active, and subject to conventions, which in themselves are forms of (changing) social organization and relationship. and this is radically different from the production and consumption of an object. It is indeed an activity and a practice, and in its accessible forms, although it may in some arts have the character of a singular object. it is still only accessible through active perception and interpretation. This makes the case of notation, in arts like drama and literature and music, only a special case of a much wider truth. What this can show us here about the practice of analysis is that we have to break from the common procedure of isolating the object and then discovering its components. On the contrary we have to discover the nature of a practice and then its conditions.

Often these two procedures may in part resemble each other, but in many other cases they are of radically different kinds, and I would conclude with an observation on the way this distinction bears on the Marxist tradition of the relation between primary economic and social practices, and cultural practices. If we suppose that what is produced in cultural practice is a series of objects, we shall, as in most current forms of sociological-critical procedure, set about discovering their components. Within a Marxist emphasis these components will be from what we have been in the habit of calling the base. We then isolate certain features which we can so to say recognize in component form. or we ask what processes of transformation or mediation these components have gone through before they arrived in this accessible state.

But I am saying that we should look not for the components of a product but for the conditions of a practice. When we find ourselves looking at a particular work. or group of works, often realizing, as we

do so, their essential community as well as their irreducible individuality, we should find ourselves attending first to the reality of their practice and the conditions of the practice as it was then executed. And from this I think we ask essentially different questions. Take for example the way in which an object "a text" -is related to a genre, in orthodox criticism. We identify it by certain leading features, we then assign it to a larger category, the genre, and then we may find the components of the genre in a particular social history (although in some variants of criticism not even that is done, and the genre is supposed to be some permanent category of the mind).

It is not that way of proceeding that is now required. The recognition of the relation of a collective mode and an individual project—and these are the only categories that we can initially presume -is a recognition of related practices. That is to say, the irreducibly individual projects that particular works are, may come in experience and in analysis to show resemblances which allow us to group them into collective modes. These are by no means always genres. They may exist as resemblances within and across genres. They may be the practice of a group in a period, rather than the practice of a phase in a genre. But as we discover the nature of a particular practice, and the nature of the relation between an individual project and a collective mode, we find that we are analysing, as two forms of the same process, both its active composition and its conditions of composition, and in either direction this is a complex of extending active relationships. This means, of course, that we have no built-in procedures of the kind which is indicated by the fixed character of an object. We have the principles of the relations of practices, within a discoverably intentional organization, and we have the available hypotheses of dominant, residual and emergent. But what we are actively seeking is the true practice which has been alienated to an object, and the true conditions of practice—whether as literary conventions or as social relationships- which have been alienated to components or to mere background.

As a general proposition this is only an emphasis, but it seems to me to suggest at once the point of break and the point of departure, in

practical and theoretical work, within an active and self-renewing Marxist cultural tradition.

注释:

1 威廉斯在《关键词》一书中曾写道,"决定"(determine)一词最初并没有内在控制或预示某一过程的含义,但是神学中上帝决定人类生存和命运之类的教义却很容易把"决定"(determination)和"命定"(predestination)混用,从而赋予"决定"这个词神学色彩较浓厚的、表示绝对限制的含义。

2 马克思在《资本论》第一卷中,把蜜蜂建造蜂房的本事与建筑师的设计能力进行对比,强调了人类的能动作用:"……在蜂房的建筑上,蜜蜂的本事会使许多以建筑为业的人感到惭愧。但即使是最拙劣的建筑师也比最巧妙的蜜蜂优越,因为建筑师在像蜜蜂般以蜂蜡筑蜂房以前,就已经在他的脑海中把它构成了。"

3 威廉斯本人认为"决定"有"设定限制"和"施加压力"这两层含义,他在主要论著《关键词》和《马克思主义与文学》中一再重申这一主张。

4 戈德曼倡导的发生学批评,主要挖掘作品所表现出的世界观与社会精神结构之间的同构关系。他在《小说社会学》一书中提出:"伟大的作家恰恰是这样一种特殊的个人,他在某个方面,即文学(或绘画、观念艺术、音乐等)作品里,成功地创造了一个一致的、几乎严密一致的想像世界,其结构与集团、整体所倾向的结构相适应。至于作品,它尤其是随着其结构远离或接近这种严密一致而显得更为平凡或更为重要。"也就是说,"作品越是表现这个社会阶级完整一贯的'世界观',它就越具有艺术生命力"。

5 意大利马克思主义者葛兰西在《狱中札记》里提出著名的霸权观念,描述了社会各阶级之间的支配和被支配关系,即统治阶级将于己有利的价值观和信仰普遍推广到全社会各个阶层之中的过程。霸权的实现依靠的不是强制性的暴力措施,而是社会上大多数人的认同,因此可以说霸权的实现是一个赢得价值共识的过程,颇似儒家的"王道"观念,"远人不服则修文德以来之",以顺乎人心、争取民意为最佳文化策略。霸权不仅存在于政治和经济制度之中,而且以经验和意识的形式存在于社会思想之中,是捍卫统治阶级利益的坚固堡垒。葛兰西的霸权观念给威廉斯很大启发。

6 *Brothers Karamazov*:《卡玛佐夫兄弟》,陀斯妥耶夫斯基的名著。

7 *Fifth Symphony*:《第五交响乐》,贝多芬的名曲。

8 *notations*:标记,威廉斯的《马克思主义与文学》用了很大的篇幅探讨这个问题。他认为,"典型的文学形式是用于阅读的书写标记"。

9 convention:成规。按照威廉斯的理解,所谓文学的成规就是文学内部的规则。这种成规不是一成不变的,而是随着社会和时代的变化而变化。

狄克·赫布迪:从文化到霸权

From Culture to Hegemony

Dick Hebdige

Culture

> Culture: cultivation, tending, in Christian authors, worship; the action or practice of cultivating the soil; tillage, husbandry; the cultivation or rearing of certain animals (e. g. fish); the artificial development of microscopic organisms, organisms so produced; the cultivating or development (of the mind, faculties, manners), improvement or refinement by education and training; the condition of being trained or refined; the intellectual side of civilization; the prosecution or special attention or study of any subject or pursuit. (*Oxford English Dictionary*)

Culture is a notoriously ambiguous concept as the above definition demonstrates.[1] Refracted through centuries of usage, the word has acquired a number of quite different, often contradictory, meanings. Even as a scientific term, it refers both to a process (artificial development of microscopic organisms) and a product (organisms so produced). More specifically, since the end of the eighteenth century, it has been used by English intellectuals and literary figures to focus critical attention on a whole range of controversial issues. The "quality of life", the effects in human terms of mechanization, the division of labor and the creation of a mass society have all been discussed within the larger confines of what Raymond Williams has called the "Culture and Society" debate. It was through this tradition of dissent and criticism that the dream of the "organic society" —of society as an integrated, meaningful whole—was largely kept alive. The dream had two basic

trajectories. One led back to the past and to the feudal ideal of a hierarchically ordered community. Here, culture assumed an almost sacred function. Its "harmonious perfection" was posited against the Wasteland of contemporary life.

The other trajectory, less heavily supported, led towards the future, to a socialist Utopia where the distinction between labor and leisure was to be annulled. Two basic definitions of culture emerged from this tradition, though these were by no means necessarily congruent with the two trajectories outlined above. The first—the one which is probably most familiar to the reader—was essentially classical and conservative. It represented culture as a standard of aesthetic excellence: "the best that has been thought and said in the world"[2], and it derived from an appreciation of "classic" aesthetic form (opera, ballet, drama, literature, art). The second, traced back by Williams to Herder and the eighteenth century, was rooted in anthropology. Here the term "culture" referred to a

> ... particular way of life which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning, but also in institutions and ordinary behavior. The analysis of culture, from such a definition, is the clarification of the meanings and values implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture.[4]

This definition obviously had a much broader range. It encompassed, in T. S. Eliot's words:

> ... all the characteristic activities and interests of a people. Derby Day, Henley Regatta, Cowes, the 12th of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the dartboard, Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, 19th century Gothic churches, the music of Elgar...[1]

As Williams noted, such a definition could only be supported if a new theoretical initiative was taken. The theory of culture now

involved the "study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life". The emphasis shifted from immutable to historical criteria, from fixity to transformation:

> ... an emphasis [which] from studying particular meanings and values seeks not so much to compare these, as a way of establishing a scale, but by studying their modes of change to discover certain general causes or "trends" by which social and cultural developments as a whole can be better understood.

Williams was, then, proposing an altogether broader formulation of the relationships between culture and society, one which through the analysis of "particular meanings and values" sought to uncover the conceived fundamentals of history; the "general causes" and broad social "trends" which lie behind the manifest appearances of an "everyday life".

In the early years, when it was being established in the Universities, Cultural Studies sat rather uncomfortably on the fence between these two conflicting definitions—culture as a standard of excellence, culture as a "whole way of life" unable to determine which represented the most fruitful line of enquiry. Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams portrayed working-class culture sympathetically in wistful accounts of pre-scholarship boyhoods but their work displayed a strong bias towards literature and literacy and an equally strong moral tone. Hoggart deplored the way in which the traditional working-class community—a community of tried and tested values despite the dour landscape in which it had been set—was being undermined and replaced by a "Candy Floss World" of thrills and cheap fiction which was somehow bland *and* sleazy. Williams tentatively endorsed the new mass communications but was concerned to establish aesthetic and moral criteria for distinguishing the worthwhile products from the "trash"; the jazz —"a real musical form" —and the football - "a wonderful game"—from the "rape novel, the Sunday strip paper and the latest Tin Pan drool". In 1966 Hoggart laid down the basic premises upon which Cultural Studies

were based:

> First, without appreciating good literature, no one will really understand the nature of society, second, literary critical analysis can be applied to certain social phenomena other than "academically respectable" literature (for example, the popular arts, mass communications) so as to illuminate their meanings for individuals and their societies.[5]

The implicit assumption that it still required a literary sensibility to "read" society with the requisite subtlety, and that the two ideas of culture could be ultimately reconciled was also, paradoxically, to inform the early work of the French writer, Roland Barthes, though here it found validation in a method- semiotics-- a way of reading signs.

Barthes: Myths and Signs

Using models derived from the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure Barthes sought to expose the *arbitrary* nature of cultural phenomena, to uncover the latent meanings of an everyday life which, to all intents and purposes, was "perfectly natural". Unlike Hoggart, Barthes was not concerned with distinguishing the good from the bad in modern mass culture, but rather with showing how *all* the apparently spontaneous forms and rituals of contemporary bourgeois societies are subject to a systematic distortion, liable at any moment to be dehistoricized, "naturalized", converted into myth:

> The whole of France is steeped in this anonymous ideology: our press, our films, our theatre, our pulp literature, our rituals, our Justice, our diplomacy, our conversations, our remarks about the weather. a murder trial, a touching wedding, the cooking we dream of, the garments we wear, everything in everyday life is dependent on the representation which the bourgeoisie *has and makes us have* of the relations between men and the world.[6]

Like Eliot, Barthes's notion of culture extends beyond the library, the opera-house and the theatre to encompass the whole of everyday life. But this everyday life is for Barthes overlaid with a significance which is at once more insidious and more systematically organized. Starting from the premise that "myth is a type of speech", Barthes set out in *Mythologies* to examine the normally hidden set of rules, codes and conventions through which meanings particular to specific social groups (i. e. those in power) are rendered universal and "given" for the whole of society. He found in phenomena as disparate as a wrestling match, a writer on holiday, a tourist guide-book, the same artificial nature, the same ideological core. Each had been exposed to the same prevailing rhetoric (the rhetoric of common sense) and turned into myth, into a mere element in a "second-order semiological system". (Barthes uses the example of a photograph in *Paris-Match*[7] of a Negro soldier saluting the French flag, which has a first and second order connotation: (1) a gesture of loyalty, but also (2) "France is a great empire, and all her sons, without color discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag".)

Barthes's application of a method rooted in linguistics to other systems of discourse outside language (fashion, film, food, etc.) opened up completely new possibilities for contemporary cultural studies. It was hoped that the invisible seam between language, experience and reality could be located and prised open through a semiotic analysis of this kind; that the gulf between the alienated intellectual and the "real" world could be rendered meaningful and, miraculously, at the same time, be made to disappear. Moreover, under Barthes's direction, semiotics promised nothing less than the reconciliation of the two conflicting definitions of culture upon which Cultural Studies was so ambiguously posited a marriage of moral conviction (in this case, Barthes's Marxist beliefs) and popular themes; the study of a society's total way of life.

This is not to say that semiotics was easily assimilable within the Cultrual Studies project. Though Barthes shared the literary preoccupations of Hoggart and Williams, his work introduced a new Marxist

"problematic" which was alien to the British tradition of concerned and largely untheorized "social commentary". As a result, the old debate seemed suddenly limited. In E. P. Thompson's words it appeared to reflect the parochial concerns of a group of "gentlemen amateurs". Thompson sought to replace Williams's definition of the theory of culture as "a theory of relations between elements in a whole way of life" with his own more rigorously Marxist formulation: "the study of relationships in a whole way of *conflict*".[8] A more analytical framework was required; a new vocabulary had to be learned. As part of this process of theorization, the work "ideology" came to acquire a much wider range of meanings than had previously been the case. We have seen how Barthes found an "anonymous ideology" penetrating every possible level of social life, inscribed in the most mundane of rituals, framing the most casual social encounters. But how can ideology be "anonymous", and how can it assume such a broad significance? Before we attempt any reading of subcultural style, we must first define the term "ideology" more precisely.

Ideology: a *Lived* Relation

In the *German Ideology*, Marx shows how the basis of the capitalist economic structure (surplus value, neatly defined by Godelier as "Profit...is unpaid work") is hidden from the consciousness of the agents of production. The failure to see through appearances to the real relations which underlie them does not occur as the direct result of some kind of masking operation consciously carried out by individuals, social groups or institutions. On the contrary, ideology by definition thrives *beneath* consciousness. It is here, at the level of "normal common sense", that ideological frames of reference are most firmly sedimented and most effective, because it is here that their ideological nature is most effectively concealed. As Stuart Hall[9] puts it:

> It is precisely its "spontaneous" quality, its transparency, its "naturalness", its refusal to be made to examine the premises on

> which it is founded, its resistance to change or to correction, its effect of instant recognition, and the closed circle in which it moves which makes common sense, at one and the same time, "spontaneous", ideological and *unconscious*. You cannot learn, through common sense, *how things are*: you can only discover *where they fit* into the existing scheme of things. In this way, its very taken-for-grantedness is what establishes it as a medium in which its own premises and presuppositions are being rendered *invisible* by its apparent transparency.

Since ideology saturates everyday discourse in the form of common sense, it cannot be bracketed off from everyday life as a self-contained set of "political opinions" or "biased views". Neither can it be reduced to the abstract dimensions of a "world view" or used in the crude Marxist sense to designate "false consciousness". Instead, as Louis Althusser has pointed out:

> ... ideology has very little to do with "consciousness"... It is profoundly *unconscious*... Ideology is indeed a system of representation, but in the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with "consciousness": they are usually images and occasionally concepts, but it is above all as *structures* that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their "consciousness". They are perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects and they act functionally on men via a process that escapes them.[10]

Although Althusser is here referring to structures like the family, cultural and political institutions, etc., we can illustrate the point quite simply by taking as our example a physical structure. Most modern institutes of education, despite the apparent neutrality of the materials from which they are constructed (red brick, white tile, etc.) carry within themselves implicit ideological assumptions which are literally structured into the architecture itself. The categorization of knowledge into arts and sciences is reproduced in the faculty system which houses

different disciplines in different buildings, and most colleges maintain the traditional divisions by devoting a separate floor to each subject. Moreover, the hierarchical relationship between teacher and taught is inscribed in the very layout of the lecture theatre where the seating arrangements—benches rising in tiers before a raised lectern—dictate the flow of information and serve to "naturalize" professorial authority. Thus, a whole range of decisions about what is and what is not possible within education have been made, however unconsciously, before the content of individual courses is even decided.

These decisions help to set the limits not only on what is taught but on *how* it is taught. Here the buildings literally *reproduce* in concrete terms prevailing (ideological) notions about what education *is* and it is through this process that the educational structure, which can, of course, be altered, is placed beyond question and appears to us as a "given" (i. e. as immutable). In this case, the frames of our thinking have been translated into actual bricks and mortar.

Social relations and processes are then appropriated by individuals only through the forms in which they are represented to those individuals. These forms are, as we have seen, by no means transparent. They are shrouded in a "common sense" which simultaneously validates and mystifies them. It is precisely these "perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects" which semiotics sets out to "interrogate" and decipher. All aspects of culture possess a semiotic value, and the most taken-for-granted phenomena can function as signs: as elements in communication systems governed by semantic rules and codes which are not themselves directly apprehended in experience. These signs are, then, as opaque as the social relations which produce them and which they represent. In other words, there is an ideological dimension to every signification.

To uncover the ideological dimension of signs we must first try to disentangle the codes through which meaning is organized. "Connotative" codes are particularly important. As Stuart Hall has argued, they "cover the face of social life and render it classifiable, intelligible, meaningful". He goes on to describe these codes as "maps of meaning" which are of necessity the product of selection. They cut across a range

of potential meanings, making certain meanings available and ruling others out of court. We tend to live inside these maps as surely as we live in the "real" world: they "think" us as much as we "think" them, and this in itself is quite "natural". All human societies *reproduce* themselves in this way through a process of "naturalization". It is through this process—a kind of inevitable reflex of all social life that *particular* sets of social relations, *particular* ways of organizing the world appear to us as if they were universal and timeless. This is what Althusser means when he says that "ideology has no history" and that ideology in this general sense will always be an "essential element of every social formation".

However, in highly complex societies like ours, which function through a finely graded system of divided (i. e. specialized) labor, the crucial question has to do with which specific ideologies, representing the interests of which specific groups and classes will prevail at any given moment, in any given situation. To deal with this question, we must first consider how power is distributed in our society. That is, we must ask which groups and classes have how much say in defining, ordering and classifying out the social world. For instance, if we pause to reflect for a moment, it should be obvious that access to the means by which ideas are disseminated in our society (i. e. principally the mass media) is *not* the same for all classes. Some groups have more say, more opportunity to make the rules, to organize meaning, while others are less favorably placed, have less power to produce and impose their definitions of the world on the world.

Thus, when we come to look beneath the level of "ideology-in-general" at the way in which specific ideologies work, how some gain dominance and others remain marginal, we can see that in advanced Western democracies the ideological field is by no means neutral. To return to the "connotative" codes to which Stuart Hall refers we can see that these "maps of meaning" are charged with a potentially explosive significance because they are traced and re-traced along the lines laid down by the *dominant* discourses about reality, the *dominant* ideologies. They thus tend to represent, in however obscure and contradictory a

fashion, the interests of the *dominant* groups in society.

To understand this point we should refer to Marx:

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i. e. the class which is the ruling *material* force of society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling class, therefore the ideas of its dominance.

This is the basis of Antonio Gramsci's theory of *hegemony* which provides the most adequate account of how dominance is sustained in advanced capitalist societies.

Hegemony: the Moving Equilibrium

> Society cannot share a common communication system so long as it is split into warring classes.
>
> (Brecht, *A Short Organum for the Theatre*)

The term hegemony refers to a situation in which a provisional alliance of certain social groups can exert "total social authority" over other subordinate groups, not simply by coercion or by the direct imposition of ruling ideas, but by "winning and shaping consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and natural". Hegemony can only be maintained so long as the dominant classes "succeed in framing all competing definitions within their range", so that subordinate groups are, if not controlled, then at least contained within an ideological space which does not seem at all "ideological": which appears

instead to be permanent and "natural", to lie outside history, to be beyond particular interests.

This is how, according to Barthes, "mythology" performs its vital function of naturalization and normalization and it is in his book *Mythologies* that Barthes demonstrates most forcefully the full extension of these normalized forms and meanings. However, Gramsci adds the important proviso that hegemonic power, precisely *because* it requires the consent of the dominated majority, can never be permanently exercised by the same alliance of "class fractions". As has been pointed out, "Hegemony... is not universal and 'given' to the continuing rule of a particular class. It has to be won, reproduced, sustained. Hegemony is, as Gramsci said, a 'moving equilibrium' containing relations of forces favorable or unfavorable to this or that tendency."

In the same way, forms cannot be permanently normalized. They can always be deconstructed, demystified, by a "mythologist" like Barthes. Moreover commodities can be symbolically "repossessed" in everyday life, and endowed with implicitly oppositional meanings, by the very groups who originally produced them. The symbiosis in which ideology and social order, production and reproduction, are linked is then neither fixed nor guaranteed. It can be prised open. The consensus can be fractured, challenged, overruled, and resistance to the groups in dominance cannot always be lightly dismissed or automatically incorporated. Although, as Lefebvre[11] has written, we live in a society where "objects in practice become signs and signs objects and a second nature takes the place of the first—the initial layer of perceptible reality", there are, as he goes on to affirm, always "objections and contradictions which hinder the closing of the circuit" between sign and object, production and reproduction.

We can now return to the meaning of youth subcultures, for the emergence of such groups has signalled in a spectacular fashion the breakdown of consensus in the post-war period. It is precisely objections and contradictions of the kind which Lefebvre has described that find expression in subculture. However, the challenge to hegemony which subcultures represent is not issued directly by them. Rather it is

expressed obliquely, in style. The objections are lodged, the contradictions displayed (and "magically resolved") at the profoundly superficial level of appearances: that is, at the level of signs. For the signcommunity, the community of myth-consumers, is not a uniform body. As Volosinov[12] has written, it is cut through by class:

> Class does not coincide with the sign community, i. e. with the totality of users of the same set of signs of ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes the arena of the class struggle.

The struggle between different discourses, different definitions and meanings within ideology is therefore always, at the same time, a struggle within signification: a struggle for possession of the sign which extends to even the most mundane areas of everyday life. "Humble objects" can be magically appropriated; "stolen" by subordinate groups and made to carry "secret" meanings: meanings which express, in code, a form of resistance to the order which guarantees their continued subordination.

Style in subculture is, then, pregnant with significance. Its transformations go "against nature", interrupting the process of "normalization". As such, they are gestures, movements towards a speech which offends the "silent majority", which challenges the principle of unity and cohesion, which contradicts the myth of consensus. Our task becomes, like Barthes's, to discern the hidden messages inscribed in code on the glossy surfaces of style, to trace them out as "maps of meaning" which obscurely represent the very contradictions they are designed to resolve or conceal.

注释：

1 威廉斯认为，"文化"是英语中最复杂的两三个词之一。在《漫长的革命》中，他宽泛地归纳出文化的三种定义：首先是"理想式的"文化定义，文化是人类完善的一种状态或过程；其次是"文献式的"文化定义，文化是智性和想像作品的总和；最后

是文化的"社会"定义，文化是某种生活方式。文化研究中采用的是"文化"的第三种定义。

2 文中引用的是阿诺德的文化观念，阿诺德的文化思想集中体现在《文化与无政府》一书中。这部文化批评著作批判了资本主义工业文明，主张利用文化来匡正现代文明的弊病。

3 这是威廉斯在《文化与社会》(1958)中提出的文化定义和文化分析的任务。

4 这是艾略特在《略论文化的定义》中所罗列的文化的内容。艾略特把文化定义为某种生活方式，第一次把文化的内容扩大到文学和艺术的范围之外。这个定义给英国文化研究极大的启发。

5 早期的英国文化研究，尤其是在霍加特担任伯明翰大学当代文化研究中心主任期间，采用实用批评的文学研究方法来分析日常生活的诸种现象。

6 见巴特的《神话》。

7 *Paris-Match*：法国的一家杂志，《巴黎竞赛》杂志。巴特分析黑人青年敬礼的这篇文章的题目是"现代神话"，收在《神话》一书中。

8 汤普森在"评《漫长的革命》"一文中，批评威廉斯的文化定义忽略了日常生活中发生的阶级冲突，对此威廉斯在《政治与文学》中曾进行过辩解。

9 霍尔(Stuart Hall，1914 -)：战后继威廉斯、汤普森之后英国新一代新左派(the New New Left)中的代表人物，他在70年代受阿尔都塞理论的影响很大。在文化研究领域，这些新年代左派批评家逐渐摈弃了霍加特倡导的研究方法，转向结构主义。

10 引文出自阿尔都塞的名著《保卫马克思》。阿尔都塞将意识形态看成一个再现系统，认为它处于人的无意识心理之中。阿尔都塞从拉康的结构主义精神分析学那里得到过许多启示。

11 勒维弗尔(Henri Lefevre，1901—)：法国著名马克思主义哲学家，著有《辨证唯物主义》(1939)、《日常生活批判》(1946)、《现代世界的日常生活》(1968)等。

12 这里提到的沃洛希诺夫(Volosinov)，应更正为巴赫金(Mikhail Bakhtin，1895—1975)。由于政治原因，巴赫金的好几部著作都是以别人的名字出版的，其中包括这里引用的《马克思主义与语言哲学》(1929 1930)。直到60年代，他才开始以自己的名字发表作品。

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